How Affect Shapes Risky Choice: Distorted Probability Weighting Versus Probability Neglect

People's choices between prospects with relatively affect‐rich outcomes (e.g., medical side effects) can diverge markedly from their choices between prospects with relatively affect‐poor outcomes (e.g., monetary losses). We investigate the cognitive mechanisms underlying this “affect gap” in risky choice. One possibility is that affect‐rich prospects give rise to more distortion in probability weighting. Another is that they lead to the neglect of probabilities. To pit these two possibilities against each other, we fitted cumulative prospect theory (CPT) to the choices of individual participants, separately for choices between options with affect‐rich outcomes (adverse medical side effects) and options with affect‐poor outcomes (monetary losses); additionally, we tested a simple model of probability neglect, the minimax rule. The results indicated a qualitative difference in cognitive mechanisms between the affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems. Specifically, in affect‐poor problems, the large majority of participants were best described by CPT; in affect‐rich problems, the proportion of participants best described by the minimax rule was substantially higher. The affect gap persisted even when affect‐rich outcomes were supplemented by numerical information, thus providing no support for the thesis that choices in affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems diverge because the information provided in the former is nonnumerical. Our findings suggest that the traditional expectation‐based framework for modeling risky decision making may not readily generalize to affect‐rich choices. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self‐Harm Focus Leads to Greater Collective Guilt: The Case of the U.S.‐Iraq Conflict

Collective guilt from harm one's group has caused an out‐group is often undermined because people minimize or legitimize the harm done (i.e., they generate exonerating cognitions). When a group action has harmed both the in‐group and an out‐group, focusing people on “self‐harm”—ways in which the in‐group has harmed itself—may elicit more collective guilt because self‐harm is less likely to be exonerated. In Study 1, American participants who focused on how the invasion of Iraq had harmed the United States expressed greater collective guilt over harm inflicted on the people of Iraq than those who focused on Iraqi suffering. Study 2 showed that this effect is due to reductions in exonerating cognitions among people focused on self‐harm. We consider the implications of these findings for intergroup reconciliation, particularly in situations where two groups have been involved in open conflict.     

Consumption Effort: The Mental Cost of Generating Utility and the Role of Consumer Energy Level in Ambitious Consumption

We propose that the essence of consumption is the mental process of generating utility from products, that this process expends consumption effort, and that consumers take consumption effort into account in their decision making. In 2 studies, we tested the hypothesis that consumption preferences become more ambitious—individuals become more inclined to choose challenging‐to‐consume products—when consumer energy levels are elevated. In Study 1, energy induced by ingesting caffeine increased participants’ tendency to choose subtitled foreign movies rather than domestic remakes of those same movies. Study 2 demonstrated the same effect with naturally occurring energy levels and with consumption experiences whose effortfulness and quality were varied independently. In choosing among sets of poems to read, participants with higher levels of energy exhibited less effort aversion but neither more nor less quality seeking. A reanalysis of Study 1 showed that the energy effect is not simply a case of consumers using more energy when they have more energy, because the energy effect disappeared when participants were made aware of the energy source, suggesting that a preference‐correction process occurred. The energy dependence of consumer preferences affords tactical opportunities for marketers, but the welfare implications for consumers are intriguingly unclear, because in both studies we found that energy increased participants’ choice of challenging consumption experiences without increasing their liking of those experiences.     

The loss‐bet paradox: Actuaries,accountants, and other numerate people rate numerically inferior gambles as superior

Psychologists have convincingly demonstrated that preferences are not always stable and, instead, are often “constructed” based on information available in the judgment or decision context. In 4 studies with experts (accountants and actuaries in Studies 1 and 2, respectively) and a diverse lay population (Studies 3 and 4), the evidence was consistent with the highly numerate being more likely than the less numerate to construct their preferences by rating a numerically inferior bet as superior (i.e., the bets effect). Thus, the effect generalizes beyond a college student sample, and preference construction differs by numeracy. Contrary to prior thinking about preference construction, however, high expertise and high ability (rather than low) consistently related to the paradoxical phenomenon. Results across studies including Study 3's experimental modifications of the task supported the hypothesized number comparison process (and not a lack of expertise with monetary outcomes and probabilities or numeracy‐related differences in attention to numbers) as the effect's underlying cause. The bets effect was not attenuated by Study 4's instructions to think about what would be purchased with bet winnings. Task results combined with free‐response coding supported the notion that highly numerate participants have a systematic and persistent inclination for doing simple and complex number operations that drive their judgments (even after controlling for nonnumeric intelligence). Implications for 3 types of dual‐process theories are discussed. The results were inconsistent with default‐interventionist theories, consistent or unclear with respect to fuzzy trace theory, and consistent with interactive theories.     

