An eye‐tracking study on information processing in risky decisions: Evidence for compensatory strategies based on automatic processes

Many everyday decisions have to be made under risk and can be interpreted as choices between gambles with different outcomes that are realized with specific probabilities. The underlying cognitive processes were investigated by testing six sets of hypotheses concerning choices, decision times, and information search derived from cumulative prospect theory, decision field theory, priority heuristic and parallel constraint satisfaction models. Our participants completed 40 decision tasks of two gambles with two non‐negative outcomes each. Information search was recorded using eye‐tracking technology. Results for choices, decision time, the amount of information searched for, fixation durations, the direction of the information search, and the distribution of fixations conflict with the prediction of the non‐compensatory priority heuristic and indicate that individuals use compensatory strategies. Choice proportions are well in line with the predictions of cumulative prospect theory. Process measures indicate that individuals thereby do not rely on deliberate calculations of weighted sums. Information integration processes seem to be better explained by models that partially rely on automatic processes such as decision field theory or parallel constraint satisfaction models. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Meta‐analytic Investigations of the Relation Between Intuition and Analysis

Over 50 years of research on cognitive style has converged on the importance of individual differences in use of intuition and analysis. This program of research is characterized, however, by two incompatible perspectives about the relation between intuition and analysis. The distinction concerns whether intuition and analysis are opposite poles of a single dimension or whether they are orthogonal constructs. Two studies report meta‐analytic investigations of the relation between intuition and analysis. A meta‐analysis of the existing research base (k = 80; n = 27 501) showed that intuition and analysis are uncorrelated. A second meta‐analysis of combinations of subscales from different cognitive style measures (n = 511) supported the results of the first meta‐analysis. Confirmatory factor analysis also supported the existence of two uncorrelated constructs. Overall, the findings support the view that intuition and analysis are independent constructs, rather than opposite ends of a bipolar continuum. In addition, the findings suggest measures of analysis or rationality are not interchangeable. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Impact of “Display‐Set” Options on Decision‐Making

The way a choice set is constructed can have a significant influence on how individuals perceive and evaluate their options, and make decisions between them. Here, I examine whether a “display set” of visible but unavailable options can exert these same types of influences on whether or not to choose a single (target) item. Across a series of experiments, purchase intent is increased when the display set and target are drawn from the same category, but decreased when the display and target items are mismatched. This effect is shown to depend on perceived similarity, such that increasing display‐target similarity increases purchase intent towards the target. Furthermore, contrary to the predictions made by previous neural and behavioral research on choice sets, the relative value and/or number of display‐only items have no significant impact on these decisions. These findings reveal a novel choice behavior in commonly encountered settings such as online marketplaces. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Test of the analysis of competing hypotheses in legal decision‐making

The analysis of competing hypotheses (ACH) has been suggested to be a method that can protect against confirmation bias in the context of intelligence analysis. In the current study, we aimed to determine whether ACH could counter confirmation bias in the reasoning with evidence in the context of criminal law proceedings. Law students (N = 191) received information about the ACH method or general information about biases. They were given a case vignette with a main suspect and a list of 24 questions, 6 of which they could ask about the case. Half of the questions related to incriminating information, whereas the other half related to exonerating information. Contrary to our expectations, participants in both conditions favoured questions relating to exonerating information and rated the exonerating evidence as being more important for their decision. Despite the lack of bias observed, it seems participants failed to properly apply the ACH method.     

“All‐or‐None” Versus “Most‐or‐Some” Options in Risky Choice: Effects of Domain and Handedness

Two methodological variants of Kahneman and Tversky's Asian disease scenario were investigated. One variant involved replacing the “all‐or‐none” outcome scenarios of the risky choice with “most‐or‐some” scenario outcomes, and the second variant involved replacing the negative domain of lives lost with a positive domain of jobs created. In addition, the effects of strength of handedness, a variable related to individual differences in risk perception, were examined. Results indicated that standard framing effects were obtained across both domains, with a decrease in risky choice under the gain domain. Scenario type also interacted with handedness, such that the all‐or‐none scenario yielded framing effects for consistent (strong)‐handers only, whereas the most‐or‐some scenario yielded framing effects for inconsistent (mixed)‐handers only (consistent‐handers are those who use the same hand exclusively for almost all activities). These results demonstrate that framing effects are strongly influenced by the presence versus absence of extreme/absolute outcomes and that individuals (in this case, decision makers with varying degrees of handedness strength) are differentially sensitive to different pieces of information. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Preadolescent Decision‐Making Competence Predicts Interpersonal Strengths and Difficulties: A 2‐Year Prospective Study

