Memory for media: investigation of false memories for negatively and positively charged public events

Despite a large body of false memory research, little has addressed the potential influence of an event's emotional content on susceptibility to false recollections. The Paradoxical Negative Emotion (PNE) hypothesis predicts that negative emotion generally facilitates memory but also heightens susceptibility to false memories. Participants were asked whether they could recall 20 "widely publicised" public events (half fictitious) ranging in emotional valence, with or without visual cues. Participants recalled a greater number of true negative events (M=3.31/5) than true positive (M=2.61/5) events. Nearly everyone (95%) came to recall at least one false event (M=2.15 false events recalled). Further, more than twice as many participants recalled any false negative (90%) compared to false positive (41.7%) events. Negative events, in general, were associated with more detailed memories and false negative event memories were more detailed than false positive event memories. Higher dissociation scores were associated with false recollections of negative events, specifically.     

Memory distortions: When suggestions cannot be easily ignored

In the present study, the persistence of personal false memories (FMs) after social feedback that denies their truth was assessed. Participants imitated actions performed by the experimenter (Session 1) and watched a doctored video with performed and critical “fake” actions (Session 2), followed by a memory rating and a recognition task. A few days later (Session 3), participants were clearly told that some memories were false and received daily reminders of the correct list of objects/actions before testing their memory again in Session 4. Results of both memory ratings and recognition indicated effective FM implantation. Interestingly, response times for correct rejections were longer for fake than true objects, suggesting participants struggled to ignore false suggestions. Crucial for our aim, Session 4 showed that FM persisted also after the debriefing and repeated presentations of correct list of objects/actions, suggesting that FMs for actions are rather difficult to discard.     

So that's why I don't remember: Normalising forgetting of childhood events influences false autobiographical beliefs but not memories

We investigated changes in autobiographical belief and memory ratings for childhood events, after informing individuals that forgetting childhood events is common. Participants received false prevalence information (indicating that a particular childhood event occurred frequently in the population) plus a rationale normalising the forgetting of childhood events; false prevalence information alone; or no manipulation, for one (Study 1) or two (Study 2) unlikely childhood events. Results demonstrated that combining prevalence information and the “forgetting rationale” substantially influenced autobiographical belief ratings, whereas prevalence information alone had no impact (Study 1) or a significantly lesser impact (Study 2) on belief ratings. Prevalence information consistently impacted plausibility ratings. No changes in memory ratings were observed. These results provide further support for a nested relationship between judgements of plausibility, belief, and memory in evaluating the occurrence of autobiographical events. Furthermore, the results suggest that some purported false memory phenomena may instead reflect the development of autobiographical false beliefs in the absence of memory.     

So that's why I don't remember: normalizing forgetting of childhood events influences false autobiographical beliefs but not memories

We investigated changes in autobiographical belief and memory ratings for childhood events, after informing individuals that forgetting childhood events is common. Participants received false prevalence information (indicating that a particular childhood event occurred frequently in the population) plus a rationale normalizing the forgetting of childhood events; false prevalence information alone; or no manipulation, for one (Study 1) or two (Study 2) unlikely childhood events. Results demonstrated that combining prevalence information and the "forgetting rationale" substantially influenced autobiographical belief ratings, whereas prevalence information alone had no impact (Study 1) or a significantly lesser impact (Study 2) on belief ratings. Prevalence information consistently impacted plausibility ratings. No changes in memory ratings were observed. These results provide further support for a nested relationship between judgements of plausibility, belief, and memory in evaluating the occurrence of autobiographical events. Furthermore, the results suggest that some purported false memory phenomena may instead reflect the development of autobiographical false beliefs in the absence of memory.     

The effects of photographs and event plausibility in creating false beliefs

Recent studies have shown that using photographs as memory retrieval aids can significantly increase the likelihood of false memories. The current study further investigated this effect by examining the interactive effects of photographs and event plausibility in developing false beliefs. At Time 1 and two weeks later at Time 2, participants rated 20 events on the Life Events Inventory (LEI) as to whether each occurred to them in childhood. One week after Time 1, participants were told that two target events were plausible and two were implausible. They then used event-related photographs to visualize one plausible and one implausible event. Occurrence ratings significantly increased from Time 1 to Time 2 for plausible events in the photo condition. These results suggest that the use of photographs as a memory enhancing technique is unlikely to cause false memories for events that are not perceived personally plausible.     

