不同目击者对儿童道德情绪判断与归因的影响

本研究考察不同权威目击者对儿童道德情绪判断与归因的影响。实验以90个7~8岁儿童为被试,采用3(行为情境)×3(目击权威类型)的组间设计,考察了不同权威目击者条件下儿童对不同行为者的道德情绪判断和归因。结果发现,目击权威的类型对儿童道德情绪判断与归因的影响在不同的行为情境条件下是不同的。成人权威目击条件下,儿童对亲社会行为者的道德情绪判断分数最高,即更多判断他们会感到高兴,对损人者的道德情绪判断分数最低,即更多判断他们会感到不高兴。而同龄权威和非权威目击条件下儿童对不同行为者的情绪判断分数不存在显著差异。不同权威目击条件下儿童对行为者的情绪归因存在显著差异,奖惩定向更多出现在成人权威目击条件。研究显示,成人权威对儿童道德情绪的培养具有重要意义,能够显著影响儿童的道德情绪判断与归因。     

Disgust,Harm, and Morality in Politics

This study experimentally tests a theoretical framework for moral judgment in politics, which integrates two research traditions, Domain‐Theory and Sentimentalism, to suggest that moral judgment is bidimensional, with one dimension pertaining to harm and the other to moral emotions. Two experiments demonstrate that priming harm associations and the moral emotion of disgust prior to a political issue facilitates moral conviction on the political issue as well as a harsher moral judgment compared to no‐prime and to nonmoral emotional and cognitive negative primes (sadness and damage to objects). In addition, harm cues and disgust, but not sadness or damage, interact with the preexisting attitude toward the political issue in affecting moral conviction.     

The relationship of moral judgment, self-awareness, and sex to complicance behavior

Sixty male and sixty female college students, representing three of Kohlberg's stages of moral judgment, were exposed to a complicance situation in which their personal count of a series of metronome clicks was contradicted by a unanimous group. Group differences were either one or two steps from veridical. For half of the subjects self-awareness was experimentally increased. The results indicated that subjects in moral judgment Stages 3 and 4 complied significantly more than Stage 5 subjects. The self-awareness manipulation produced a complex pattern of results in the form of a three way interaction with moral judgment and type of compliance. Finally, sex differences in compliance behavior were significant, with females complying more than males. The results were discussed in terms of a cognition-behavior relationship.     

God Versus Party: Competing Effects on Attitudes Concerning Criminal Punishment,National Security,and Military Service

We explore how images of God interact with political party to predict attitudes concerning the appropriate role of government in both criminal punishment and national security. Using the second wave of the Baylor Religion Survey (2007), we analyze the extent to which beliefs regarding God's moral judgment moderate the influence of party affiliation on opinions about the death penalty, fighting terrorism, punishing criminals, serving in the military, and U.S. involvement in the Iraq War. Specifically, we find that Democrats who believe in a judgmental God tend to support more conservative policies. In fact, attitudes converge such that the effects of party membership are erased if rival partisans both believe in a judgmental moral authority.     

Post-conventional moral reasoning and reputation

Kohlberg’s theory of moral development conceives conventional and post-conventional moral reasoning as consecutive levels in a developmental sequence. This claim was examined in terms of the relationship between preference for these two styles of reasoning on the one hand and moral identity as perceived by others (reputation) and as self-perceived and on the other. Participants (n = 172), in groups of four mutual acquaintances, provided ratings of one another’s standing, and estimates of their own standing and reputation, on four trait dimensions (moral responsibility, consideration for others, respect for authority, and political orientation). Post-conventional moral reasoning, assessed using the Defining Issues Test, was not significantly related either to reputation or to self-rating on any dimension except political orientation. Conventional reasoning was related to politics though in the opposite direction, but additionally to both self- and other-ratings of moral responsibility and to the corresponding ratings of respect for authority. Findings do not support the view that the conventional/post-conventional distinction in moral reasoning is a developmental difference. An alternative proposed is that these are independent domains of moral thought, related to quite different aspects of social behaviour and political attitudes.     

