儒家传统荣辱观及其当代价值

以荣辱观教育统领道德教育,以道德教育统领人才培养,这是传统儒家教育思想和社会治理思想的精华。传统儒家荣辱观所追求的价值目标无非有二:一在知耻,二在求荣。儒家一贯认为,不知耻无以为人,不求荣无以为尊。因而主张荣耻对立,泾渭分明,荣荣耻耻,礼义立人。以知耻教育来推进义理教育,以义理教育来保障道德秩序,以道德秩序来巩固封建统治秩序。这正是儒家认定荣辱观教育为“治教之大端”的基本思路。认真分析儒家传统荣辱观,可以为今天的道德教育和社会治理提供借鉴。     

孟子德育思想的整体架构

孟子是先秦儒家学派的重要代表人物,其德育思想主要表现为:通过创立性善论建立了道德教育的理论基础;把仁义统一为道德教育的核心内容;强调自我教育是德育的关键环节;推崇诗意的理想人格从而达到以德治国的政治目的.     

先秦儒家天命思想的三重境界

先秦儒家天命思想上承殷周,并经过孔孟荀等儒家先哲进一步阐释与说明后不断向前推进,最终构成了以天命思想为统领、以天德合一为宗旨的宏大思想体系。在对待天命的问题上,先秦儒家一方面承认天命力量的客观存在,另一方面又主张人在将"命"交由"天"控制的同时,通过积极主动尽自己的本分去回应天命,呈现出畏天命、顺天命和制天命的三重境界,灌注了先秦儒家对人与天、人与自然关系的思考,对于今人正确看待生命和命运、理性追求生命价值、积极成就自我具有积极借鉴意义。     

超越社群主义的群己观——先秦儒家道德哲学中的群己之辨及其现代意义

群己之辨是先秦儒家道德哲学中一个十分重要的论题。从孔子的"鸟兽不可与同群"、孟子的"老吾老,以及人之老;幼吾幼,以及人之幼"到荀子的"人能群,彼不能群也",都表明先秦儒者更加重视群体的价值。但这并不意味着儒家就忽视个体生命以及个体利益,儒家实际上认为个体和群体在最终的利益和价值上应当是合一的。这样一种群己观,在与西方社群主义群己观的对比中,可以更加凸显出其理论特质,并呈现出其现代意义。     

先秦儒家对人伦次序的安排——以对夫妇一伦的考察为中心

与西周社会以"亲亲"、"尊尊"为准则建立的以父子一伦为首的人伦次序不同,先秦儒家以"亲"、"尊"、"义"为准则建立了以夫妇一伦为首的人伦关系网。尽管在先秦儒家内部,仍然有不少人认可以父子一伦为首的人伦次序安排,并且这种安排在汉代以后又成为中国传统社会的主流观点,但是在先秦儒家那里,以夫妇一伦为首的人伦次序安排却有着发展为主流的倾向。先秦儒家的这种人伦关系理论不仅对现代社会人伦关系的规范和安顿有重要的意义,它也是儒家在现代社会继续生根发芽并繁荣发展的基石。     

先秦儒家人格教育思想的主体性意蕴

儒家教育思想虽然强调了受教育者对于既定的社会秩序和伦理规范的服从和顺从,但同时也包含着主体性的道德意蕴。尤其是在先秦儒家的人格教育思想中,其主体性的精神内涵是比较突出的。先秦儒家倡导道德的自主修养,强调道德行为选择的自为自主,主张使自我成为道德意志的主宰者,赋予道德主体在道德低线与道德高线之间选择的权利。这些都可以视作是先秦儒家人格教育思想中所具有的主体性意蕴。虽然它与当代教育所倡导的主体性精神存在差异,但是其所体现的精神旨趣依然值得我们去反思和挖掘。     

自目的论与责任论分析与重建儒家道德哲学

<正> 儒家的道德哲学定位:人、人生、人心、人性儒家的道德哲学是基于对人的了解而发生的,亦即基于对“人”的认识而产生对人的道德行为的认识。但什么是人的认识?要回答这个问题,吾人可以循三个方面加以考察:第一个方面是人在社会中的地位。第二个方面是人在自我反省中的自我发现。第三个方面是人在天地宇宙中的地位。这三个方面也正好显示了人在社会、自我与宇宙反省中的价值。从先秦儒家哲学的发展过程来看,这三方面也正好形成一个儒家哲学发展的阶段。第一个方面是从社会为人定位。这可以《尚书》与《论语》两书的义理为代表;第二个方面是人的自觉和自我发现,这可以孟子为代表。第三个方面是人的发生根源,从宇宙本体为人定位。这可以《易传》、《中庸》为代表。当然,代表这三方面的儒家经典不一定应合历史发展的先后秩序,     

