最后通牒游戏中接收者拒绝行为的情绪义务模型

公平偏好使人们在面对不公平的分配时通常会有所表示,在最后通牒游戏中具体表现为对不公平报价的拒绝,有很多研究把拒绝的原因归结为不公平厌恶和互惠主义等社会偏好,但这并不能解释一些最后通牒变体游戏中的拒绝行为。但这恰恰支持了情绪义务模型。     

两人和三人最后通牒博弈任务中嗓音吸引力对决策的影响

本研究用两人和三人最后通牒博弈任务探究男性嗓音吸引力对决策的影响。实验1发现, 高吸引力的嗓音会提高被试对不公平分配方案的接受率。实验2发现, 即使分配方案对第三方接受者公平, 对被试不公平, 第三方接受者的高吸引力嗓音仍然会提高被试对方案的接受率。综上, 嗓音吸引力可以诱发类似面孔吸引力的“美貌津贴”效应。     

身体姿势启动的内隐权力感对公平决策的影响

已有研究表明, 扩张身体姿势可启动个体的权力感。基于具身认知的视角, 实验1考察身体姿势对免惩罚游戏的提议者进行金钱分配时的影响, 实验2和实验3分别考察最后通牒游戏、免惩罚游戏的回应者在蜷缩和扩张姿势下对各种分配类型方案的拒绝率。结果表明, 与蜷缩姿势相比, 扩张姿势使个体更倾向于在免惩罚游戏提议者角色时做出更多的利己不公平分配, 同时使个体更倾向于拒绝最后通牒游戏和免惩罚游戏中的不公平分配。本研究证明了扩张姿势启动的权力感可影响个体的公平决策。     

不同博弈情境下社会排斥对社会决策的影响作用

本研究借助经典的最后通牒博弈范式(UG)和独裁者博弈范式(DG),将回应者/接受者作为研究对象,考察了不同公平条件、平等条件下社会排斥对社会决策的影响作用。实验结果发现:(1)在面对高不公平性的分配方案时,被排斥组比被接纳组更倾向于拒绝接受该分配方案;(2)被排斥组对高不公平性分配方案的满意度要显著低于被接纳组;(3)被排斥组在不平等的博弈(DG)条件下对分配方案的满意度显著低于平等博弈(UG)条件下对分配方案的满意度。本研究结果说明,社会排斥情境下的被试对公平与平等因素更加敏感:在高不公平条件下,被排斥的个体表现出更少的合作互惠行为,甚至不惜放弃自身经济利益,也要惩罚博弈对方的不公平行为;此外,在不平等的博弈条件下,被排斥的个体产生了更多的消极情绪体验。本文的研究结果提高了社会决策研究的生态效度和传统决策模型的预测效度,有利于更加完整透彻地了解社会决策的影响因素。     

Why do people reject unintended inequity? Responders' rejection in a truncated ultimatum game

Rejection of an inequitable and yet unintended outcome in a truncated ultimatum game was examined in an experiment with 46 undergraduate students (27 men and 19 women) from a large national university in Japan. In an ultimatum game, one of two players, the proposer, makes an offer to divide a fixed-sum of money. The other player, the responder, decides whether to accept or reject the offer. When the responder rejects the proposer's offer, neither of the two players receives a reward. Previous work examining the behavior of participants in the truncated ultimatum game employed strategy method in their experimental design. We examined whether these previous findings would be replicated in an experimental design that did not use the strategy method and instead used the standard one-shot game. Seven out of 46 responders given an inequitable offer rejected it, replicating prior results with the strategy method. We further found that subjects who rejected an offer that was involuntary and yet inequitable did not over-attribute intentions to the proposer's involuntary behavior more strongly than did acceptors. These findings strongly suggest that aversion to inequity is the explanation for the subjects' rejection of the inequitable offer.     

Lex talionis: Testosterone and the law of retaliation

Research examining both the organizing and activating effects of testosterone in one-shot bargaining contexts has been vexed by inconsistencies. Some research finds that high-testosterone men are more likely to reject unfair offers in an ultimatum game and exogenous administration of testosterone to men leads to less generous offers. In contrast, other research finds that higher prenatal exposure to testosterone predicts more generous dictator game offers and administering testosterone to women leads to more generous ultimatum game offers. The current research seeks to resolve these inconsistencies by examining how the organizing effects of testosterone affect bargaining behavior. Because testosterone is associated with status seeking and concerns with social reputation, we hypothesized that testosterone would predict aggressive bargaining but only after provocation. Two studies found that prenatal testosterone exposure, as measured by 2D:4D ratio, led to aggressive responses for both males and females, but only after they received unfair offers. Furthermore, perceptions of fairness violations moderated but did not mediate the effect of testosterone on retributional responding. These results suggest that the organizing effects of testosterone have consistent effects on bargaining behavior for both males and females but its predictive ability requires some form of provocation to emerge.     