Predicting compliance behavior from moral judgment scales

Two experiments with college males examined the relationship between moral judgment and compliance in a modified Asch paradigm. In Experiment 1 moral judgment was assessed with the written form of Kohlberg's dilemmas. Stage of moral judgment interacted with type of compliance, with Stage 4 subjects showing a compromise response between their own perceptions and the responses of others. In Experiment 2 moral judgment was assessed with Rest's Defining Issues Test. Compliance was found to be negatively related to level of moral judgment. The relationship found between moral judgment and compliance in the two experiments was interpreted in terms of a trend away from external standards and toward internal standards with higher levels of moral judgment.     

Psychological Researches in Schizophrenic Language and Thought

Seventy-two five- to seven-year-old boys were exposed to televised adult models and were then administered tests of resistance to deviation (moral behavior), moral choice, and moral judgment level. Boys exposed to a model who said he would resist deviating from a prohibition and who supported his statement with a morally realistic justification were subsequently more likely to use that model's statements to guide their own moral behavior and moral choice than were boys exposed to a model advocating resistance to deviation with a morally autonomous justification. Realistic models expressing a deviating moral choice led to more deviating moral choices in observers than did autonomous deviating models. The moral judgment levels of the boys were not significantly affected by the models. The boys' moral behavior was predictive of their moral choice while moral judgment level was not significantly related to the other two indices of morality.     

新型冠状病毒疫情影响下大学生对医生角色行为的道德判断研究

2020年初,在我国发生了新型冠状病毒引发的重大疫情,医生是战“疫”的重要角色,也是最受关注的职业群体。这次疫情是否改变了以往因医患矛盾而引发的大众对医生的道德判断?本研究采用徐科朋(2019)编制的道德判断材料,以非医护专业大学生为被试,用实验法分别比较了疫情前和疫情中大学生对医生道德和不道德行为的判断。结果发现:(1)疫情前大学生对医生在公平行为上的赞扬程度显著高于疫情中,疫情中大学生对医生在关爱、忠诚、权威行为上,赞扬程度显著高于疫情前。(2)在整体不道德行为上,疫情中大学生均对医生的评价比对照组严格。疫情前大学生对医生在背叛、颠覆行为上的评价要比对照组宽松。疫情中大学生对医生在伤害、背叛、堕落行为上的评价要比对照组严格。(3)疫情中,大学生对医生在整体不道德行为和各维度不道德行为上的评价较疫情前均更加严格。     

Individual moral judgment and cultural ideologies

Moral judgment cannot be reduced to cultural ideology, or vice versa. But when each construct is measured separately, then combined, the product predicts powerfully to moral thinking. In Study 1, 2 churches (N = 96) were selected for their differences on religious ideology, political identity, and moral judgment. By combining these 3 variables, a multiple correlation of .79 predicted to members' moral thinking (opinions on human rights issues). Study 2 replicated this finding in a secular sample, with the formula established in Study 1 (R = .77). Individual conceptual development in moral judgment and socialization into cultural ideology co-occur, simultaneously and reciprocally, in parallel, and not serially. Individual development in moral judgment provides the epistemological categories for cultural ideology, which in turn influences the course of moral judgment, to produce moral thinking (e.g., opinions about abortion, free speech).     

The relation of moral judgment development and educational experience to recall of moral narratives and expository texts

Moral text processing was used as an ecologically valid method for assessing implicit and explicit moral understanding and development. The authors tested undergraduates, seminarians, and graduate students in political science and philosophy for recall of moral narratives and moral expository texts. Multivariate analyses of covariance using educational experience as an independent variable, age and moral judgment score as covariates, and recall of embedded moral arguments as a dependent variable revealed a relation between education and level of moral arguments recalled. Lower stage moral reasoning was best recalled by undergraduates, whereas higher stage reasoning was best recalled by graduate students, with seminarians intermediate for both types of text. Moral judgment score was related to recall of the highest level moral arguments even when age and educational experience were controlled. Moral judgment development appeared to be particularly helpful in recall of expository compared with narrative texts.     

Family metaphors and moral intuitions: how conservatives and liberals narrate their lives

This research examines life-narrative interviews obtained from 128 highly religious and politically active adults to test differences between political conservatives and liberals on (a) implicit family metaphors (G. Lakoff, 2002) and (b) moral intuitions (J. Haidt & C. Joseph, 2004). Content analysis of 12 key scenes in life stories showed that conservatives, as predicted, tended to depict authority figures as strict enforcers of moral rules and to identify lessons in self-discipline. By contrast, liberals were more likely to identify lessons learned regarding empathy and openness, even though (contrary to prediction) they were no more likely than conservatives to describe nurturant authority figures. Analysis of extended discourse on the development of religious faith and personal morality showed that conservatives emphasized moral intuitions regarding respect for social hierarchy, allegiance to in-groups, and the purity or sanctity of the self, whereas liberals invested more significance in moral intuitions regarding harm and fairness. The results are discussed in terms of the recent upsurge of interest among psychologists in political ideology and the value of using life-narrative methods and concepts to explore how politically active adults attempt to construct meaningful lives.     

