Can fluency be interpreted as novelty? Retraining the interpretation of fluency in recognition memory

Stimuli that are processed fluently tend to be regarded as more familiar and are more likely to be classified as old on a recognition test compared with less fluent stimuli. Recently it was shown that the standard relationship between fluency and positive recognition judgments can be reversed if participants are trained that previously studied stimuli are associated with lower levels of fluency. Under such conditions, fluent stimuli are more likely to be classified as new on a recognition test (C. Unkelbach, 2006), which suggests that the interpretation of fluency is malleable and context dependent. Five experiments investigated the resilience of this reversed fluency effect. Using 2 different fluency manipulations, the finding of a reversed fluency effect after training was replicated. However, it was also found that the reversal depends on explicit feedback during training and is specific to the particular fluency manipulation used during training. Moreover, it was found that the reversal did not generalize to similar memory judgments. The balance of experimental results suggest that the standard interpretation of fluency as indicating higher levels of familiarity is quite stable and is resistant to reinterpretation.     

Feeling the ease: How the use of oral motor fluency changes in amnesia

The present study examined the evolution observed in amnesic patients’ use of motor fluency when making recognition memory decisions. In this experiment, 9 patients with amnesia and 18 matched controls were presented with two recognition memory tasks composed of 3 types of items: (1) natural words, (2) nonwords difficult to pronounce, and (3) nonwords easy to pronounce, the latter having been shown to be processed in a surprisingly fluent manner as long as participants can articulate them at a subvocal level (i.e., oral motor fluency). Our results provide evidence that the motor-movement manipulation was successful to induce a fluency effect. More specifically, data revealed that both amnesic patients and control participants showed a pattern of response consistent with the use of fluency as a cue to memory for studied items. However, only control participants relied on fluency to increase their rate of “yes” responses for unstudied items. These results suggest that patients with amnesia set a more conservative response criterion before relying on oral motor fluency, showing a pattern consistent with the idea that fluency is only used as a cue to memory when it exceeds a certain threshold. These findings are discussed in terms of adaptative metacognition strategies implemented by amnesic patients to reduce fluency-based memory errors as well as in terms of the variations that seem to occur in these strategies depending on the type of fluency that is experienced.     

Distinguishing highly confident accurate and inaccurate memory: insights about relevant and irrelevant influences on memory confidence

It is generally believed that accuracy and confidence in one's memory are related, but there are many instances when they diverge. Accordingly it is important to disentangle the factors that contribute to memory accuracy and confidence, especially those factors that contribute to confidence, but not accuracy. We used eye movements to separately measure fluent cue processing, the target recognition experience, and relative evidence assessment on recognition confidence and accuracy. Eye movements were monitored during a face-scene associative recognition task, in which participants first saw a scene cue, followed by a forced-choice recognition test for the associated face, with confidence ratings. Eye movement indices of the target recognition experience were largely indicative of accuracy, and showed a relationship to confidence for accurate decisions. In contrast, eye movements during the scene cue raised the possibility that more fluent cue processing was related to higher confidence for both accurate and inaccurate recognition decisions. In a second experiment we manipulated cue familiarity, and therefore cue fluency. Participants showed higher confidence for cue-target associations for when the cue was more familiar, especially for incorrect responses. These results suggest that over-reliance on cue familiarity and under-reliance on the target recognition experience may lead to erroneous confidence.     

Fluency, familiarity, aging, and the illusion of truth

Research has shown that repeated statements are rated as more credible than new statements. However, little research has examined whether such "illusions of truth" can be produced by contextual (nonmnemonic) influences, or compared to the magnitude of these illusions in younger and older adults. In two experiments, we examined how manipulations of perceptual and conceptual fluency influenced truth and familiarity ratings made by young and older adults. Stimuli were claims about companies or products varying in normative familiarity. Results showed only small effects of perceptual fluency on rated truth or familiarity. In contrast, manipulating conceptual fluency via semantic/textual context had much larger effects on rated truth and familiarity, with the effects modulated by normative company familiarity such that fluency biases were larger for lesser-known companies. In both experiments, young and older adults were equally susceptible to fluency-based biases.     

