直觉和分析在不同任务条件下的逃生决策效果

目的：探讨针对简单和复杂逃生任务时, 直觉和分析在不同判断依据条件下的逃生决策效果。方法：采用两个主实验和两个预备实验。实验一和实验二的被试人数分别为：85人和87人。两个主实验均采取2 (思维方式：直觉和分析) × 2 (判断依据：简单和复杂)组间实验设计。主要结果：(1)针对简单逃生任务, 直觉组和分析组在不同判断依据条件下的逃生决策效果差异不明显; (2)针对复杂逃生任务, 在简单判断依据条件下分析决策优于直觉决策; 在复杂判断依据条件下直觉决策优于分析决策。主要结论：直觉性和分析性逃生决策的效果主要与决策任务的复杂程度有关, 而与判断依据的复杂程度关系不大。     

On the origin of intermediate effects in clinical case recall

In two experiments, the effects of level of medical expertise and study time on free recall of a clinical case were assessed. In Experiment 1, a nonmonotonic relationship between level of expertise and recall was found: Subjects of intermediate levels of expertise remembered more information from the case than both experts and novices. This “intermediate effect” disappeared, however,when study time was restricted. Analysis of post hoc acquired protocols of pathophysiological knowledge active during case processing suggested that this phenomenon could be attributed to the nature of the pathophysiological knowledge mobilized to comprehend the case. In Experiment 2, this assumption was directly tested by priming relevant pathophysiological knowledge for either a short or a longer period, before enabling subjects to study the case briefly. Free-recall data confirmed and extended the results of Experiment 1. Again, an intermediate effect was found; this time, however, it was generated experimentally. The findings were interpreted in terms of qualitative differences in the nature of the knowledge structures underlying performance between novices, advanced students, and medical experts: Experts use knowledge in an encapsulated mode while comprehending a case, whereas students use elaborated knowledge.     

Take-the-best in expert-novice decision strategies for residential burglary

We examined the decision strategies and cue use of experts and novices in a consequential domain: crime. Three participant groups decided which of two residential properties was more likely to be burgled, on the basis of eight cues such as location of the property. The two expert groups were experienced burglars and police officers, and the novice group was composed of graduate students. We found that experts’ choices were best predicted by a lexicographic heuristic strategy called take-the-best that implies noncompensatory information processing, whereas novices’ choices were best predicted by a weighted additive linear strategy that implies compensatory processing. The two expert groups, however, differed in the cues they considered important in making their choices, and the police officers were actually more similar to novices in this regard. These findings extend the literature on judgment, decision making, and expertise, and have implications for criminal justice policy.     

Sex differences in components of imagined perspective transformation

We explored the impact of motor experience on the interaction between implicit motor simulation and language-processing. In an action familiarity judgment task, expert volleyball players, fans and novices were presented with semantically correct sentences describing possible and not possible motor actions, all as negative or positive contexts, e.g., "Don't shank!" or "Assist!". As processing negated action-phrases is known to reduce simulation states, exposure to negative or positive contexts was used here to test how simulation varies according to motor feasibility (possible, impossible) and experience (experts and fans). A significant group×stimulus×context interaction showed that athletes and fans, took longer to process negative than positive contexts for possible actions, compared to action-impossible sentences. In addition, experts were significantly faster and more accurate than fans and, in turn, they were both more accurate than novices. Thus, implicit motor simulation impacts on action-verb processing depending on (i) the domain-relevant expertise, (ii) the feasibility of the actions, and (iii) on whether scenes are presented in a negated context. These results suggest that the implicit triggering of motor representations is modulated by the context and it is tuned to people's motor repertoire, even when actions are described linguistically.     