The rich get richer,the poor get even: Perceived socioeconomic position influences micro‐social distributions of wealth

Economic inequality has a robust negative effect on a range of important societal outcomes, including health, wellbeing, and education. Yet, it remains insufficiently understood why, how, and by whom unequal systems tend to be perpetuated. In two studies we examine whether psychological mindsets adopted by the wealthy and the poor in their micro‐social transactions act to perpetuate or challenge inequality. We hypothesized that occupying a wealthier socioeconomic position promotes the pursuit of self‐interest and contributes to inequality maintenance; poorer socioeconomic position, on the other hand, should promote the pursuit of fairness and equality restoration. In Study 1, participants completed an ultimatum game as proposers after being primed to believe they are wealthier or poorer, offering money to either poor or wealthy responders. As expected, the wealthy pursued their self‐interest and the net effect of this behavior contributes to the maintenance of inequality. Conversely, the poor pursued fairness and the net effect of this behavior challenges inequality. In Study 2, participants were responders deciding whether to accept or reject unfair distributions. Compared to the wealthier, the poorer challenged inequality by rejecting unequal offers. The links between micro‐social processes and macro‐societal inequality are discussed.     

公平偏好的电生理测量：来自脑电、皮肤电和心电的证据

研究发现,人们普遍具有追求公平的偏好,即人们在追求个人收益时也会关注收益分配的公平性。随着电生理技术的发展,越来越多的研究者采用电生理技术对公平偏好进行深入探讨。本研究从脑电、皮肤电、心电等方面梳理公平偏好的电生理机制。脑电的研究发现,公平偏好相关的脑电主要涉及反馈相关负波和P300;皮肤电的研究发现,相比于公平分配,个体在不公平分配情况下其皮肤电的激活水平更高;心率的研究发现,相比于公平分配,个体遭遇不公平分配时其心率降低。研究公平偏好电生理机制有助于更深入地揭示公平偏好的产生根源与形成过程。未来可从公平偏好电生理的整合研究、公平偏好的脑成像与电生理的整合性探索,以及拓展公平偏好电生理的外部效度和研究范式等方面展开进一步探究。     

Cooperation in repeated interactions: A systematic review of Centipede game experiments, 1992–2016

Cooperation is a fundamental form of social interaction, and turn-taking reciprocity one of its most familiar manifestations. The Centipede game provides a formal model of such alternating reciprocal cooperation, but a backward induction (BI) argument appears to prove logically that instrumentally rational players would never cooperate in this way. A systematic review of experimental research reveals that human decision makers cooperate frequently in this game, except under certain extreme conditions. Several game, situational, and individual difference variables have been investigated for their influence on cooperation. The most influential are aspects of the payoff function (especially the social gain from cooperation and the risk associated with a cooperative move), the number of players, repetitions of the game, group vs. individual decisions, and players’ social value orientations (SVOs). Our review of experimental evidence suggests that other-regarding preferences, including prosocial behavioural dispositions and collective rationality, provide the most powerful explanation for cooperation.     

Counterfactual comparison modulates fairness consideration in the mini‐ultimatum game: An event‐related potentials study

Existing literature on the mini‐ultimatum game indicates that counterfactual comparison between chosen and unchosen alternatives is of great importance for individual's fairness consideration. However, it is still unclear how counterfactual comparison influences the electrophysiological responses to unfair chosen offers. In conjunction with event‐related potentials’ (ERPs) technique, the current study aimed to explore the issue by employing a modified version of the mini‐ultimatum game where a fixed set of two alternatives (unfair offer vs. fair alternative, unfair vs. hyperfair alternative, unfair offer vs. hyperunfair alternative) was presented before the chosen offer. The behavioral results showed that participants were more likely to accept unfair chosen offers when the unchosen alternative was hyperunfair than when the unchosen alternative was fair or hyperfair. The ERPs results showed that the feedback‐related negativity (FRN) elicited by unfair chosen offers was insensitive to the type of unchosen alternative when correcting for possible overlap with other components. In contrast, unfair chosen offers elicited larger P300 amplitudes when the unchosen alternative was hyperunfair than when the unchosen alternative was fair or hyperfair. These findings suggest that counterfactual comparison may take effect at later stages of fairness consideration as reflected by the P300.     

