荣格与罗杰斯的人格及其治疗观的比较探究

本文对荣格与罗杰斯的理论的背景渊源,他们人格理论中的意识、无意识、自我及前者的自性化或后者的自我实现的潜能,他们的治疗目标、态度及方法作了一个浅显的比较,以期在共性与个性之中有所发现。     

论荣格分析心理学中人的自性化发展

自性化或自性化过程,是荣格分析心理学中的特别术语,也是其核心性的概念。荣格用自性化来说明心灵的发展。他用自性化表达这样一种过程:一个人最终成为他自己,成为一种整合性的,不可分割的,但又不同于他人的发展过程。人的自性化发展对于现代教育及个人人格的自我完善具有重要的现实指导意义。     

荣格宗教心理观述评

著名心理学家荣格在其晚年的研究生涯中将其研究重心转移至宗教、精神领域,其研究成果是宗教心理学理论的重要组成部分。本文以荣格原著为研究依据,在熟悉荣格分析心理学理论的基础上,系统、深入地阐释了荣格的宗教心理观,修正了以往研究的有待商榷之处,并对荣格早期、晚期思想进行了贯通,从整体上梳理、总结了荣格的宗教心理观。     

浅谈荣格的基督教心理观

本文介绍了荣格及其与基督教的渊源,简述了荣格的基督教心理观,总结了荣格基督教心理观的特点,并从贡献以及局限性两个方面对荣格的基督教心理观进行了评价,试图引起学界对荣格的基督教心理观的关注。     

荣格与后现代精神分析

在我国 ,首先阐明荣格学说与后现代思潮之关联的学者是荣格研究者冯川。冯川曾指出 ,对于精神分析的语言学转向、对于后结构主义、对于当代阐释学 ,荣格的思想都具有先导意义[1] 。本文从文化病理学的角度 ,从荣格对西方现代文明的反省和诊治中来探讨荣格与后现代精神分析之间的契合。1　荣格对现代西方文明的反省与诊疗文化病理学 (ＰａｔｈｏｌｏｇｉｅｄｅｒＫｕｌｔｕｒ)这样一个组合术语于1912年出现在德文著作《重新感受和评价 :论文化的病理学》[2 ] 中 ,用以揭示文化中的疾患 ,从而把“病理”的问题从医学领地中拓展出来。这样便带…     

荣格心理学的东方文化意蕴

本文从荣格心理学理论与美的东方模式的关系入手,分析了其中的东方文化意蕴.指出荣格的心理学理论具有印度和中国传统美学特征,荣格从中发现了心灵的原始意象以及用互补和谐的美学原则阐释原型之间的关系.     

荣格心理学与中国文化

荣格及其分析心理学,对于我们国内的心理学和人文科学都曾产生了重要影响。但是,荣格心理学本身,却与我们的中国文化,有着内在的联系。或者说,在荣格正是在充分吸收了中国文化的基础上,才完善与发展民其分析心理学的体系。在本文中,作者通过对汉学字维尔海姆,以及通过《易经》和“道”,分析与论述了荣格分析心理学与中国传统 关系,阐述了中国文化心理学的意义 。     

荣格与《易经》

荣格在《易经》的影响下提出了具有重大理论价值的"同时性原理",这是一种与因果律完全不同的普遍性联系。本文介绍了荣格的这一原理,依据《易传》的相关论述对其作了深入剖析,并进一步用"同气相求"同类相动"的道理,对同时性现象,包括占筮过程作了新的解释。文章认为,荣格在肯定《易经》科学价值的同时,正确地指出了《易经》所代表的中国科学与西方科学在思维方式和认识方法上的根本区别。     

卡尔·古斯塔·荣格

<正>(一)介绍卡尔·古斯塔·荣格（Carl Gustav Jung,1875-1961）是瑞士杰出的心理医生和精神病理学家,也是分析心理学的奠基人。在1899年阅读了艾宾的《精神病学教科书》后,荣格决定通过精神治疗追求内心梦想。他于1900年成为苏黎世大学伯格尔斯立精神病医院的助理医生,进行了备受瞩目的“字词联想”研究,提出了“情结”理论;后来深入研究弗洛伊德的理论,创建了“国际精神分析学会”,但在1914年与弗洛伊德分道扬镳。     

