情感启发式对风险选择的影响

本研究旨在考察情感启发式对风险选择的影响。研究1采用线上和线下结合的方式对687名大学生进行问卷施测,修订并检验中文版情感启发式问卷的信效度,以该问卷测试的风险−收益相关系数作为衡量情感启发式倾向的指标。研究2采用极端被试法,在103名大学生完成问卷后,将风险−收益相关系数绝对值前20%和后20%的被试分为高、低情感启发式组,完成风险选择任务。结果发现：（1）中文版情感启发式问卷具有较好的信度与效度,可以作为情感启发式倾向的测试问卷。（2）风险选择任务激活负性情绪时,相比于低情感启发式倾向,高情感启发式倾向的被试更容易受负性情绪的影响,其风险判断的主观值更高。研究揭示了情感启发式对风险选择的影响,为情感启发式作为个体进行风险判断的重要依据提供了实证支持。     

How Affect Shapes Risky Choice: Distorted Probability Weighting Versus Probability Neglect

People's choices between prospects with relatively affect‐rich outcomes (e.g., medical side effects) can diverge markedly from their choices between prospects with relatively affect‐poor outcomes (e.g., monetary losses). We investigate the cognitive mechanisms underlying this “affect gap” in risky choice. One possibility is that affect‐rich prospects give rise to more distortion in probability weighting. Another is that they lead to the neglect of probabilities. To pit these two possibilities against each other, we fitted cumulative prospect theory (CPT) to the choices of individual participants, separately for choices between options with affect‐rich outcomes (adverse medical side effects) and options with affect‐poor outcomes (monetary losses); additionally, we tested a simple model of probability neglect, the minimax rule. The results indicated a qualitative difference in cognitive mechanisms between the affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems. Specifically, in affect‐poor problems, the large majority of participants were best described by CPT; in affect‐rich problems, the proportion of participants best described by the minimax rule was substantially higher. The affect gap persisted even when affect‐rich outcomes were supplemented by numerical information, thus providing no support for the thesis that choices in affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems diverge because the information provided in the former is nonnumerical. Our findings suggest that the traditional expectation‐based framework for modeling risky decision making may not readily generalize to affect‐rich choices. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

自我框架、风险认知和风险选择

对行为决策中“框架效应”(Framing Effect)的研究进行了拓展：探讨了自我框架对风险决策的影响及其机制。面对运用图示方法表示的管理,健康,及投资方面的风险决策问题,参与者自主地选择对方案的描述（自我框架）。研究有四个主要发现：1）自我框架对风险选择的效应部分显著,而且对风险选择的影响方向因情境的不同而不同;2）机会威胁认知是自我框架效应的一个中介变量;3）自我框架在情绪语气上的差异对风险决策有显著影响：决策者对一个备选方案（确定性或风险性方案）相对于另一个备选方案的自我描述的情绪语气越积极正面,这个方案被选择的可能性越大;4）决策者的机会-威胁认知是这一自我框架效应的部分中介变量。也就是说,对备选方案的自我描述语气作为一种对决策信息的编码影响了风险（机会和威胁）认知,进而影响决策者的风险偏好和选择     

Priming Risky Choice: Do Risk Preferences Need Inferences?

The notion that subtle influences, often falling outside awareness, can bias behaviour has a strong grip on both theoretical perspectives and the public imagination. We report three experiments that examined this idea in the context of risky choice. Experiment 1 (N = 100) appeared to find evidence for an interaction whereby participants primed but not reminded of the prime showed an assimilation effect (e.g. participants primed to be risk seeking became more risk seeking) whereas those who were primed and reminded showed a contrast effect (e.g. became less risk seeking). However, two further experiments (N = 180, N = 128) failed to find any evidence for this interaction, and none of the experiments found evidence for the asymmetry in awareness predicted by an ‘unconscious’ assimilation but ‘conscious’ contrast account. The data were analysed using both Null Hypothesis Significance Testing and Bayesian methods, and the implications of the conclusions arising from each are discussed. Whatever one's statistical predilection, the results imply a reduction of confidence in the belief that risk preferences need no inferences. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

