Operational interpretations for the G and Gm indexes of agreement

Operational proportional increase in agreement (PIA) and proportional reduction in error (PRE) interpretations are given for Holley and Guilford's G index of agreement and Holley and Lienert's G_m index of agreement.     

Against Cognitivism About Supposition

A popular view maintains that supposition is a kind of cognitive mental state, very similar to belief in essential respects. Call this view “cognitivism about supposition”. There are at least three grades of cognitivism, construing supposition as (i) a belief, (ii) belief-like imagination or (iii) a species of belief-like imagination. I shall argue against all three grades of cognitivism and claim that supposition is a sui generis form of imagination essentially dissimilar to belief. Since for good reasons (i) is not supported in the literature, I shall dwell on (ii) and (iii). Without further explanation supposition has been very often merely postulated as being nothing but belief-like imagination—that is, (ii). I shall show that at least two considerations undermine (ii). First, supposition and belief-like imagination are governed by different norms, more precisely the former is freer than the latter and requires minimal or no mental effort. Second, contrary to belief-like imagination, supposition is “cold”, in that it is typically dissociated from emotional reactions. Proponents of (iii) face the pressure of explaining these differences between supposition and belief-like imagination too. I shall argue that they have not sufficiently motivated the claim that supposition is belief-like. In particular they fail to accommodate precisely the dimensions of supposition pertaining to its normativity and emotionality. I shall close with a sketch of a new account of supposition.     

Capitalization on chance: The case of Guilford's Memory Abilities

Reanalysis of a memory study originally interpreted to support J. P. Guilford's Structure-of-Intellect (SI) model fails to give support for the SI distinctions: (1) When capitalization on chance was limited by selecting a subsample of variables for analysis, only 3 out of 9 hypothesized factors were identified, (2) the root-one number-of-factor criterion indicate that the SI model leads to a rather dramatic over-factoring even when the factors are theoretically over-determined, and (3) although the fit to the model is somewhat better than is expected on the basis of a completely random model, more reasonable semi-random null-hypotheses cannot be rejected in favor of the SI model.     

Walter Burley on the Simple Supposition of Singular Terms

This paper argues that Burley's theory of simple supposition is not as it has usually been presented. The prevailing view is that Burley and other authors agreed that simple supposition was in every case supposition for a universal, and that the disagreement over simple supposition between, say, Ockham and Burley was merely a disagreement over what a universal was (a piece of the ontology? a concept?), combined with a separate disagreement over what terms signify (the speaker's thoughts? the objects the thoughts are about?). In fact, however, Burley explicitly allows that some instances of simple supposition are for an individual, and that in certain cases personal supposition and simple supposition coincide. The present paper explores Burley's theory on this topic, and proposes a way of thinking about the metaphysics and the semantics that makes sense of what he says.     

Correction of item-total correlations in item analysis

The biserial correlation between an item and the total test of which the item is a part tends to be misleadingly high when used in item analysis, since the item is included in the total test. Two formulas with correction for this overlap are derived and compared with Zubin's and Guilford's formulas. One of the new coefficients is invariant to test length.     

Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility: The Flicker of Freedom

Some defenders of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) have responded to the challenge of Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs) to PAP by arguing that there remains a flicker of freedom -- that is, an alternative possibility for action -- left to the agent in FSCs. I argue that the flicker of freedom strategy is unsuccessful. The strategy requires the supposition that doing an act-on-one's-own is itself an action of sorts. I argue that either this supposition is confused and leads to counter-intuitive results; or, if the supposition is acceptable, then it is possible to use it to construct a FSC in which there is no flicker of freedom at all. Either way, the flicker of freedom strategy is ineffective against FSCs. Since the flicker of freedom strategy is arguably the best defense of PAP, I conclude that FSCs are successful in showing that PAP is false. An agent can act with moral responsibility without having alternative possibilities available to her.     

试论团体创造力研究与创造心理学的理论转向

团体创造力研究是当前创造心理学的新方向。本文讨论了自J．P．Guilford以来,从个体层次创造力研究发展到重视团体创造力研究的演变过程。认为团体创造力研究不仅在创造心理学传统理论框架内开辟了一个新时期,其方法论视角的转换为以更广阔视野揭示创造力本质打开了思路。     

The specificity of behaviors and measurements

This essay examines the fundamental fact of specificity in behaviors both outside and inside the testing room. Two tests of the same construct typically have a moderate to low correlation between them, the level of relationship depending on whether the mode, the situation, the task, and the stimuli for one test are similar to or different from those for the other. The great majority of psychological tests have considerable specificity. Their scores tend to correlate far less than perfectly with other tests of the same variable. Even when an ability is defined within a model such as Guilford's Structure-of-Intellect, each test of that ability will usually have some specific determinants not shared by other tests of that aspect of intelligence. Moreover, such a test is likely to correlate almost as well with tests of other similar abilities as with tests of its particular one.     

