Ambiguity Aversion,Comparative Ignorance,and Decision Context

People typically find bets less attractive when the probability of receiving a prize is more vague or ambiguous (Ellsberg, 1961). According to Fox and Tversky's (1995) comparative ignorance hypothesis, ambiguity aversion is driven by the comparison with more familiar events or more knowledgeable individuals, and diminishes or disappears in the absence of such a comparison. In this paper we emphasize that “comparative ignorance” refers to the state of mind of the decision maker. We extend the comparative ignorance hypothesis by documenting four new ways in which decision context can affect willingness to act under uncertainty that do not rely on the comparative-noncomparative evaluation paradigm used in previous studies. First, people find uncertain bets more attractive when preceded by questions about less familiar items than when preceded by questions about more familiar items. Second, the preference to bet on more familiar domains is less pronounced for the first domain evaluated on a survey than for later domains. Third, people find bets less attractive when they are provided with diagnostic information that they do not know how to use, compared to when they are provided with no such information. Finally, people are sensitive to the relative competence of their counterpart when playing a simple competitive (matching pennies) game, but not when playing a noncompetitive (coordination) game that has the same mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.     

Should I save or should I not kill? How people solve moral dilemmas depends on which rule is most accessible

The literature on how people solve moral dilemmas often focuses on situations in which individuals have to make a decision where different moral rules are in conflict. In some of these situations, such as in footbridge dilemmas, people have to choose between sacrificing a few people in order to save many. The present research focuses on how people decide what to do in dilemmas involving conflicting moral rules. We propose that the rule that is cognitively most accessible during the decision making process (e.g., “Save lives” or “Do not kill”) will influence how people solve these moral dilemmas. Three studies are reported that indeed demonstrate that the most accessible rule influences willingness to intervene within footbridge dilemmas. This effect is found even when the accessibility of the rule is induced subliminally.     

The use of recognition information and additional cues in inferences from memory

Goldstein and Gigerenzer's (2002) "Recognition Heuristic" (RH) was tested for its empirical validity in an experimental paradigm with induced recognition of objects. RH claims that upon inferring which of two objects (e.g., cities) scores higher on a criterion (e.g., city size), a recognized object will be chosen over an unrecognized one, if the recognition is a valid predictor of the criterion without considering additional object information. Trying to avoid potential shortcomings of former studies, we (a) used the city population task, (b) provided additional cue information only for recognized cities, and (c) had participants draw inferences from memory. Participants learned city names and additional information about some cities. They also learned that recognition and the additional information were valid predictors of the criterion "city size". In a subsequent decision phase, the additional information about the cities in memory strongly affected the inferences, suggesting that recognition information is clearly integrated into judgments, but by no means in a non-compensatory fashion that would dominate every other cue.     

Why people are reluctant to tempt fate

The present research explored the belief that it is bad luck to "tempt fate." Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that people do indeed have the intuition that actions that tempt fate increase the likelihood of negative outcomes. Studies 3-6 examined our claim that the intuition is due, in large part, to the combination of the automatic tendencies to attend to negative prospects and to use accessibility as a cue when judging likelihood. Study 3 demonstrated that negative outcomes are more accessible following actions that tempt fate than following actions that do not tempt fate. Studies 4 and 5 demonstrated that the heightened accessibility of negative outcomes mediates the elevated perceptions of likelihood. Finally, Study 6 examined the automatic nature of the underlying processes. The types of actions that are thought to tempt fate as well as the role of society and culture in shaping this magical belief are discussed.     