Expert Trespassing Testimony and the Ethics of Science Communication

Scientific expert testimony is crucial to public deliberation, but it is associated with many pitfalls. This article identifies one—namely, expert trespassing testimony—which may be characterized, crudely, as the phenomenon of experts testifying outside their domain of expertise. My agenda is to provide a more precise characterization of this phenomenon and consider its ramifications for the role of science in society. I argue that expert trespassing testimony is both epistemically problematic and morally problematic. Specifically, I will argue that scientific experts are subject to a particular obligation. Roughly, this is the obligation to qualify their assertions when speaking outside their domain of scientific expertise in certain contexts. Thus, I argue that scientists who possess expert knowledge are confronted with hard questions about when and how to testify and, therefore, that being a scientific expert comes with great responsibility. Consequently, I provide a concrete “expert guideline” according to which scientific experts, in certain contexts, face an obligation to qualify their assertions when speaking outside their domain of expertise. Furthermore, I consider a number of the conditions in which the guideline is waived or overridden. On this basis, I consider the broader aspects of the roles of scientific experts in a society with a high division of cognitive labor that calls for trust in scientific expert testimony.     

Chess masters show a hallmark of face processing with chess

Face processing has several distinctive hallmarks that researchers have attributed either to face-specific mechanisms or to extensive experience distinguishing faces. Here, we examined the face-processing hallmark of selective attention failure--as indexed by the congruency effect in the composite paradigm--in a domain of extreme expertise: chess. Among 27 experts, we found that the congruency effect was equally strong with chessboards and faces. Further, comparing these experts with recreational players and novices, we observed a trade-off: Chess expertise was positively related to the congruency effect with chess yet negatively related to the congruency effect with faces. These and other findings reveal a case of expertise-dependent, facelike processing of objects of expertise and suggest that face and expert-chess recognition share common processes.     

Accounting for the Appeal to the Authority of Experts

Work in Argumentation Studies (AS) and Studies in Expertise and Experience (SEE) has been proceeding on converging trajectories, moving from resistance to expert authority to a cautious acceptance of its legitimacy. The two projects are therefore also converging on the need to account for how, in the course of complex and confused civic deliberations, nonexpert citizens can figure out which statements from purported experts deserve their trust. Both projects recognize that nonexperts cannot assess expertise directly; instead, the nonexpert must judge whether to trust the expert. But how is this social judgment accomplished? A normative pragmatic approach from AS can complement and extend the work from SEE on this question, showing that the expert’s putting forward of his view and “bonding” it with his reputation for expertise works to force or “blackmail” his audience of citizens into heeding what he says. Appeals to authority thus produce the visibility and accountability we want for expert views in civic deliberations.     

Influence of Domain Knowledge on Monitoring Performance Across the Life Span

Two studies were conducted to investigate effects of domain knowledge on metacognitive monitoring across the life span in materials of different complexity. Participants from 4 age groups (3rd-grade children, adolescents, younger and older adults) were compared using an expert–novice paradigm. In Study 1, soccer experts’ and novices’ ease-of-learning judgments (EOLs), judgments of learning (JOLs), and confidence judgments (CJs) were contrasted when memorizing soccer-related word pairs. In Study 2, monitoring judgments (i.e., a rating of global comprehension, JOLs, and CJs) were collected in regards to a soccer-related narrative. The results of both approaches showed that experts’ better memory performance obtained in both studies was not always accompanied by advantages in monitoring performance. In Study 1, experts of all ages outperformed novices in monitoring accuracy. In Study 2, no benefits of expertise on monitoring were found; in children, novices even surpassed experts in monitoring quality. In both studies, the most consistent influence of previous domain knowledge on monitoring performance concerned more optimistic judgments of experts compared with novices, regardless of stimuli and recall format. In sum, our results document a twofold effect of expertise on monitoring. Although domain-specific knowledge enhances monitoring performance in some situations, more optimistic estimates, presumably due to the application of a familiarity heuristic, typically reduce experts’ monitoring accuracy.     

Chronometric comparisons of imagery to action: visualizing versus physically performing springboard dives

Motor imagery research emphasizes similarities between the mental imagery of an action and its physical execution. In this study, temporal differences between motor imagery and its physical performance as a function of performer expertise, skill complexity, and spatial ability were investigated. Physical execution times for springboard dives were compared with visualized execution times. Results indicate that physical and visualized performance times were not identical: Their relation is a function of dive complexity and diver expertise, but not their interaction. Relative to physical time, visualization time increased with increased complexity, suggesting the involvement of capacity-limited working memory. A nonmonotonic relation was found for expertise: Unlike experts or novices, visualization time for intermediates was significantly slower than physical time. These temporal differences are most consistent with schematic differences in skill representation. Intermediates may be relatively slowed by greater amounts of nonautomatized knowledge, as compared with the automatized knowledge of experts or the sparse knowledge of novices.     

