Long-term memory for pictures and sentences

Two experiments were conducted to examine the fan effect in recognition memory for pictures and sentences. Subjects in the first experiment memorized sets of pictures (N= 13) or sentences (N=13) in which the study items comprised concept combinations (e.g., the clock is on the television) that could be unambiguously depicted in each modality. The fan effect, contrasting study items involving unique- and shared-concepts combinations, was observed in the recognition reaction time data for sentences but not for pictures. Subjects in the second experiment (N= 17) memorized sets of pictures and sentences in which, in addition to the unique and shared intramodality conditions used in Experiment 1, subjects memorized items in each modality that shared concepts with items in the alternative modality. Although the fan effect was reduced for sentences in the second experiment, the intramodality results were qualitatively comparable to those obtained in Experiment 1. The results in the intermodality conditions indicated that, although pictorial study items influenced reaction time to sentences with which they shared a concept, the reverse was not the case. The results were thought to be inconsistent with the view that pictures and sentences enjoy a common representational format in long-term memory.     

On the process of comparing sentences against pictures

The present study outlines a theory of how people compare sentences against pictures. This theory was tested in four experiments in which Ss were timed as they judged whether a sentence (e.g., Star isn't above plus) was true or false of a picture (e.g., ⁺_∗). The latencies in these tasks were consistent with the thesis that: (1) sentences are represented in terms of elementary propositions; (2) pictures are encoded in the same interpretive format; (3) these two codes are compared in an algorithmic series of mental operations, each of which contributes additively to the response latency; and (4) sentence encoding, picture encoding, comparing, and responding are four serially ordered stages, and their component latencies are additive. From these results, it was also possible to rule out certain explanations based on visual imagery, conversion (e.g., converting isn't above into is below), reading time, normative word frequencies, and other factors. Finally, it was shown that this theory is consistent with previous studies on sentence comprehension, sentence verification, concept verification, and other related phenomena.     

The process of verifying affirmative and negative sentences against pictures

Experiments 1 and 2 investigated sentence context effects on picture encoding in a sentence-picture verification and a picture naming task, respectively. The results showed that a picture following a sentence was encoded faster when the two were congruent than when they were incongruent. Experiment 3 compared two conditions: Under one condition, true affirmatives, false affirmatives, true negatives, and false negatives were mixed in each block of presentation. Under the other condition, different sentence types were presented in different blocks. The results showed (l) that errors committed in verification were largely negation errors, but seldom falsification errors, and (2) that there was a decrease of falsification time, but a resistance to change in negation time from the mixed to the blocked presentation. These results were interpreted to mean that falsification time results from a longer time to encode the picture and to confirm or disconfirm the truth index value by the polarity of the sentence in false affirmatives and true negatives than in true affirmatives and false negatives, whereas negation time and negation errors result from a response-suppression operation.     

Toddlers’ referential understanding of pictures

Pictures are referential in that they can represent objects in the real world. Here we explore the emergence of understanding of the referential potential of pictures during the second year of life. In Study 1, 15-, 18-, and 24-month-olds learned a word for a picture of a novel object (e.g., “blicket”) in the context of a picture book interaction. Later they were presented with the picture of a blicket along with the real object it depicted and asked to indicate the blicket. Many of the 24-, 18-, and even 15-month-olds indicated the real object as an instance of a blicket, consistent with an understanding of the referential relation between pictures and objects. In Study 2, children were tested with an exemplar object that differed in color from the depicted object to determine whether they would extend the label they had learned for the depicted object to a slightly different category member. The 15-, 18-, and 24-month-old participants failed to make a consistent referential response. The results are discussed in terms of whether pictorial understanding at this age is associative or symbolic.     

Pictures in sentences: understanding without words

To understand a sentence, the meanings of the words in the sentence must be retrieved and combined. Are these meanings represented within the language system (the lexical hypothesis) or are they represented in a general conceptual system that is not restricted to language (the conceptual hypothesis)? To evaluate these hypotheses, sentences were presented in which a pictured object replaced a word (rebus sentences). Previous research has shown that isolated pictures and words are processed equally rapidly in conceptual tasks, but that pictures are markedly slower than words in tasks requiring lexical access. The lexical hypothesis would therefore lead one to expect that rebus sentences will be relatively difficult, whereas the conceptual hypothesis would predict that rebus sentences would be rather easy. Sentences were shown using rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) at a rate of 10 or 12 words per second. With one set of materials (Experiments 1 and 2), readers took longer to judge the plausibility of rebus sentences than all-word sentences, although the accuracy of judgment and of recall were similar for the two formats. With two new sets of materials (Experiments 3 and 5), rebus and all-word sentences were virtually equivalent except in one circumstance: when a picture replaced the noun in a familiar phrase such as seedless grapes. In contrast, when the task required overt naming of the rebus picture in a sentence context, latency to name the picture was markedly longer than to name the corresponding word, and the appropriateness of the sentence context affected picture naming but not word naming (Experiment 4). The results fail to support theories that place word meanings in a specialized lexical entry. Instead, the results suggest that the lexical representation of a noun or familiar noun phrase provides a pointer to a nonlinguistic conceptual system, and it is in that system that the meaning of a sentence is constructed.     

Aphasic adults' understanding of complex adverbial sentences

Twelve aphasics with relatively preserved auditory comprehension were tested for their understanding of four adverbial sentence types expressing the temporal order of events. The relative effects of order of mention, adverbial choice, and adverbial clause placement on subjects' comprehension were investigated. Only adverbial choice was significant with aphasics producing more errors of temporal order on after than before sentences. Subjects' error patterns were not similar to those of children acquiring language. The results are discussed with respect to the theory of lexical marking and the regression hypothesis.     