儒家哲学中关于“教”的学说

儒家重视教育、教化,从这个意义上说,儒学又被称为儒教。儒教就本来的意义说,是指儒家之人伦教化,教育是其中一方面的内容。兴私学,办教育,自孔子始儒家学者已经在这方面付出很大的努力,并保留下来很多宝贵的教育思想。从根本上说,儒家的教育是成德之教,首先要成就的就是一个“成人”,而不是具有某方面技能的专家。但成德之教归根到底是每个人自身的事情,儒家虽重视“先知觉后知,先觉觉后觉”的启发式教育,但更强调的是每个人的自我修养,此即《中庸》所说的“修道”之“教”。历史地讲,儒学或儒教并非宗教,但在人文教化中所…     

《太一生水》与先秦儒家性情论

先秦儒家的哲学构架是始于性情论,而又终于性情论的。在先秦儒家的思想体系中,人的性情是天玄地黄、阴阳大化、风雨薄施的摩荡结果。先秦儒家吸收了《太一生水》的自然哲学思想。这不仅体现在儒家哲学的表述方式上,更为重要的是对儒家性情论,乃至整个儒家哲学的整体架构的建立,都产生了深远的影响。     

儒家成德精神动力的心理学分析

儒家是要成德的。儒家为什么要成德 ?这就是儒家之所以为儒家的精神动力问题 ,从心理学看则是动机问题。儒家成德的精神动力源于孔子“以德配天”的天命思想。“以德配天”的思想一方面为成德找到了外在本原依据 ,另一方面也彰显了人的主体性。但面对天不应德的现实 ,孔子虽然以盲目命来化解 ,但儒家的成德内在合理性毕竟受到怀疑。先秦儒家通过“时”来化解这种质疑。后儒则逐步从外在预设向个体内在、本然性方面转换 ,逐步形成了以张载为代表的人的内在本原成德观。虽然如此 ,面对成德过程中的诸多不确定性 ,外在的盲目命思想一直保留下来。这样内在本然成德动力和外在“际命”化解的思想从内外方面使儒家成德动力得以维系和作用     

The Relationship Between Effort and Moral Worth: Three Amendments to Sorensen’s Model

Kelly Sorensen defends a model of the relationship between effort and moral worth in which the effort exerted in performing a morally desirable action contributes positively to the action’s moral worth, but the effort required to perform the action detracts from its moral worth. I argue that Sorensen’s model, though on the right track, is mistaken in three ways. First, it fails to capture the relevance of counterfactual effort to moral worth. Second, it wrongly implies that exerting unnecessary effort confers moral worth on an action. Third, it fails to adequately distinguish between cases in which effort is required because of defects of moral character and those in which effort is required because of barriers external to moral character, such as social pressures or non-moral cognitive deficits. I suggest three amendments to Sorensen’s model that correct these three defects.     

Gender,Steroids, and Fairness in Sport

This article examines and defends the claim that whether or not to cheat can be a genuine moral dilemma within the ethics of team sports. That is, although there is always something morally wrong in cheating there may also be moral reasons in its favour and thus some (and perhaps an overriding) duty to cheat. This is based on the duty that players have of not letting down their teammates by failing to make sufficient effort to achieve victory. In considering the normative limits to such efforts, it is argued that players could reasonably be morally criticised for not cheating where this is of a kind commonly practised in their sport. Evidence is found in the attitudes to cheating of those connected with sport to suggest that some of it is regarded as part of the game, though in a sense that does not undermine its status as genuine cheating. In conclusion a brief consideration is given to the implications for the education, training and character of players, given a belief in there being moral reasons for cheating.     

全面建设小康社会与思想道德教育的重点

在全面建设小康社会的历史实践中 ,思想道德教育对培育社会主义先进文化和建立社会主义道德体系 ,具有举足轻重的作用。当前 ,思想道德教育的重点环节应放在以下三个方面 :加强对广大农村居民的思想道德教育 ;围绕依法治国和以德治国相结合的治国方略有效开展法治、德治教育 ;在方法论上实现由以义务为起点的思想道德教育转变为以权利为起点的思想道德教育 ,由单纯的思想道德教育转变为以利益赏罚为载体的思想道德教育。     

The Problem of Confucian Moral Cultivation and Its Solution: Using Ritual Propriety to Support Rule by Law

Thinking about the decline of morality in post-reform China,the author analyzes the development of virtuous governance based on moral education,and concludes that the reason why ancient rulers were so infatuated with it was the inhibitive function of public evaluation on moral transgressions in familiar neighborhoods.However,as China transforms into a dynamic and commercial society,and its people move from familiar neighborhoods to alienated communities in the cities,public evaluation is losing its power over moral transgressors.To prevent the collapse of the moral system,it is necessary to use rule by law to foster people's sense of justice and rule-consciousness-not to simply hope for the appearance of more altruists.This is possible because law is the embodiment of moral principle,and because legal restraints and penalties can be internalized as habits.After a sense of justice and rule-consciousness has been established in people,we can again take up Confucian virtue education to nurture people's sense of shame and dignity,and their humane and righteous mind.However,to stop the current chaos and corruption,it is urgent that we adopt rule by law and supplement it with moral education.     