Creating false memories for events that occurred before versus after the offset of childhood amnesia

We examined whether false images and memories for childhood events are more likely when the event supposedly took place during the period of childhood amnesia. Over three interviews, participants recalled six events: five true and one false. Some participants were told that the false event happened when they were 2 years old (Age 2 group), while others were told that it happened when they were 10 years old (Age 10 group). We compared participants’ reports of the false event to their reports of a true event from the same age. Consistent with prior research on childhood amnesia, participants in the Age 10 group were more likely than participants in the Age 2 group to remember their true event and they reported more information about it. Participants in the Age 2 group, on the other hand, were more likely to develop false images and memories than participants in the Age 10 group. Furthermore, once a false image or memory developed, there were no age-related differences in the amount of information participants reported about the false event. We conclude that childhood amnesia increases our susceptibility to false suggestion, thus our results have implications for court cases where early memories are at issue.     

Creating false memories for events that occurred before versus after the offset of childhood amnesia

We examined whether false images and memories for childhood events are more likely when the event supposedly took place during the period of childhood amnesia. Over three interviews, participants recalled six events: five true and one false. Some participants were told that the false event happened when they were 2 years old (Age 2 group), while others were told that it happened when they were 10 years old (Age 10 group). We compared participants' reports of the false event to their reports of a true event from the same age. Consistent with prior research on childhood amnesia, participants in the Age 10 group were more likely than participants in the Age 2 group to remember their true event and they reported more information about it. Participants in the Age 2 group, on the other hand, were more likely to develop false images and memories than participants in the Age 10 group. Furthermore, once a false image or memory developed, there were no age-related differences in the amount of information participants reported about the false event. We conclude that childhood amnesia increases our susceptibility to false suggestion, thus our results have implications for court cases where early memories are at issue.     

Personalized and not general suggestion produces false autobiographical memories and suggestion-consistent behavior

Suggesting false childhood events produces false autobiographical beliefs, memories and suggestion-consistent behavior. The mechanisms by which suggestion affects behavior are not understood, and whether false beliefs and memories are necessary for suggestions to impact behavior remains unexplored. We examined the relative effects of providing a personalized suggestion (suggesting that an event occurred to the person in the past), and/or a general suggestion (suggesting that an event happened to others in the past). Participants (N=122) received a personalized suggestion, a general suggestion, both or neither, about childhood illness due to spoiled peach yogurt. The personalized suggestion resulted in false beliefs, false memories, and suggestion-consistent behavioral intentions immediately after the suggestion. One week or one month later participants completed a taste test that involved eating varieties of crackers and yogurts. The personalized suggestion led to reduced consumption of only peach yogurt, and those who reported a false memory showed the most eating suppression. This effect on behavior was equally strong after one week and one month, showing a long lived influence of the personalized suggestion. The general suggestion showed no effects. Suggestions that convey personal information about a past event produce false autobiographical memories, which in turn impact behavior.     

Fluctuating confidence: the dynamic consequences of true/false affirmatives and denials on how a listener appraises their personal past

The present study examined the mnemonic consequences of true/false denials and affirmatives on how a listener appraises their personal past. To this end, participants (listeners) rated the extent to which they were confident certain events occurred during their childhood. They rated these events both before and after a confederate (speaker) denied or affirmed the occurrence of four different childhood events each, for a total of eight “rehearsed” events. For each set (denials and affirmatives) of events, half were true and half were false. In turn, this created four types of events (two each): true denials, true affirmatives, false denials, and false affirmatives. Additionally, half of the participants were told that the speaker was provided independent information about the veracity of the event’s occurrence (“expert” condition). Overall, listeners were less confident in the occurrence of false denial events, but more so when they believed the speaker to be more knowledgeable of the listeners memories, more confident in false affirmative events and, counter intuitively, more confident in the occurrence of true denial events. These results underscore the importance of a nuanced approach to the mnemonic consequences of true and false denials and affirmations in the course of social interactions.     

Comparing recollective experience in true and false autobiographical memories

This study investigated whether true autobiographical memories are qualitatively distinct from false autobiographical memories using a variation of the interview method originally reported by E. F. Loftus and J. Pickrell (1995). Participants recalled events provided by parents on 3 separate occasions and were asked to imagine true and false unremembered events. True memories were rated by both participants and observers as more rich in recollective experience and were rated by participants as more important, more emotionally intense, as having clearer imagery, and as less typical than false memories. Rehearsal frequency was used as a covariate, eliminating these effects. Imagery in true memories was most often viewed from the field perspective, whereas imagery in false memories was most often viewed from the observer perspective. More information was communicated in true memories, and true memories contained more information concerning the consequences of described events. Results suggest repeated remembering can make false memories more rich in recollective experience and more like true memories. Differences between true and false memories suggest some potentially distinct characteristics of false memories and provide insight into the process of false memory creation.     