Why are maximizers less happy than satisficers? Because they maximize positive and negative outcomes

Although extant research suggests maximizing is related to objectively positive outcomes (e.g., job offers), I propose maximizing may be simultaneously and positively related to objectively negative outcomes (e.g., job rejections). Specifically, I argue maximizers bear more instances of positive and negative outcomes than satisficers, and that in spite of their positive outcomes—yet because of their negative outcomes—maximizers are less happy than satisficers. In Study 1, participants took the alternate uses test; as expected, maximizing was related to seeking alternatives, yet, maximizing was also related to seeking low‐quality alternatives. Moreover, the number of low‐quality alternatives partially mediated the relationship between maximizing and negative affect. In Study 2, the impact of maximizing on experiencing negative affect was further assessed by examining whether maximizing is related to seeking and choosing low‐quality alternatives. Participants played the Iowa Gambling Task; it was found maximizing was related to alternating among decks, and in particular, sampling bad decks; ultimately, maximizing was related to winning less money, and experiencing more negative affect. Finally, in Study 3, participants responded to questionnaires about positive and negative life outcomes; it was found that maximizing was simultaneously related to experiencing more positive and more negative outcomes, and that negative outcomes predicted happiness to a greater degree than positive outcomes. These findings suggest an irony of maximizing: It produces both positive and negative outcomes, contributing to literature explaining why maximizers are less happy than satisficers, and ultimately whether happiness is a matter of choice. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Attributes of God: Conceptual Foundations of a Foundational Belief

Anthropomorphism, or the attribution of human properties to nonhuman entities, is often posited as an explanation for the origin and nature of God concepts, but it remains unclear which human properties we tend to attribute to God and under what conditions. In three studies, participants decided whether two types of human properties—psychological (mind‐dependent) properties and physiological (body‐dependent) properties—could or could not be attributed to God. In Study 1 (n = 1,525), participants made significantly more psychological attributions than physiological attributions, and the frequency of those attributions was correlated both with participants’ religiosity and with their attribution of abstract, theological properties. In Study 2 (n = 99) and Study 3 (n = 138), participants not only showed the same preference for psychological properties but were also significantly faster, more consistent, and more confident when attributing psychological properties to God than when attributing physiological properties. And when denying properties to God, they showed the reverse pattern—that is, they were slower, less consistent, and less confident when denying psychological properties than when denying physiological properties. These patterns were observed both in a predominantly Christian population (Study 2) and a predominantly Hindu population (Study 3). Overall, we argue that God is conceptualized not as a person in general but as an agent in particular, attributed a mind by default but attributed a body only upon further consideration.     

The moderating role of objective and subjective numeracy in attribute framing

Previous research has found that objective numeracy moderates framing effects: People who are less numerate were found to be more susceptible to goal‐framing and attribute‐framing effects than people who are highly numerate. This study examined the possibility that subjective numeracy likewise moderates attribute framing in contexts where participants are presented with percentages of success or failure. The results show that compared with highly numerate participants, less numerate participants were more susceptible to the effect of attribute framing. Interestingly, this moderating effect was revealed only when using objective numeracy measures, and not when subjective numeracy measures were used. Future research is suggested to replicate these findings, to establish the generalizability of numeracy as a moderator of other cognitive biases, and to examine several possible theoretical explanations for the differential moderation of attribute‐framing bias.     

Numeracy as a Predictor of Adaptive Risky Decision Making

Numeracy or one's ability to appropriately process and use numerical information has been shown to be an important individual difference factor in decision making. The current study utilized a risky decision‐making task (called the “cups task”) in which choices are made to both earn and avoid losing hypothetical money. Critically, this design allowed investigators to examine numeracy‐related differences in adaptive decision‐making as measured by sensitivity to expected value (EV) differences over 54 paired‐choice trials—some in which it was advantageous to take a risk and some in which it was not. Results showed that in an undergraduate sample of 114 individuals, the less numerate took more risks and were less sensitive to varying EV levels than the more numerate, especially when it was disadvantageous to take a risk and when the choice involved a potential loss (rather than a gain). These results are consistent with a dual processing account in which the more numerate are much better than the less numerate at extracting the precise affective “gist” of the numerical information, which is then used to determine the goodness or badness of a particular choice. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Susceptible to Social Influence: Risky “Driving” in Response to Peer Pressure1

In 2 studies, college students were socially influenced to be risky or not in a driving simulation. In both studies, confederate peers posing as passengers used verbal persuasion to affect driving behavior. In Study 1, participants encouraged to drive riskily had more accidents and drove faster than those encouraged to drive slowly or not encouraged at all. In Study 2, participants were influenced normatively or informationally to drive safely or riskily. As in Study 1, influence to drive riskily increased risk taking. Additionally, informational influence to drive safely resulted in the least risk taking. Together, the studies highlight the substantial influence of peers in a risk‐related situation; in real life, peer influence to be risky could contribute to automobile accidents.     