Fluency,Familiarity, Aging,and the Illusion of Truth

ABSTRACT

Research has shown that repeated statements are rated as more credible than new statements. However, little research has examined whether such “illusions of truth” can be produced by contextual (nonmnemonic) influences, or compared to the magnitude of these illusions in younger and older adults. In two experiments, we examined how manipulations of perceptual and conceptual fluency influenced truth and familiarity ratings made by young and older adults. Stimuli were claims about companies or products varying in normative familiarity. Results showed only small effects of perceptual fluency on rated truth or familiarity. In contrast, manipulating conceptual fluency via semantic/textual context had much larger effects on rated truth and familiarity, with the effects modulated by normative company familiarity such that fluency biases were larger for lesser-known companies. In both experiments, young and older adults were equally susceptible to fluency-based biases.     

Perceptual fluency can be used as a cue for categorization decisions

Learning in the prototype distortion task is thought to involve perceptual learning in which category members experience an enhanced visual response (Ashby & Maddox. Annual Review of Psychology, 56, 149-178, 2005). This response likely leads to more-efficient processing, which in turn may result in a feeling of perceptual fluency for category members. We examined the perceptual-fluency hypothesis by manipulating fluency independently from category membership. We predicted that when perceptual fluency was induced using subliminal priming, this fluency would be misattributed to category membership and would affect categorization decisions. In a prototype distortion task, the participants were more likely to judge stimuli that were not members of the category as category members when the nonmembers were made perceptually fluent with a matching subliminal prime. This result suggests that perceptual fluency can be used as a cue during some categorization decisions. In addition, the results provided converging evidence that some types of categorization are based on perceptual learning.     

Self-generated cognitive fluency as an alternative route to preference formation

People tend to prefer fluently processed over harder to process information. In this study we examine two issues concerning fluency and preference. First, previous research has pre-selected fluent and non-fluent materials. We did not take this approach yet show that the fluency of individuals’ idiosyncratic on-line interactions with a given stimulus can influence preference formation. Second, while processing fluency influences preference, the opposite also may be true: preferred stimuli could be processed more fluently than non-preferred. Participants performed a visual search task either before or after indicating their preferred images from an array of either paintings by Kandinsky or decorated coffee mugs. Preferred stimuli were associated with fluent processing, reflected in facilitated search times. Critically, this was only the case for participants who gave their preferences after completing the visual search task, not for those stating preferences prior to the visual search task. Our results suggest that the spontaneous and idiosyncratic experience of processing fluency plays a role in forming preference judgments and conversely that our first impressions of preference do not drive response fluency.     

Memory predictions are influenced by perceptual information: evidence for metacognitive illusions

Although perceptual information is utilized to judge size or depth, little work has investigated whether such information is used to make memory predictions. The present study examined how the font size of to-be-remembered words influences predicted memory performance. Participants studied words for a free-recall test that varied in font size and made judgments of learning (JOLs) for each item. JOLs were influenced by font size, as larger font sizes were given higher JOLs, whereas little relationship was evident between font size and recall. The effect was modified when other, more valid, sources of information (e.g., associative strength) were available when JOLs were made and persisted despite experience with multiple study-test sessions, use of a forgetting scale to assess predictions, and explicit warning of participants that font size has little effect on memory performance. When ease of reading was manipulated, such that large font size words were made less fluent, the effect was eliminated. Thus, highly accessible perceptual cues can strongly influence JOLs, likely via encoding fluency, and this effect can lead to metacognitive illusions     

编码强度对字体大小效应的影响

本研究采用3个实验考察编码强度对字体大小效应的影响, 探讨由于知觉特征而引发的元认知错觉的内在产生机制(实验1)与有效的矫正措施(实验2和实验3)。结果发现:(1)大字体词语的知觉流畅性显著优于小字体, 并且贝叶斯多层中介分析结果表明, 知觉流畅性对字体大小效应起部分中介作用(实验1); (2)随着编码强度的增加, 由字体大小引起的学习判断错觉逐渐消失(实验2和实验3)。以上结果表明, 刺激的知觉特征(字体大小)对个体学习判断的影响, 随编码强度激活线索的增加而逐渐减弱。这一结果为真实教学情境中提高学习者的编码强度, 进而削弱学习判断对知觉特征线索的依赖, 并准确地监测自身的学习进程提供了科学依据。     

Non-monotonic relationships between emotional arousal and memory for color and location

Recent research points to the decreased diagnostic value of subjective retrieval experience for memory accuracy for emotional stimuli. While for neutral stimuli rich recollective experiences are associated with better context memory than merely familiar memories this association appears questionable for emotional stimuli. The present research tested the implicit assumption that the effect of emotional arousal on memory is monotonic, that is, steadily increasing (or decreasing) with increasing arousal. In two experiments emotional arousal was manipulated in three steps using emotional pictures and subjective retrieval experience as well as context memory were assessed. The results show an inverted U-shape relationship between arousal and recognition memory but for context memory and retrieval experience the relationship was more complex. For frame colour, context memory decreased linearly while for spatial location it followed the inverted U-shape function. The complex, non-monotonic relationships between arousal and memory are discussed as possible explanations for earlier divergent findings.     