Recent research has demonstrated that decision‐making competence (DMC), a latent construct reflecting individual differences in rational thought, is predictive of real‐world decision outcomes at various stages of life. This construct has been shown to be associated with concurrent and retrospective accounts of health‐risking behavior, but its predictive validity has yet to be demonstrated. In the present study, we examine this issue using a 2‐year prospective, multiple‐informant design. Specifically, we tested the degree to which preadolescent DMC (PA‐DMC) obtained at ages 10–11 years (Time 1; N = 101) predicted both self‐reports and caregiver reports of emotional, behavioral, and peer‐related difficulties obtained 2 years later (Time 2; N = 76). Holding variables such as numeracy and inhibitory control constant, lower Time 1 PA‐DMC scores predicted greater reported Time 2 psychosocial difficulties (i.e. peer, conduct, emotional, and hyperactivity/inattention problems). Additionally, higher PA‐DMC scores were associated with greater self‐reported prosocial behaviors at Time 2. These results highlight the utility of testing individual differences in rational responding. We discuss the potential for improving children's decision‐making processes. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The illusion of courage in self‐predictions: Mispredicting one's own behavior in embarrassing situations

People exhibit an “illusion of courage” when predicting their own behavior in embarrassing situations. In three experiments, participants overestimated their own willingness to engage in embarrassing public performances in exchange for money when those performances were psychologically distant: Hypothetical or in the relatively distant future. This illusion of courage occurs partly because of cold/hot empathy gaps. That is, people in a relatively “cold” unemotional state underestimate the influence on their own preferences and behaviors of being in a relative “hot” emotional state such as social anxiety evoked by an embarrassing situation. Consistent with this cold/hot empathy gap explanation, putting people “in touch” with negative emotional states by arousing fear (Experiments 1 and 2) and anger (Experiment 2) decreased people's willingness to engage in psychologically distant embarrassing public performances. Conversely, putting people “out of touch” with social anxiety through aerobic exercise, which reduces state anxiety and increases confidence, increased people's willingness to engage in psychologically distance embarrassing public performances (Experiment 3). Implications for self‐predictions, self‐evaluation, and affective forecasting are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Secrecy Heuristic: Inferring Quality from Secrecy in Foreign Policy Contexts

Three experiments demonstrate that in the context of U.S. foreign policy decision making, people infer informational quality from secrecy. In Experiment 1, people weighed secret information more heavily than public information when making recommendations about foreign political candidates. In Experiment 2, people judged information presented in documents ostensibly produced by the Department of State and the National Security Council as being of relatively higher quality when those documents were secret rather than public. Finally, in Experiment 3, people judged a National Security Council document as being of higher quality when presented as a secret document rather than a public document and evaluated others' decisions more favorably when those decisions were based on secret information. Discussion centers on the mediators, moderators, and broader implications of this secrecy heuristic in foreign policy contexts.     

Reflections of the self: how self‐esteem determines decision framing and increases risk taking

Historically, research examining the influence of individual personality factors on decision processing has been sparse. In this paper we investigate how one important individual aspect, self‐esteem, influences imposition and subsequent processing of ambiguously, negatively or positively framed decision tasks. We hypothesized that low self‐esteem individuals would impose a negative frame onto ambiguous decision problems and would be especially sensitive to negatively framed decision tasks. In Study 1 we utilized a self‐framing procedure and demonstrated that HSE participants were evenly divided in the hedonic valence they self‐imposed whereas LSE participants were more likely to self‐impose a negative frame. When these differences were accounted for, HSE and LSE participants were equivalent in risk seeking/avoiding choices. Study 2 used a risky‐choice framing task and found that LSE individuals were especially sensitive to the negative frame. Study 3, provided converging evidence and generalization of these findings to a reflection tasks involving money. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Physiological Correlates of Choice‐Induced Dissonance: An Exploration of HPA‐Axis Responses

Choice can produce a negatively arousing cognitive conflict (called dissonance), which is thought to motivate the chooser to spread their preferences for the relevant options (called Spreading of Alternatives, or SA). The current work aimed to determine the relationship between HPA‐axis activity and both choice‐induced dissonance and its reduction (i.e. SA) among individuals with varying cultural backgrounds. European–Americans and Asians made a choice between two equally attractive CDs either in the presence of a cue indicative of social eyes (i.e. public‐choice condition) or in the absence thereof (i.e. private‐choice condition). As predicted, European–Americans and Asians showed a reliable SA primarily in the private and public choice conditions, respectively. Importantly, a sharp decline of salivary cortisol was observed over the span of 30 min, and, moreover, this decline was reliably predicted by the magnitude of SA regardless of either culture or the choice being private vs. public. These results suggest that although choice‐induced dissonance is too weak to elicit an HPA‐axis stress response, SA is associated with variability in the decline of salivary cortisol during the laboratory task. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Authorship Decision Making: An Empirical Investigation

This empirical study concerns the authorship credit decision-making processes and outcomes that occur among coauthors in cases of multiauthored publications. The 2002 American Psychological Association (APA) Ethics Code offers standards for determining authorship order; however, little is known about how these decisions are made in actual practice. Results from a survey of 109 randomly selected authors indicated that most authors were satisfied with the decision-making process and outcome with few disagreements. Participants reported cases of both undeserved authorship being given and omission of deserving contributors' names as coauthors. Some factors associated with authorship decisions included “sense of loyalty or obligation,” “publish or perish pressures,” and “power differentials.” Authors who used APA standards were significantly more satisfied with both the process and outcome of authorship credit decisions.     