The culture of perceptual expertise and the other-race effect

In our commentary, we propose that the ORE can be viewed as a form of perceptual expertise. Like experts, we recognize own-race faces at the subordinate level as individuals and novices when recognize other-race faces at the basic level of race. Applying a perceptual expertise account, we explain the ORE in terms of its cognitive, neural, and motivational factors. We suggest that by creating a culture of “other-race” expertise, improvements in other-race face recognition can be achieved.     

Analogical transfer and expertise in legal reasoning

Analogical transfer and its relation to expertise is examined in a legal context. Three experiments were conducted comparing the performance of novices (introductory tax students) and of experts (experienced tax practitioners from multinational public accounting firms) on tasks involving the application of tax laws. In Experiment 1 subjects completed a target problem after reading a decided case that was either analogous or not analogous to a target problem. A limited amount of transfer was observed, with no differential rate of transfer across experience levels. In Experiments 2 and 3 attempts were made to facilitate transfer of knowledge by inducing transfer-appropriate processing of the source analog and by providing multiple source analogs. The results of both experiments indicate an interaction between treatment and expertise. Unexpectedly, the facilitating treatments reduced the transfer of knowledge for experts while increasing the transfer for novices. Subsequent analysis of the responses of the expert subjects indicates that for the more experienced expert subjects a highly proceduralized rule interfered with the knowledge transfer when that rule was made salient by the facilitating treatments. The less experienced expert subjects behaved in a manner consistent with the hypotheses. This poor performance of the more experienced experts results from the inflexibility in expert problem solving due to the proceduralization of information processing. Frensch and Sternberg (1989) demonstrate that this type of inflexibility is one of the costs of expertise and results from the development of a large and highly complex knowledge base containing numerous well developed strategies.     

Deliberation versus intuition: Global versus local processing in judgment and choice

Decisions and judgments made after deliberation can differ from expert opinion and be more regretted over time than intuitive judgments and decisions. We investigated a possible underlying process of this phenomenon, namely global versus local processing style. We argue that deliberation induces a local processing style. This processing style narrows conceptual attention and can have detrimental effects on judgment and decision-making. Study 1 showed that intuitive judgments of quality of modern paintings were more accurate than were more deliberate, reasoned judgments. Study 2 showed that local versus global processing style is associated with accuracy of quality judgments of paintings, and Study 3 replicated this finding with an experimental manipulation of processing style. Finally, Study 4 showed that the effect of intuitive versus deliberative decision mode on quality judgments of poems is mediated by processing style.     

Fit between decision mode and processing style predicts subjective value of chosen alternatives

Intuition is associated with a global processing style, whereas deliberation is associated with a local processing style. Drawing on previous research on the effects of decisional fit on the subjective value attached to chosen alternatives, we examined the possibility that a fit between processing style and decision mode results in greater subjective value than a lack of fit. In three experiments employing various combinations of naturally occurring and experimentally manipulated processing styles and decision modes, we found that when congruence was high (i.e., global processing style and intuitive judgment, or local processing style and deliberative judgment), participants judged their chosen item to be more expensive than when congruence was low. These findings indicate that increased fit resulted in higher estimated value. We discuss implications for judgment and decision‐making.     

Adaptive expertise: Effects of type of experience and the level of theoretical understanding it generates

This research investigates the development of transferable—“adaptive”—expertise. The study contrasts problem-solving performance of two kinds of experts (business consultants and restaurant managers) on novel problems at the intersection of their two domains, as well as a group of novices (non-business undergraduates). Despite a lack of restaurant experience, consultants performed better than restaurant managers and undergraduates, even though the problems concerned a restaurant. Process measures suggest this was due to the use of more theoretical reasoning. Analyses show this resulted from differences in work experience and not other factors (e.g., education). We discuss aspects of experience that might be responsible for development of theoretical understanding and, thus, expertise that transfers to novel problems. One possible explanation, consistent with existing research from multiple approaches, is that to transfer to novel problems, experience must include substantive variability. The social context of learning may also play a role.     

