Patient preferences for physician persuasion strategies

This study investigated patient preferences for various types of physician persuasion strategies. Four types of persuasion strategies were utilized which involved combination of high and low levels of affectivity and information. In addition, patient variables, receiver apprehension and health beliefs were introduced to predict preference choices by patients. Results indicated that patients are influenced in their decision-making (preferences) by the type of persuasive strategy employed. Further, patients with different characteristics and predispositions prefer different persuasive strategies. The results of this study suggest that the success of physician persuasiveness is dependent upon the type of strategy used and the type of patient being persuaded.     

The relative influence of advice from human experts and statistical methods on forecast adjustments

Decision makers and forecasters often receive advice from different sources including human experts and statistical methods. This research examines, in the context of stock price forecasting, how the apparent source of the advice affects the attention that is paid to it when the mode of delivery of the advice is identical for both sources. In Study 1, two groups of participants were given the same advised point and interval forecasts. One group was told that these were the advice of a human expert and the other that they were generated by a statistical forecasting method. The participants were then asked to adjust forecasts they had previously made in light of this advice. While in both cases the advice led to improved point forecast accuracy and better calibration of the prediction intervals, the advice which apparently emanated from a statistical method was discounted much more severely. In Study 2, participants were provided with advice from two sources. When the participants were told that both sources were either human experts or both were statistical methods, the apparent statistical‐based advice had the same influence on the adjusted estimates as the advice that appeared to come from a human expert. However when the apparent sources of advice were different, much greater attention was paid to the advice that apparently came from a human expert. Theories of advice utilization are used to identify why the advice of a human expert is likely to be preferred to advice from a statistical method. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pain in the Past and Pleasure in the Future: The Development of Past–Future Preferences for Hedonic Goods

It seems self-evident that people prefer painful experiences to be in the past and pleasurable experiences to lie in the future. Indeed, it has been claimed that, for hedonic goods, this preference is absolute (Sullivan, 2018). Yet very little is known about the extent to which people demonstrate explicit preferences regarding the temporal location of hedonic experiences, about the developmental trajectory of such preferences, and about whether such preferences are impervious to differences in the quantity of envisaged past and future pain or pleasure. We find consistent evidence that, all else being equal, adults and children aged 7 and over prefer pleasure to lie in the future and pain in the past and believe that other people will, too. They also predict that other people will be happier when pleasure is in the future rather than the past but sadder when pain is in the future rather than the past. Younger children have the same temporal preferences as adults for their own painful experiences, but they prefer their pleasure to lie in the past and do not predict that others' levels of happiness or sadness vary dependent on whether experiences lie in the past or the future. However, from the age of 7, temporal preferences were typically abandoned at the earliest opportunity when the quantity of past pain or pleasure was greater than the quantity located in the future. Past–future preferences for hedonic goods emerge early developmentally but are surprisingly flexible.     

Tell Me What I Wanted to Hear: Confirmation Effect in Lay Evaluations of Financial Expert Authority

In real life, people engage in interactive decision processes by consulting with experts. However, before taking advice, they must recognise the authority of an expert to assess the quality of the advice. The main goal of this research was to investigate how the confirmation effect affects lay evaluations of the epistemic authority of financial experts. Experiment 1 showed that lay people tend to ascribe greater epistemic authority to those experts whose advice confirms people's opinions, both measured and manipulated. Experiment 2 revealed that when participants' own opinions are not salient, people tend to evaluate experts' authority as higher when their advice confirms social norms. In Experiment 3 we jointly investigated the effects of participants' own opinions and social norms on the evaluations of authority. When both sources of expertise were made salient, decision‐makers favoured advice confirming their own beliefs and used it to evaluate experts' authority. Three interpretations of the role confirmation plays in the experts' authority evaluations are proposed: (1) self‐defensive strategies; (2) processing fluency; and (3) psychological consequences of naïve realism. The paper discusses practical implications of the results. We propose that increasing consumers' knowledge about biases might protect their evaluations of financial advice from being susceptible to the confirmation effect.     

Confidence via correction: The effect of judgment correction on consumer confidence

At times, consumers are motivated to reduce the influence of a product recommendation on their judgments. Based on previous research, it is unclear whether this correction process will increase or decrease consumers' confidence in their judgments. We find that source credibility moderates the effect of correction on confidence: correction decreases confidence when a product recommendation comes from a high credibility source but increases confidence when the same message comes from a low credibility source. As a result, correction increases the effectiveness of recommendations from low credibility sources on purchase intentions. Notably, this “confidence via correction” effect is further moderated by elaboration, such that the effect is attenuated for high elaboration consumers. Our results have implications for understanding consumers' reactions to persuasive messages and for both marketing practitioners and consumer protection agencies using correction cues to influence message persuasiveness.     

