Children's utilization of emotion expectancies in moral decision‐making

This study investigated the relevance of emotion expectancies for children's moral decision‐making. The sample included 131 participants from three different grade levels (M = 8.39 years, SD = 2.45, range 4.58–12.42). Participants were presented a set of scenarios that described various emotional outcomes of (im)moral actions and asked to decide what they would do if they were in the protagonists' shoes. Overall, it was found that the anticipation of moral emotions predicted an increased likelihood of moral choices in antisocial and prosocial contexts. In younger children, anticipated moral emotions predicted moral choice for prosocial actions, but not for antisocial actions. Older children showed evidence for the utilization of anticipated emotions in both prosocial and antisocial behaviours. Moreover, for older children, the decision to act prosocially was less likely in the presence of non‐moral emotions. Findings suggest that the impact of emotion expectancies on children's moral decision‐making increases with age. Contrary to happy victimizer research, the study does not support the notion that young children use moral emotion expectancies for moral decision‐making in the context of antisocial actions.     

Consumer Trust and Advice Acceptance: The Moderating Roles of Benevolence,Expertise, and Negative Emotions

I explored advice acceptance for high‐stakes decisions (i.e., those with subjectively important and risky outcomes), focusing on the relative influence of two components of consumer trust—benevolence and expertise—as well as perceived emotional decision difficulty. Participants solicited advice from experts when their decisions were low in perceived emotional difficulty but favored the advice of predominantly benevolent providers when making highly emotionally difficult decisions. Although consumers who faced emotionally difficult decisions were willing to trade off expertise for benevolence, they did not perceive this non‐normative trade‐off to influence decision quality. Instead, the results support a “stress buffering” effect whereby consumers were more confident in the accuracy of predominantly benevolent providers’ advice.     

DECISION AFFECT THEORY:

Abstract— How do people feel about the outcomes of risky options? Results from two experiments demonstrate that the emotional reaction to a monetary outcome is nor a simple function of the utility of that outcome Emotional responses also depend on probabilities and unobtained outcomes Unexpected outcomes have greater emotional impact than expected outcomes Furthermore any given outcome is lets pleasant if an unobtained outcome is better We propose an account of emotional experiences associated with outcomes of decisions called decision affect theory. It incorporates utilities expectations and counterfactual companions into hedonic responses. Finally, we show that choices between risky options can be described as the maximization of expected emotional experiences as predicted by decision affect theory That is people choose the risky option for which they expect to feel better on average.     

Emotion,Decision, and Risk: Betting on Gambles versus Betting on People

We examined the effects of two emotions, fear and anger, on risk‐taking behavior in two types of tasks: Those in which uncertainty is generated by a randomizing device (“lottery risk”) and those in which it is generated by the uncertain behavior of another person (“person‐based risk”). Participants first completed a writing task to induce fear or anger. They then made choices either between lotteries (Experiment 1) or between actions in risky two‐person decisions (Experiments 2 and 3). The experiments involved substantial real‐money payoffs. Replicating earlier studies (which used hypothetical rewards), Experiment 1 showed that fearful participants were more risk‐averse than angry participants in lottery‐risk tasks. However—the key result of this study—fearful participants were substantially less risk‐averse than angry participants in a two‐person task involving person‐based risk (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 offered options and payoffs identical to those of Experiment 2 but with lottery‐type risk. Risk‐taking returned to the pattern of Experiment 1. The impact of incidental emotions on risk‐taking appears to be contingent on the class of uncertainty involved. For lottery risk, fear increased the frequency of risk‐averse choices and anger reduced it. The reverse pattern was found when uncertainty in the decision was person‐based. Further, the effect was specifically on differences in willingness to take risks rather than on differences in judgments of how much risk was present. The impact of different emotions on risk‐taking or risk‐avoiding behavior is thus contingent on the type, as well as the degree, of uncertainty the decision maker faces. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Impact of Depression on Self–Other Discrepancies in Decision Making

Although there is a small but growing body of literature on how people make risky decisions for others and predict others' decisions, results seem to be contradictory. The authors contribute to the understanding of these mixed results by investigating how depression affects self–other discrepancies in decision making and the psychological processes that underlie these discrepancies. In an experiment, depressed and nondepressed individuals read a series of scenarios involving decisions about health, money, and interpersonal relationships. They then indicated which of two options they would choose for themselves or for another person, or predicted which option this person would choose for himself or herself. Finally, participants reported benefits and drawbacks of the decisions (i.e., cognitions) and feelings about risk. Depressed individuals were less prone to bias when they predicted others' decisions than nondepressed individuals. Feelings about risk played a key role in determining the direction and the magnitude of this bias. In contrast, both depressed and nondepressed individuals showed bias when they made decisions for others. This bias affected their decisions in opposing ways and was determined by cognitions. This bias is consistent with literature showing that depression is associated with an increased sensitivity to social risks. The authors provide a theoretical explanation of self–other discrepancies in decision making in depressed and nondepressed individuals and conclude that the results support the assumption that depression is associated with psychological processes whose role is to increase sensitivity to social threats rather than with a more general negative bias in cognitive functioning. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Extreme Outcomes Sway Risky Decisions from Experience