Early Education in Plato's Republic

In this paper, I reconsider the commonly held position that the early moral education of the Republic is arational since the youths of the Kallipolis do not yet have the capacity for reason. I argue that, because they receive an extensive mathematical education alongside their moral education, the youths not only have a capacity for reason but that capacity is being developed in their early education. If this is so, though, then we must rethink why the early moral education is arational. I argue that the reason is rooted in the nature of moral explanations. These sorts of explanations are rooted in the Forms and thus one can only understand those explanations when they have knowledge of the Forms. But this requires preparation – the very sort of preparation that is provided by both the mathematical and moral educations.     

试论高校隐性德育课程设计

高校学生工作即德育工作,虽高等教育质量的生命线,这对于培养新世纪高素质人才具有十分重要的现实意义。高校德育主要是通过德育课程来完成的。高校德育课程由显性德育课程与隐性德育课程两部分构成。实施高校隐性德育课程设计必须深刻理解其内涵及特征,客观确定其价值取向,科学设计其课程内容。     

Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism

Though moral relativism has had its supporters over the years, it is not a dominant position in philosophy. I will argue here, though, that the view is an attractive position. It evades some hardcore challenges that face absolutism, and it is reconcilable with an appealing emotivist approach to moral attitudes. In previous work, I have offered considerations in favor of a version of moral relativism that I call “perspectivalism.” These considerations are primarily grounded in linguistic data. Here I offer a self‐standing argument for perspectivalism. I begin with an argument against moral absolutism. I then argue that moral terms, such as ‘wrong’ and ‘right’, require for their application that the moral judge instantiate particular affective states, and I use this claim to provide further defense of moral relativism.     

Individual Moral Development and Moral Progress

At first glance, one of the most obvious places to look for moral progress is in individuals, in particular in moral development from childhood to adulthood. In fact, that moral progress is possible is a foundational assumption of moral education. Beyond the general agreement that moral progress is not only possible but even a common feature of human development things become blurry, however. For what do we mean by ‘progress’? And what constitutes moral progress? Does the idea of individual moral progress presuppose a predetermined end or goal of moral education and development, or not? In this article we analyze the concept of moral progress to shed light on the psychology of moral development and vice versa; these analyses are found to be mutually supportive. We suggest that: moral progress should be conceived of as development that is evaluated positively on the basis of relatively stable moral criteria that are the fruit and the subject of an ongoing conversation; moral progress does not imply the idea of an end-state; individual moral progress is best conceived of as the development of various components of moral functioning and their robust integration in a person’s identity; both children and adults can progress morally - even though we would probably not speak in terms of progress in the case of children - but adults’ moral progress is both more hard-won and to a greater extent a personal project rather than a collective effort.     

交往理性与德育理念的重建

哲学意义上的交往理论,尤其是哈贝马斯的交往理性可以解决当前目的理性泛滥带来的的德育危机。交往德育是在超越灌输德育的基础上,对主体存在、人的存在目标和生存意义提出本质追问并提供某种可能性诠释的德育理论。它是一种扬弃与超越灌输德育而又与灌输德育截然不同的德育理念,是德育发展的必经阶段。     

Refining our understanding of the VIA Classification: Reflections on papers by Han,Miller, and Snow

ABSTRACT

Han, Miller, and Snow have written three thoughtful critiques of the VIA Classification of Strengths and Virtues. In this response, I emphasize five points. First, I suggest the concept of practical wisdom may be understood in terms of three VIA strengths: prudence, judgment, and perspective. Second, recognizing that the VIA Classification is a structural model of individual traits, rather than a moral theory, can address some concerns about the model, including its failure to account for the unity of the virtues. Third, I review a three-virtue model that has emerged in recent research on the VIA strengths may provide essential elements for a taxonomy of virtue. Fourth, I raise several issues associated with the application of the VIA Classification to moral education. Finally, though the model demonstrates substantial generalizabilty across Westernized populations, research in traditional indigenous cultures remains insufficient. I conclude with a series of questions for future research.