Preference reversals with losses

People who prefer larger, later gains over smaller, sooner gains when considering outcomes far in the future often reverse their preference as the alternatives become closer in time. This finding, which is contrary to a normative economic account of intertemporal choice, has been interpreted as support for hyperboloid discounting, but the results can also be explained by steeper discounting of smaller amounts. The present study is the first to demonstrate that analogous preference reversals occur with losses: People who preferred a smaller, sooner loss over a larger, later loss when the outcomes were far in the future reversed their preference when these alternatives were closer in time. Because there was no magnitude effect (i.e., smaller losses were not discounted more steeply than larger losses), the present findings strongly support the proposition that reversals in preference between delayed outcomes occur because of the hyperboloid shape of the discounting function.     

Do Measures of Executive Functioning and Manipulation of Ego Depletion Predict How University Students Discount Probabilistic Gains and Losses?

Discounting occurs when the subjective value of an outcome is altered because the outcome is delayed or uncertain. Previous research has suggested that how individuals discount delayed gains is related to executive functioning. The present study attempted to extend this relationship to discounting of probabilistic gains and losses, and to examine whether diminishing cognitive resources would impact how participants discounted monetary outcomes. In Experiment 1, university students completed an executive function measure and then a probability-discounting task that involved the hypothetical sum of either $1,000 or $100,000 framed as either a gain or a loss. The executive function of organization was a significant predictor of how participants discounted all four outcomes while motivational drive predicted discounting of losses, but not gains. In Experiment 2, participants completed the same measures with the addition of an ego-depletion task to deplete cognitive resources before making discounting decisions. The executive function of motivational drive and empathy were significant predictors of how participants discounted both loss outcomes. The results suggest that discounting of monetary outcomes is related to the executive function of organization for gains and motivational drive, and empathy for losses. They also support the notion that the discounting of gains may be a distinct process from the discounting of losses.     

Feelings of dread and intertemporal choice

It frequently has been observed that people discount future rewards relative to present rewards. However, the literature on intertemporal choices involving emotional upsets and losses is fraught with inconsistencies, with some studies finding similar discounting of gains and losses, and others reporting that participants elect to undergo negative experiences sooner rather than later. To help resolve these contradictions, time preferences for different types of aversive experiences (social rejection, embarrassment, pain, monetary and property loss) were examined in five studies. Most participants preferred to postpone monetary and property losses, but intertemporal choices for other unpleasant experiences showed highly variable responses, with some participants deferring them as long as possible, and many electing to experience them immediately. Time preferences for these negative experiences were correlated, but were independent of time preference for rewards. It is argued (following Loewenstein, 1987 ) that anticipation of dread plays a key role in many people's choices about timing of aversive experiences. This interpretation was supported by choices about when to learn of a very unpleasant event whose timing was fixed (Study 3), and by a novel preference reversal (Study 4). Study 5 examined how actual and hypothetical experiences of dread unfolded over time; the results were consistent with a dread‐based interpretation of choices in the preceding studies. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Delay discounting of different outcomes: Review and theory

Steep delay discounting is characterized by a preference for small immediate outcomes relative to larger delayed outcomes and is predictive of drug abuse, risky sexual behaviors, and other maladaptive behaviors. Nancy M. Petry was a pioneer in delay discounting research who demonstrated that people discount delayed monetary gains less steeply than they discount substances with abuse liability. Subsequent research found steep discounting for not only drugs, but other nonmonetary outcomes such as food, sex, and health. In this systematic review, we evaluate the hypotheses proposed to explain differences in discounting as a function of the type of outcome and explore the trait- and state-like nature of delay discounting. We found overwhelming evidence for the state-like quality of delay discounting: Consistent with Petry and others' work, nonmonetary outcomes are discounted more steeply than monetary outcomes. We propose two hypotheses that together may account for this effect: Decreasing Future Preference and Decreasing Future Worth. We also found clear evidence that delay discounting has trait-like qualities: People who steeply discount monetary outcomes steeply discount nonmonetary outcomes as well. The implication is that changing delay discounting for one outcome could change discounting for other outcomes.     

