Why treat the wounded? Warrior care, military salvage, and national health

Because the goal of military medicine is salvaging the wounded who can return to duty, military medical ethics cannot easily defend devoting scarce resources to those so badly injured that they cannot return to duty. Instead, arguments turn to morale and political obligation to justify care for the seriously wounded. Neither argument is satisfactory. Care for the wounded is not necessary to maintain an army's morale. Nor is there any moral or logical connection between the right to health care (a universal human right) and the duty to defend one's nation (a local political duty). Once badly wounded, soldiers enjoy the same right to medical care as any similarly ill or injured individual. National health care systems grasp this point and offer few additional health care benefits to veterans. In the United States, however, lack of universal health coverage skews the debate to focus on special entitlements for veterans without considering the health care rights that other citizens enjoy.     

The Effect of a Majority Group’s Perspective-Taking on Minority Helping

The current study examines how perspective-taking impacts on a majority group’s support for the governmental actions to help minority groups. The contextual background of the current study is tense relations between Sunnis representing a Muslim majority and Ahmadis and Shiites representing Muslim minorities in Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim population. The results (N = 200) demonstrated that strong perspective-taking than weak perspective-taking triggered a greater minority helping, but only among the majority who strongly identified with their nation, but not with Sunnis. Moreover, participants in the strong perspective-taking condition than those in the weak perspective-taking condition demonstrated a greater willingness to perceptually include minorities as a representative group of national citizens, but not as Muslims, and in turn this perceived inclusion mediated the effect of perspective-taking on minority helping. We also hypothesised and found that such a mediating role of perceived inclusion of minorities as national citizens was more pronounced when the national identification and not Sunni identification was high. Finally, the inclusion of Muslim minorities as national citizens and minority helping increased identity enhancement of national identity, but these effects were more pronounced when the majority strongly identified with their nation, but not with Sunnis. These findings suggest that the merits of perspective-taking in promoting help on behalf of minority groups is not generic, but limited to a specific domain of superordinate category to which these minority groups are included, and to the nature of group identification.     

Samaritanism and Civil Disobedience

In this paper, I defend the existence of a moral duty to disobey the law and engage in civil disobedience on the basis of one of the grounds of political obligation—the Samaritan duty. Christopher H. Wellman has recently offered a ‘Samaritan account’ of state legitimacy and political obligation, according to which the state is justified in coercing each citizen in order to rescue all from the perilous circumstances of the state of nature; and each of us is bound to obey the law, as the state demands, because we each have a responsibility to help rescue others when this assistance is not unreasonably costly. Though Wellman recognizes that there can be reasons for disobeying the law and resisting injustice in otherwise legitimate states, he overlooks the possibility that at least some of these reasons could be Samaritan in nature, grounded in the duty to rescue people from peril. As I shall argue, the Samaritan duty supports obligations to disobey the law, when the law prohibits Samaritan rescues, and to engage in civil disobedience, when unjust laws and practices contribute to endangering people. The discussion proceeds as follows. After a brief overview of the Samaritan duty, I articulate my case for Samaritan duties to disobey the law, and duties to engage in civil disobedience when unjust laws, institutions, or practices enable what I call ‘persistent Samaritan perils’. I then examine and respond to several objections to my account: first, that the costs of law-breaking are unreasonable, and thus cannot be morally required; second, that individuals’ particular acts of protest and civil disobedience do not appear to make any difference to the rescue, and thus cannot be required; third, that I stretch the Samaritan duty beyond recognition; and fourth, that the Samaritan duty binds us to help people in need or peril anywhere, not particularly at home. I consider in conclusion the advantages and limits of my account of citizens’ Samaritan duties in the face of injustice.     

Moral Expertise?: Constitutional Narratives and Philosophical Argument

Using the bench trial of Colorado's Amendment 2 as an example, this article focuses on the more general question of expert testimony in moral philosophy. It argues that there is indeed expertise in moral philosophy but argues against admitting such expert testimony in cases dealing with what John Rawls terms "constitutional essentials" and 'matters of basic justice." Developing the idea of public reason inherent in the Rawlsian concept of political liberalism, the article argues that philosophers can and should speak out on public issues, if they do so with due respect for certain restrictions, but that they should not serve as expert witnesses on core constitutional questions, since doing so suggests that they claim a type of authority that would require fellow citizens to defer to their views. Such claims to authority in basic ethical matters threaten the mutual respect for divergent comprehensive doctrines that lies at the core of political liberalism. Philosophers have a duty to serve the public good, and they perform this service in fruitful ways. But they should refuse a public role that appears incompatible with equal respect for the committed ethical searching of their fellow citizens.     

