The Power of Invitation: The Moral Discourse of Kairos Palestine

Abstract: In this article I analyze the moral discourse of the Palestinian kairos document A Moment of Truth (2009) using the distinctions between prophetic, ethical, narrative, policy, and participatory discourse offered by James M. Gustafson and Lisa S. Cahill. I conclude that the document articulates a sixth variety: invitational discourse. This is a kind of moral discourse that invites a wide range of groups and individuals into a normative discussion on a given issue.     

Sociobiology and Human Nature: A Perspective from Catholic Theology

This paper addresses a nonspecialist audience on how sociobiological accounts of human nature might be relevant to Christian theology. I begin with some confessional remarks to clarify what I mean by Christian theology and how I understand it to be related to science. I indicate briefly why sociobiology might be of interest to theology and then move on to sketch some ways in which sociobiology might relate to theological ethics. My basic point is that sociobiology is directly relevant to theological ethics in its understanding of evolved human emotional predispositions but not in its normative reflection proper.     

THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY IN UNCOVERING THE MATRIX OF HUMAN MORALITY

Abstract. Theology and the life sciences are mutually dependent on one another in the task of understanding the origin and function of moral behavior. The life sciences investigate morality from the perspective of the historical and communal dimension of humanity and point to survival as the primary function of human behavior. A Christian ethic of self-sacrifice advances the preservation of the entire human and nonhuman creation and should not, therefore, be objected to by the life sciences. Religion, however, is more than a survival mechanism. It points to a preserving agency beyond humanity and prevents the life sciences from reducing life to its strictly biological side.     

Naturalizing Ethics: the Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency

Moral agency is a central feature of both religious and secular conceptions of human beings. In this paper I outline a scientific naturalistic model of moral agency making use of current findings and theories in sociobiology,developmental psychology, and social cognitive theory. The model provides answers to four central questions about moral agency: (1) what it is, (2) how it is acquired, (3) how it is put to work, and (4) how it is justified. I suggest that this model can provide religious and secular moral theories with a basis for a common understanding of moral agency.     

儿童道德情绪归因研究的进展及未来展望

20世纪70年代以来,对儿童道德情绪归因的研究主要集中在概念界定、定向发展、年龄差异、产生原因及其影响因素等方面。但在研究对象的拓展、情境的设置以及归因对象的完善等方面还需要未来作进一步的探索与研究。     

法律正义与道德正义

进入文明时代以来,社会正义一直是人们追求的基本价值目标.社会正义实质上是对人类社会关系(包括个人之间、群体及组织之间、个人与群体及组织之间的相互关系)的公平性、正当性的确认和捍卫,社会正义通常采取法律形式和道德形式来表达.法律正义是以国家意志的形式来表达的社会关系的规定性,它通过制度规范方式来确认和捍卫公民的合法权益和守法义务.道德正义是以德性和良心的形式来表现的社会关系的规定性,它通过伦理规范的方式来确认和维护公民的伦理权利和道德义务.法律正义是道德正义的基础和保障,因而也是社会正义的底线和起点;道德正义是法律正义的前提和灵魂,因而也是社会正义的理想和目标.构建法律正义与道德正义的良性互动关系.是实现社会正义的有效保证.     

Particularism and the Point of Moral Principles

According to radical moral particularists such as Jonathan Dancy, there are no substantive moral principles. And yet, few particularists wish to deny that something very like moral principles do indeed play a significant role in our everyday moral practice. Loathe at dismissing this as mere error on the part of everyday moral agents, particularists have proposed a number of alternative accounts of the practice. The aim of all of these accounts is to make sense of our appeal to general moral truths in both reaching and justifying our particular moral judgments without thereby violating the particularists' stricture against substantive moral principles. In this paper, I argue that the most prominent non-substantive accounts of moral generalities appealed to by radical particularists – the heuristic account and default reasons accounts – fail in this aim.     

Moral identity and education in a multicultural society

In answering the question, “Which moral identity has to be developed in a multicultural society?” we draw a distinction between public and non-public identities of persons. On our view, a liberal democracy is characterized by a specific conception of these two central components of moral identity. In section 2, we concentrate on the public identity, while, in section 3, the nonpublic identity is the centre of interest. In explaining these main components of moral identity, we will appeal to those aspects of identity as set out by Rorty &; Wong which are constitutive of moral identity.     

World ethics: Its foundation

Although there are enormous differences between humans, it is also the case that they are fundamentally alike in certain ways. As a prelude to universal ethics, this paper enumerates many commonalities among humans.     

儒家伦理的基德和荣格的道德观

作为中国传统文化之主体的儒家伦理,已经确立了中国传统文化的"基德"或"母德",这是在长达2000多年历史发展中形成的,经过先秦时期的百家争鸣,形成了独树一帜的儒家思想,董仲舒提出"抑黜百家、独尊儒术"的建议,确立了儒家在中国社会的统治地位。经过以后历代的兼收并蓄和对立融合,发展成为儒、道、佛融合一体的宋明理学,近代中国社会对儒家思想的批判性发展,促使人们对儒家伦理思想进行时代的反思。荣格的分析心理学思想为东西方道德观的比较提供了一种独特的研究视角。     

How (and where) does moral judgment work?