Whether buying stocks or playing the slots, people making real‐world risky decisions often rely on their experiences with the risks and rewards. These decisions, however, do not occur in isolation but are embedded in a rich context of other decisions, outcomes, and experiences. In this paper, we systematically evaluate how the local context of other rewarding outcomes alters risk preferences. Through a series of four experiments on decisions from experience, we provide evidence for an extreme‐outcome rule, whereby people overweight the most extreme outcomes (highest and lowest) in a given context. As a result, people should be more risk seeking for gains than losses, even with equally likely outcomes. Across the experiments, the decision context was varied so that the same outcomes served as the high extreme, low extreme, or neither. As predicted, people were more risk seeking for relative gains, but only when the risky option potentially led to the high‐extreme outcome. Similarly, people were more risk averse for relative losses, but only when the risky option potentially led to the low‐extreme outcome. We conclude that in risky decisions from experience, the biggest wins and the biggest losses seem to matter more than they should. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The gap between medical and monetary choices under risk persists in decisions for others

Decisions under risk in the medical domain have been found to systematically diverge from decisions in the monetary domain. When making choices between monetary options, people commonly rely on a decision strategy that trades off outcomes with their probabilities; when making choices between medical options, people tend to neglect probability information. In two experimental studies, we tested to what extent differences between medical and monetary decisions also emerge when the decision outcomes affect another person. Using a risky choice paradigm for medical and monetary decisions, we compared hypothetical decisions that participants made for themselves to decisions for a socially distant other (Study 1) and to recommendations as financial advisor or doctor (Study 2). In addition, we examined people's information search in a condition in which information about payoff distributions had to be learned from experiential sampling. Formal modeling and analyses of search behavior revealed a similarly pronounced gap between medical and monetary decisions in decisions for others as in decisions for oneself. Our results suggest that when making medical decisions, people try to avoid the worst outcome while neglecting its probability—even when the outcomes affect others rather than themselves.     

Anticipated Emotions as Guides to Choice

When making decisions, people often anticipate the emotions they might experience as a result of the outcomes of their choices. In the process, they simulate what life would be like with one outcome or another. We examine the anticipated and actual pleasure of outcomes and their relation to choices people make in laboratory studies and real-world studies. We offer a theory of anticipated pleasure that explains why the same outcome can lead to a wide range of emotional experiences. Finally, we show how anticipated pleasure relates to risky choice within the framework of subjective expected pleasure theory.     

Conservatives Anticipate and Experience Stronger Emotional Reactions to Negative Outcomes

The present work examined whether conservatives and liberals differ in their anticipation of their own emotional reactions to negative events. In two studies, participants imagined experiencing positive or negative outcomes in domains that do not directly concern politics. In Study 1, 190 American participants recruited online (64 male, M_age = 32 years) anticipated their emotional responses to romantic relationship outcomes. In Study 2, 97 Canadian undergraduate students (26 male, M_age = 21 years) reported on their anticipated and experienced emotional responses to academic outcomes. In both studies, more conservative participants predicted they would feel stronger negative emotions following negative outcomes than did more liberal participants. Furthermore, a longitudinal follow‐up of Study 2 participants revealed that more conservative participants actually felt worse than more liberal participants after receiving a lower‐than‐desired exam grade. These effects remained even when controlling for the Big Five traits, prevention focus, and attachment style (Study 1), and optimism (Study 2). We discuss how the relationship between political orientation and anticipated affect likely contributes to differences between conservatives and liberals in styles of decision and policy choices.     

Reducing uncertainty to promote appropriate decisions when facing hazardous phenomena at an active volcano

This study investigated a new direction for improving the decision making of populations at risk in the context of uncertain environmental events, such as volcanic hazards. According to the risk as feelings theory and dual process models, situations with certain outcomes do not necessarily require the use of affect heuristics (e.g., experienced feelings, anticipated emotions) as valid information in the decision‐making process. In the case of difficult decisions with moral dilemmas, certainty could even improve decisions. Thus, using an ecological design with various scenarios depicting upcoming volcanic hazards, we examined whether reducing the uncertainty of lethal threat by conveying certainty in an information campaign could influence decision making and promote a better quality of choice (correct application of the recommendations from the competent authorities). We focused specifically on two populations composed of local people living in the vicinity of an active volcano (Tungurahua volcano, Ecuador) and local scientists. We also examined whether a difficult decision involving a moral dilemma (e.g., leaving people behind so as not to jeopardize one's own life) potentiated this effect, compared to a less difficult situation without a dilemma. We demonstrated that, for local people facing a moral dilemma (difficult decision), the reduction of uncertainty of lethal threat involved a better application of the actual recommendations. These outcomes provided perspectives on improving the applications of the recommendations among local populations at risk in the context of a real risk exposure.     