An antinomy of political judgment: Kant,Arendt, and the role of purposiveness in reflective judgment

This article builds on Arendt’s development of a Kantian politics from out of the conception of reflective judgment in the Critique of Judgment. Arendt looks to Kant’s analysis of the beautiful to explain how political thought can be conceived. And yet Arendt describes such Kantian reflection as an empirical undertaking that justifies itself only in relation to the abstract principle of the moral law. The problem for such an account is that the autonomy of the moral law appears to be at odds with the social cohesion of Kantian political life. The ensuing contradiction can be deemed the antinomy of political judgment. Kant’s conception of reflective judgment offers such an inquiry considerably more to work with than Arendt uncovers. In particular, the regulative principle of the purposiveness of nature that is shown to direct all reflection can be seen to offer the solution to this antinomy.     

Enhancement of maturity of moral judgment by parent education

Relationships between maturity of moral judgment of parents, role-taking opportunities in the home, role-taking ability in children, and maturity of children's moral judgment were studied. A parent intervention program designed to increase role-taking opportunities in the home thought to lead to an increase in the maturity of moral judgment of children was utilized. Suggestive evidence for the claim that it is possible to accelerate rates of moral maturity of children through intervening indirectly to train their parents was found. Significant relationships were also found between maturity of moral judgment in children and role-taking and opportunities for role-taking in the home. Maturity of moral judgment of parents was not found to be significantly related to maturity of moral judgment of their children.This study was supported in part by Grant No. 13-11-01-00-053 (71) and Grant No. 13-01-00-53 (73) from the Minnesota Governor's Crime Commission.     

Societal rule evaluations: Adolescent offenders' reasoning about moral,conventional, and personal rules

This study investigated adolescent offenders' (81 felons and 83 misdemeanants) evaluations of three types of societal rules (moral, conventional, and personal) on dimensions pertaining to importance, sanctions, authority, and individual choice. In addition, participants selected the acts which should be under personal jurisdiction. Participants provided reasons (i.e., justifications) to support their evaluations. The judgment evidence suggests that the moral rules were considered the most important, the transgressions the most wrong, the violators the most deserving of punishment, and the acts the least acceptable when permitted by an authority. With regard to these same dimensions, conventional rules and violations were ranked second; whereas, the personal rules were ranked third. Offender status differences were obtained for importance ratings and for deservedness of punishment. Justifications for moral events reflected reasoning from both the moral (e.g., other's welfare) and conventional (e.g., social order) domains. Reasoning about conventions involved both conventional and personal concerns; whereas, justifications about personal issues focused on individual prerogatives. The implications of these data are discussed. © 1996 Wiley-Liss, Inc.     

青少年道德推脱与攻击行为：道德判断调节作用的性别差异

通过对756名青少年的问卷调查,考察了道德判断在青少年道德推脱与攻击行为之间调节作用的性别差异。结果发现:(1)道德推脱会对青少年的攻击行为产生显著的正向影响,道德判断不会对青少年的攻击行为产生显著的影响,但是道德判断可以显著地调节道德推脱与攻击行为之间的关系;(2)道德判断在调节道德推脱与攻击行为之间的关系时存在明显的性别差异,较高的道德判断能力难以削弱道德推脱对男生攻击行为的正向影响,但可以明显地削弱道德推脱对女生攻击行为的正向影响。     

Another Defense of Naturalized Ethics

This essay argues against Richard Joyce, using him as an exemplar of a number of writers who purport to show that the best a naturalized ethics can provide are demands that we can hold only as moral agnostics; that is, that no moral claims can be shown to be epistemically warranted, hence no moral claims have the property of “inescapable authority” necessary for real moral discourse or deliberation. The prudent (and “dignified”) course of action is therefore to act as if moral claims had categorical standing, knowing full well that we cannot, in principle, know this. The essay proposes instead that a fully naturalized account of moral reasoning and sentiments, compatible with the commitment to understanding human beings as products of evolutionary processes, can provide “existence imperatives” necessarily implicated in our being social animals. It argues that, on the one hand, we're mistaken in believing that real moral discourse must include imperatives that hold with inescapable authority as a foundation and, on the other, that a naturalistic perspective can offer demands that are authoritative enough to make moral judgment sound.     