Familiarity and person construal: Individuating knowledge moderates the automaticity of category activation

In this experiment, we examined how perceivers' familiarity with targets moderates person construal. Based on evidence from object categorization that level of construal varies with expertise in a manner that maximizes cue validity, we reasoned that although social (i.e., group‐level) categorization is functional for construing unfamiliar others (about whom little or no individuating information is available), it is less functional for familiar others (about whom a great deal of individuating information is available). Results from an automatic priming paradigm provided evidence for our reasoning: Participants categorized unfamiliar faces according to the most salient categorical dimension available in the visual information (in this case, sex), but did not do so for familiar faces. Implications for models of person perception are discussed. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Single-process versus multiple-strategy models of decision making: Evidence from an information intrusion paradigm

When decision makers are confronted with different problems and situations, do they use a uniform mechanism as assumed by single-process models (SPMs) or do they choose adaptively from a set of available decision strategies as multiple-strategy models (MSMs) imply? Both frameworks of decision making have gathered a lot of support, but only rarely have they been contrasted with each other. Employing an information intrusion paradigm for multi-attribute decisions from givens, SPM and MSM predictions on information search, decision outcomes, attention, and confidence judgments were derived and tested against each other in two experiments. The results consistently support the SPM view: Participants seemingly using a “take-the-best” (TTB) strategy do not ignore TTB-irrelevant information as MSMs would predict, but adapt the amount of information searched, choose alternative choice options, and show varying confidence judgments contingent on the quality of the “irrelevant” information. The uniformity of these findings underlines the adequacy of the novel information intrusion paradigm and comprehensively promotes the notion of a uniform decision making mechanism as assumed by single-process models.     

Cue abstraction and ideal prototype abstraction in estimation tasks

This study investigates abstracted processes and introduces a new prototype abstraction model adapted to estimation tasks. This prototype abstraction model assumes that the processing of whole exemplar patterns supports the detection of the underlying statistics necessary for the abstraction of two extreme prototypes on the continuous criterion dimension of the task. The prototypes are stored in memory as valid reference points for future similarity-based judgments. This prototype model was compared with the cue abstraction model, which assumes that people abstract cue weights in learning and add the cue information from exemplars to infer their criterion values varying on the continuous dimension. This study hypothesises that the training mode and the number of exemplars in training interact and affect subsequent model performance at test. The results from an experiment confirmed this hypothesis and showed that observational training supports an efficient prototype abstraction and feedback training supports an efficient cue abstraction.     

The road to the unconscious self not taken: Discrepancies between self‐ and observer‐inferences about implicit dispositions from nonverbal behavioural cues

To what extent can individuals gain insight into their own or another person's implicit dispositions' We investigated whether self‐perceivers versus neutral observers can detect implicit dispositions from nonverbal behavioural cues contained in video feedback (cue validity) and whether these cues are in turn used as a valid basis for explicit dispositional inferences (cue utilization). Across three studies in the domains of extraversion and anxiety we consistently obtained reliable cue validity and cue utilization for neutral observers but not for self‐perceivers. An additional measure of state inferences in Study 3 showed that one reason for the lack of mediation in self‐perceivers is their reluctance to use their state inferences as a basis for more general trait inferences. We conclude that people have a ‘blind spot’ with respect to the nonverbal behavioural manifestations of their unconscious selves, even though neutral observers may readily detect and utilize this information for dispositional inferences. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intelligence as the efficiency of cue-driven retrieval from secondary memory

Complex-span (working-memory-capacity) tasks are among the most successful predictors of intelligence. One important contributor to this relationship is the ability to efficiently employ cues for the retrieval from secondary memory. Presumably, intelligent individuals can considerably restrict their memory search sets by using such cues and can thereby improve recall performance. We here test this assumption by experimentally manipulating the validity of retrieval cues. When memoranda are drawn from the same semantic category on two successive trials of a verbal complex-span task, the category is a very strong retrieval cue on its first occurrence (strong-cue trial) but loses some of its validity on its second occurrence (weak-cue trial). If intelligent individuals make better use of semantic categories as retrieval cues, their recall accuracy suffers more from this loss of cue validity. Accordingly, our results show that less variance in intelligence is explained by recall accuracy on weak-cue compared with strong-cue trials.     

