From acclaim to blame: evidence of a person sensitivity decision bias

In a series of studies, the authors established empirical support for a general decision-making bias that they termed a person sensitvity bias. Specifically, a person sensitivity bias consists of a person positivity bias (D. O. Sears, 1983) under positive performance conditions and a person negativity bias under negative performance conditions. The authors conducted the first empirical studies of a direct comparison between individuals and objects performing the same task under both positive and negative performance conditions. Two additional studies tested the boundaries of the sensitivity bias within negatively framed decision dilemmas. The results are discussed in terms of their relevance toward a more comprehensive theory of person-object evaluation differences.     

How race affects evidence accumulation during the decision to shoot

The biasing role of stereotypes is a central theme in social cognition research. For example, to understand the role of race in police officers’ decisions to shoot, participants have been shown images of Black and White males and instructed to shoot only if the target is holding a gun. Findings show that Black targets are shot more frequently and more quickly than Whites. The decision to shoot has typically been modeled and understood as a signal detection process in which a sample of information is compared against a criterion, with the criterion set for Black targets being lower. We take a different approach, modeling the decision to shoot as a dynamic process in which evidence is accumulated over time until a threshold is reached. The model accounts for both the choice and response time data for both correct and incorrect decisions using a single set of parameters. Across four studies, this dynamic perspective revealed that the target’s race did not create an initial bias to shoot Black targets. Instead, race impacted the rate of evidence accumulation with evidence accumulating faster to shoot for Black targets. Some participants also tended to be more cautious with Black targets, setting higher decision thresholds. Besides providing a more cohesive and richer account of the decision to shoot or not, the dynamic model suggests interventions that may address the use of race information in decisions to shoot and a means to measure their effectiveness.     

Generating and evaluating options for decision making: the impact of sequentially presented evidence

We examined how decision makers generate and evaluate hypotheses when data are presented sequentially. In the first 2 experiments, participants learned the relationship between data and possible causes of the data in a virtual environment. Data were then presented iteratively, and participants either generated hypotheses they thought caused the data or rated the probability of possible causes of the data. In a 3rd experiment, participants generated hypotheses and made probability judgments on the basis of previously stored general knowledge. Findings suggest that both the hypotheses one generates and the judged probability of those hypotheses are heavily influenced by the most recent evidence observed and by the diagnosticity of the evidence. Specifically, participants generated a narrow set of possible explanations when the presented evidence was diagnostic compared with when it was nondiagnostic, suggesting that nondiagnostic evidence entices participants to cast a wider net when generating hypotheses.     

Rapid acquisition in concurrent chains: evidence for a decision model

Pigeons' choice in concurrent chains can adapt to rapidly changing contingencies. Grace, Bragason, and McLean (2003) found that relative initial-link response rate was sensitive to the immediacy ratio in the current session when one of the terminal-link fixed-interval schedules was changed daily according to a pseudorandom binary sequence (e.g., Schofield & Davison, 1997). The present experiment tested whether the degree of variation in delays across sessions had any effect on acquisition rate in Grace et al.'s (2003) rapid-acquisition procedure. In one condition ("minimal variation"), the left terminal link was always fixed-interval 8 s and the right terminal link was either fixed-interval 4 s or fixed-interval 16 s. In the other condition ("maximal variation"), a unique pair of fixed-interval values was used in each session. Responding was sensitive to the current-session immediacy ratio in both conditions, but across subjects there was no systematic difference in sensitivity. These results challenge the view that initial-link responding in the rapid-acquisition procedure is determined by changes in the learned value of the terminal-link stimuli, and suggests instead that a process resembling categorical discrimination may control performance. A decision model based on the assumption that delays are categorized as short or long relative to the history of delays provided a good account of the data and shows promise in being able to explain other choice phenomena.     

A model for evidence accumulation in the lexical decision task

We present a new model for lexical decision, REM-LD, that is based on REM theory (e.g., ). REM-LD uses a principled (i.e., Bayes' rule) decision process that simultaneously considers the diagnosticity of the evidence for the 'WORD' response and the 'NONWORD' response. The model calculates the odds ratio that the presented stimulus is a word or a nonword by averaging likelihood ratios for lexical entries from a small neighborhood of similar words. We report two experiments that used a signal-to-respond paradigm to obtain information about the time course of lexical processing. Experiment 1 verified the prediction of the model that the frequency of the word stimuli affects performance for nonword stimuli. Experiment 2 was done to study the effects of nonword lexicality, word frequency, and repetition priming and to demonstrate how REM-LD can account for the observed results. We discuss how REM-LD could be extended to account for effects of phonology such as the pseudohomophone effect, and how REM-LD can predict response times in the traditional 'respond-when-ready' paradigm.     

