Primary qualities, secondary qualities and the truth about intention

In this paper I will argue that Crispin Wright’s defence of the claim that the truth about intention is judgement-dependent is unstable because it can serve also to establish that the truth about shape is judgement-dependent, thereby violating his constraint that in developing the distinction between judgement-independent and judgement-dependent subject matters we have to be driven by the assumption that colour and shape will fall on different sides of the divide.     

Sensory-perceptual qualities of images

Four experiments demonstrated that such sensory-perceptual features of objects as weight, color, and numerosity affect imaginal performance involving images of those objects. For example, imaginary transport times of objects increased with both the hypothetical weight of the imagined object and the distance traversed. The transport functions were steeper when a map of the terrain was imagined than when it was perceived, suggesting that imaginal performance of heft did not parallel more perceptually guided performance. Corresponding to the view that images activate noncanonical information from long-term memory, mental transport times were longer for maps of familiar terrains than for those of presumably unelaborated unfamiliar terrains. Further, the effects of imaginary color discriminations depended on the familiarity of the object being imagined. Images of customarily colored familiar objects were generated faster when projected onto a surface of the same color than when projected onto a surface of another color, whereas images constructed from unfamiliar targets were recognized more accurately when the target's color differed substantially from that of the ground than when it differed by a smaller amount. The results were predicted by a model that assumed that images may incorporate ancillary characteristics in addition to canonical information.     

Making sense of powerful qualities

According to the powerful qualities view, properties are both powerful and qualitative. Indeed, on this view the powerfulness of a property is identical to its qualitativity. Proponents claim that this view provides an attractive alternative to both the view that properties are pure powers and the view that they are pure qualities. It remains unclear, however, whether the claimed identity between powerfulness and qualitativity can be made coherent in a way that allows the powerful qualities view to constitute this sort of alternative. I argue here that this can be done, given a particular conception of both the qualitativity and powerfulness of properties. On this conception, a property is qualitative just in the sense that its essence is fixed independently of any distinct properties, and it is powerful just if its essence grounds its dispositional role.

     

The acquisition of odour qualities

Odours can evoke a large range of qualities. Some of these qualities (e.g., sweetness) appear to be acquired through simultaneously experiencing odours mixed with tastes. Acquisition might also occur when two odours are experienced as a mixture. In this case mixture components might acquire each other's qualities. This was tested in two experiments. In the first, subjects repeatedly sniffed two odour mixtures (either AX, BY or AY, BX). Odours mixed with A acquired A's properties and were judged more similar to A than to B. Odours mixed with B were not clearly discriminable. The second experiment used a similar approach except that Odour B was replaced. Subjects now smelled either AX, CY or AY, CX. All components were discriminable. Odours mixed with A acquired A's properties and were judged more similar to A than to C. Although odours mixed with C did not acquire C's qualities due to a confusion of quality terms, odours previously mixed with C were judged as more similar to C than to A. Evidence of other quality exchanges were also obtained. These results suggest that pure odour qualities can be learnt and lend support to William James's (1890) notion of the acquired equivalence/distinctiveness of cues.     

Adaptation and cross-adaptation of the four gustatory qualities

On the basis of magnitude estimations of solutions of NaCl, quinine sulfate, sucrose, and HCl, a seven-step series of each compound was chosen. The concentration of each compound in the same ordinal position of the series was of approximately the same sensory magnitude. The middle concentration of each series was presented as an adapting stimulus, and the entire series was used to test the effects of 2 min of adaptation on magnitude estimations and quality reports. Both NaCl and sucrose adaptation markedly lowered magnitude estimations of test stimuli of the same compounds for concentrations lower than that of the adapting stimulus, but had little effect on higher concentrations. Cross-adaptation generally enhanced the magnitude estimations over those obtained in initial estimations. Neither adaptation nor cross-adaptation procedures produced quality changes.     

Organized Crime and Preventive Justice

By comparison with the prevention of terrorism, the prevention of acts of organized crime might be thought easier to conceptualize precisely and less controversial to legislate against and police. This impression is correct up to a point, because it is possible to arrive at some general characteristics of organized crime, and because legislation against it is not obviously bedeviled by the risk of violating civil or political rights, as in the case of terrorism. But there is a significant residue of legal, moral and political difficulty: legislation against organized crime is hard to make effective; the harm of organized crime is not uniform, and so some preventive legislation seems too sweeping and potentially unjust. More fundamentally, the scale and rewards of organized crime are often dependent on mass public participation in markets for proscribed goods, which may point to a hidden public consensus in favour of some of what is criminalized. For all of these reasons, I argue that existing preventive policing and legislation against organized crime may be harder to justify than their counterparts in counter-terrorism, at least in the UK.     

Attitudinal qualities relating to the strength of the attitude-behavior relationship

A study was conducted to examine the relation between each of several attitudinal qualities and attitude-behavior consistency. Subjects' attitudes toward volunterring to participate in psychological research were assessed. The number of experiments in which each subject volunteered to participate was employed as the measure of behavior. Attitude-behavior consistency was significantly related to (1) the amount of direct experience upon which the subject's attitude was based (specifically, the number of experiments in which the subject had previously participated), (2) the degree of certainty with which the attitude was held, and (3) how well-defined the subject's attitude was, as measured by the width of his latitude of rejection. These three attitudinal qualities were significantly intercorrelated, suggesting that direct experience with an attitude object may produce an attitude that is both better defined and more confidently held than an attitude formed through more indirect means.     

Philosophical pictures and secondary qualities

The paper presents a novel account of nature and genesis of some philosophical problems, which vindicates a new approach to an arguably central and extensive class of such problems: The paper develops the Wittgensteinian notion of ‘philosophical pictures’ with the help of some notions adapted from metaphor research in cognitive linguistics and from work on unintentional analogical reasoning in cognitive psychology. The paper shows that adherence to such pictures systematically leads to the formulation of unwarranted claims, ill-motivated problems, and pointless theories. To do so, the paper proceeds from a case-study on a lastingly influential development in early modern philosophy: the adoption of the doctrine of secondary qualities, and its principal consequences. The findings motivate a new approach to an arguably extensive and important class of philosophical problems: to the problems we raise in the grip of philosophical pictures.     

Casinos and banking: Organized crime in the Bahamas

The symbiotic relationships among gambling casinos, offshore banks and professional criminals are complex. In numerous contemporary cases, professional criminals from the United States and elsewhere are known to utilize both casinos and financial institutions to launder money and to hide large amounts of illicitly acquired money. Long before recent revelations of such activities became known in the Caribbean and the U. S., developers in the Bahamas had started the process of bringing casinos and banks together to serve underworld interests. This paper traces the developments of that process and shows how American organized crime interests penetrated the Bahamas by using gambling and banking to gain a firm foothold.