The secret life of fluency

Fluency - the subjective experience of ease or difficulty associated with completing a mental task - has been shown to be an influential cue in a wide array of judgments. Recently researchers have begun to look at how fluency impacts judgment through more subtle and indirect routes. Fluency impacts whether information is represented in working memory and what aspects of that information are attended to. Additionally, fluency has an impact in strategy selection; depending on how fluent information is, people engage in qualitatively different cognitive operations. This suggests that the role of fluency is more nuanced than previously believed and that understanding fluency could be of critical importance to understanding cognition more generally.     

Remembering makes evidence compelling: retrieval from memory can give rise to the illusion of truth

The illusion of truth is traditionally described as the increase in perceived validity of statements when they are repeated (Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977). However, subsequent work has demonstrated that the effect can arise due to the increased familiarity or fluency afforded by repetition and not necessarily to repetition per se. We examine the case of information retrieved from memory. Recently experienced information is expected to be subsequently reexperienced as more fluent and familiar than novel information (Jacoby, 1983; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). Therefore, the possibility exists that information retrieved from memory, because it is subjectively re-experienced at retrieval, would be more fluent or familiar than when it was first learned and would thus lead to an increase in perceived validity. Using a method to indirectly poll the perceived truth of factual statements, our experiment demonstrated that information retrieved from memory does indeed give rise to an illusion of truth. The effect was larger than when statements were explicitly repeated twice and was of comparable size to when statements were repeated 4 times. We conclude that memory retrieval is a powerful method for increasing the perceived validity of statements (and subsequent illusion of truth) and that the illusion of truth is a robust effect that can be observed even without directly polling the factual statements in question.     

The marriage of perception and memory: Creating two-way illusions with words and voices

By most theories of lexical access, idiosyncratic aspects of speech (such as voice details) are considered noise and are filtered in perception. However, episodic theories suggest that perceptual details are stored in memory and mediate later perception. By this view, perception and memory are intimately linked. The present investigation tested this hypothesis by creating symmetric illusions, using words and voices. In two experiments, listeners gave reduced noise estimates to previously heard words, but only when the original voices were preserved. Conversely, in two recognition memory experiments, listeners gave increased old responses to words (or voices) presented in relatively soft background noise. The data suggest that memory can be mistaken for perceptual fluency, and perceptual fluency can be mistaken for memory. The data also underscore the role of detailed episodes in lexical access.     

Forgotten but not gone: context effects on recognition do not require explicit memory for context

Context effects on recognition memory provide an important indirect assay of associative learning and source memory. Neuropsychological studies have indicated that such context effects may obtain even if the contexts themselves are not remembered--for example, in individuals impaired on direct tests of memory for contextual information. In contrast, a recent study indicated that the effects of temporal context reinstatement on visual recognition obtain only when the contextual information itself was explicitly recollected. Here we report that the effects of reinstatement of spatial-simultaneous context on visual object recognition memory obtain irrespective of whether those context stimuli are explicitly recognized. We suggest that spatial-simultaneous context effects might be based on ensemble unitization of target and context stimuli at encoding, whereas temporal context effects may require recollective processes.     

Forgotten but not gone: Context effects on recognition do not require explicit memory for context

Context effects on recognition memory provide an important indirect assay of associative learning and source memory. Neuropsychological studies have indicated that such context effects may obtain even if the contexts themselves are not remembered—for example, in individuals impaired on direct tests of memory for contextual information. In contrast, a recent study indicated that the effects of temporal context reinstatement on visual recognition obtain only when the contextual information itself was explicitly recollected. Here we report that the effects of reinstatement of spatial-simultaneous context on visual object recognition memory obtain irrespective of whether those context stimuli are explicitly recognized. We suggest that spatial-simultaneous context effects might be based on ensemble unitization of target and context stimuli at encoding, whereas temporal context effects may require recollective processes.     