不同建议来源和关系亲疏下突发事件决策中的框架效应

从建议来源和关系亲疏两个方面对突发事件下的决策框架效应进行探讨。采用2（建议来源：来自普通群众／消防人员）×2（关系亲疏：关系亲密／关系疏远）×2（任务框架：正面框架／负面框架）完全被试间实验设计。实验材料以突发事件为背景,根据Kahneman（1981）研究的经典“亚洲疾病问题”改编。采用集体施测的方法,240名来自济南和重庆的大学生参加了实验。结果发现：①建议来源影响被试的决策反应,尤其是当建议来自专业人士（如消防人员）时,决策者表现出偏好于风险的单向框架效应;②关系亲疏导致不同的框架效应,在拯救包括亲属在内的受灾人群（关系亲密）时,框架效应非常明显;但当拯救陌生人（关系疏远）时,决策者表现出偏好于风险的单向框架效应;③当建议来源和关系亲疏共同作用于被试决策时,凡涉及关系亲密条件时决策者不管建议来源都表现出明显的框架效应;而当关系疏远时不同的建议来源导致决策者的决策框架不同。这说明,不同的建议来源和关系亲疏对突发事件下的决策框架效应产生了影响。     

The role of achievement goal orientations in students' perceptions of and preferences for classroom environment

Background . Recent research on achievement motivation has begun to examine the effects of environmental factors affecting students' motivational beliefs and goal tendencies. However, when interpreting and applying the results, individual factors underlying students' different perceptions of their learning environment are often ignored. An implicit assumption seems to be that regardless of their dispositional differences (e.g. motivational basis), students will experience and benefit from instructional practices in the same way. Aims . This paper highlights the importance of students' dispositional motivational factors when examining differences in their perceptions of and preferences for the learning environment. The study builds on a conception of student motivation that emphasizes the interaction of individual and contextual factors. Sample and method . Questionnaires served as self‐report tools and assessed students' achievement goal orientations, self‐esteem, causality beliefs, academic withdrawal and perceptions of and preferences for the learning environment. The sample consisted of 208 sixth grade elementary school students. Results . Based on latent class cluster analysis and one‐way analyses of variance, it was found that students' perceptions of and preferences for the learning environment vary depending on differences in students' motivational tendencies. Conclusions . Students' dispositional motivational characteristics should be taken into account both in theoretical considerations and in instructional interventions.     

How Hispanic patients address ambiguous versus unambiguous bias in the doctor's office

Two studies examined Hispanic individuals' preferences for using ten different bias reduction strategies when interacting with a doctor whose beliefs about their group were either ambiguous or clearly biased. Consistent with predictions, participants who imagined interacting with a doctor whose beliefs were ambiguous preferred strategies that facilitate positive doctor–patient interactions, whereas participants whose doctor explicitly endorsed negative stereotypes about their group preferred strategies that address stereotype content. The results also revealed that, regardless of whether the doctor's beliefs were ambiguous or clearly biased, stigma consciousness predicted participants' preferences for using strategies that address stereotype content. These findings suggest that both doctors' behavior and individual‐level factors influence how minority individuals choose to behave in a healthcare setting.     

Individual and group advice taking in judgmental forecasting: Is group forecasting superior to individual forecasting?

We examined how individuals and groups behave in making judgmental forecasts when they are given external forecast advice. We compare individual and group advice-taking behavior under different conditions: (a) when advice quality is fixed, (b) when advice quality is randomly varied, and (c) when there is feedback on advice quality or not. Participants in Study 1 received fixed advice of either reasonable or unreasonable quality while making their decisions. Participants in Study 2 randomly received both reasonable and unreasonable advice. We found in both studies that groups feel more confident than individuals. This greater confidence decreased the groups' reliance on advice. We also found that groups are better than individuals at discerning the quality of advice. In the group treatment, the group's reliance on advice increased according to the degree of disagreement with the initial decisions of the group members. In Study 3, participants randomly received both reasonable and unreasonable advice, and in addition, they received feedback on actual realizations that enabled them to learn about the quality of advice. In the presence of feedback on random advice quality, groups are no longer less receptive to advice than individuals; with feedback, both individuals and groups discount advice more than they do without feedback. Nevertheless, groups are still better than individuals at discerning the quality of advice. We conclude that group forecasting is better than individual forecasting across various conditions that we investigate except when advice quality is known to be consistently reliable.     