Problem Representation,Option Generation,and Poliheuristic Theory: An Experimental Analysis

Poliheuristic (PH) theory has received strong empirical support for its depiction of the option selection process: it explains how leaders evaluate, weigh, and ultimately choose among a set of policy options. But PH theory does not explain how this initial set of options is generated. Foreign policy problem representation (PR) research has shown that the way in which leaders mentally represent decision problems determines which options are generated for consideration. In this article, we develop a hybrid PR‐PH framework in which leaders’ problem representations drive an unconscious screening process that occurs prior to the conscious screening of PH stage 1. We test hypotheses drawn from this framework experimentally and find that key elements of PR (most notably, perceived threat) determine which options consciously occur to decision makers and which options are not generated during a simulated foreign policy crisis.     

The Use of Touch in Counseling: An Ethical Decision‐Making Model

Although some counselors have advocated for the limited use of touch in counseling, others have argued that touch has no place within the counseling relationship. Despite the controversy, the use of touch has been shown to have a number of therapeutic benefits; however, there are few ethical decision‐making models that are appropriate for considering the use of touch in counseling. The authors discuss the controversy surrounding the use of touch and the benefits/contraindications of touch. The 5 ethical principles of counseling are also examined; a new ordering of the principles is presented as a useful ethical decision‐making model when considering the use of touch in counseling.     

Linkage Analysis as Evidence in Court: A Thematic Analysis of Mock Juror Deliberations

Linkage analysis has, albeit occasionally, been presented in courts across the world as evidence that a series of offences possess behavioural similarities and distinctiveness from other offences, meaning they have probably been committed by the same individual. It is therefore imperative to ascertain how linkage analysis is regarded by juries within the context of deliberations. Three groups of participants (N = 22) eligible for jury duty in England and Wales viewed a simulated rape and murder trial derived from an actual South African case. Linkage analysis formed the sole evidence against the defendant in the two later offences, although DNA matches and eyewitness identifications of the defendant were present in the two earlier offences. Participant deliberations were recorded and subjected to thematic analysis. Five themes were discovered: behavioural consistencies and inconsistencies, physical versus case linkage evidence, barriers to admissibility, potential uses of linkage analysis, and dependence of lay knowledge. Jurors' over‐reliance on erroneous lay knowledge contributed to their conclusion that linkage analysis is, at present, unrepresentative evidence that cannot independently indicate a defendant's culpability. However, participants believed that linkage analysis could be a useful tool within investigations and, with further research evidence, in court in England and Wales. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The sunk‐time effect: An exploration

We explored the potential for a sunk‐cost effect in the realm of time. Questionnaire studies (Experiments 1–4) obtained a sunk‐time effect that was robust to manipulations of prospective value, individual versus group consequences, and the effort or enjoyment inherent in the time. Behavioral experiments (Experiments 5–7) also suggested a sunk‐time effect and found support for a personal responsibility by sunk‐cost interaction on choice behavior. We discuss theoretical implications and a potential connection to animal sunk‐cost phenomena. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Between a rock and a hard place: Damned if you do, damned if you don’t

Individuals are frequently forced to make decisions from among undesirable choice-sets. Raise taxes or cut social services? Lay off workers or go bankrupt? Go deep in debt or forgo a college education? The research presented here suggests that in such situations, decision-makers are often evaluated negatively regardless of the choice they make. In Experiment 1, participants read about a judge deciding which of two seemingly unfit parents to award sole custody in a real-life divorce case. In Experiment 2, participants were led to believe that their partner in the experiment was forced to pick one of two unpleasant tasks for the participant to perform. In both cases, the decision and decision-maker were evaluated negatively regardless of the alternative chosen–and regardless of the fact that they were the only options in the choice-set. Discussion focuses on the source, scope, and consequences of this phenomenon.     

An effort based analysis of the paradoxical effects of incentives on decision‐aided performance

This study examines the effect of incentives on decision‐aided performance. In particular, the study provides further insight into whether, when, and how incentives affect task performance in the presence of decision aids by (1) replicating previous research showing the negative effects of incentives on performance; (2) investigating whether this effect generalizes to a more realistic scenario in which decision makers have access to additional contextual information not captured by the decision aid; and (3) applying an effort‐based framework to explain the link between incentives and performance. In contrast to the findings of prior research, our study shows that incentives do not necessarily decrease performance in the presence of decision aids. Rather, we demonstrate that the effect of incentives on decision‐aided performance depends on other contextual factors such as the absence or presence of additional contextual information. By further specifying the conditions under which incentives result in increases or decreases to decision‐aided task performance, our results have implications for both future research and the design of incentive systems in practice. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.