The role of preschoolers' social understanding in evaluating the informativeness of causal interventions

Preschoolers use information from interventions, namely intentional actions, to make causal inferences. We asked whether children consider some interventions to be more informative than others based on two components of an actor’s knowledge state: whether an actor possesses causal knowledge, and whether an actor is allowed to use their knowledge in a given situation. Three- and four-year-olds saw a novel toy that activated in the presence of certain objects. Two actors, one knowledgeable about the toy and one ignorant, each tried to activate the toy with an object. In Experiment 1, either the actors chose objects or the child chose for them. In Experiment 2, the actors chose objects blindfolded. Objects were always placed on the toy simultaneously, and thus were equally associated with the effect. Preschoolers’ causal inferences favored the knowledgeable actor’s object only when he was allowed to choose it (Experiment 1). Thus, children consider both personal and situational constraints on knowledge when evaluating the informativeness of causal interventions.     

Children’s causal inferences from indirect evidence: Backwards blocking and Bayesian reasoning in preschoolers

Previous research suggests that children can infer causal relations from patterns of events. However, what appear to be cases of causal inference may simply reduce to children recognizing relevant associations among events, and responding based on those associations. To examine this claim, in Experiments 1 and 2, children were introduced to a “blicket detector,” a machine that lit up and played music when certain objects were placed upon it. Children observed patterns of contingency between objects and the machine’s activation that required them to use indirect evidence to make causal inferences. Critically, associative models either made no predictions, or made incorrect predictions about these inferences. In general, children were able to make these inferences, but some developmental differences between 3- and 4-year-olds were found. We suggest that children’s causal inferences are not based on recognizing associations, but rather that children develop a mechanism for Bayesian structure learning. Experiment 3 explicitly tests a prediction of this account. Children were asked to make an inference about ambiguous data based on the base rate of certain events occurring. Four-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds were able to make this inference.     

Launching at a distance: The effect of spatial markers

It has been widely reported that spatial contiguity is important to judgements of causality involving one object launching another [Michotte's “launching effect” (1963, 1991)]. The present study examined the impact of different types of spatial markers on causal judgements of a distal launch (one object approaching other, stopping short of it, and the second object subsequently moving along the same trajectory). The spatial markers were objects that either partially or completely bridged the spatial gap between two objects (Experiment 1), or they were dashed lines that marked the stopping location of the first object or the starting location of the second object (Experiment 2). The presence of either objects or dashed lines could produce higher causal ratings, but the location of the marker mattered. The results suggest that altering a cause's ability to predict when the effect would occur (via a spatial marker) and the presence of a conduit for energy transmission have independent effects on causal judgements of object interaction.     

Causal learning mechanisms in very young children: two-, three-, and four-year-olds infer causal relations from patterns of variation and covariation

Three studies investigated whether young children make accurate causal inferences on the basis of patterns of variation and covariation. Children were presented with a new causal relation by means of a machine called the "blicket detector." Some objects, but not others, made the machine light up and play music. In the first 2 experiments, children were told that "blickets make the machine go" and were then asked to identify which objects were "blickets." Two-, 3-, and 4-year-old children were shown various patterns of variation and covariation between two different objects and the activation of the machine. All 3 age groups took this information into account in their causal judgments about which objects were blickets. In a 3rd experiment, 3- and 4-year-old children used the information when they were asked to make the machine stop. These results are related to Bayes-net causal graphical models of causal learning.     

Causal learning across domains

Five studies investigated (a) children's ability to use the dependent and independent probabilities of events to make causal inferences and (b) the interaction between such inferences and domain-specific knowledge. In Experiment 1, preschoolers used patterns of dependence and independence to make accurate causal inferences in the domains of biology and psychology. Experiment 2 replicated the results in the domain of biology with a more complex pattern of conditional dependencies. In Experiment 3, children used evidence about patterns of dependence and independence to craft novel interventions across domains. In Experiments 4 and 5, children's sensitivity to patterns of dependence was pitted against their domain-specific knowledge. Children used conditional probabilities to make accurate causal inferences even when asked to violate domain boundaries.     