Adaptive regression and types of cognitive flexibility

The relationship between adaptive regression and cognitive flexibility was explored in a group of 42 college students. Adaptive regression was measured with the Holt scoring system for the Rorschach. One type of cognitive flexibility was measured by Guilford's tests of divergent production (Word Fluency, Associational Fluency, and Alternate Uses) and a second type by Mednick's Remote Associates Test. Adaptive regression was found to be significantly positively related to the Remote Associates Test in males but not in females. Adaptive regression was found to be unrelated to divergent production tests. These relationships were not found to be mediated by Rorschach productivity or verbal intelligence. A two-stage process was proposed to account for the cognitive operations underlying adaptive regression and the Remote Associates Test. The first stage is seen as a generative (primary process) stage, while the second stage is seen as an evaluative (secondary process) stage. Possible reasons for sex differences were also discussed.     

A factor analytic study of the Stanford Binet with young children

Seven factors were found as the result of a factor analysis of year IV-6 through year VI of the 1960 Revision of the Stanford Binet Intelligence Test. No factor had a sufficient number of high loadings to justify interpretation as ‘g’, a general intelligence factor. The test protocols used were of 152 children from three to seven years of age who attended a University nursery school or Head Start day care centers. The group included 107 white and 45 Negro children who had been tested as part of a routine intellectual evaluation. The socioeconomic level, as measured by occupation of the parent, was higher than that of the standardizing population of the Binet, as was the mean IQ (109.4 ± 14.7). The results of this study were compared with the logical analysis of Meeker & Bonsall based upon Guilford's factors of the intellect, and with Valett's profile analysis.     

Supposition and Truth in Ockham's Mental Language

In this paper, Ockham's theory of an ideal language of thought is used to illuminate problems of interpretation of his theory of truth. The twentieth century idea of logical form is used for finding out what kinds of atomic sentences there are in OckhamÕs mental language. It turns out that not only the theory of modes of supposition, but also the theory of supposition in general is insufficient as a full theory of truth. Rather, the theory of supposition is a theory of reference, which can help in the determination of truth values within the scope of simple predications. Outside this area, there are interesting types of sentences, whose truth does not depend on whether the terms supposit for the same things or not for the same things.     

The Specificity of Behaviors and Measurements

This essay examines the fundamental fact of specificity in behaviors both outside and inside the testing room. Two tests of the same construct typically have a moderate to low correlation between them, the level of relationship depending on whether the mode, the situation, the task, and the stimuli for one test are similar to or different from those for the other. The great majority of psychological tests have considerable specificity. Their scores tend to correlate far less than perfectly with other tests of the same variable. Even when an ability is defined within a model such as Guilford's Structure-of-Intellect, each test of that ability will usually have some specific determinants not shared by other tests of that aspect of intelligence. Moreover, such a test is likely to correlate almost as well with tests of other similar abilities as with tests of its particular one.     

The location of superfactors P, E and N within an unexplored personality factor space

Two questionnaires designed by Howarth (HPQ, APF2) whose factor space in unexplored and the EPQ (Eysenck) were jointly scale factored on 79 subjects, under the hypothesis that Eysenck's superfactors of P, E, and N should be represented as major influences in the resultant factor structure. A prinicipal component analysis yielded 7 factors from 24 by the Kaiser-Guttman and Scree Test, these 7 being rotated to a maximum simple structure by the Direct Oblimin procedure. Although failing to satisfy Bargmann's test of simple structure, this solution was accepted as adequate, noting the deficiencies og Bargmann's test and the efficiencies of the rotation method used. Within the 7 factor solution, P, E, and N were seen to be located as factor numbers 2, 3 and 1, respectively. One interesting detail is that a sociability primary loaded with an impulsivity primary on the Extraversion factor contrary to Guilford's (1977) arguments for the independence of these primaries. It is concluded that Eysenck's assertion of the enduring stability and breadth of the PEN factor triad has been upheld.     

Of heroes and butterflies: Technological dreams and human realities

Since the seventeenth century the dream of rendering human life less arduous and of securing it against the whims of fate through the development and deployment of technological devices has been a factor stimulating scientific research and development. This dream rests on a supposition that we live in a universe governed by deterministic laws in which limits on our ability to predict and control are set only by the imperfection of our knowledge and skill. But recent work in chaos theory combined with reminders that human beings themselves form part of the worldin which they live and seek to control suggests that this supposition is unjustified. If this is the case, then the idea that there is a technological solution to every problem, one which can be found by scientists or experts (the modern heroes) is revealed as a magical attitude which should have no place in rational decision making and whose persistence threatens to turn scientists into the high priests of a cult of technology.     