Anticipated Regret and Time Perspective: Changing Sexual Risk-taking Behavior

In two studies we test the effects of anticipated affective reactions such as regret on behavioral expectations and behavior. These effects were examined in the context of sexual risk-taking behavior. More specifically, we tested the impact of the anticipated feelings associated with unsafe sex on sexual risk-taking behavior. We assumed a difference between the feelingsabout unsafe sex and the feelings people anticipate to haveafter this behavior. Two studies tested the hypothesis that respondents who are induced to focus on their anticipated, post-behavioral feelings are more likely to report negative feelings such as regret and to adopt safer sexual practices than respondents who are asked to focus on their feelings about the behavior itself. Study 1 shows that anticipated feelings after unsafe sex were more negative than feelings about the behavioral act itself, and that respondents who were asked to consider these anticipated feelings expressed stronger expectations to reduce their risk in future interactions. Thus, asking respondents to take a wider time perspective, and to consider the feelings they would haveafter having had unsafe sex, resulted in ‘safer’ behavioral expectations. Study 2 replicates the findings of Study 1, and also yielded a reliable effect of the time perspective manipulation on actual, self-reported behavior. Respondents who were asked to report on their anticipated feelings after unsafe sex showed less risky behavior in the five months following the experiment than the remaining respondents. Thus, the induced focus on post-behavioral emotions increased the likelihood of preventive behavior. Implications of these findings for behavioral intervention programs are discussed.     

Risking Everything in Obsessive–Compulsive Disorder: An Analogue Decision-Making Study

An experiment examined decision-making processes among nonclinical participants with low or high levels of OCD symptomatology (N?=?303). To better simulate the decision environments that are most likely to be problematic for clients with OCD, we employed decision tasks that incorporated “black swan” options that have a very low probability but involve substantial loss. When faced with a choice between a safer option that involved no risk of loss or a riskier alternative with a very low probability of substantial loss, most participants chose the safer option regardless of OCD symptom level. However, when faced with choices between options that had similar expected values to the previous choices, but where each option had some low risk of a substantial loss, there was a significant shift towards riskier decisions. These effects were stronger when the task involved a contamination based, health-relevant decision task as compared to one with financial outcomes. The results suggest that both low and high symptom OC participants approach decisions involving risk-free options and decisions involving risky alternatives in qualitatively different ways. There was some evidence that measures of impulsivity were better predictors of the shift to risky decision making than OCD symptomatology.

     

High‐Stakes Decision‐Making Within Complex Social Environments: A Computational Model of Belief Systems in the Arab Spring

People experiencing similar conditions may make different decisions, and their belief systems provide insight about these differences. An example of high‐stakes decision‐making within a complex social context is the Arab Spring, in which large numbers of people decided to protest and even larger numbers decided to stay at home. This study uses qualitative analyses of interview narratives and social media addressing individual decisions to develop a computational model tracing the cognitive decision‐making process. The model builds on work by Abelson and Carroll (1965), Schank and Abelson (1977), and Axelrod (1976) to systematically trace the inferences connecting beliefs to decisions. The findings show that protest decisions were often based on positive emotions such as pride, hope, courage, and solidarity, triggered by beliefs about successful protest and self‐sacrifice. By contrast, decisions to stay at home were triggered by beliefs about safety, state approval, and living conditions. As one participant said, “When I heard about the revolution in Tunisia, my heart was filled with solidarity for the people.” In the words of a non‐participant: “When people are killed, we must be careful. There are more important things than protest: safety and stability.” This study of individual explanations about events identifies the role of emotions in high‐stakes decision‐making within complex social environments.     