Causal learning from probabilistic events in 24‐month‐olds: an action measure

How do young children learn about causal structure in an uncertain and variable world? We tested whether they can use observed probabilistic information to solve causal learning problems. In two experiments, 24‐month‐olds observed an adult produce a probabilistic pattern of causal evidence. The toddlers then were given an opportunity to design their own intervention. In Experiment 1, toddlers saw one object bring about an effect with a higher probability than a second object. In Experiment 2, the frequency of the effect was held constant, though its probability differed. After observing the probabilistic evidence, toddlers in both experiments chose to act on the object that was more likely to produce the effect. The results demonstrate that toddlers can learn about cause and effect without trial‐and‐error or linguistic instruction on the task, simply by observing the probabilistic patterns of evidence resulting from the imperfect actions of other social agents. Such observational causal learning from probabilistic displays supports human children's rapid cultural learning.     

Determinants of spatial priming in environmental memory

Spatial priming in recognizing objects in experimentally learned environments has been proposed as strong evidence for spatial organization of environmental memory. However, in all studies showing recognition priming effects, encoding and rehearsal contiguity may have coincided with spatial proximity, and thus priming may have been due to temporal associations formed during rehearsal, not encoded spatial relations per se. We investigated this question in four experiments, using a trip trial learning method in which temporal contiguity and spatial relations were independent. In Experiment 1, no spatial priming in recognition was found, even though indirect evidence suggested that subjects had encoded spatial relations. In Experiment 2, the trip trial method was compared with the free study procedure commonly used in previous priming studies. Spatial priming occurred only for free study subjects, even though the two groups were equivalent on direct measures of encoding accuracy. In Experiment 3, spatial priming in recognition was obtained with a modification of the trip trial method in which temporal and spatial contiguity were deliberately confounded. In Experiment 4, the unmodified trip trial method produced spatial priming in a location-decision task. Taken together, our results suggest that environmental memory may be spatially organized, but retrieval of object identities does not necessarily activate encoded spatial relations.     

Learning about causes from people: Observational causal learning in 24-month-old infants

How do infants and young children learn about the causal structure of the world around them? In 4 experiments we investigate whether young children initially give special weight to the outcomes of goal-directed interventions they see others perform and use this to distinguish correlations from genuine causal relations-observational causal learning. In a new 2-choice procedure, 2- to 4-year-old children saw 2 identical objects (potential causes). Activation of 1 but not the other triggered a spatially remote effect. Children systematically intervened on the causal object and predictively looked to the effect. Results fell to chance when the cause and effect were temporally reversed, so that the events were merely associated but not causally related. The youngest children (24- to 36-month-olds) were more likely to make causal inferences when covariations were the outcome of human interventions than when they were not. Observational causal learning may be a fundamental learning mechanism that enables infants to abstract the causal structure of the world. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

The Role of Probability and Intentionality in Preschoolers' Causal Generalizations

Three experiments examined whether preschoolers recognize that the causal properties of objects generalize to new members of the same set given either deterministic or probabilistic data. Experiment 1 found that 3- and 4-year-olds were able to make such a generalization given deterministic data but were at chance when they observed probabilistic information. Five-year-olds reliably generalized in both situations. Experiment 2 found that 4-year-olds could make some probabilistic inferences, particularly when comparing sets that had no efficacy with sets in which some members had efficacy. Children had some difficulty discriminating between completely effective sets and stochastic ones. Experiment 3 examined whether 3- and 4-year-olds could reason about probabilistic data when provided with information about the experimenter's beliefs about causal outcomes. Children who were more successful on standard false-belief measures were more likely to respond as if the data were deterministic. These data suggest that children's probabilistic inferences develop into early elementary school, but preschoolers might have some understanding of probability when reasoning about causal generalization.     