风险条件下的跨期选择

跨期选择是指对发生在未来不同时间点上的结果做出权衡的决策过程。由于大部分跨期选择的情景都处于某种风险之中, 把风险变量纳入跨期选择的研究中则至为关键。针对以往研究在研究范围、理论构建、现实意义等诸方面的不足, 本研究拟采用实验室实验与纸笔测验相结合的方法, 深入揭示高、中、低三种概率水平下风险对跨期选择的影响特征, 探索其发生的机制、各类经典效应的大小。在此基础上, 根据全国不同地区的大样本调查结果, 了解各地区风险条件下跨期选择的差异及其与本地宏观经济指标(如, 消费者物价指数)的关联, 进而探讨研究的现实意义。本研究期望对风险条件下的跨期选择做出系统、全面的科学探索, 并为国家相关部门制定政策提供有价值的参考。     

心理距离对跨期选择和风险选择的影响

通过考察时间距离、社会距离和概率距离对跨期选择和风险选择的影响, 探究跨期选择和风险选择心理过程的相似性, 并检验不同心理距离影响决策的相似性。结果发现, 无论是时间距离(实验1)、社会距离(实验2)、还是概率距离(实验3), 心理距离越远, 被试在跨期选择中越倾向于延迟选项, 在风险选择中越倾向于风险选项。研究认为, 在跨期选择和风险选择中, 选项的表征结构和选项整体评价时不同选项特征的相对权重具有相似性。随着心理距离增加, 与高识解相联系的金额特征的相对权重增加, 与低识解相联系的时间和概率特征的相对权重降低, 这使得被试更倾向于选择金额较大的延迟和风险选项。同时, 研究发现三类心理距离对两类决策有相似影响, 进一步验证了不同心理距离的本质相似性。     

The effects of statistical training on choice heuristics in choice under uncertainty

Kahneman and Tversky (1984) proposed that decision makers perceive choice uncertainty in two ways: (1) as a distribution of possible outcomes or (2) as a single uncertain outcome. Using statistical training as a factor that influences these perceptions, and thus the type of decision approach individuals use, we found that individuals with different levels of experience displayed differences in the decisions they made and in the choice heuristics used to make those decisions. Statistically naive individuals were more likely to prefer loss-minimizing alternatives, use a more non-compensatory heuristic, and spend more time on loss-related information than their statistically experienced counterparts. When a distributional cue, indicating the distributional nature of choice outcomes, was presented to both experience groups, the naive group was found to use a decision approach similar to the experienced group and to make similar decisions. The results are discussed in terms of the need to include factors that alter individuals' approaches to uncertainty in future behavioral models of uncertain choice.     

Choice in the repeated-gambles experiment

Humans chose 10 times between two roulette wheels projected on a monitor. During the first trial, the left wheel provided a hypothetical $100 with p = .94, and the right wheel provided $250 with p = .39. A titration procedure adjusted the probability of a $250 win across trials to permit estimation of an indifference point between alternatives. In Experiment 1, intertrial-interval duration (25 vs. 90 s) and whether sessions began with an intertrial interval or a trial were varied in a 2 × 2 design in this risky-choice procedure. Risk aversion (preference for the $100 wheel) increased with intertrial interval but was unaffected by whether sessions began with a trial or an intertrial interval. In Experiment 2, all sessions began with a trial, and subjects were informed that the experiment ended after 10 trials. Intertrial-interval duration had no effect on choice. In Experiment 3, intertrial-interval duration and whether subjects were given $10 or $10,000 before beginning were varied among four groups in a 2 × 2 design. In all other ways, the procedure was unchanged from Experiment 2. Intertrial interval had no effect on choice, but the $10,000 groups showed less risk aversion than the $10 groups. These results can be explained more readily in terms of Kahneman and Tversky's (1984) notion of “framing of the prospect” than in terms of Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon, and Frankel's (1986) behavioral account of risky choice.