Why the Duty to Self-Censor Requires Social-Media Users to Maintain Their Own Privacy

Revelations of personal matters often have negative consequences for social-media users. These consequences trigger frequent warnings, practical rather than moral in nature, that social-media users should consider carefully what they reveal about themselves since their revelations might cause them various difficulties in the future. I set aside such practical considerations and argue that social-media users have a moral obligation to maintain their own privacy that is rooted in the duty to self-censor. Although Anita L. Allen provides a paternalist justification of the duty that supports my position that social-media users are obligated to self-censor what they reveal about themselves, I justify the obligation through considerations that are more palatable to liberals than is paternalism. I accomplish this by arguing that the failure to self-censor often creates for others undue burdens that individuals are obligated morally not to create. In particular, social-media revelations often create undue burdens for those, such as employers and university personnel, who are obligated morally to respect individuals’ privacy in their decision-making processes. I also demonstrate that this argument is not for a broad duty to self-censor, but, rather, for a narrow duty that applies to particular circumstances such as certain uses of social media.

     

“To serve and protect” when expecting to be seen negatively: The relation between police officers' contact with citizens,meta‐stereotyping,and work‐related well‐being

We examined the relationship between contact of police officers with citizens, their (meta‐)stereotypes about citizens, and their work‐related well‐being. Ninety‐three police officers from 4 police stations in low‐ and high‐crime regions in France completed the questionnaire. As expected, negative well‐being of police officers is predicted by negative contact with citizens and their belief that police officers are stereotyped negatively by citizens. Moreover, the relationship between negative contact and negative well‐being was mediated by police officers' beliefs that police officers are perceived negatively by citizens, whereas their perceptions of citizens did not mediate this relationship. Interestingly, level of crime did not influence these relationships. Together, this research shows the important role of beliefs about how one's group is stereotyped when in contact with another group as it may have consequences for people's well‐being.     

Reciprocity,Vulnerability, and the Moral Significance of Herd Immunity

This article proposes a novel defense of vaccine mandates: such policies are justifiable because they protect the capabilities of individuals who cannot cultivate individual immunity against infection. We begin by considering a nearby argument that has recently enjoyed popularity, which claims individuals have an enforceable obligation to get vaccinated because they have benefited from community protection (often referred to as ‘herd immunity’), and thus they ought to do their fair share in sustaining that public good by getting vaccinated. We object, however, that this kind of argument misstates the ethical basis for vaccine mandates because community protection primarily protects unvaccinated people. We contend that the duty to vaccinate is not fundamentally an obligation to make a fair contribution to a public good from which vaccinated people benefit, but a duty to protect the wellbeing of otherwise vulnerable third parties. We flesh out our view by drawing on Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach.     

THE BEGINNING OF COMMUNITY: POLITICS IN THE FACE OF DISAGREEMENT

Rawls' requirement that citizens of liberal democracies support only policies which they believe can be justified in 'public reason' depends on a certain ideal for the relationships between citizens. This is a valuable ideal, and thus citizens have reasons to try to achieve it. But it is not always possible to find the common ground that we would need in order to do so, and thus we should reject Rawls' strong claim that we have an obligation to defend our views in public reason. Because I recognize that we have strong reasons to conduct our political enquiry within the guidelines of political liberalism, but deny that we always have an obligation to do so, one might call my view 'permissive political liberalism'.     

Reasons for Not Helping

Second-grade, fourth-grade, sixth-grade, high school, and college students (N = 140) were asked to describe situations in which they would not help someone else and their reasons for not helping in those situations. Younger subjects used perceived self-incompetence as a reason for not helping more frequently than did older subjects. In contrast, older subjects more frequently cited a desire not to violate another's personal situation and/or their own internalized values, laws, and rules as reasons not to help than did their younger counterparts. For a majority of the not-helping categories, however, no significant effect of age level was found, and indeed, some individuals in even the youngest age group expressed subtle and insightful reasons for not helping.     

Causes and consequences of time perception differences in overweight and normal weight people.

Three experiments considered whether there are differences between overweight and normal weight subjects in time perception which represent the obese subjects' lack of internal responsiveness as well as heightened external reactivity in a noneating setting. In the first study, no time-relevant cues were provided, and overweight subjects were inaccurate in their temporal judgments and showed significantly higher group variability than did normals. In the second study, the effects of differential temporal information generated by interesting and boring cues was considered. The presentation of these time-relevant external cues reduced the judgment variability of the overweight subjects and influenced their perceived passage of time significantly more than normals. The third study examined the influence, on eating behavior, of differences in perceived passage of time as a consequence of manipulating cues for interest or boredom. When bored, overweight subjects perceived time to pass more slowly than did normals and thus ate sooner. Similarly, they delayed eating, judging time to have passed more quickly than it actually had, when they were attending to interesting cues. The implications of a generalized lack of internal sensitivity for a theory about the development and consequences of obesity are discussed.     

Cognitive biases in moral judgments that affect political behavior

Cognitive biases that affect decision making may affect the decisions of citizens that influence public policy. To the extent that decisions follow principles other than maximizing utility for all, it is less likely that utility will be maximized, and the citizens will ultimately suffer the results. Here I outline some basic arguments concerning decisions by citizens, using voting as an example. I describe two types of values that may lead to sub-optimal consequences when these values influence political behavior: moralistic values (which people are willing to impose on others regardless of the consequences) and protected values (PVs, values protected from trade-offs). I present evidence against the idea that voting is expressive, i.e., that voters aim to express their moral views rather than to have an effect on outcomes. I show experimentally that PVs are often moralistic. Finally, I present some data that citizens’ think of their duty in a parochial way, neglecting out-groups. I conclude that moral judgments are important determinants of citizen behavior, that these judgments are subject to biases and based on moralistic values, and that, therefore, outcomes are probably less good than they could be.     