论荣格的集体无意识

理解并批判西方整个精神分析运动,不但要研究弗洛伊德,更要研究荣格。正是荣格的分析心理学体系,使无意识的探求走入更深的层次,这个层次的基点、核心,便是荣格的集体无意识。一、荣格集体无意识理论的双向提出 1、理论的个体形成荣格的童年,对死亡、孤独、神经症等就有着特异的个体情绪体验。这种体验影响着他的中学学科学习,大学职业选择乃至后来和布伦洛、让内特别是弗洛伊德的交往。     

Reflections on the self state dream

Self psychologists contend that patients with narcissistic personality disorders have dreams which cannot be understood in terms of current psychoanalytic dream theory and that these dreams, called self state dreams, have a different origin and structure. The manifest content of these dreams is said to reveal the reactions of healthy sectors of the psyche to disturbing changes in the condition of the self. Self psychologists are said to be able to understand these dreams directly, without the patients' associations, as portrayals of the dreamers' dread of threats to the integrity of the self. The authors raise questions about these contentions. They conclude that the self state dream will remain a dubious concept until a more extensive psychology of dreaming is provided by self psychologists.     

The Deep Self Model and asymmetries in folk judgments about intentional action

Recent studies by experimental philosophers demonstrate puzzling asymmetries in people’s judgments about intentional action, leading many philosophers to propose that normative factors are inappropriately influencing intentionality judgments. In this paper, I present and defend the Deep Self Model of judgments about intentional action that provides a quite different explanation for these judgment asymmetries. The Deep Self Model is based on the idea that people make an intuitive distinction between two parts of an agent’s psychology, an Acting Self that contains the desires, means-end beliefs, and intentions that are the immediate causal source of an agent’s actions, and a Deep Self, which contains an agent’s stable and central psychological attitudes, including the agent’s values, principles, life goals, and other more fundamental attitudes. The Deep Self Model proposes that when people are asked to make judgments about whether an agent brought about an outcome intentionally, in addition to standard criteria proposed in traditional models, people also assess an additional ‘Concordance Criterion’: Does the outcome concord with the psychological attitudes of the agent’s Deep Self? I show that the Deep Self Model can explain a very complex pattern of judgment asymmetries documented in the experimental philosophy literature, and does so in a way that has significant advantages over competing models.     

Psychometric properties of the Beck Self-Esteem Scales

The psychometric characteristics of the Beck Self-Esteem Scales (BSE) are described for 360 psychiatric outpatients. Patients rated their evaluative beliefs about themselves (Self Scale) and their beliefs about how others evaluate them (Other Scale). Both measures consist of 18 pairs of adjectives, e.g., lovable-unlovable, that are rated using a 10-point scale. The coefficient alphas for the Self Scale (0.94) and the Other Scale (0.95) indicated high internal consistency. Both scales were positively associated with other measures of self-esteem and negatively associated with measures of anxiety and depression. As predicted by the cognitive theory of depression, patients with a principal mood disorder scored significantly lower on the BSE than patients with a principal anxiety disorder. In addition, the mean scores for patients with major depression and dysthymia on the Self Scale were significantly lower than the mean scores for the Other Scale.     

The wise baby as the voice of the true self

Sandor Ferenczi wrote about a typical dream of the "Wise Baby" and later used this figure to represent the child who is traumatized into precocious wisdom, who becomes "the family psychiatrist." We discuss Ferenczi's theory of traumatization and the "split self," noting how it was taken up in D. W. Winnicott's "True Self/False Self" conceptualization. We then present three patients' wise baby dreams to show how these trauma theories can be used in dream interpretation and how dream interpretation can support them.     