时间洞察力对跨期选择偏好的预测

利用津巴多时间洞察力问卷,采用跨期选择经典范式,考察“现在享乐型”和“未来定向型”两类时间洞察力个体在跨期选择上的偏好,从人格特质角度来探究跨期选择的认知机制。结果发现：(1)现在享乐定向组的延迟折扣率显著高于未来定向组;(2)未来定向组在时间洞察力量表“未来维度”得分与延迟折扣率显著负相关。这说明时间洞察力对个体延迟折扣率具有预测作用,支持了跨期选择的时间感知基础模型。     

How Has the Wenchuan Earthquake Influenced People's Intertemporal Choices?1

On May 12, 2008, a major magnitude‐8.0 earthquake shook Wenchuan, China. An opportunity sample of 104 college students was obtained to conduct a within‐subject study investigating the influence of the earthquake on intertemporal choices. The findings indicated that after the earthquake, delayed gains were discounted significantly more steeply than before it, and that delayed losses tended to be discounted more steeply after the earthquake, although this tendency did not reach statistical significance. These results suggest that after the disaster, people might be more shortsighted when they make decisions with intertemporal tradeoffs. Implications of these findings for intervention and management in the aftermath of disasters are discussed.     

Differential effects of amount on temporal and probability discounting of gains and losses

In four experiments, we compared the effects of delay, probability, and monetary amount on the subjective value of gains and losses. For delayed gains, smaller amounts were discounted more steeply than larger amounts, whereas the opposite pattern was observed with probabilistic gains. For both delayed and probabilistic losses, however, amount had much smaller and less reliable effects on discounting. Taken together, the pattern of differential magnitude effects leads to delayed gains' being discounted significantly more steeply than delayed losses, but only at smaller amounts, whereas probabilistic gains are discounted significantly more steeply than probabilistic losses, but only at larger amounts. Even though the same hyperbola-like function described both individual and group discounting of delayed and probabilistic gains and losses, the present findings suggest that different processes are involved in discounting positive and negative outcomes. Raw data may be downloaded from www.psychonomic.org/archive.     

Intertemporal Similarity: Discounting as a Last Resort

Standard models of intertemporal choice assume that individuals discount future payoffs by integrating reward amounts and time delays to generate a discounted value. Alternative models propose that, rather than integrate across them, individuals compare within attributes (amounts and delays) to determine if differences in one attribute outweigh differences in another attribute. For instance, the similarity model 1) compares the two reward amounts to determine whether they are similar, 2) compares the similarity of the two time delays, and then 3) makes a decision based on these similarity judgments. Here, I tested discounting models against attribute‐based models that use similarity judgments to make choices. I collected intertemporal choices and similarity judgments for the reward amounts and time delays from participants in three experiments. All experiments tested the ability of discounting and similarity models to predict intertemporal choices. Model generalization analyses showed that the best predicting models started with similarity judgments and then, if similarity failed to make a prediction, resorted to discounting models. Similarity judgments also matched intertemporal choice data demonstrating both the magnitude and sign effects, thereby accounting for behavioral data that contradict many discounting models. These results highlight the possibility that attribute‐based models such as the similarity models provide alternatives to discounting that may offer insights into the process of making intertemporal choices. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Time discounting over the lifespan

Several theories of intertemporal choice predict systematic age differences in the rate at which people discount the future. Different theories, however, predict different patterns: one predicts that discounting will decrease over the lifespan, so that young people will discount more than the middle aged or elderly, another suggests it will increase over the lifespan, and yet another suggests that the middle-aged will discount less than either the young or the old. We conduct a study testing these predictions. 123 respondents between the ages of 19 and 89 made a large number of time discounting decisions on both computerized and paper-and-pencil questionnaires. The results suppported the view that older people discount more than younger ones, and that middle aged people discount less than either group. This finding appears to contrast with earlier work (Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994) but, as we show, our results are remarkably congruent with that study. We conclude by considering whether our results can be reconciled with the fact that young people commit more apparently impulsive acts than do the elderly.     