Learning What is Essential: Relative and Absolute Changes in Children's Beliefs about the Heritability of Ethnicity

There are conflicting findings regarding the development of essentialist beliefs about social categories. The present studies address these findings by differentiating between the developments of the relative versus absolute essentialist status of categories. Participants were Israeli Secular Jewish and Muslim Arab kindergarteners, second graders, and sixth graders. Study 1 asked children which among alternative properties of a parent was most likely to transfer to a child. Findings showed that while kindergarteners did not systematically discriminate among properties, second and sixth graders privileged ethnicity. Study 2 asked children whether membership in various social categories was biologically or environmentally determined. Findings showed that kindergarteners and second graders, but not sixth graders, believed ethnicity to be biologically inherited. These results are discussed vis-à-vis different theories about the origins of social essentialism.     

议价博弈决策的权利认知效应

在议价博弈中,决策者可能存在因对自己及其他参与者拥有权利的认识程度不同,从而影响其策略选择及决策行为的现象。为验证该“权利认知效应”的存在,用实验法考察了240名不同年龄被试在两种议价博弈任务——最后通牒和纳什议价中的决策表现,结果发现：（1）6到12岁儿童和大学生中均存在权利认知效应;（2）随着年龄增长,受权利认知影响的人数呈现逐渐减少的趋势;（3）在议价博弈中,儿童对分配权的认识程度高于对否决权的认知。     

An experimental test of a game‐theoretical model of reciprocity

In this contribution the norm of reciprocity is defined as a basic internal motivation. Using formal tools of game theory, a model of social utility function is presented. The reciprocity model predicts that social actors should reciprocate costs and benefits they receive, even when there are costs in conforming to the norm. Hypotheses about actors' behavior, expectations and evaluations are derived from the model. The hypotheses were tested in an experimental situation, the reciprocity game, consisting of a prisoner's dilemma game (PD) followed by a dictator game (DG). The sample was composed of 74 Italian undergraduate students. In line with the model's predictions, the experimental results showed that participants reciprocate the behavior of the opponent in the PD. In the DG, if the opponent cooperated, participants gave back an almost equal share, whereas if the opponent defected, participants gave a minimal amount. These reciprocity effects are modulated by individual differences in the concern for reciprocity. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On‐line ostracism affects children differently from adolescents and adults

This research examines adults', and for the first time, children's and adolescents' reaction to being ostracized and included, using an on‐line game, ‘Cyberball’ with same and opposite sex players. Ostracism strongly threatened four primary needs (esteem, belonging, meaning, and control) and lowered mood among 8‐ to 9‐year‐olds, 13‐ to 14‐year‐olds, and adults. However, it did so in different ways. Ostracism threatened self‐esteem needs more among 8‐ to 9‐year‐olds than older participants. Among 13‐ to 14‐year‐olds, ostracism threatened belonging more than other needs. Belonging was threatened most when ostracism was participants' first experience in the game. Moreover, when participants had been included beforehand, ostracism threatened meaning needs most strongly. Gender of other players had no effect. Practical and developmental implications for social inclusion and on‐line experiences among children and young people are discussed.     

What you don’t know won’t hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games

We used simple economic games to examine pro-social behavior and the lengths that people will take to avoid engaging in it. Over two studies, we found that about one-third of participants were willing to “exit” a $10 dictator game and take $9 instead. The exit option left the receiver nothing, but also ensured that the receiver never knew that a dictator game was to be played. Because most social utility models are defined over monetary outcomes, they cannot explain choosing the ($9, $0) exit outcome over the dominating $10 dictator game, since the game includes outcomes of ($10, $0) and ($9, $1). We also studied exiting using a “private” dictator game. In the private game, the receiver never knew about the game or from where any money was received. Gifts in this game were added innocuously to a payment for a separate task. Almost no dictators exited from the private game, indicating that receivers’ beliefs are the key factor in the decision to exit. When, as in the private game, the receivers’ beliefs and expectations cannot be manipulated by exit, exit is seldom taken. We conclude that giving often reflects a desire not to violate others’ expectations rather than a concern for others’ welfare per se. We discuss the implications of our results for understanding ethical decisions and for testing and modeling social preferences. An adequate specification of social preferences should include “psychological” payoffs that directly incorporate beliefs about actions into the utility function.     