延迟学习判断研究的发展与展望

延迟学习判断是学习判断的一种形式,是指在材料学习完以后间隔一段时间才发生的学习判断。在与即时学习判断的对比研究中发现,延迟学习判断具有较高的相对准确性,这种现象被称为延迟学习判断效应。研究者进行了大量的研究并提出了多种理论来解释这种延迟学习判断效应。随着研究的不断深入,延迟学习判断的研究从研究指标、研究方法甚至是研究的理论基础都在不断更新。延迟学习判断的研究进展,包括主要理论和相关实验,以及最新研究成果将被介绍。最后,文章梳理了延迟JOL的研究进程,并指出了未来的研究方向。     

Remembering the past and imagining the future: a role for nonvisual imagery in the everyday cognition of blind and sighted people

Images can be generated in all sensory modalities. Nevertheless, research on the everyday use of mental imagery, for example in autobiographical memory tasks, has suggested that it is only visual images that facilitate memory retrieval (e.g., Williams, Healy, & Ellis, 1999). If this is the case, individuals born without sight may be forced to rely more on verbal encoding (Goddard & Pring, 2001). This paper explores the presence and everyday role of nonvisual sensory imagery in 16 individuals with and 16 without sight. Using a cue word paradigm, contrary to previous research, Experiment 1 suggested that for both blind and sighted people, nonvisual imageries have a significant role to play in the generation of autobiographical memories. These results were reinforced by similar findings in Experiment 2, which used the same cue word method to explore the role of visual and nonvisual (auditory) imagery when generating future events. The results refute the claim that "useful" imagery in everyday tasks is exclusively visual.     

Allocation of attention, reading skills, and deafness.

Brannan and Williams (1987) found that poor readers cannot successfully utilize parafoveal cues to identify letter targets. Whether a similar deficit in the use of cue information occurs in deaf poor readers and whether it is only specific to processes that capture attention automatically were investigated in congenitally deaf young adults classified as poor or good readers and hearing controls classified as good readers. Subjects were presented with central or parafoveal cues that varied in cue validity probability, followed by letter targets presented to the left or right of fixation. The reaction time data analyses showed significant main effects for cue type and cue location and significant interactions among cue type, cue location, cue validity probability, and visual field. No significant main effect or interactions involving groups were found. These results raise the possibility that reading difficulties associated with deafness do no involve a deficit in the visual attentional system of deaf people. They also confirm that parafoveal cues are more effective than central cues in capturing attention.     

Thirst for confirmation in multi-attribute choice: Does search for consistency impair decision performance?

Experimental evidence suggests that people often do not feel comfortable with making decisions based on a single piece of evidence and that they systematically look for confirming evidence before choosing. The goal of this paper is to investigate whether such behavior is appropriate for multi-attribute binary choice. We model the experimentally observed “thirst for confirming redundancy” (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956) through a simple heuristic strategy (CONF) that needs two consistent cues to make a binary choice. Analytical expressions for the probabilities that CONF chooses correctly between two alternatives and takes a decision after considering fewer than all pieces of evidence are presented. Importantly, CONF is advantageously insensitive to cue ordering. The model performs equally well in both structured environments, where cues are ordered by validity, and unstructured environments, where the cues are not consulted in the order of their validity. We further compare the performance of CONF with the performance of other heuristics in a series of simulated three-cue environments, where the cues are continuous and vary in both predictive ability and inter-correlation. We show that across environments, CONF balances the advantages and disadvantages of other simple models. We conclude that confirmation-seeking in multi-attribute decision making is a simple, fast, and robust “ignorance” strategy that hedges your bets when you know that you might not know.     

不确定性和预期有效性对运动方向感知决策的影响

环境中的运动刺激往往多变, 更好的方向感知需要同时依赖当前信息和先验信息。然而, 当前刺激的不确定性与先验线索的预期有效性在运动方向感知决策中如何整合尚不清楚。研究采用随机点运动范式, 要求被试判断散点群的整体运动方向, 方向一致的散点为相干点, 其比例越低, 不确定性越高。实验1比较了不同相干点比例下的感知准确度。根据实验1的结果, 选出20%和60%的相干点比例分别对应实验2中散点群的高、低不确定性水平。实验2比较了高、低不确定性和高、低预期有效性(线索正确预测目标的概率)下的感知准确度。结果发现, 随着不确定性的降低和预期有效性的增加, 感知准确度显著提高; 预期效应(高、低有效性下感知准确度的差异)随不确定性的提高而增加。结果表明, 先验信息与感觉信息能在运动方向感知决策中整合。研究为双重控制机制(DMC)理论下主动性与反应性控制协同工作的观点提供了实证支持, 并为交通事故的解释与预防提供了理论依据。     