Liar,liar: Consistent lying decreases belief in the truth

This study investigated the effects of lying on belief ratings for autobiographical childhood events. Participants lied by trying to convince the experimenter that likely events had not happened and that unlikely events had happened. Participants consistently lied, consistently told the truth, and alternated lying and truth telling across two sessions. Results showed that consistent false assents increased belief in those false events and that consistent false denials decreased belief in those true events. False denials had a larger influence on belief than did false assents. False assents that were told first were more likely to increase in belief than were false assents told in the second session. False denials decreased belief in the true event regardless of when they were told. These results suggest that lying influences confidence ratings both by increasing belief in a lied‐about event and by decreasing belief in a true event.     

Adult recollections of earliest childhood dreams: a cross-cultural study

In two studies, Caucasian and Asian college students recalled their earliest memory of a dream, and they provided information about behaviours and beliefs associated with dreaming. Consistent with previous research on childhood amnesia, participants rarely recounted dreams that occurred before age 3. In Study 1, the mean age of the earliest dream memory was 14 months earlier for Caucasians than for Asians. In Study 2, more Asians than Caucasians were unable to remember a childhood dream. Dream-related behaviours and beliefs also differed markedly across cultures. Compared to Asians, Caucasians reported talking more frequently with parents about their dreams in childhood, receiving stronger parental encouragement to share dreams, and feeling more comfortable doing so. Caucasians also reported sharing their dreams with others more frequently in adulthood and they assigned greater value to their dreams. Most Caucasians but few Asians consented to the researchers' request to send parents a questionnaire concerning the participant's childhood dreams. The results support the social interaction explanation for autobiographical memory development, in which parent-child conversations about the personal past contribute to memory accessibility.     

Adult recollections of earliest childhood dreams: A cross-cultural study

In two studies, Caucasian and Asian college students recalled their earliest memory of a dream, and they provided information about behaviours and beliefs associated with dreaming. Consistent with previous research on childhood amnesia, participants rarely recounted dreams that occurred before age 3. In Study 1, the mean age of the earliest dream memory was 14 months earlier for Caucasians than for Asians. In Study 2, more Asians than Caucasians were unable to remember a childhood dream. Dream-related behaviours and beliefs also differed markedly across cultures. Compared to Asians, Caucasians reported talking more frequently with parents about their dreams in childhood, receiving stronger parental encouragement to share dreams, and feeling more comfortable doing so. Caucasians also reported sharing their dreams with others more frequently in adulthood and they assigned greater value to their dreams. Most Caucasians but few Asians consented to the researchers' request to send parents a questionnaire concerning the participant's childhood dreams. The results support the social interaction explanation for autobiographical memory development, in which parent–child conversations about the personal past contribute to memory accessibility.     

警告对共同目击者讨论后产生的错误记忆的影响

采用误导信息干扰范式,研究了事件后正确诱导与事件后误导对共同目击者的记忆准确性的影响。实验1,要求被试接受事件后诱导信息后进行线索化自由回忆,结果发现,目击者对事件后正确诱导信息项目的记忆准确性显著提高;对事件后误导信息项目的记忆准确性显著下降,产生了共同目击者误导信息效应。实验2,研究了警告对目击者记忆准确性的影响。在回忆前警告被试共同目击者提供的事件后信息不完全正确,请按照自己的记忆来完成线索化自由回忆,讨论无警告组与讨论警告组比较发现,警告并没有改变事件后误导信息效应,也没有改变目击者对正确诱导项目     

Evolving informational credentials: the (mis)attribution of believable facts to credible sources

Three studies demonstrate that individuals often rely on a "belief force equals credible source" heuristic to make source judgments, wherein they assume that statements they believe originate from credible sources. In Study 1, participants who were exposed to a statement many times (and hence believed it) were more likely to attribute it to Consumer Reports than to the National Enquirer. In Study 2, participants read a murder investigation article containing evidence against two suspects from credible and noncredible sources. When participants believed a particular suspect to be guilty, they misattributed evidence incriminating that suspect to the high-credibility source. Study 3 demonstrated that this phenomenon occurs because individuals assume their beliefs are true and that true beliefs come from credible sources; when participants were given feedback that their beliefs were incorrect, the relationship between beliefs and source inferences did not occur.     