Making sense of recommendations

Computer algorithms are increasingly being used to predict people's preferences and make recommendations. Although people frequently encounter these algorithms because they are cheap to scale, we do not know how they compare to human judgment. Here, we compare computer recommender systems to human recommenders in a domain that affords humans many advantages: predicting which jokes people will find funny. We find that recommender systems outperform humans, whether strangers, friends, or family. Yet people are averse to relying on these recommender systems. This aversion partly stems from the fact that people believe the human recommendation process is easier to understand. It is not enough for recommender systems to be accurate, they must also be understood.     

Selective exposure among advisors: the impact of impression motivation

Audience confirmation bias (ACB) refers to the extent to which people prefer information supporting (vs. conflicting with) their audience's views. In two studies, we showed that advisors shifted their ACB toward the needs of their advisees (i.e., audience): When advisors were led to believe that their advisees wanted to defend their views, the ACB was higher compared with when advisees were open minded for critique. Study 2 indicated that this pattern occurred because advisors wanted to have a pleasant interaction with their advisees (impression motivation): Whereas impression‐motivated advisors exhibited a stronger ACB when they were asked to give advice to a defensive (vs. open‐minded) advisee, accuracy‐motivated advisors showed a balanced ACB, regardless of their advisee's needs.     

The persuasiveness puzzle about bootstrapping

This paper aims at resolving a puzzle about the persuasiveness of bootstrapping. On the one hand, bootstrapping is not a persuasive method of settling questions about the reliability of a source. On the other hand, our beliefs that our sense apparatus is reliable is based on other empirically formed beliefs, that is, they are acquired via a presumably complex bootstrapping process. I will argue that when we doubt the reliability of a source, bootstrapping is not a persuasive method for coming to believe that the source is reliable. However, when being initially unaware of a source and its reliability, as in the case of forming beliefs about our sense apparatus, bootstrapping can be eventually persuasive.     

Repetition, not number of sources, increases both susceptibility to misinformation and confidence in the accuracy of eyewitnesses

Are claims more credible when made by multiple sources, or is it the repetition of claims that matters? Some research suggests that claims have more credibility when independent sources make them. Yet, other research suggests that simply repeating information makes it more accessible and encourages reliance on automatic processes—factors known to change people's judgments. In Experiment 1, people took part in a “misinformation” study: people first watched a video of a crime and later read eyewitness reports attributed to one or three different eyewitnesses who made misleading claims in either one report or repeated the same misleading claims across all three reports. In Experiment 2, people who had not seen any videos read those same reports and indicated how confident they were that each claim happened in the original event. People were more misled by—and more confident about—claims that were repeated, regardless of how many eyewitnesses made them. We hypothesize that people interpreted the familiarity of repeated claims as markers of accuracy. These findings fit with research showing that repeating information makes it seem more true, and highlight the power of a single repeated voice.     

Explaining social norm compliance. A plea for neural representations

How should we understand the claim that people comply with social norms because they possess the right kinds of beliefs and preferences? I answer this question by considering two approaches to what it is to believe (and prefer), namely: representationalism and dispositionalism. I argue for a variety of representationalism, viz. neural representationalism. Neural representationalism is the conjunction of two claims. First, what it is essential to have beliefs and preferences is to have certain neural representations. Second, neural representations are often necessary to adequately explain behaviour. After having canvassed one promising way to understand what neural representations could be, I argue that the appeal to beliefs and preferences in explanations of paradigmatic cases of norm compliance should be understood as an appeal to neural representations.     

Counselling, support and advice: The adolescent viewpoint

Few discussions on counselling pay more than lip service to what adolescents actually want. Data presented on the preferences of adolescents with regard to helping services show that no one method of providing help would be adequate. An indication of the number of relatively Isolated and unsupported adolescents is given, suggesting that 20-40% of young people lack a regular source of advice or understanding. Professional and official sources of advice are rarely used, and are not likely to be until they improve both their accessibility and image in the eyes of youth.     