Emotional arousal and negative affect in marital conflict: the influence of gender,conflict structure,and demand‐withdrawal

This report covers two studies that examined how spouses' emotional arousal and negative affect in response to marital conflict are shaped by gender, conflict structure, and demand‐withdraw communication. In Study 1, 86 couples participated in a video analogue presentation procedure, and in Study 2, 32 couples participated in an observational methodology. In both studies, spouses' evaluative reports of their emotional arousal and negative affect were collected within two experimental conditions in which either the husband's or the wife's issue was discussed. In both studies, husbands—but not wives—reported lower levels of post‐interaction arousal and negative affect in the wife's issue condition than in the husband's issue condition. In both studies, husbands' as well as wives' level of emotional arousal was positively associated with their level of negative affect. In Study 2, husbands who were less demanding and more withdrawing during marital conflict were less aroused after the discussion. In contrast, wives reported more emotional arousal and negative affect as they were more withdrawing and less demanding, respectively. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Personal initiative,commitment and affect at work

This paper reports two studies on the relationships between employees' personal initiative, affect and commitment. The results of Study 1 among 390 health care sector employees show that individuals' self‐rated personal initiative is related to affect as well as affective commitment to four distinguishable foci, namely the organization, supervisor, work‐group and career. Commitment explains unique variance in personal initiative, even when controlling for demographic variables and positive and negative work affect. As Study 1 relied solely on self‐report data, multi‐source data were gathered for Study 2 (N = 80). This allowed retesting the hypotheses using both self‐ and manager‐ratings of initiative. Results showed that commitment explains variance in both self‐ and manager‐rated initiative beyond demographics and affect. For self‐rated initiative, team commitment explains most variance, whereas for manager‐rated initiative, organizational commitment does.     

Task formats and ambiguity aversion

This paper proposes that task format (choosing or rejecting) moderates the effect of ambiguity aversion. Specifically, an ambiguous option is more attractive in a choosing task than in a rejecting task compared with a risky option. The author performed three experiments to test the propositions. In the first experiment, participants showed less ambiguity aversion when they had to choose a preferred option (risky or ambiguous) compared with when they had to reject an option they preferred less. In the second experiment with a monetary incentive, participants had to form a cash‐equivalent estimate for both a risky gamble and an ambiguous gamble in a traditional Ellsberg scenario. The ambiguous option emerged as more attractive than the risky option in the choosing task compared with the rejecting task. The third experiment showed that the participants' decision rationale mediated the effect of the task format on choice. These three experiments support the proposition that task formats moderate the effect of ambiguity aversion. On the basis of the findings, the author provides suggestions for practice and further research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Motivated to confront: How experiencing anger affects anchoring bias

Prior research has asserted that emotions affect anchoring bias in decision making through the emotion's certainty appraisal or through the emotion's action tendencies, but these prior studies investigate the role of each component—appraisal or action tendency—without accounting for potential effects of the other one. The current research investigates whether anger exerts a significant effect on anchoring bias by activating a desire to confront a potential anchor. Importantly, the studies compare the effect of anger versus disgust, emotions that differ in their action tendency but are similar in their certainty appraisal. In Study 1, participants completed an emotion induction task and then a negotiation task where the first offer from the negotiation partner served as a potential anchor. Anger led to more deviation from the anchor compared with disgust or neutral feelings. Subsequent studies provide evidence that the angry participants are less anchored when the anchor value comes from a more confrontable source (someone else vs. themselves in Study 2 and an out‐group member vs. an in‐group member in Study 3).     

Differential weighting in choice versus advice: I’ll do this,you do that

We propose that when individuals make a decision for themselves they weight attributes more uniformly compared to when they give advice. In Study 1, 138 participants were given a hypothetical choice between two jobs varying on two dimensions and asked either to choose for themselves, offer advice to a best friend, or offer advice to an acquaintance. We hypothesized that respondents offering advice would favor the option with the higher value on the more important dimension. More participants in the acquaintance condition recommended the job with a higher value on the important dimension than participants making the choice for themselves. Study 2 (N=62) tested the hypothesis in a situation where the options consisted of three dimensions. One option was relatively high on two of the three dimensions and the other option was relatively high on the remaining ‘socially important’, or ‘prominent’, dimension. The uniform weighting hypothesis for self‐choice predicts higher frequency of choice for the former option. Data were consistent with this prediction. Study 3 (N=170) tested the hypothesis in students' choice of major at the university. We made use of an actual event, a pending university budget cut, that would require some students to change majors. Participants either made the decision for themselves, made a recommendation to a student in their same department, or made a recommendation to a student in another department facing the analogous dilemma. Replicating the findings of the first two studies, participants offering advice to a student in another department suggested staying with their current major significantly more than participants making the choice for themselves. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Numeracy Predicts More Effortful and Elaborative Search Strategies in a Complex Risky Choice Context: A Process‐Tracing Approach