Moral psychology has long focused on reasoning, but recent evidence suggests that moral judgment is more a matter of emotion and affective intuition than deliberate reasoning. Here we discuss recent findings in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, including several studies that specifically investigate moral judgment. These findings indicate the importance of affect, although they allow that reasoning can play a restricted but significant role in moral judgment. They also point towards a preliminary account of the functional neuroanatomy of moral judgment, according to which many brain areas make important contributions to moral judgment although none is devoted specifically to it.     

Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to do Otherwise

In his classic paper, The Principle of Alternate Possibilities, Harry Frankfurt presented counterexamples to the principle named in his title: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. He went on to argue that the falsity of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) implied that the debate between the compatibilists and the incompatibilists (as regards determinism and the ability to do otherwise) did not have the significance that both parties had attributed to it -- since moral responsibility could exist even if no one was able to do otherwise. I have argued that even if PAP is false, there are other principles that imply that moral responsibility entails the ability to do otherwise, and that these principles are immune to Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Frankfurt has attempted to show that my arguments for this conclusion fail. This paper is a rejoinder to that reply; I argue that he has failed to show this.     

Children's Social and Moral Reasoning About Exclusion

ABSTRACT— Developmental research on social and moral reasoning about exclusion has utilized a social-domain theory, in contrast to a global stage theory, to investigate children's evaluations of gender- and race-based peer exclusion. The social-domain model postulates that moral, social-conventional, and personal reasoning coexist in children's evaluations of inclusion and exclusion, and that the priority given to these forms of judgments varies by the age of the child, the context, and the target of exclusion. Findings from developmental intergroup research studies disconfirm a general-stage-model approach to morality in the child, and provide empirical data on the developmental origins and emergence of intergroup attitudes regarding prejudice, bias, and exclusion.     

Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities

Is choice necessary for moral responsibility? And does choice imply alternative possibilities of some significant sort? This paper will relate these questions to the argument initiated by Harry Frankfurt that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility, and to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's extension of that argument in terms of guidance control in a causally determined world. I argue that attending to Frankfurt's core conceptual distinction between the circumstances that make an action unavoidable and those that bring it about that the action is performed – a distinction emphasised in his recent restatement – provides a new route into an analysis of Frankfurt's argument by showing how it depends on a person's ‘decision to act’ involving the exercise of choice. The implicit reliance of Frankfurt's argument on this notion of choice, however, undermines his claim that the example of the counterfactual intervener strengthens the compatibilist case by providing a counter-example to the principle of alternative possibilities. I also argue that Frankfurt's reliance on the exercise of choice for moral responsibility is also evident in the Fischer/Ravizza argument, and that a close analysis of both arguments shows that such exercise of choice is not available if causal determinism is true.     

初中学生道德推理、移情反应、亲社会行为及其相互关系的比较研究

抽取上海市初中三个年级217名学生为被试,通过对道德判断推理能力、移情反应、亲社会行为的测量和问卷调查,考察初中阶段学生在这三个方面的发展规律,以及三者之间的相互关系。结果显示：道德判断推理与亲社会行为、与移情能力之问没有显著相关;移情能力中的个别指标与亲社会行为之间相关显著;在移情反应、亲社会行为水平、以及助人动机、帮助方式等方面均存在显著的性别差异;故事呈现方式不同会对故事与自己相关程度产生影响。     

Liberating Moral Traditions: Saga Morality and Aristotle's Megalopsychia

It is a matter for both surprise and disappointment that so little has been written from a philosophical perspective about the moral tradition enshrined in Europe's oldest living literature, the Icelandic sagas. The main purpose of the present essay is to start to ameliorate this shortcoming by analysing and assessing the moral code bequeathed to us by the saga literature. To do so, I draw attention to the striking similarities between saga morality and what tends to be called an 'ancient moral outlook' (with special reference to Aristotle's much-maligned virtue of megalopsychia) and then try to defend the credentials of both outlooks in so far as they clash, or seem to clash, with certain aspects of a 'modern moral outlook.'     

Moral Responses and Moral Theory: Socially-based Externalist Ethics

The paper outlines a view called social (or two-level) response-dependency as an addition to standard alternatives in metaethics that allows for a position intermediate between standard versions of internalism and externalism on the question of motivational force. Instead of taking psychological responses as either directly supplying the content of ethics (as on emotivist or sentimentalist accounts) or as irrelevant to its content (as in classical versions of Kantian or utilitarian ethics), the view allows them an indirect role, as motivational props to moral teaching and thus to the general institution of moral discourse. However, they are not implied by any particular moral judgment (or speaker), so that amoralism comes out as possible. The response that defines the distinctively moral notion of wrong on this account is the second-level (social) response of forbidding some behavior; but this is ultimately to be understood in terms of (variable) individual reactions. Natural human emotion tendencies thereby constrain the content of ethics, while allowing for some degree of social variation in moral codes.     

Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility: The Flicker of Freedom

Some defenders of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) have responded to the challenge of Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs) to PAP by arguing that there remains a flicker of freedom -- that is, an alternative possibility for action -- left to the agent in FSCs. I argue that the flicker of freedom strategy is unsuccessful. The strategy requires the supposition that doing an act-on-one's-own is itself an action of sorts. I argue that either this supposition is confused and leads to counter-intuitive results; or, if the supposition is acceptable, then it is possible to use it to construct a FSC in which there is no flicker of freedom at all. Either way, the flicker of freedom strategy is ineffective against FSCs. Since the flicker of freedom strategy is arguably the best defense of PAP, I conclude that FSCs are successful in showing that PAP is false. An agent can act with moral responsibility without having alternative possibilities available to her.