Empirical tests of the recognition heuristic

The recognition heuristic postulates that individuals should choose a recognized object more often than an unrecognized one whenever recognition is related to the criterion. This behavior has been described as a one‐cue, noncompensatory decision‐making strategy. This claim and other assumptions were tested in four experiments using paired‐comparison tasks with cities and other geographical objects. The main results were (1) that the recognized object was chosen more often than the unrecognized one when the recognition cue was valid; (2) that participants' behavior did not reflect the recognition validity of their own knowledge; (3) that a less‐is‐more effect (i.e., better performance with less knowledge) was either absent or of only small size; and (4) that judgments were influenced by further knowledge, which could even compensate for the recognition cue. In sum, the recognition cue represents an important piece of knowledge in paired comparisons, but apparently not the only one. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Maintenance rehearsal affects knowing,not remembering; elaborative rehearsal affects remembering,not knowing

In a directed-forgetting paradigm, each word in a study list was followed by a cue designating that word as eitherlearn orforget. This cue appeared after either a short or a long delay. It was assumed that a long delay would increase maintenance rehearsal of all the words, and that only the words followed by a learn cue would be rehearsed elaboratively. Moreover, because the interval between the words was constant, a short cue delay should allow more time for elaborative rehearsal. In a subsequent test, subjects maderemember orknow responses to indicate whether recognition of each word was accompanied by conscious recollection or by feelings of familiarity in the absence of conscious recollection. The hypothesis was that remembering depends on elaborative rehearsal, and knowing depends on maintenance rehearsal. In accord with this hypothesis, the learn-versus-forget designation influenced remember but not know responses, and there were more remember responses after the short cue delay; cue delay influenced know responses, regardless of word designation.     

The Path of Least Resistance: Using Easy-to-Access Information

Abstract— Recent work on judgment and decision making has focused on how people preferentially use cues, or pieces of relevant information, that are easy to access when making decisions. In this article, we discuss a framework for understanding the ways that cues become accessible. We begin by identifying two components of cues and show how these components can become accessible during different parts a decision process. We highlight evidence for the use of accessible information and discuss implications for future research on heuristics.     

Memory accessibility shapes explanation: Testing key claims of the inherence heuristic account

People understand the world by constructing explanations for what they observe. It is thus important to identify the cognitive processes underlying these judgments. According to a recent proposal, everyday explanations are often constructed heuristically: Because people need to generate explanations on a moment-by-moment basis, they cannot perform an exhaustive search through the space of possible reasons, but may instead use the information that is most easily accessible in memory (Cimpian & Salomon 2014a, b). In the present research, we tested two key claims of this proposal that have so far not been investigated. First, we tested whether—as previously hypothesized—the information about an entity that is most accessible in memory tends to consist of inherent or intrinsic facts about that entity, rather than extrinsic (contextual, historical, etc.) facts about it (Studies 1 and 2). Second, we tested the implications of this difference in the memory accessibility of inherent versus extrinsic facts for the process of generating explanations: Does the fact that inherent facts are more accessible than relevant extrinsic facts give rise to an inherence bias in the content of the explanations generated (Studies 3 and 4)? The findings supported the proposal that everyday explanations are generated in part via a heuristic process that relies on easily accessible—and often inherent—information from memory.     

Optimal cue aggregation in the absence of criterion knowledge

The study of multi‐cue judgment investigates how decision makers aggregate cues to predict the value of a criterion variable. We consider a multi‐cue judgment task in which decision makers have prior knowledge of inter‐cue relationships but are ignorant of how the cues correlate with the criterion. In this setting, a naive judgment strategy prescribes weighting the cues equally. Although many participants are well described via an equal weighting scheme, we find that a substantial minority of participants make predictions consistent with a weighting scheme based on a low‐dimensional projection of the cue space that optimally takes into account inter‐cue correlations. The use of such a weighting scheme is consistent with minimizing maximal error in prediction when the cue‐criterion relationships are unknown.