Six-year-old children's understanding of sentences adjoined with time adverbs

The adjoining of clauses with temporal links is the basis for many sentences that convey sequence of events. The present study attempts to delineate 6-year-old children's (N=30) understanding of the meaning sequences imparted by sentences adjoined with after, before, and until. Their performance of the meaning sequence for each of 24 carefully constructed sentences is compared to an adult model. Analysis of the results (using a Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Signed Rank Test) indicated that: (1)Ss understood sentences adjoined with after according to an adult model more frequently than before adjoined sentences (P<0.01); (b) Until adjoined sentences with a negative marker in the main clause were understood according to an adult model more often than until adjoined sentences with no such negative element, but the difference was not significant at a=0.01; (3)Ss understood before adjoined sentences according to an adult model more often than until adjoined sentences, but the difference was not significant at a=0.01. In general, the results indicated that 6-year-olds have not yet completed development of an adult grammar with respect to adjoining clauses with temporal links, after, before, and until.     

Early understanding of the socially mediated representational function of pictures

The present two studies investigated whether toddlers’ ability to use pictures in problem solving could be facilitated by making available the social context in which pictures were created. To make this social context available, we introduced an Experimental treatment in which the creator was intentionally drawing different objects. In Experiment-1, due to this treatment, children performed better in the Test in which the Experimenter was drawing the Test-pictures of the retrieval task. In Experiment-2, after the same Experimental treatment the facilitative effect was replicated although the social context was removed in the Test phase by using pre-drawn Test-pictures without any drawing action in the retrieval task. The results suggest that a treatment which offers the opportunity to understand the socially mediated representational function of pictures enables children to perform better when contextualizing pictures in current reality. These two experiments revealed a novel way to facilitate children’s picture comprehension by identifying an underlying factor that can explain children’s difficulty in picture comprehension.     

Reasoning about conditional sentences: development of understanding of cues to quantification

The previous literature has reported that when children are asked to judge the truth or falsity of universally quantified conditional sentences of the form If a thing is P then it is Q they typically give responses, e.g., responding "true" whenever there is a case of P and Q even if there are also cases of P and not-Q. Three experiments are reported that address possible sources of this error. Experiment 1 shows that the error survives on sentences that refer to particular things as well as to things of a particular kind, and further shows that articulating the necessity of the consequent (... then it has to be Q) eliminates the error for adults and reduces it for fifth graders, although it does not affect second grade performance. Experiment 2 shows that for second and fifth graders the error survives to problems that are not universally quantified and for second graders to problems that are not conditionals although are otherwise structurally similar. Experiment 3 compares various verbal formulations of such universally quantified conditionals: Second and fifth graders do not make the error when the quantification is expressed with the surface structure that makes its universality most explicit (all things ...); the error tendency is greatest when the indefinite article is used (if a thing ...); and formulations using any fall in between. We argue that such erroneous evaluations of universally quantified conditionals have more to do with the quantificational aspect than the conditional aspect of the problems; children interpret the indefinite article as existential, although they resist the error when the cue to universal quantification is completely clear. The error appears to result more from the surface-structure form of the stimuli than from an inability of children to appreciate the logic of universally quantified conditionals.     

Action sentences

I would like to thank Eddy Zemach, Jonathan Stavi, Julius Moravcsik and Dov Gabbay for some very good discussions on the logical form of action sentences. Also, I am indebted to an anonymous referee of Erkenntnis for some very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

Framing sentences

The sentence frames formed during language production are commonly and rather uncontroversially represented as hierarchical constituent structures. There is less accord about whether the frames are pure structural configurations or limnings of meaning. We examined these alternatives with a sentence priming paradigm in which the primes and targets shared phrase structures and event structures, or only phrase structures. The results of the first and second experiments indicated that event-structure changes had no impact on a reliable tendency to replicate the phrase structures of the primes within sentence targets. The last experiment showed that this tendency could not be attributed to metrical or to closed-class lexical similarities. The implication is that sentence frames are not identifiable with metrical or conceptual information, but are comparatively independent syntactic representations.     

Hybrid terms and sentences

In the paper we present completeness theorems for hybrid logics, discuss the problem of finite axiomatization and study term rewriting and unification for the variety of distributive lattices and the variety of groups of exponent 2.A financial assistance by the DFG is gratefully acknowledged.     

比喻性语言加工的脑机制

早期观点认为比喻性语言加工主要依赖右脑, 随着研究的深入, 右脑假说受到许多研究结果的挑战, 左脑参与比喻性语言的加工。同时, 左右脑语言区发挥各自不同的作用, 新的研究证实, 前额前部皮层同样参与比喻性语言的加工。比喻性语言的理解需要左右半球及前额皮层的共同激活, 同时对其加工还依赖左右半球的联合作用, 比喻性语言理解神经网络的建立需要新证据。     

Remembering complex sentences

Recall of complex sentences at two retention intervals was examined, using sentences which varied simultaneously in three ways, being either active or passive, of low or high Yngve depth, and predictable or unpredictable. Recall of any particular sentence was cued with either the logical subject, logical object, verb or adverbial phrase noun. In general, unpredictable sentences were recollected better than predictable ones, low Yngve depth sentences were recalled better than high Yngve depth ones, and passive sentences were retained better than active ones. The most effective cue was the object, followed in turn by the subject and the adverbial phrase noun, with the verb being least effective. Implications of these findings are discussed.