Music-reading expertise alters visual spatial resolution for musical notation

Crowding occurs when the perception of a suprathreshold target is impaired by nearby distractors, reflecting a fundamental limitation on visual spatial resolution. It is likely that crowding limits music reading, as each musical note is crowded by adjacent notes and by the five-line staff, similar to word reading, in which letter recognition is reduced by crowding from adjacent letters. Here, we tested the hypothesis that, with extensive experience, music-reading experts have acquired visual skills such that they experience a smaller crowding effect, resulting in higher music-reading fluency. Experts experienced a smaller crowding effect than did novices, but only for musical stimuli, not for control stimuli (Landolt Cs). The magnitude of the crowding effect for musical stimuli could be predicted by individual fluency in music reading. Our results highlight the role of experience in crowding: Visual spatial resolution can be improved specifically for objects associated with perceptual expertise. Music-reading rates are likely limited by crowding, and our results are consistent with the idea that experience alleviates these limitations.     

Using story contexts to bias children’s true and false memories

The effects of embedding standard Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists into stories whose context biased interpretation either toward or away from the overall themes of the DRM lists on both true and false recognition were investigated with 7- and 11-year-olds. These biased story contexts were compared with the same children’s susceptibility to false memory illusions using the standard DRM list presentation paradigm. The results showed the usual age effects for true and false memories in the standard DRM list paradigm, where 11-year-olds exhibited higher rates of both true and false recognition compared with the 7-year-olds. Importantly, when DRM lists were embedded in stories, these age effects disappeared for true recognition. For false recognition, although developmental differences were attenuated, older children were still more susceptible to false memory illusions than younger children. These findings are discussed in terms of current theories of children’s false memories as well as the role of themes and elaboration in children’s memory development.     

Mere exposure effect: A consequence of direct and indirect fluency-preference links

In three experiments, picture quality between test items was manipulated to examine whether subjects' expectations about the fluency normally associated with these different stimuli might influence the effects of fluency on preference or familiarity-based recognition responses. The results showed that fluency due to pre-exposure influenced responses less when objects were presented with high picture quality, suggesting that attributions of fluency to preference and familiarity are adjusted according to expectations about the different test pictures. However, this expectations influence depended on subjects' awareness of these different quality levels. Indeed, imperceptible differences seemed not to induce expectations about the test item fluency. In this context, fluency due to both picture quality and pre-exposure influenced direct responses. Conversely, obvious, and noticed, differences in test picture quality did no affect responses, suggesting that expectations moderated attributions of fluency only when fluency normally associated with these different stimuli was perceptible but difficult to assess.     

Age-Related Differences in Memory Illusions: Revelation Effect

Older adults are often more susceptible to various illusions and distortions of memory than young adults. In the experiments reported here, we explored the question of whether normal aging was associated with a larger revelation effect, an illusion of memory in which items that are revealed gradually during a recognition test are more likely to be called old than unrevealed items that are shown in their entirety. Contrary to expectations, older adults were not susceptible to this memory illusion. A revelation effect occurred for young but not older adults, even when older adults were similar to young adults on measures of recognition and repetition priming. When data across experiments were combined, there was evidence for a negative revelation effect in older adults in which revealed items were less likely called old than unrevealed items. These results place boundary conditions on the claim that older adults are more susceptible than young adults to memory illusions, and imply that one or more mechanisms underlying the revelation effect are age sensitive.     

What makes recognition without awareness appear to be elusive? Strategic factors that influence the accuracy of guesses