Timing of dietary change in response to a telephone counseling intervention: evidence from the WHEL study

OBJECTIVE: Little is known about temporal patterns of diet change within interventions, nor about predictors of early and sustained successful change. Social-cognitive theory asserts that early successes in achieving behavior change increase self-efficacy, leading to longer-term success. DESIGN: The authors conducted exploratory cluster analyses using dietary data from the first month of the telephone counseling intervention of the Women's Healthy Eating and Living (WHEL) Study. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURE: Change in dietary pattern at three early intervention timepoints. RESULTS: Three clusters were identified: Cluster 1 (25%) was close to meeting study goals at baseline, but still made major changes; Cluster 2 (49%) and Cluster 3 (26%) were not achieving study goals at baseline, but Cluster 2 made substantial immediate changes, while Cluster 3 changed their diet more gradually. Baseline demographic and behavioral variables were associated with cluster membership; however, the strongest predictors of cluster were self-efficacy, motivation, and approaches to study goals. Cluster membership predicted dietary pattern at 12 months. CONCLUSION: These data suggest that a one-on-one telephone counseling intervention that is intensive in the early weeks may maximize the level of change achieved in a study.     

A hybrid decision framework for evaluating psychometric evidence

The United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) directed federal trial judges to preliminarily evaluate the scientific bases of proffered expert evidence. This article presents a decision flowchart for evaluating psychometric data, and attempts to operationalize existing evidentiary standards in hybrid (part science/part law) terms. The resulting framework should better assist courts and forensic experts to understand, evaluate, and apply scientific reasoning in determining the admissibility and probative value of psychometric evidence.     

Emotion words and categories: evidence from lexical decision

We examined the categorical nature of emotion word recognition. Positive, negative, and neutral words were presented in lexical decision tasks. Word frequency was additionally manipulated. In Experiment 1, “positive” and “negative” categories of words were implicitly indicated by the blocked design employed. A significant emotion–frequency interaction was obtained, replicating past research. While positive words consistently elicited faster responses than neutral words, only low frequency negative words demonstrated a similar advantage. In Experiments 2a and 2b, explicit categories (“positive,” “negative,” and “household” items) were specified to participants. Positive words again elicited faster responses than did neutral words. Responses to negative words, however, were no different than those to neutral words, regardless of their frequency. The overall pattern of effects indicates that positive words are always facilitated, frequency plays a greater role in the recognition of negative words, and a “negative” category represents a somewhat disparate set of emotions. These results support the notion that emotion word processing may be moderated by distinct systems.     

Development of affective decision making for self and other: evidence for the integration of first- and third-person perspectives

The role of perspective taking in affective decision making was studied in children at two ages (3 and 4 years) using a delay-of-gratification paradigm in which children chose between an immediate reward of lower value and a delayed reward of higher value. Half the children chose for themselves (self condition), and half chose for the experimenter (other condition). Three-year-olds chose delayed rewards in the other condition but made impulsive choices in the self condition. Compared with 3-year-olds, 4-year-olds performed better in the self condition and worse in the other condition. Results suggest that 3-year-olds took either a subjective, first-person perspective (for self) or an objective, third-person perspective (for other). Four-year-olds integrated these perspectives, considering a third-person perspective in the self condition and the experimenter's subjective perspective in the other condition (i.e., her desire for immediate gratification). This integration allowed reason to be tempered by emotion, and vice versa.     

How to remain neutral: An experimental analysis of neutralization

Many patients with obsessive-compulsive problems engage in neutralizing activity to reduce or “cancel out” the effects of the obsession. In many cases, neutralization is covert and therefore difficult to assess or manipulate experimentally. We hypothesize that neutralization resembles overt compulsions. In particular, it was predicted that: (i) neutralization reduces the anxiety evoked by unacceptable thoughts, and (ii) if neutralization is delayed, anxiety and the urge to neutralize will decay naturally. To test the hypothesis, 63 Ss prone to a cognitive bias known to be associated with obsessional complaints (thought-action fusion) were asked to write a sentence that would evoke anxiety. Measures of anxiety (and other variables of interest such as guilt, responsibility and the likelihood of harm) were taken. Subjects were then instructed to either immediately neutralize (n = 29) or delay for 20 min (n = 34), after which time anxiety and urge to neutralize were re-assessed. The Ss who had neutralized were then instructed to delay, and the Ss who had delayed were now instructed to neutralize, after which time the final assessments were taken. The results confirmed the predictions and supported the hypothesis that neutralization resembles overt compulsions. Of note, there were no differences between anxiety reduction after a 20-min delay, and after immediate neutralization. The problems involved in designing and conducting experiments on covert phenomena are discussed, and the clinical implications of the study are considered.     