双系统逃生决策的顺序替代效应

探讨当信息以不同方式呈现时双系统逃生决策的顺序替代效应。采用单因素完全随机设计,将180名被试平均分配到直觉、分析和直觉后分析三种条件下考察其逃生决策。结果表明：(1)信息直接呈现时,直觉和分析决策、以及直觉和直觉后分析决策均差异显著且趋势相同;(2)信息隐含呈现时,直觉和分析决策差异显著,但直觉和直觉后分析决策差异不显著。结论：当信息直接呈现时个体的逃生决策存在顺序替代;而当信息隐含呈现时存在反顺序替代。     

The relation between problem categorization and problem solving among experts and novices

These investigations were conducted to examine the relationship between problem-solving ability and the criteria used to decide that two classical mechanics problems would be solved similarly. We began by comparing experts and novices on a similarity judgment task and found that the experts predominantly relied on the problems' deep structures in deciding on similarity of solution, although the presence of surface-feature similarity had a clear adverse effect on performance. The novices relied predominantly on surface features, but were capable of using the problems' deep structures under certain conditions. In a second experiment, we compared groups of novices, at the same level of experience, who tended to employ different types of reasoning in making similarity judgments. Compared to novices who relied predominantly on surface features, novices who made greater use of principles tended to categorize problems similarly to how experts categorized them, as well as score higher in problem solving. These results suggest that principles play a fundamental role in the organization of conceptual and procedural knowledge for good problem solvers at all levels.     

Mechanisms and neural basis of object and pattern recognition: a study with chess experts

Comparing experts with novices offers unique insights into the functioning of cognition, based on the maximization of individual differences. Here we used this expertise approach to disentangle the mechanisms and neural basis behind two processes that contribute to everyday expertise: object and pattern recognition. We compared chess experts and novices performing chess-related and -unrelated (visual) search tasks. As expected, the superiority of experts was limited to the chess-specific task, as there were no differences in a control task that used the same chess stimuli but did not require chess-specific recognition. The analysis of eye movements showed that experts immediately and exclusively focused on the relevant aspects in the chess task, whereas novices also examined irrelevant aspects. With random chess positions, when pattern knowledge could not be used to guide perception, experts nevertheless maintained an advantage. Experts' superior domain-specific parafoveal vision, a consequence of their knowledge about individual domain-specific symbols, enabled improved object recognition. Functional magnetic resonance imaging corroborated this differentiation between object and pattern recognition and showed that chess-specific object recognition was accompanied by bilateral activation of the occipitotemporal junction, whereas chess-specific pattern recognition was related to bilateral activations in the middle part of the collateral sulci. Using the expertise approach together with carefully chosen controls and multiple dependent measures, we identified object and pattern recognition as two essential cognitive processes in expert visual cognition, which may also help to explain the mechanisms of everyday perception.     

Conscious thought beats deliberation without attention in diagnostic decision-making: at least when you are an expert

Contrary to what common sense makes us believe, deliberation without attention has recently been suggested to produce better decisions in complex situations than deliberation with attention. Based on differences between cognitive processes of experts and novices, we hypothesized that experts make in fact better decisions after consciously thinking about complex problems whereas novices may benefit from deliberation-without-attention. These hypotheses were confirmed in a study among doctors and medical students. They diagnosed complex and routine problems under three conditions, an immediate-decision condition and two delayed conditions: conscious thought and deliberation-without-attention. Doctors did better with conscious deliberation when problems were complex, whereas reasoning mode did not matter in simple problems. In contrast, deliberation-without-attention improved novices’ decisions, but only in simple problems. Experts benefit from consciously thinking about complex problems; for novices thinking does not help in those cases.