Borders,Tensegrity and Development in Dialogue

In this article we propose a development of the Dialogical Self Theory by introducing the notions of borders, cogenetic logic and tensegrity that we have elaborated during the last 5 years, in order to introduce a stronger developmental and dynamic perspective within the theory. We start from the discussion of some recent advancements of the model proposed by Hermans et al. (Integrative Psychological and Behavioural Science, 51(4), 2017), who refer to the metaphor of democratic society of the Self to understand the challenges and possible directions of adaptation that the persons can face in those border-crossing processes characterizing contemporary western societies. We conceptualized the Self as a dynamic semiotic system in constant evolutive tension, rather than a system in equilibrium adapting to the environmental changing conditions. Then, we propose to replace the concept of stability and continuity of the Self with the more fruitful idea of tensional integrity.     

From Patterns To Prosperity: A Review Of Rachlin’s The Science Of Self-control.

The Science of Self‐Control (Rachlin, 2000) presents a clear overview of research and theory on self‐control, emphasizing important recent research by Rachlin and his students on temporally extended behavioral patterning as an aid to curbing impulsive decisions. We found the book well suited as a textbook in a graduate seminar on self‐control, particularly because it lucidly presents several provocative ideas about self‐control, decision making, addiction, and general theories of behavior. Of particular interest are his discussion of the “primrose path” to addiction and his behavioral research on the “prisoner's dilemma” as it relates to self‐control. Although we take some issue with teleological behaviorism, the theory of behavior advocated by Rachlin, we recommend this book to anyone interested in self‐control.     

Relational and Substantival Ontologies, and the Nature and the Role of Primitives in Ontological Theories

Several metaphysical debates have typically been modeled as oppositions between a relationist approach and a substantivalist approach. Such debates include the Bundle Theory and the Substratum Theory about ordinary material objects, the Bundle (Humean) Theory and the Substance (Cartesian) Theory of the Self, and Relationism and Substantivalism about time. In all three debates, the substantivalist side typically insists that in order to provide a good treatment of the subject-matter of the theory (time, Self, material objects), it is necessary to postulate the existence of a certain kind of substance, while the other side, the relationist one, characteristically feels that this is an unnecessary expense and that one can get the job done in an ontologically cheaper way just with inter-related properties or events. In this paper I shall defend the view that there is much less of a disagreement between relational ontologies and substantival ontologies than it is usually thought. I believe that, when carefully examined, the two sides of the debate are not that different from each other, in all three cases of pairs of views mentioned above. As we will see, both the relational side and the substantival side work in the same way, suffer from and answer the same objections, and are structurally extremely similar. It will be an important question—one that I shall discuss in detail, and that is indeed the main point of interest for me in this paper—whether this means that the two sides of the debate are somehow ‘equivalent’ or not, and what ‘equivalent’ could mean.     

Reply to Catriona Mackenzie

In her excellent critique of my book Self to Self (2006), Catriona Mackenzie highlights three gaps in my view of the self. First, my effort to distinguish among different applications of the concept ‘self’ is not matched by any attempt to explain the interactions among the selves so distinguished. Second, in analyzing practical reasoning as aimed at self-understanding, I speak sometimes of causal-psychological understanding (e.g. in the paper titled ‘The Centered Self’) and sometimes of narrative self-understanding (e.g. in ‘The Self as Narrator’), but I never explain how these two modes of self-understanding are related. Third, I never explain how my account of autonomous agency can be reconciled with my interpretation of Kant's (e.g., in ‘A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics’). In this reply to Mackenzie, I agree with her about all three of these gaps, and I offer some (admittedly incomplete) ideas about how they might be filled.     

Autoscopic phenomena and one's own body representation in dreams

Autoscopic phenomena (AP) are complex experiences that include the visual illusory reduplication of one’s own body. From a phenomenological point of view, we can distinguish three conditions: autoscopic hallucinations, heautoscopy, and out-of-body experiences. The dysfunctional pattern involves multisensory disintegration of personal and extrapersonal space perception. The etiology, generally either neurological or psychiatric, is different. Also, the hallucination of Self and own body image is present during dreams and differs according to sleep stage. Specifically, the representation of the Self in REM dreams is frequently similar to the perception of Self in wakefulness, whereas in NREM dreams, a greater polymorphism of Self and own body representation is observed. The parallels between autoscopic phenomena in pathological cases and the Self-hallucination in dreams will be discussed to further the understanding of the particular states of self awareness, especially the complex integration of different memory sources in Self and body representation.