工作压力的要求-控制模型

工作要求和工作控制共同决定工作压力。大量的研究很好地支持了该模型,但对Karasek所假设的关于工作要求和工作控制之间的交互作用的验证结论也存在一些矛盾的方面。作者分析了工作要求-控制模型和其它工作压力模型之间的差异,对该模型以及正反两方面的研究证据作了详细地述评,并提出了今后相关研究的思路。     

A factorial study of temperament

The theory is advanced that personality factors obtained in the first order may often represent combinations of temperament traits that occur in the experimental population. Under these circumstances an investigation of the second order represents a purification process and yields factors which represent the more basic or pervasive characteristics of the original behavior items included in the factorial study. These second-order factors can be obtained directly in the first order by a careful selection of the variables which enter into the analysis. A second-order analysis was undertaken of the nine factors inherent in three of J. P. Guilford's inventories, and four clearly interpretable second-order factors were obtained. Three of these factors were obtained directly in the first order in a new factorial study of twenty-two behavior items. Attention is drawn to the similarities between these factors and traits of temperament postulated by an independent investigator.This paper abstracts portions of the writer's Ph.D. dissertation.     

Supposition as Quantification versus Supposition as Global Quantificational Effect

This paper follows up a suggestion by Paul Vincent Spade that there were two Medieval theories of the modes of personal supposition. I suggest that early work by Sherwood and others was a study of quantifiers: their semantics and the effects of context on inferences that can be made from quantified terms. Later, in the hands of Burley and others, it changed into a study of something else, a study of what I call global quantificational effect. For example, although the quantifier in ¬xPx is universal, it can be seen globally as having an existential effect; this is because the formula containing it is equivalent to x¬Px. The notion of global effect can be explained in terms of the modern theory of normal forms. I suggest that early authors were studying quantifiers, and the terminology of the theory of personal supposition is a classification of kinds of quantifiers. In this theory, to say that a term has distributive supposition is to say, roughly, that it is quantified by a universal quantifying sign. Later authors turned this into a theory of global quantificational effect. In the later theory, to say that a term has distributive supposition is to say that the overall effect is as if the term were universally quantified with a quantifier taking (relatively) wide scope. The difference between these two approaches is illustrated by the fact that the term man is classified as having distributive ("universal") supposition in Not every man is running in the earlier theory, whereas in the later theory that term does not have distributive supposition; it has determinate ("existential") supposition. In the paper I explain these options, and I argue from several texts that the earlier and later medieval theories actually worked like this. In an appendix I make further efforts to clarify the obscure early accounts, as well as the nineteenth century "doctrine of distribution". The last section of the paper discusses the "purpose(s)" of supposition theory.     

A simple and unified approach to human voluntary movements

In his provocative article, F. Mechsner (2004) advances the thesis that human voluntary movements are subject to "psychological" or "perceptual-cognitive" control and are thus organized "without regard to efferent patterns" (p. 355). Rather than considering in detail the experiments that he proffered by way of support, the present author discusses the degree to which that supposition has appeal on the grounds of simplicity and is defined in terms that are compatible with a unified science.     

Heidegger and the Supposition of a Single,Objective World

Christina Lafont has argued that the early Heidegger's reflections on truth and understanding are incompatible with ‘the supposition of a single objective world’. This paper presents her argument, reviews some responses that the existing Heidegger literature suggests (focusing, in particular, on work by John Haugeland), and offers what I argue is a superior response. Building on a deeper exploration of just what the above ‘supposition’ demands (an exploration informed by the work of Bernard Williams and Adrian Moore), I argue that a crucial assumption that Lafont and Haugeland both accept must be rejected, namely, that different ‘understandings of Being’ can be viewed as offering ‘rival perspectives’ on a common subject‐matter. I develop this case by drawing on an alternative account of what a Heideggerian ‘understanding of Being’ might be like.     

RELATIONS BETWEEN PREDICTION- AND ESTIMATION-RESPONSES IN CUE-PROBABILITY LEARNING AND TRANSFER

B auer M arianne Relations between prediction- and estimation-responses in cue-probability learning and transfer. Scand. J. Psychol ., 1972, 13 , 198–207. —Comparisons were made between prediction- and estimation-responses, preceded by training with different types of responding and when task probabilities were shifted. The main results were: ( a ) differential effects of procedure of learning and shift in task structure on predictions and estimates support the hypothesis of two different processes, ( b ) estimates as indicators of probability learning reflect traits assumed to characterize the perception process, viz. sensitivity to shifts in probabilities, and robustness against influence from procedure of learning, and ( c ) prediction-responses were affected in the direction of more extreme responses by simultaneous estimation, which result strengthens the supposition that probability estimates are insufficient as indicators of the complete perception process in a prediction task.