A second-order relevance logic with modality

In this paper a system, RPF, of second-order relevance logic with S5 necessity is presented which contains a defined, notion of identity for propositions. A complete semantics is provided. It is shown that RPF allows for more than one necessary proposition. RPF contains primitive syntactic counterparts of the following semantic notions: (1) the reflexive, symmetrical, transitive binary alternativeness relation for S5 necessity, (2) the ternary Routley-Meyer alternativeness relation for implication, and (3) the Routley-Meyer notion of a prime intensional theory, as well as defined syntactic counterparts, of the semantic notions of a possible world and the Routley-Meyer ^* operator.     

Time perception and the experience of agency

In the current study, we investigate whether sense of agency over an effect coincides with the perceived time of the effect that occurs either at its usual time or earlier or later than usual. One group of participants usually perceived an action effect immediately after the action, another group delayed by 250 ms. In test blocks the effect stimulus was sometimes presented earlier or later than usual. Participants judged either the degree of experienced agency over the effect or whether the effect had appeared at its usual time, or earlier or later than usual. In both groups experienced agency and the perception of the effect’s time ‘as usual’ were highly correlated. To rule out that time judgments influenced sense of agency, we replicated the pattern of agency judgments in Experiment 2 in which participants only judged agency. Taken together, we demonstrated that agency and time judgments vary similarly across temporal deviations of effects irrespective of to which delay participants were adapted to. The high correlation of judgment types indicates that perceiving an effect at its usual time and sensing to have caused the effect are closely related. In contrast, physical temporal proximity of actions and effects has only a minor impact on experienced agency.     

Hybrid logic with the difference modality for generalisations of graphs

We discuss recent work generalising the basic hybrid logic with the difference modality to any reasonable notion of transition. This applies equally to both subrelational transitions such as monotone neighbourhood frames or selection function models as well as those with more structure such as Markov chains and alternating temporal frames. We provide a generic canonical cut-free sequent system and a terminating proof-search strategy for the fragment without the difference modality but including the global modality.     

Combinations of tense and deontic modality: On the approach to temporal logic with historical necessity and conditional obligation

We consider three infinite hierarchies of what I call “two-dimensional temporal logics with explicit realization operators”, viz. (i) one without historical or deontic modalities, (ii) one with historical but without deontic modalities, and (iii) one with historical and with dyadic deontic modalities for conditional obligation and permission. Sound and complete axiomatizations are obtained for all three hierarchies relative to a simplified version of the finite co-ordinate-system semantics given for so-called T × W logic of historical necessity in [L. Åqvist, The logic of historical necessity as founded on two-dimensional modal tense logic, J. Philos. Logic 28 (1999) 329–369].     

Hume and the phenomenology of agency

Some philosophers argue that Hume, given his theory of causation, is committed to an implausibly thin account of what it is like to act voluntarily. Others suggest, on the basis of his argument against free will, that Hume takes no more than an illusory feature of action to distinguish the experience of performing an act from the experience of merely observing an act. In this paper, I argue that Hume is committed to neither an unduly parsimonious nor a sceptical account of the phenomenology of agency.     

Stit and the language of agency

Stit, a sentence form first introduced in Belnap and Perloff (1988), encourages a modal approach to agency. Von Wright, Chisholm, Kenny, and Castañeda have all attempted modal treatments of agency, while Davidson has rejected such treatments. After a brief explanation of the syntax and semantics of stit and a restatement of several of the important claims of the earlier paper, I discuss the virtues of stit against the background of proposals made by these philososphers.     

Culture and the role of choice in agency

Three cross-cultural studies conducted among U.S. and Indian adults compared perceptions of helping friends in strongly versus weakly expected cases, views of helping family versus strangers, and responses to a self-determination motivation scale. Expectations to help family and friends were positively correlated with satisfaction and choice only among Indians and not among Americans. Also, whereas U.S. respondents associated lesser satisfaction and choice with strongly versus weakly socially expected helping, Indian respondents associated equal satisfaction and choice with the 2 types of cases. Providing evidence of the importance of choice in collectivist cultures, the results indicate that social expectations to meet the needs of family and friends tend to be more fully internalized among Indians than among Americans. Methodologically, the results also highlight the need to incorporate items that tap more internalized meanings of role-related social expectations on measures of motivation in the tradition of self-determination theory.     