The Blicket Within: Preschoolers' Inferences About Insides and Causes

Four experiments examined children's inferences about the relation between objects' internal parts and their causal properties. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds recognized that objects with different internal parts had different causal properties, and those causal properties transferred if the internal part moved to another object. In Experiment 2, 4-year-olds made inferences from an object's internal parts to its causal properties without being given verbal labels for objects or being shown that insides and causal properties covaried. Experiment 3 found that 4-year-olds chose an object with the same internal part over one with the same external property when asked which object had the same causal property as the target (which had both the internal part and external property). Finally, Experiment 4 demonstrated that 4-year-olds made similar inferences from causal properties to internal parts, but 3-year-olds relied more on objects' external perceptual appearance. These results suggest that by the age of 4, children have developed an understanding of a relation between an artifact's internal parts and its causal properties.     

Bridging the gap: Causality-at-a-distance in children's categorization and inferences about internal properties

Previous research has shown that preschoolers extend labels and internal properties of objects based on those objects’ causal properties, even when the causal properties conflict with the objects’ perceptual appearance [Nazzi, T., & Gopnik, A. (2000). A shift in children's use of perceptual and causal cues to categorization. Developmental Science, 3, 389–396; Sobel, D. M., Yoachim, C. M., Gopnik, A., Meltzoff, A. N., & Blumenthal, E. J. (2007). The blicket within: Preschoolers’ inferences about insides and causes. Journal of Cognition and Development, 8, 159–182]. These studies, however, only presented causal relations that acted on contact. In two studies, contact causality was replaced by distance causality. In contrast to the contact causality case, 4- and 5-year-olds extended labels to objects with similar perceptual properties over objects with similar causal properties when those properties acted at a distance. When children were asked to make inferences about object's internal properties, they were more likely to make causal responses, with 5-year-olds doing so to a greater extent than 4-year-olds. In a second study, 4-year-olds registered causal properties that acted at a distance and used them to make inferences when no perceptual conflict was present. These results support a hypothesis that young children develop an understanding of the specific mechanisms that link causal relations.     

Blickets and babies: the development of causal reasoning in toddlers and infants

Previous research has suggested that preschoolers possess a cognitive system that allows them to construct an abstract, coherent representation of causal relations among events. Such a system lets children reason retrospectively when they observe ambiguous data in a rational manner (e.g., D. M. Sobel, J. B. Tenenbaum, & A. Gopnik, 2004). However, there is little evidence that demonstrates whether younger children possess similar inferential abilities. In Experiment 1, the authors extended previous findings with older children to examine 19- and 24-month-olds' causal inferences. Twenty-four-month-olds' inferences were similar to those of preschoolers, but younger children lacked the ability to make retrospective causal inferences, perhaps because of performance limitations. In Experiment 2, the authors designed an eye-tracking paradigm to test younger participants that eliminated various manual search demands. Eight-month-olds' anticipatory eye movements, in response to retrospective data, revealed inferences similar to those of 24-month-olds in Experiment 1 and preschoolers in previous research. These data are discussed in terms of associative reasoning and causal inference.     

Spatial cognition: gathering strategies used by preschool children

How preschool children retrieve hidden objects was examined in two cross-sectional studies. The first was a simple task in which 1- and 3-year-olds saw two treats hidden in their living room. The newly walking infants generally sought the closer treat first, providing evidence for a least-distance spatial strategy. However, this strategy was affected by a tendency to approach the hiding place most recently baited. Three-year-old children used a least-distance strategy regardless of the order of hidings. In Experiment 2, 3- and 5-year-olds saw 12 puzzle pieces hidden in various containers equally spaced within a naturally furnished children's laboratory. Factors in addition to age were the distinctiveness of the containers and a requirement to return to the center of the array after each retrieval. Overall, children of both age groups were quite successful at this task, retrieving 11 of the pieces. However, 3-year-olds were less efficient, retrieving fewer pieces and requiring more searches. Detailed analyses of errors and patterns of choices indicated differential processes in achieving their performance. Three-year-old children showed the use of memories for events, discrimination of classes of hiding places, and efficient spatial biases. Five-year-old children were more likely to exhibit these processes concurrently.     