Now for Me,Later for Us? Effects of Group Context on Temporal Discounting

Delayed rewards are less valuable than immediate rewards. This well‐established finding has focused almost entirely on individual outcomes. However, are delayed rewards similarly discounted if they are shared by a group? The current article reports on three experiments exploring the effect of group context on delay discounting. Results indicate that discount rates of individual and group rewards were highly correlated, but that respondents were more willing to wait (decreased discounting) for shared outcomes than for individual outcomes. An explanatory model is proposed suggesting that decreased discount rates in group contexts may be due to the way the effects of both delay and social discounting are combined. That is, in a group context, a person values both a future reward (discounted by delay) and a present reward to another person (discounted by the social distance between them). The results are explained by a combined discount function containing a delay factor and a factor representing the social distance between the decision maker and group members. Practical implications of the fact that shared consequences can increase individual self‐control are also discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

跨期选择的认知机制与神经基础

跨期选择是指个体对发生在不同时间的成本与收益进行权衡的决策过程。跨期选择的计算模型从经济学的角度用数学模型来建构时间折扣函数,而认知成分模型则从心理学的角度来研究跨期选择中的心理效应与认知成分。跨期选择的神经基础有三种不同的研究取向：双机制加工取向、单机制加工取向、自我控制取向。未来研究应该在跨期选择的认知机制、神经通路及运行机制、跨期选择的应用,以及从进化的角度对人与动物的跨期选择行为进行更深入的研究。     

不确定性容忍度对跨期选择的影响及其情景依赖性

采用2(不确定性容忍度：高、低)×2(跨期日期：今天/14天、今天/180天)×2(延迟奖赏值：200元、1000元)混合实验设计,探讨不同任务特征下不确定性容忍度对跨期选择的影响。结果表明：跨期日期为180天时,不确定性容忍度主效应边缘显著;不确定性容忍度与延迟奖赏值交互作用显著：在200元时低容忍度个体对延迟奖赏的折扣程度大于高容忍度个体,在1000元时无此效应;跨期日期为14天时,不确定性容忍度的主效应及其与延迟奖赏值交互作用均不显著。这表明,不确定性容忍度对跨期选择存在影响,但这种影响受到跨期日期和延迟奖赏值的调节,具有情景依赖性。     

Now or Later? Attentional Processing and Intertemporal Choice

The tendency to discount future prospects in lieu of smaller immediate outcomes is known as temporal discounting. The current work used eye‐tracking methodology to examine attentional processing to different elements of choice during an intertemporal decision task. Our findings reveal that those who tend to prefer the immediate option demonstrate attentional biases that were predictive of choice. When losses were at stake, selective attention biases also predicted unique variance in self‐report measures of risk taking, impulsivity, and self‐control beyond what was accounted for by a discounting parameter (k), a typical method for summarizing intertemporal choice data. Overall, our findings suggest that eye‐tracking measures of selective attention may allow for a better theoretical understanding of the mechanisms and processes involved in intertemporal choice. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A mechanism for reducing delay discounting by altering temporal attention

Rewards that are not immediately available are discounted compared to rewards that are immediately available. The more a person discounts a delayed reward, the more likely that person is to have a range of behavioral problems, including clinical disorders. This latter observation has motivated the search for interventions that reduce discounting. One surprisingly simple method to reduce discounting is an "explicit-zero" reframing that states default or null outcomes. Reframing a classical discounting choice as "something now but nothing later" versus "nothing now but more later" decreases discount rates. However, it is not clear how this "explicit-zero" framing intervention works. The present studies delineate and test two possible mechanisms to explain the phenomenon. One mechanism proposes that the explicit-zero framing creates the impression of an improving sequence, thereby enhancing the present value of the delayed reward. A second possible mechanism posits an increase in attention allocation to temporally distant reward representations. In four experiments, we distinguish between these two hypothesized mechanisms and conclude that the temporal attention hypothesis is superior for explaining our results. We propose a model of temporal attention whereby framing affects intertemporal preferences by modifying present bias.     