Various factors could conceivably promote the accuracy of guesses during a recognition test. Two that we identified in previous studies are forced-choice testing format and high perceptual similarity between the repeat target and novel foil. In restricted circumstances, the relative perceptual fluency of the target can be compared with that of the foil and used as a reliable cue to guide accurate responses that occur without explicit retrieval—a phenomenon we referred to as “implicit recognition.” In this issue, Jeneson and colleagues report a failure to replicate accurate guesses and also a tendency on the part of subjects to hazard guesses infrequently, even though testing circumstances were very similar to those that we used. To resolve this discrepancy, we developed a simple manipulation to encourage either guessing or confident responding. Encouraging guessing increased both the prevalence of guesses and the accuracy of guesses in a recognition test, relative to when confident responding was encouraged. When guessing was encouraged, guesses were highly accurate (as in our previous demonstrations of implicit recognition), whereas when confident responding was encouraged, guesses were at chance levels (as in Jeneson and colleagues'' data). In light of a substantial literature showing high accuracy despite low confidence in certain circumstances, we infer that both the prevalence and accuracy of guessing can be influenced by whether subjects adopt guessing-friendly strategies. Our findings thus help to further characterize conditions likely to promote implicit recognition based on perceptual fluency.In several prior experiments, we reported findings indicative of recognition without awareness (Voss et al. 2008; Voss and Paller 2009). The experiments involved recognition tests for colorful and complex geometric shapes (kaleidoscope images). Subjects attempted to discriminate repeat stimuli (targets) from novel stimuli (foils). In some of our experiments, subjects made recognition responses and also rated the quality of their recognition experience or their confidence in their decision. For example, recognition often occurred with awareness of memory retrieval and with some level of confidence. On the other hand, correct recognition of a target sometimes occurred with no discernable awareness of memory retrieval or confidence; essentially, subjects felt that their response was merely a guess—and yet they were correct.Of course, the reason that a guess might be correct in a recognition test might have nothing at all to do with the subject having retrieved relevant information; the response might be merely a “lucky guess.” Our results, however, provided evidence that processes of implicit memory were operative in producing at least a subset of the correct guesses. In recognition tests using a forced-choice format, targets and foils shared a high degree of perceptual similarity and were displayed side-by-side, and we found that, for guess responses, the repeat stimulus was correctly selected remarkably often. With no stored information (and given that the target occurred equally often on the left side and the right side, and that targets and foils were counterbalanced across subjects), the repeat stimulus should be selected correctly 50% of the time in the long run. In our original report, we found that 82% of the guess responses were correct, which was more accurate than responses when trials with high- or low-confidence responses were pooled together (56%; data combined for all study conditions) (Experiment 2 of Voss et al. 2008). We referred to this phenomenon as recognition without awareness or implicit recognition. For the present discussion, we will use the latter term.Indeed, our results provided several additional reasons for linking implicit memory with this phenomenon of implicit recognition. In one experiment, each trial was classified as either (1) a recognition experience in which subjects recollected episodic information from their initial experience with the target; (2) recognition with familiarity for the target, but no other recall of prior information concerning the target; or (3) a guess with no confidence in the accuracy of the response (Voss and Paller 2009). We found that guesses were approximately as accurate as recollection responses (73% vs. 79%, respectively, averaged across encoding conditions), and that guesses were more accurate than decisions based on familiarity (59%, averaged across encoding conditions).Another feature of these experiments was that we contrasted two types of learning conditions. In one condition, to-be-remembered stimuli were viewed while subjects simultaneously performed a verbal working memory task. This task required that the subject listen to a spoken digit on each trial and respond according to whether the digit on the prior trial was odd or even (i.e., a one-back task). In the other condition, there were no spoken digits, and attention could be allocated fully to viewing the to-be-remembered stimuli. In several different experiments, recognition accuracy was higher with divided-attention study than with full-attention study. Although this is a highly unusual outcome for recognition performance, it was clear that divided attention during the study led to relatively less confidence during the recognition test, such that guessing was more prevalent, and these guess responses were highly accurate.Notably, these two key results—highly accurate guessing, and a recognition advantage for divided over full attention at study—were not obtained when recognition was tested with a yes–no format (targets and highly similar foils randomly intermixed and shown one stimulus at a time), or when a forced-choice test was prepared such that each target was paired with a random foil rather than a highly similar foil (Voss et al. 2008). On the basis of these findings, as well as additional results from electrophysiological recordings (described below in the Discussion section), we argued that subjects were able to weigh the relative perceptual fluency of the target and the foil only for forced-choice tests with high target/foil similarity, and then they could use this fluency cue to guide accurate selection of the target (Voss and Paller 2009).We aim to develop a line of reasoning to clarify why implicit recognition might tend to operate preferentially in certain circumstances, such as when the relative perceptual fluency of targets versus foils is likely to serve as a useful cue, and when the ability to remember specific stimulus details does not provide a useful cue (as is the case when these details are largely shared between the target and the foil). In many situations, however, perceptual fluency may not be a good basis for making recognition judgments. Often, accurate recognition reflects conceptual elaboration about the meaning of an event, and the conceptual features are typically remembered more robustly than the set of stimulus features perceived during the course of the event. Thus, implicit recognition may be less likely to guide a response in a recognition test in the presence of confident memory for the target. Dividing attention during encoding resulted in lower confidence during the recognition test, and this may have been one factor that promoted reliance on signals of relative perceptual fluency. Of course, there may be other factors that also promote or inhibit this type of strategy in a recognition test.