Sharing losses and sharing gains: Increased demand for fairness under adversity

There is ample experimental evidence showing that people have a strong preference for equity in wealth allocation and social interaction. Although the behavior of gain sharing and responses to (un)fairness in allocation of wealth has been extensively investigated in studies employing economic exchange games, few studies have focused on how people respond to an unfair division of loss between individuals. In this study we developed a new variant of the ultimatum game and examined the participants' reactions to (un)fairness in both gain and loss sharing. Results from three experiments showed that the rejection rates to unfair offers were generally higher in the loss than in the gain domain. Moreover, participants were inclined to associate loss with “unfair” and gain with “fair”, with stronger associations leading to higher rejection rates in the ultimatum game. Furthermore, in subjective rating, unfair offers were perceived as being more unfair in the loss than in the gain domain. These results demonstrate an increased demand for fairness under adversity and the importance of justice in liability sharing.     

Social Value Orientation Moderates the Effects of Intuition versus Reflection on Responses to Unfair Ultimatum Offers

We investigated whether social value orientation (SVO) moderates the effects of intuitive versus reflective information processing on responses to unfair offers. We measured SVO one week prior to an ultimatum game experiment in which participants had to accept or reject a series of 10 ultimatum offers including very low (unfair) ones. Before making these decisions, participants mentally contrasted their individual goals with the obstacle of pondering at length or acting in a hasty way; then they made the plan to adopt an intuitive or a reflective mode of processing (intuitive and reflective condition, respectively), or made no such plans (control condition). Participants with rather high (prosocial) SVO scores were more likely to accept unfair offers in the reflective than the intuitive condition. This effect also evinced for a subset of selfish individuals; however, the majority with rather low (selfish) scores made similar decisions in both conditions. This pattern of results suggests that SVO moderates the effects of intuitive versus reflective modes of processing on responses to low ultimatum offers. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How to Model Heterogeneity in Costly Punishment: Insights from Responders' Response Times

We investigate what processes may underlie heterogeneity in social preferences. We address this question by examining participants' decisions and associated response times across 12 mini‐ultimatum games. Using a finite mixture model and cross‐validating its classification with a response time analysis, we identified four groups of responders: one group takes little to no account of the proposed split or the foregone allocation and swiftly accepts any positive offer; two groups process primarily the objective properties of the allocations (fairness and kindness) and need more time the more properties need to be examined; and a fourth group, which takes more time than the others, appears to take into account what they would have proposed had they been put in the role of the proposer. We discuss implications of this joint decision–response time analysis. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The salience of a recipient’s alternatives: Inter- and intrapersonal comparison in ultimatum games

The social utility model suggests that in social decision-making, both inter- and intrapersonal comparisons are important in assessing the utility of a decision outcome. In the ultimatum game both these comparisons play a role. This is especially true for recipients reacting to an unfair offer. We propose that the relative weights inter- and intrapersonal comparisons receive in ultimatum games depend on the way the decision is structured. In three studies we show that presenting recipients with a straightforward choice instead of the usual accept/reject question makes recipients more inclined to accept unfair offers. Moreover, the existence of an alternative outcome, i.e., the fact that refusal of the offer also leads to a substantial outcome, similarly raises the level of acceptances in a standard ultimatum game. Results are discussed in relation to the joint/separate evaluation disparity and the distinction between occurrences and non-occurrences.     

Fairness and bargaining power in threshold public goods experiments

Experiments on three two‐person threshold public good provision games, namely, the simultaneous, sequential, and dictator games, are conducted to explore the motives behind giving. Players who move simultaneously are endowed with equal bargaining power, and players who move first are endowed with more bargaining power than players who move subsequently. Dictators are indubitably endowed with complete bargaining power. Since the differences between the bargaining powers of two players increase from the simultaneous to the sequential to the dictator game, comparisons among games allow us to trace whether the contribution behavior is motivated by fairness or is simply due to the strategic concern. The experimental evidence shows that the strategic concern explains the overall contribution behavior better than the motive of fairness. However, in the final round 26% of the dictators share the threshold evenly with their opponents, suggesting that some subjects do play fairly. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.