False memories of fabricated political events

In the largest false memory study to date, 5,269 participants were asked about their memories for three true and one of five fabricated political events. Each fabricated event was accompanied by a photographic image purportedly depicting that event. Approximately half the participants falsely remembered that the false event happened, with 27% remembering that they saw the events happen on the news. Political orientation appeared to influence the formation of false memories, with conservatives more likely to falsely remember seeing Barack Obama shaking hands with the president of Iran, and liberals more likely to remember George W. Bush vacationing with a baseball celebrity during the Hurricane Katrina disaster. A follow-up study supported the explanation that events are more easily implanted in memory when they are congruent with a person's preexisting attitudes and evaluations, in part because attitude-congruent false events promote feelings of recognition and familiarity, which in turn interfere with source attributions.     

Fabrication inflation increases as source monitoring ability decreases

The current research looked at the effects of lying about a false childhood event on the liar's memory for the event. Participants attempted to convince researchers that false events had actually happened to them. In Experiment 1, participants showed a Fabrication Inflation Effect in that they were more likely to increase their beliefs in the lied-about events than control events. Individual differences such as scores on the Dissociative Experience Scale, frequency of lying, and self-reported feelings of discomfort while lying were related to rates of fabrication inflation. In Experiment 2, participants also showed fabrication inflation and were more likely to inflate their likelihood ratings when the lie was created during a separate session from the posttest. Results from both studies support the idea that Source Monitoring failures may cause participants to increase their likelihood ratings of lied-about events. These results suggest that intentional lying may lead some participants to increase their beliefs in their own fabrications. Applications to the legal field are discussed.     

“You and your best friend Suzy put Slime in Ms. Smollett’s desk”: Producing false memories with self-relevant details

Rates of false memory reports vary markedly in the published literature. In an effort to explain these differences, the present study investigated the effects of including different types of details in a false narrative upon subsequent false memory formation. Participants were assigned to one of four conditions in which the inclusion of self-relevant and/or specific details in a false event (putting a toy in a teacher's desk) was manipulated. Participants engaged in a standard memory recovery procedure over three interviews, involving recall for three true and one false event Upon completion, 68.2% of participants in self-relevant groups were judged as having created memories or images about the false event, as compared with 36.4% in non-self-relevant groups. Subjective ratings of memory intensity were higher for self-relevant groups, and self-relevant participants were less likely to correctly guess the false event. These findings indicate that including self-relevant details in suggested childhood events increases the likelihood that such events will be accepted as false memories.     

Social influence and mental routes to the production of authentic false memories and inauthentic false memories

Two studies assessed the extent to which people incorporated false facts provided by bogus others into their own recognition memory reports, and how these false memory reports were affected by: (a) truth of the information in others’ summaries supporting the false facts, (b) motivation to process stories and summaries, (c) source credibility, and (d) ease of remembering original facts. False memory report frequency increased when false facts in a summary were supported by true information and varied inversely with the ease with which original facts could be remembered. Results from a measure probing participants’ memory perceptions suggest that some false memories are authentic: People sometimes lack awareness of both the incorporation of false facts into their memory reports and where the false facts came from. However, many false memories are inauthentic: Despite reporting a false memory, people sometimes retain knowledge of the original stimulus and/or the origin of false facts.     

On the persuadability of memory: Is changing people's memories no more than changing their minds?

The observation of parallels between the memory distortion and persuasion literatures leads, quite logically, to the appealing notion that people can be ‘persuaded’ to change their memories. Indeed, numerous studies show that memory can be influenced and distorted by a variety of persuasive tactics, and the theoretical accounts commonly used by researchers to explain episodic and autobiographical memory distortion phenomena can generally predict and explain these persuasion effects. Yet, despite these empirical and theoretical overlaps, explicit reference to persuasion and attitude‐change research in the memory distortion literature is surprisingly rare. In this paper, we argue that stronger theoretical foundations are needed to draw the memory distortion and persuasion literatures together in a productive direction. We reason that theoretical approaches to remembering that distinguish (false) beliefs in the occurrence of events from (false) memories of those events – compatible with a source monitoring approach – would be beneficial to this end. Such approaches, we argue, would provide a stronger platform to use persuasion findings to enhance the psychological understanding of memory distortion.