The role of self‐esteem and anxiety in decision making for self versus others in relationships

Previous research has documented a tendency for people to make more risk‐seeking decisions for others than for themselves in relationship scenarios. Two experiments investigated whether this self–other difference is moderated by participants' self‐esteem and anxiety levels. In Experiment 1, lower self‐esteem and higher anxiety levels were associated with more risk‐averse choices for personal decisions but not for decisions for others. Therefore, participants with lower self‐esteem/higher anxiety showed greater self–other differences in comparison to participants with higher self‐esteem/lower anxiety levels. Experiment 2 demonstrated that this effect was largely mediated by participants' expectations of success and feelings about potential negative outcomes. These results are discussed in the context of “threats to the self,” with a central role played by anxiety and self‐esteem threats in personal decision making but not in decision making for others. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What goes around comes around: The integrated role of emotions on consumer ethical decision‐making

The current study aims to further our understanding of the integrated role of emotions on consumer decision‐making involving ethical issues, by considering the influence of both positive and negative emotions on ethical decision‐making process. It considers not only the emotions experienced prior to ethical decision‐making (pre‐decision emotions) but also those resulting from the course of action chosen (post‐decision emotions). Scenarios are used, and the results of the structural modelling analyses support the proposed relationships between current emotions, consumers' ethical decision‐making, post‐decision emotions and future ethical behavioural intentions. The data suggest the possible existence of a “virtuous ethical cycle”, whereby positive emotions lead to more ethical consumer decisions and behaviours; and these in turn lead to more positive (post‐decision) emotions, which have a positive and significant effect on future ethical behavioural intentions. In addition, happiness emerges as exerting a pivotal role in predicting consumer ethical decisions.     

Parental rearing behavior prospectively predicts adolescents’ risky decision‐making and feedback‐related electrical brain activity

The present study examined the role of parental rearing behavior in adolescents’ risky decision‐making and the brain's feedback processing mechanisms. Healthy adolescent participants (n = 110) completed the EMBU‐C, a self‐report questionnaire on perceived parental rearing behaviors between 2006 and 2008 (T1). Subsequently, after an average of 3.5 years, we assessed (a) risky decision‐making during performance of the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART); (b) event‐related brain potentials (ERPs) elicited by positive (gain) and negative feedback (loss) during the BART; and (c) self‐reported substance use behavior (T2). Age‐corrected regression analyses showed that parental rejection at T1 accounted for a unique and significant proportion of the variance in risk‐taking during the BART; the more adolescents perceived their parents as rejecting, the more risky decisions were made. Higher levels of perceived emotional warmth predicted increased P300 amplitudes in response to positive feedback at T2. Moreover, these larger P300 amplitudes (gain) significantly predicted risky decision‐making during the BART. Parental rearing behaviors during childhood thus seem to be significant predictors of both behavioral and electrophysiological indices of risky decision‐making in adolescence several years later. This is in keeping with the notion that environmental factors such as parental rearing are important in explaining adolescents’ risk‐taking propensities.     

Emotional processes in risky and multiattribute health decisions

Objective: Here, we develop an integrative account of the roles of emotion in decision-making. In Part I, we illustrate how emotional inputs into decisions may rely on physiological signals from emotions experienced while making the decision, and we review evidence suggesting that the failure to represent the emotional meaning of options can often reduce decision quality. We propose that health-related decrements in the ability to generate emotional reactions lead people to inaccurately represent emotional responses and compromise decisions, particularly about risk. Part II explores complex decisions in which choice options involve trade-offs between positive and negative attributes. We first review evidence showing that difficult trade-off decisions generate negative affect and physiological arousal. Next, we propose that medical decision-making will be linked to short- and long-term stress and health outcomes.

Conclusion: In sum, this article proposes and reviews initial evidence supporting the effective use and management of emotional inputs as important to both clinical and non-clinical populations. Our approach will contribute to the understanding of patient-centred emotional decision-making and will inform medical decision aids.     

Strategy Selection in Risky Choice: The Impact of Numeracy,Affect, and Cross‐Cultural Differences

Real‐world decisions often involve options with outcomes that are uncertain and trigger strong affect (e.g., side effects of a drug). Previous work suggests that when choosing among affect‐rich risky prospects, people are rather insensitive to probability information, potentially compromising decision quality. We modeled the strategies of less and more numerate participants in the United States and in Germany when choosing between affect‐rich prospects and between monetarily equivalent affect‐poor prospects. Using large probabilistic national samples (n = 1047 from the United States and Germany), Study 1 showed that compared with more numerate participants, less numerate participants chose the normatively better option (i.e., the one with the higher expected value) less often, guessed more often, and relied more on a simple risk‐minimizing strategy. U.S. participants—although less numerate—selected the normatively better option more frequently and were more consistent across affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems than the German participants. Using a targeted quota sample (n = 118 from Germany), Study 2 indicated that although both more and less numerate participants paid less attention to probability information in affect‐rich than in affect‐poor problems, the two numeracy groups relied on different outcome‐based heuristics: More numerate participants often followed the minimax heuristic, and less numerate participants the affect heuristic. The observed strategy differences suggest that attempts to improve decision‐making need to take into account individual differences in numeracy as well as cultural‐specific experiences in making trade‐offs. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.