The structure of perceived qualities of situations

Situations can be seen as having attributes or qualities in much the same way as people have traits. The structure of people's perceptions of these situation qualities was explored. A comprehensive list of adjectives that might describe situations was generated, and people rated situations using samples of the words. Across several samples of words and participants and several analytic methods, four factors show up regularly (positivity, negativity, productivity, and ease of negotiation). In a second study, it was shown that these factors predict the way in which people freely sort situations. The conceptual nature of these factors and of situation qualities is discussed, with particular emphasis on how people's goals and perceived outcomes influence their perceptions of situations. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Primary qualities, secondary qualities and the truth about intention

In this paper I will argue that Crispin Wright’s defence of the claim that the truth about intention is judgement-dependent is unstable because it can serve also to establish that the truth about shape is judgement-dependent, thereby violating his constraint that in developing the distinction between judgement-independent and judgement-dependent subject matters we have to be driven by the assumption that colour and shape will fall on different sides of the divide.     

Sensory-perceptual qualities of images

Four experiments demonstrated that such sensory-perceptual features of objects as weight, color, and numerosity affect imaginal performance involving images of those objects. For example, imaginary transport times of objects increased with both the hypothetical weight of the imagined object and the distance traversed. The transport functions were steeper when a map of the terrain was imagined than when it was perceived, suggesting that imaginal performance of heft did not parallel more perceptually guided performance. Corresponding to the view that images activate noncanonical information from long-term memory, mental transport times were longer for maps of familiar terrains than for those of presumably unelaborated unfamiliar terrains. Further, the effects of imaginary color discriminations depended on the familiarity of the object being imagined. Images of customarily colored familiar objects were generated faster when projected onto a surface of the same color than when projected onto a surface of another color, whereas images constructed from unfamiliar targets were recognized more accurately when the target's color differed substantially from that of the ground than when it differed by a smaller amount. The results were predicted by a model that assumed that images may incorporate ancillary characteristics in addition to canonical information.     

Adaptation and cross-adaptation of the four gustatory qualities

On the basis of magnitude estimations of solutions of NaCl, quinine sulfate, sucrose, and HCl, a seven-step series of each compound was chosen. The concentration of each compound in the same ordinal position of the series was of approximately the same sensory magnitude. The middle concentration of each series was presented as an adapting stimulus, and the entire series was used to test the effects of 2 min of adaptation on magnitude estimations and quality reports. Both NaCl and sucrose adaptation markedly lowered magnitude estimations of test stimuli of the same compounds for concentrations lower than that of the adapting stimulus, but had little effect on higher concentrations. Cross-adaptation generally enhanced the magnitude estimations over those obtained in initial estimations. Neither adaptation nor cross-adaptation procedures produced quality changes.     

Making sense of powerful qualities

According to the powerful qualities view, properties are both powerful and qualitative. Indeed, on this view the powerfulness of a property is identical to its qualitativity. Proponents claim that this view provides an attractive alternative to both the view that properties are pure powers and the view that they are pure qualities. It remains unclear, however, whether the claimed identity between powerfulness and qualitativity can be made coherent in a way that allows the powerful qualities view to constitute this sort of alternative. I argue here that this can be done, given a particular conception of both the qualitativity and powerfulness of properties. On this conception, a property is qualitative just in the sense that its essence is fixed independently of any distinct properties, and it is powerful just if its essence grounds its dispositional role.

     

The acquisition of odour qualities

Odours can evoke a large range of qualities. Some of these qualities (e.g., sweetness) appear to be acquired through simultaneously experiencing odours mixed with tastes. Acquisition might also occur when two odours are experienced as a mixture. In this case mixture components might acquire each other's qualities. This was tested in two experiments. In the first, subjects repeatedly sniffed two odour mixtures (either AX, BY or AY, BX). Odours mixed with A acquired A's properties and were judged more similar to A than to B. Odours mixed with B were not clearly discriminable. The second experiment used a similar approach except that Odour B was replaced. Subjects now smelled either AX, CY or AY, CX. All components were discriminable. Odours mixed with A acquired A's properties and were judged more similar to A than to C. Although odours mixed with C did not acquire C's qualities due to a confusion of quality terms, odours previously mixed with C were judged as more similar to C than to A. Evidence of other quality exchanges were also obtained. These results suggest that pure odour qualities can be learnt and lend support to William James's (1890) notion of the acquired equivalence/distinctiveness of cues.     

Organized Crime and Preventive Justice

By comparison with the prevention of terrorism, the prevention of acts of organized crime might be thought easier to conceptualize precisely and less controversial to legislate against and police. This impression is correct up to a point, because it is possible to arrive at some general characteristics of organized crime, and because legislation against it is not obviously bedeviled by the risk of violating civil or political rights, as in the case of terrorism. But there is a significant residue of legal, moral and political difficulty: legislation against organized crime is hard to make effective; the harm of organized crime is not uniform, and so some preventive legislation seems too sweeping and potentially unjust. More fundamentally, the scale and rewards of organized crime are often dependent on mass public participation in markets for proscribed goods, which may point to a hidden public consensus in favour of some of what is criminalized. For all of these reasons, I argue that existing preventive policing and legislation against organized crime may be harder to justify than their counterparts in counter-terrorism, at least in the UK.