Time is on my side: optimism in intertemporal choice

The present research examines the role of optimism on time preferences for both losses and gains. It is argued that optimism has asymmetric effects on time preferences for gains versus losses: one reason why decision makers prefer immediate gains is because they are optimistic that these gains will be followed by additional gains in future. In contrast, decision makers prefer to delay losses because they are optimistic that losses are avoidable in the future. Optimism about outcomes affects time preferences for both gains and losses, such that low optimism reduces the discount rates while increased optimism is associated with higher discount rates. This prediction was supported in two different domains: monetary outcomes (Study 1), and health (Study 2). Implications of these results for both research practice and time preferences in the real world are discussed.     

Heaven can wait. How religion modulates temporal discounting

Evidence suggests that religious systems have specific effects on attentional and action control processes. The present study investigated whether religions also modulate choices that involve higher-order knowledge and the delay of gratification in particular. We tested Dutch Calvinists, Italian Catholics, and Atheists from both countries/cultures using an intertemporal choice task where participants could choose between a small immediate and a larger delayed monetary reward. Based on the Calvinist theory of predestination and the Catholic concept of a cycle of sin–confession–expiation, we predicted a reduced delay tolerance, i.e., higher discount rate, for Italian Catholics than for Dutch Calvinists, and intermediate rates for the two atheist groups. Analyses of discount rates support our hypotheses. We also found a magnitude effect on temporal discounting and faster responses for large than for small rewards across religions and countries/cultures. We conclude that temporal discounting is specifically modulated by religious upbringing rather than by generic cultural differences.     

Evidence for a magnitude effect in temporal discounting with pigeons

A magnitude effect in human intertemporal choice is well established-larger rewards or outcomes are discounted over time at a lower rate than are smaller rewards. However, many recent studies have failed to find a corresponding effect in nonhuman animals. Here we report a magnitude effect in temporal discounting for pigeons' choices involving a tradeoff between reward delay and amount. Pigeons chose between a small reward (1-s access to food) after a 2-s delay, and a large reward (4.5-s access to food) after a 28-s delay. Across conditions, the delays to the small and large rewards were increased or decreased, respectively. Temporal discounting functions obtained through a value-estimation procedure showed clear evidence of a magnitude effect: The value of the large reward decreased more slowly with increasing delay than the value of the small reward. We linked this result to a nonlinear relationship between choice and the delays associated with the small and large rewards. The nonlinearity was contrary to the generalized matching law but was predicted by the contextual choice model. Our results confirm the existence of a magnitude effect in nonhuman temporal discounting, showing that this adaptation is not unique to humans.     

Conditioned Reflex and Perception: The Concept of Syncretism

Delay discounting occurs when the subjective value of an outcome decreases because its delivery is delayed. Past research has shown that how steeply participants discount an outcome varies inversely with the value of previously discounted outcomes. In the present study, participants discounted the same hypothetical monetary outcome ($1,000) after their hypothetical annual income was halved (Experiment 1) or doubled (Experiment 2). Rates of discounting decreased and increased, respectively, after these manipulations (although a similar change in discounting was observed for the control and treatment groups in Experiment 2). These results suggest that altering the context in which the discounting task is framed alters the subjective value of the outcome itself, in this case money. This result has implications for understanding contrast effects that are observed in rates of discounting, as well as for researchers and practitioners who are interested in determining methods for altering how individuals discount delayed outcomes.