Older adults as adaptive decision makers: evidence from the Iowa Gambling Task

Older adults process emotional information differently than younger adults and may demonstrate less of a negativity bias on cognitive tasks. The Iowa Gambling Task designed by A. Bechara, H. Damasio, D. Tranel, and A. R. Damasio (1997) has been used to examine the integration of emotion and cognition in a risky-choice decision task and may give insight into differences in the decision-making strategies in younger and older adults. Eighty-eight younger adults (18-34 years) and 67 older adults (65-88 years) completed the Iowa Gambling Task. Using a theoretical decomposition of the task designed by J. R. Busemeyer and J. C. Stout (2002), the authors found that both groups were successful at solving the task but used very different strategies that reflected each group's strength. For younger adults, that strength was learning and memory. For older adults, that strength was an accurate representation of wins and losses (valence).     

Weighing the evidence for a dorsal processing bias under continuous flash suppression

With the introduction of continuous flash suppression (CFS) as a method to render stimuli invisible and study unconscious visual processing, a novel hypothesis has gained popularity. It states that processes typically ascribed to the dorsal visual stream can escape CFS and remain functional, while ventral stream processes are suppressed when stimuli are invisible under CFS. This notion of a CFS-specific “dorsal processing bias” has been argued to be in line with core characteristics of the influential dual-stream hypothesis of visual processing which proposes a dissociation between dorsally mediated vision-for-action and ventrally mediated vision-for-perception. Here, we provide an overview of neuroimaging and behavioral studies that either examine this dorsal processing bias or base their conclusions on it. We show that both evidence for preserved ventral processing as well as lack of dorsal processing can be found in studies using CFS. To reconcile the diverging results, differences in the paradigms and their effects are worthy of future research. We conclude that given the current level of information a dorsal processing bias under CFS cannot be universally assumed.     

Dilution in legal decision making: Effect of non-diagnostic information in relation to amount of diagnostic evidence

Judgments about others are often based on information that varies in terms of its diagnosticity or usefulness in predicting a certain outcome. Previous studies have demonstrated a “dilution effect” in which the addition of nondiagnostic or irrelevant information yields less extreme judgments than those based solely on diagnostic information. Two studies investigated the dilution effect in a juror decision making context in which no midpoint of a scale was provided by researchers. Study 1 examined the inclusion of positive, negative, or neutral character information in a criminal case and found that this nondiagnostic information affected attitude toward the defendant but did not “dilute” guilt judgments. The cases in Study 1 contained a larger amount of diagnostic information than studies that demonstrated the dilution effect. Thus, the amount of diagnostic evidence provided was varied in Study 2, and the results showed “diluted” judgments only when a small amount of diagnostic information was presented. Limitations to the dilution effect were discussed.     

Dilution in legal decision making: Effect of non-diagnostic information in relation to amount of diagnostic evidence

Judgments about others are often based on information that varies in terms of its diagnosticity or usefulness in predicting a certain outcome. Previous studies have demonstrated a “dilution effect” in which the addition of nondiagnostic or irrelevant information yields less extreme judgments than those based solely on diagnostic information. Two studies investigated the dilution effect in a juror decision making context in which no midpoint of a scale was provided by researchers. Study 1 examined the inclusion of positive, negative, or neutral character information in a criminal case and found that this nondiagnostic information affected attitude toward the defendant but did not “dilute” guilt judgments. The cases in Study 1 contained a larger amount of diagnostic information than studies that demonstrated the dilution effect. Thus, the amount of diagnostic evidence provided was varied in Study 2, and the results showed “diluted” judgments only when a small amount of diagnostic information was presented. Limitations to the dilution effect were discussed.     

Conjunction error rates on a continuous recognition memory test: little evidence for recollection

Two experiments examined conjunction memory errors on a continuous recognition task where the lag between parent words (e.g., blackmail, jailbird) and later conjunction lures (blackbird) was manipulated. In Experiment 1, contrary to expectations, the conjunction error rate was highest at the shortest lag (1 word) and decreased as the lag increased. In Experiment 2 the conjunction error rate increased significantly from a 0- to a 1-word lag, then decreased slightly from a 1- to a 5-word lag. The results provide mixed support for simple familiarity and dual-process accounts of recognition. Paradoxically, searching for an item in memory does not appear to be a good encoding task.     

Reasoning and mathematical skills contribute to normatively superior decision making under risk: evidence from the game of dice task

In this study, we assessed to what extent reasoning improves performance in decision making under risk in a laboratory gambling task (Game of Dice Task-Double, GDT-D). We also investigated to what degree individuals with above average mathematical competence decide better than those with average mathematical competence. Eighty-five participants performed the GDT-D and several numerical tasks. Forty-two individuals were asked to calculate the probabilities and the outcomes associated with the different options of the GDT-D before performing it. The other 43 individuals performed the GDT-D at the beginning of the test session. Both reasoning and mathematical competence had a positive effect on decision making. Different measures of mathematical competence correlated with advantageous performance in decision making. Results suggest that decision making under explicit risk conditions improves when individuals are encouraged to reflect about the contingencies of a decision situation. Interventions based on numerical reasoning may also be useful for patients with difficulties in decision making.