Does Repeated Exposure to Popular Media Strengthen Moral Intuitions?: Exploratory Evidence Regarding Consistent and Conflicted Moral Content

Previous studies have indicated that media consumption may influence moral intuition sensitivity. The present exploratory studies sought to expand on these findings by employing a three-phase, longitudinal experiment conducted over nine weeks, where participants were exposed to two genres of films (romance, action) mixed in various ratios (high = 100% romance, medium = 60% romance, low = 20% romance, none = 0% romance). Findings from the initial study indicate that repeated exposure to romantic films led to increases in sensitivity for four of the five moral intuitions (i.e., care, fairness, authority, purity); at the same time, any exposure to action films seemed to erode these changes. A follow-up post-hoc content analysis sought to confirm these findings and test an operationalization of “moral conditioning.” We discuss the results in regards to media entertainment theory and research, and the societal implications of the role of media entertainment to reinforce standards of moral judgment.     

Peter Winch and Political Authority

This article explores a neglected aspect of Peter Winch's work: his writings on political authority. It seeks to show that this neglect is undeserved. Three themes are interweaved in the discussion. First, the major developments in Winch's thinking between his first published article on political authority (in a symposium with Richard Peters) and his later writings on the subject are identified and assessed. Criticism is focused mainly on his tendency to be insufficiently attentive to the distinction between being in authority and being an authority, and the implications this has for the distinctiveness of political authority. Secondly, particular attention is given to some of the key strands in Winch's analysis. These include his distinction between the nature and the grounds of political authority, how the role of consent is to be understood in the light of this distinction, how an adequate understanding political authority does not undermine our ideas of autonomy, and what it might mean to reject the whole idea of political authority. Finally, the article concludes by briefly defending the value of Winch's approach to political philosophy. Earlier it is shown that Winch's analysis does not foreclose on a range of political responses to authority, and this point is generalised to argue for a philosophical approach (like Winch’s) that aims at understanding, rather than at advancing any particular set of moral or political principles.     

Hume on the Standard of Virtue

Among those sympathetic to Hume'smoral philosophy, a general consensus hasemerged that his first work on the topic,A Treatise of Human Nature, is his best. Hislater work, An Enquiry Concerning thePrinciples of Morals, is regarded as scaleddown in both scope and ambition. In contrastto this standard view, I argue that Hume'slater work offers a more sophisticated theoryof moral evaluation. I begin by reviewing theTreatise theory of moral evaluation tohighlight the reasons why commentators find socompelling Hume's account of the corrections wemake to our moral sentiments. The method isendorsed by philosophers such as Henry DavidAiken and Annette C. Baier because, theyallege, it shows that moral sentiments reflecta process of judgment that includes thepossibility of corrigibility and ofjustification. But Hume's method of correctionfalls short and does not establish why thesentiments conforming to the standard of virtueshould count as moral judgments. In the secondEnquiry, Hume lays out a different set ofcriteria, including not only the need forcertain virtues of good judgment but attentionto the particular cultural and historicalorigins of the norms governing the virtues ofgood judgment. Hume's attention to diversityin evaluative outlook in his more matureposition takes seriously the relation betweenmoral authority and public debate.     

Normative Force and Normative Freedom: Hume and Kant, But Not Hume versus Kant

Our notion of normativity appears to combine, in a way difficult to understand but seemingly familiar from experience, elements of force and freedom. On the one hand, a normative claim is thought to have a kind of compelling authority; on the other hand, if our respecting it is to be an appropriate species of respect, it must not be coerced, automatic, or trivially guaranteed by definition. Both Hume and Kant, I argue, looked to aesthetic experience as a convincing example exhibiting this marriage of force and freedom, as well as showing how our judgment can come to be properly attuned to the features that constitute value. This image of attunement carries over into their respective accounts of moral judgment. The seemingly radical difference between their moral theories may be traceable not to a different conception of normativity, but to a difference in their empirical psychological theories – a difference we can readily spot in their accounts of aesthetics.