No-Self and the phenomenology of agency

The Buddhists philosophers put forward a revisionary metaphysics which lacks a “self” in order to provide an intellectually and morally preferred picture of the world. The first task in the paper is to answer the question: what is the “self” that the Buddhists are denying? To answer this question, I look at the Abhidharma arguments (as presented in Chapter 9 of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmako?a-bhāsya) for the No-Self doctrine and then work back to an interpretation of the self that is the target of such a doctrine. I argue that Buddhists are not just denying the diachronically unified, extended, narrative self but also minimal selfhood insofar as it associated with sense of ownership and sense of agency. The view is deeply counterintuitive and the Buddhists are acutely aware of this fact. Accordingly, the Abhidharma-Buddhist writings are replete with attempts to explain the phenomenology of experience in a no-self world. The second part of the paper reconstructs the Buddhist explanation using resources from contemporary discussions about the sense (or lack thereof) of agency.     

Knowledge and modality

Kripke claims that there are necessary a posteriori truths and contingent a priori truths. These claims challenge the traditional Kantian view that

1. (K)
   All knowledge of necessary truths is a priori and all a priori knowledge is of necessary truths.
    

Kripke’s claims continue to be resisted, which indicates that the Kantian view remains attractive. My goal is to identify the most plausible principles linking the epistemic and the modal. My strategy for identifying the principles is to investigate two related questions. Are there compelling general supporting arguments for (K)? Are there decisive counterexamples to (K)? My investigation uncovers two intuitively plausible principles that are not open to decisive counterexamples but which enjoy no compelling independent support.

     

Truthmakers and modality

This paper attempts to locate, within an actualist ontology, truthmakers for modal truths: truths of the form <Possibly, p> or <Necessarily, p>. In Sect. 1 I motivate the demand for substantial truthmakers for modal truths. In Sect. 2 I criticise Armstrong’s account of truthmakers for modal truths. In Sect. 3 I examine essentialism and defend an account of what makes essentialist attributions true, but I argue that this does not solve the problem of modal truth in general. In Sect. 4 I discuss, and dismiss, a theistic account of the source of modal truth proposed by Alexander Pruss. In Sect. 5 I offer a means of (dis)solving the problem.     

Feature and conjunction processing in the auditory modality

In five experiments, participants made speeded target/nontarget classification responses to singly presented auditory stimuli. Stimuli were defined via vocal identity and location in Experiments 1 and 2 and frequency and location in the remaining experiments. Performance was examined in two conditions inspired by visual search: In the feature condition, responses were based on the detection of unique stimulus features; in the conjunction condition, unique combinations of features were critical. Experiment 1 showed a conjunction benefit, since classifications were faster in the conjunction condition than in the feature condition. Potential confounds were eliminated in Experiments 2 and 3, which resulted in the observation of conjunction costs. In Experiments 4 and 5, we examined, respectively, whether the cost could be explained in terms of differences in interstimulus similarity and target template complexity across the main conditions. Both accounts were refuted. It seems that when the identification of particular feature combinations is necessary, conjunction processing in audition becomes an effortful process.     

Within- and between-dimensional processing in the auditory modality

Participants made speeded target-nontarget responses to singly presented auditory stimuli in 2 tasks. In within-dimension conditions, participants listened for either of 2 target features taken from the same dimension; in between-dimensions conditions, the target features were taken from different dimensions. Judgments were based on the presence or absence of either target feature. Speech sounds, defined relative to sound identity and locale, were used in Experiment 1, whereas tones, comprising pitch and locale components, were used in Experiments 2 and 3. In all cases, participants performed better when the target features were taken from the same dimension than when they were taken from different dimensions. Data suggest that the auditory and visual systems exhibit the same higher level processing constraints.