The goal of the current study was to explore information search and processing differences between individuals who are less and more numerate in an attempt to better understand the mechanisms that might differentiate the choices they make. We did so using a computerized process‐tracing system known as MouseTrace, which presented monetary gambles in an alternative × attribute matrix with outcome (dollar amount) and probability information as attributes. This information was initially occluded but could be revealed by clicking on the cell that contained the desired information. Beginning with nine gambles offering the chance of gaining or losing a specified amount, participants (N = 110) narrowed down the options (to three and then one) using an inclusion or exclusion strategy. Consistent with previous research, inclusion was a more effortful strategy, and individuals who were higher in numeracy were more likely to select prospects with the highest expected value. Process measures revealed these individuals expended more effort (i.e., attended to and sought out more information and processed it in greater depth) and exhibited more compensatory processing than those who were lower in numeracy, but this sometimes depended on whether one was asked to include or exclude. These results serve as further evidence that individuals with higher levels of numeracy often engage in more elaborative processing of the decision task, which tends to lead to more optimal choices. However, they also suggest that individuals are adaptive and that the specific situation can matter. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self‐Control Moderates Decision‐Making Behavior When Minimizing Losses versus Maximizing Gains

We examined (1) whether people would be more responsive to the delayed consequences of their decisions when attempting to minimize losses than when attempting to maximize gains in a history‐dependent decision‐making task and (2) how trait self‐control would moderate such an effect. In two experiments, participants performed a dynamic decision‐making task where they chose one of two options on each trial. The increasing option always gave a smaller immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to increase. The decreasing option always gave a larger immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to decrease. In Experiment 1 where the two options had equivalent expected value in the long run, participants were more prone to select the increasing option, which yielded larger benefits on future trials, in the loss‐minimization condition than in the gain‐maximization condition. Trait self‐control moderated the effect of losses by enhancing the effect for low self‐control participants while attenuating it for high self‐control participants. In Experiment 2 where selecting the increasing option was suboptimal, low self‐control participants still attempted to reduce losses on future trials by selecting the increasing option more often than high self‐control participants. These results suggest that decision makers value delayed consequences of their actions more in a losses domain relative to a gains domain and low self‐control individuals are more susceptible to such an effect. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Choosing versus rejecting: Why some options are both better and worse than others

A previously unobserved pattern of choice behavior is predicted and corroborated. In line with the principle of compatibility, according to which the weighting of inputs is enhanced by their compatibility with output, the positive and negative dimensions of options (their pros and cons) are expected to loom larger when one is choosing and when one is rejecting, respectively. Subjects are presented with pairs of options, one of which—theenriched option—has more positive as well as more negative dimensions than does the other,impoverished, option. Because positive dimensions are weighted more heavily in choosing than in rejecting, and negative dimensions are weighted more heavily in rejecting than in choosing, the enriched option tends to be chosen and rejected relatively more often than the impoverished option. These findings are extended to nonbinary decision problems, and their implications for the rational theory of choice and for everyday decisions are discussed.     

Hiding effort to gain a competitive advantage: Evidence from China

Previous studies with Western populations have shown that adolescents' tendency to downplay their academic effort is affected by two kinds of motives: ability‐related motives (e.g., to appear competent) and social approval motives (e.g., to be popular). In this research, we test for the presence of additional competition‐related motives in China, a culture placing strong emphasis on academic competition. Study 1 (N = 150) showed that, in response to a scenario in which a hard‐working high‐school junior hid effort from classmates, the most highly endorsed explanation was “to influence others to work less hard to maintain a competitive advantage.” Study 2 (N = 174) revealed that competition‐related explanations were endorsed relatively more often when the speaker and audience had similar academic rankings. This tendency was most evident when both speaker and audience were top performers, and when this was the case, participants' desire to demonstrate superiority over others was a positive predictor of endorsement of competition‐related motives. Study 3 (N = 137) verified that competition‐related motives were more strongly endorsed among Chinese participants than U.S. participants. These results suggest that at least in cultures that emphasize academic competition and in contexts where competition is salient, hiding effort is often about attempting to gain strategic advantage.