共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Haim Gaifman 《Synthese》2010,174(1):5-46
The goal of this paper is a comprehensive analysis of basic reasoning patterns that are characteristic of vague predicates.
The analysis leads to rigorous reconstructions of the phenomena within formal systems. Two basic features are dealt with.
One is tolerance: the insensitivity of predicates to small changes in the objects of predication (a one-increment of a walking
distance is a walking distance). The other is the existence of borderline cases. The paper shows why these should be treated
as different, though related phenomena. Tolerance is formally reconstructed within a proposed framework of contextual logic,
leading to a solution of the Sorites paradox. Borderline-vagueness is reconstructed using certain modality operators; the
set-up provides an analysis of higher order vagueness and a derivation of scales of degrees for the property in question. 相似文献
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Giorgie Dzhaparidze 《Studia Logica》1992,51(2):249-277
A nonempty sequence T1,...,Tn of theories is tolerant, if there are consistent theories T
1
+
,..., T
n
+
such that for each 1 i n, T
i
+
is an extension of Ti in the same language and, if i n, T
i
+
interprets T
i+1
+
. We consider a propositional language with the modality , the arity of which is not fixed, and axiomatically define in this language the decidable logics TOL and TOL. It is shown that TOL (resp. TOL) yields exactly the schemata of PA-provable (resp. true) arithmetical sentences, if (A1,..., An) is understood as (a formalization of) PA+A1, ..., PA+An is tolerant. 相似文献
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Stephen P. Schwartz 《Synthese》1989,80(3):395-406
I would like to thank Terence Horgan, William Throop and especially my wife, Diane Schwartz, for helpful suggestions for improving this paper and for valuable and insightful discussions on the topic of vagueness. I would also like to thank Ithaca College for generously supporting the work on this paper with a Summer Research Grant. 相似文献
7.
Nikk Effingham 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(1):35-42
Sider has a favourable view of supersubstantivalism (the thesis that all material objects are identical to the regions of spacetime that they occupy). This paper argues that given supersubstantivalism, Sider's argument from vagueness for (mereological) universalism fails. I present Sider's vagueness argument (§§II–III), and explain why – given supersubstantivalism – some but not all regions must be concrete in order for the argument to work (§IV). Given this restriction on what regions can be concrete, I give a reductio of Sider's argument (§V). I conclude with some brief comments on why this is not simply an ad hominem against Sider, and why this incompatibility of supersubstantivalism with the argument from vagueness is of broader interest (§VI). 相似文献
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J. R. G. Williams 《Erkenntnis》2009,70(2):151-171
This paper explores the interaction of well-motivated (if controversial) principles governing the probability conditionals,
with accounts of what it is for a sentence to be indefinite. The conclusion can be played in a variety of ways. It could be
regarded as a new reason to be suspicious of the intuitive data about the probability of conditionals; or, holding fixed the
data, it could be used to give traction on the philosophical analysis of a contentious notion—indefiniteness. The paper outlines
the various options, and shows that ‘rejectionist’ theories of indefiniteness are incompatible with the results. Rejectionist
theories include popular accounts such as supervaluationism, non-classical truth-value gap theories, and accounts of indeterminacy
that centre on rejecting the law of excluded middle. An appendix compares the results obtained here with the ‘impossibility’
results descending from Lewis (1976).
相似文献
J. R. G. WilliamsEmail: |
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Brian P. McLaughlin 《No?s (Detroit, Mich.)》1997,31(S11):209-230
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Kristie Miller 《Erkenntnis》2006,64(2):223-230
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Matthew Konieczka 《Sophia》2011,50(1):221-232
Ted Sider argues that a binary afterlife is inconsistent with a proportionally just God because no just criterion for placing
persons in such an afterlife exists. I provide a possible account whereby God can remain proportionally just and allow a binary
afterlife. On my account, there is some maximum amount of people God can allow into Heaven without sacrificing some greater
good. God gives to all people at least their due but chooses to allow some who do not deserve Heaven to enter out of grace.
Although this model implies a precise cutoff between those who enter Heaven and those who do not, I have argued that there
is a precise point where God best serves justice and some greater good. Although God’s actions may appear arbitrary and ‘whimsically
generous,’ it is merely because we are ignorant of the precise cutoff point that best serves his purposes. 相似文献
16.
Ken Akiba 《Philosophical Studies》2002,107(1):69-86
Deflationists cannot make sense ofthe notion of referential indeterminacybecause they deny the existence of substantivereference. One way for them to make sense ofthe objective existence of linguisticindeterminacy is by embracing theworldly (or objectual) view ofindeterminacy, the view that indeterminacyexists not in reference relations but in the(non-linguistic) world itself. On this view,the entire world is divided into precisified worlds, just as it is dividedinto temporal slices and (arguably) alethicpossible worlds. Supervaluationism proves tobe neutral with respect to the debate betweenthe worldly view and the referential view ofindeterminacy. 相似文献
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In this paper we compare different models of vagueness viewed as a specific form of subjective uncertainty in situations of
imperfect discrimination. Our focus is on the logic of the operator “clearly” and on the problem of higher-order vagueness.
We first examine the consequences of the notion of intransitivity of indiscriminability for higher-order vagueness, and compare
several accounts of vagueness as inexact or imprecise knowledge, namely Williamson’s margin for error semantics, Halpern’s
two-dimensional semantics, and the system we call Centered semantics. We then propose a semantics of degrees of clarity, inspired
from the signal detection theory model, and outline a view of higher-order vagueness in which the notions of subjective clarity
and unclarity are handled asymmetrically at higher orders, namely such that the clarity of clarity is compatible with the
unclarity of unclarity. 相似文献
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Erik Carlson 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2013,16(3):449-463
John Broome has argued that incomparability and vagueness cannot coexist in a given betterness order. His argument essentially hinges on an assumption he calls the ‘collapsing principle’. In an earlier article I criticized this principle, but Broome has recently expressed doubts about the cogency of my criticism. Moreover, Cristian Constantinescu has defended Broome’s view from my objection. In this paper, I present further arguments against the collapsing principle, and try to show that Constantinescu’s defence of Broome’s position fails. 相似文献