What are Adaptive Preferences? Exclusion and Disability in the Capability Approach

It is a longstanding problem for theorists of justice that many victims of injustice seem to prefer mistreatment, and perpetuate their own oppression. One possible response is to simply ignore such preferences as unreliable ‘adaptive preferences’. Capability theorists have taken this approach, arguing that individuals should be entitled to certain capabilities regardless of their satisfaction without them. Although this initially seems plausible, worries have been raised that undermining the reliability of individuals' strongly‐held preferences impugns their rationality, and further excludes already marginalised groups. I argue that such criticisms trade on an ambiguity between two uses of the term ‘adaptive preference’. An adaptive preference is often assumed to be irrational, and an unreliable guide to its possessor's best interests. However, I suggest a preference may also be adaptive in the sense that it is an unreliable guide to our distributive entitlements, and that this does not require an assessment of individuals' rationality. I consider this distinction in relation to disability, arguing that this clarification allows us to justifiably ignore some disabled individuals' preferences, in the context of theorising about distributive justice, without disrespecting or undermining their rationality or culture.     

When getting angry is smart: emotional preferences and emotional intelligence

People who prefer to feel useful emotions, even when they are unpleasant to experience, must understand emotions and seek to regulate them in strategic ways. Such people, therefore, may be more emotionally intelligent compared with people who prefer to feel emotions that may not be useful for the context at hand, even if those emotions are pleasant to experience. We tested this hypothesis by measuring emotional intelligence and preferences to feel pleasant and unpleasant emotions in contexts in which they are likely to be useful or not. We found significant positive associations between emotional intelligence and preferences for useful emotions, even when controlling for trait emotional experiences and cognitive intelligence. People who prefer to feel anger when confronting others tend to be higher in emotional intelligence, whereas people who prefer to feel happiness in such contexts tend to be lower in emotional intelligence. Such findings are consistent with the idea that wanting to feel bad may be good at times, and vice versa.     

Gender differences in distributive justice preferences: The impact of domain

Past research has found that distributive justice preferences vary markedly both as a function of gender of allocator and the domain in which outcomes or rewards are allocated (e.g., relationships vs. work contexts). This study examined the interaction of these two factors in determining distributive justice preferences. Subjects were asked to fill out two scales designed to assess the degree to which their general distributive preferences in work contexts and in relationships were benevolent (prefer inputs to exceed outcomes), equity sensitive (prefer outcome/input ratios to be equal), or entitled (prefer outcomes to exceed inputs). Results revealed that women's preferences were significantly more benevolent (or less entitled) than men's in work domains, but that men's and women's distributive preferences did not differ significantly in relationships. In addition, both sexes indicated significantly more entitled preferences in work domains than in relationships, but the difference between domains was much greater for men than for women. These results suggest that, when considering issues of justice, men make a greater distinction between domains than do women, and that previously observed gender differences in distributive justice preferences may be specific to the work domain.     

Preference for Human (vs. Robotic) Labor is Stronger in Symbolic Consumption Contexts

Advances in robotics, automation, and artificial intelligence increasingly enable firms to replace human labor with technology, thereby fundamentally transforming how goods and services are produced. From both managerial and societal points of view, it is therefore important to understand demand‐side incentives for firms to employ human labor. We begin to address this question by examining for which products and services consumers are more likely to favor human (vs. robotic) labor. In six studies, we demonstrate that consumers prefer human (vs. robotic) labor more for products with higher (vs. lower) symbolic value (e.g., when expressing something about one's beliefs and personality is of greater importance). We theorize that this is because consumers have stronger uniqueness motives in more (vs. less) symbolic consumption contexts (and associate human labor more strongly with product uniqueness). In line with this account, we demonstrate that individual differences in need for uniqueness moderate the interaction between production mode and symbolic motives and that a measure of uniqueness motives mediates the effect of consumption context on preferences for human (vs. robotic) production.     

算法决策趋避的过程动机理论

算法常用于决策, 但相较于由人类做出的决策, 即便内容相同, 算法决策更容易引起个体反应的分化, 此即算法决策趋避。趋近指个体认为算法的决策比人类的更加公平、含有更少的偏见和歧视、也更能信任和接受, 回避则与之相反。算法决策趋避的过程动机理论用以解释趋避现象, 归纳了人与算法交互所经历的原初行为互动、建立类社会关系和形成身份认同三个阶段, 阐述了各阶段中认知、关系和存在三种动机引发个体的趋避反应。未来研究可着眼于人性化知觉、群际感知对算法决策趋避的影响, 并以更社会性的视角来探究算法决策趋避的逆转过程和其他可能的心理动机。