When do victim group members feel a moral obligation to help suffering others?

In four experiments, we assessed when the salience of ingroup historical victimization will encourage a sense of moral obligation to reduce the suffering of others. Historically victimized groups (Jews and women; Experiments 1 and 3) who considered the lessons of the past for their ingroup felt heightened moral obligation to help other non‐adversary victimized groups. However, when the suffering outgroup was an adversary, Jews (Experiment 2) and women (Experiment 4) who focused on the lesson of historical victimization for their ingroup reported lower moral obligation to reduce others' suffering. The lesson focus effect on moral obligation was mediated by benefit finding as well as perceived similarity to the outgroup. Means to facilitate moral obligation, as well as limiting factors, among victimized group members are discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Case of Guest Workers: Exploitation,Citizenship and Economic Rights

Working from a ``capitalist' theory of exploitation, based on a neo-classical account of economic value, I argue that guest workers are exploited. It may be objected, however, that since they are not citizens, any inequality that stems from their status as non-citizens is morally unobjectionable. Although host countries are under no moral obligation to admit guest workers as citizens, thereare independent reasons that call for the extension of economicrights – the freedom of occupation in particular – to guestworkers. Since the cause of unequal exchange rests in the factthat guest workers are deprived of these rights, rather than in their exclusion from citizenship per se, I concludethat they are exploited even if their exclusion from citizenshipmay be justified.     

Family obligation and the transition to young adulthood

Changes in a sense of obligation to assist, support, and respect the family were examined among an ethnically diverse group of 745 American individuals as they began to move from secondary school into young adulthood. A sense of family obligation increased for all young adults, with slight variations according to ethnic and financial backgrounds. Young adults from Filipino and Latin American families reported the strongest sense of familial duty during young adulthood, which partially explained their tendency to live with and contribute financially to their families. The implications of family obligation for employment and educational persistence depended on age and academic performance in high school. Finally, a sense of family obligation was associated with more positive emotional well-being.     

Making Attentive Citizens: The Ethics of Democratic Engagement,Political Equality,and Social Justice

Much discussion of the ethics of participation focuses on electoral participation and whether citizens are obligated or can be coerced to vote. Yet these debates have ignored that citizens must first pay attention to politics and make up their minds about where they stand before they can engage in any form of participation. This article considers the importance for liberal democracy of citizens paying attention to politics, or attentive citizenship. It argues that the democratic state has an obligation to cultivate interest in politics and that this obligation authorizes means up to and including some forms of coercion. The argument is that when citizens are inattentive to politics, it undermines political equality and social justice because it undermines what John Rawls called the fair value of the political liberties. The importance of these ends for liberal democratic states requires them to take steps to promote attentive citizenship.     

The Obligation to Know: Information and the Burdens of Citizenship

Contemporary persons are daily confronted with enormous quantities of information, some of which reveal causal connections between their actions and harm that is visited upon distant others. Given their limited cognitive and information processing capacities, persons cannot reasonably be expected to respond to every cry for help or call to action, but neither can they defensibly refuse to hear and reflect upon any of them. Persons have a limited obligation to know, I argue, which requires that they inform themselves and others about their role in harmful social practices, with a view toward challenging the norms that sustain such practices. In this paper, I explore this obligation to know, and the related idea of excusable ignorance, offering accounts of the epistemic burden that it entails for persons in their capacities as citizens and in the context of global climate change and of reproach as a potentially effective tool for rectifying rather than excusing ignorance.     

Paying for positive group esteem: how inequity frames affect whites' responses to redistributive policies

This article finds that, when faced with racial inequity framed as White advantage, Whites' desire to think well of their racial group increases their support for policies perceived to harm Whites. Across 4 studies, the article provides evidence that (a) relative to minority disadvantage, White advantage increases Whites' support for policies perceived to reduce their group's economic opportunities, but does not increase support for policies perceived to increase minority opportunities; and (b) the effect of White advantage on Whites' esteem for their ingroup drives the effect of inequity frame on support for policies perceived to reduce Whites' opportunities.     

POLITICAL OBLIGATION AND THE PARTICULARITY PROBLEM

Natural duty theorists of political obligation try to base a moral duty to obey the law on some natural duty, such as the duty to promote justice. Their critics say they confront an insurmountable obstacle in the particularity problem: Since natural duties do not bind us to some persons and institutions more strongly than to others, they cannot support a duty to one particular state or society. I solve the particularity problem, by developing a version of the political obligation thesis, giving a natural duty argument for it and showing that the particularity problem does not arise for the argument. I reply to some likely objections to my view.