Reference directions and reference objects in spatial memory of a briefly viewed layout

Two experiments investigated participants' spatial memory of a briefly viewed layout. Participants saw an array of five objects on a table and, after a short delay, indicated whether the target object indicated by the experimenter had been moved. Experiment 1 showed that change detection was more accurate when non-target objects were stationary than when non-target objects were moved. This context effect was observed when participants were tested both at the original learning perspective and at a novel perspective. In Experiment 2, the arrays of five objects were presented on a rectangular table and two of the non-target objects were aligned with the longer axis of the table. Change detection was more accurate when the target object was presented with the two objects that were aligned with the longer axis of the table during learning than when the target object was presented with the two objects that were not aligned with the longer axis of the table during learning. These results indicated that the spatial memory of a briefly viewed layout has interobject spatial relations represented and utilizes an allocentric reference direction.     

Disagreement and causal learning: Others' hypotheses affect children's evaluations of evidence

When children evaluate evidence and make causal inferences, they are sensitive to the social context in which data are generated. This study investigated whether children learn more from evidence generated by an agent who agrees with them or from one who disagrees with them. Children in two age groups (5- and 6-year-olds and 9- and 10-year-olds) observed the functioning of a machine that lit up and played music in the presence of certain objects. After endorsing one of two plausible causal hypotheses, children observed a puppet either agree or disagree with their own hypotheses. The puppet then generated a further piece of evidence that confirmed, disconfirmed, or was neutral with respect to the children's hypotheses. When they were later asked to make causal inferences about objects they did not directly observe, children in both age groups responded differentially to identical evidence depending on whether the agent agreed or disagreed, and they often drew stronger inferences in response to disagreement. In addition, older children were particularly sensitive to disagreement when the evidence was ambiguous. Our results suggest that children consider the relationship between their own and others' hypotheses when evaluating evidence that others generate. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Forming a stable spatial representation

The visual system sometimes fails, partially or completely, to encode and/or retrieve spatial relations among parts of an object. For example, targets can easily be confused with their mirror images, especially when they must be retained in memory. In the current experiments we ask whether our representations of spatial relations can be amended by information from different cognitive domains. Specifically, we ask whether failure to form a stable representation of spatial relations among parts can be overcome by the use of linguistic information. Four year-olds saw squares split by color and matched them after delay. In Experiment 1, children saw the target and were told either “Look, this is a blicket” (Label Condition) or “Look!” (NoLabel Condition). Then, three choices appeared: the target (e.g. vertical split with red left, green right), its mirror image, and another square that had a different internal split (e.g. horizontal). Overall, children performed better than chance. However, their errors were almost exclusively mirror image confusions, suggesting that children failed to bind color and location (e.g. red left, green right). There was no difference between the NoLabel and Label conditions, suggesting the whole-object novel label did not help children form a stable representation of the spatial relation among the parts. Experiment 2 tested whether color–location binding can be improved by providing language that might bind these features. Children were shown a target and were told, e.g. “The red is on the left.” Performance was reliably better than in Experiment 1, suggesting language did help children bind color and location. Experiments 3 and 4 explored whether the same performance improvement could be accomplished by increasing non-linguistic attention to the target (i.e. flashing the red part, Experiment 3) or by using neutral relational language (e.g. “The red is touching the green”). Neither experiment showed enhanced performance, suggesting that language can augment visual–spatial representations only if it conveys very specific information (e.g. direction). Generally, the results suggest that specific linguistic information can help form a stable representation of spatial relationship and that this effect is not attributable to general attentional effects.     

Evidence for a distinction between judged and perceived causality

Two experiments investigated Michotte's launch event, in which successive motion of two objects appears to evoke an immediate perception that the first motion caused the second, as in a collision. Launching was embedded in event sequences where a third event (a colour change of the second object) was established as a competing predictor of the second motion, in an attempt to see whether subjects' learning of alternative predictive relationships would influence their causal impressions of launch events. In Experiment 1 subjects saw launch events in which temporal contiguity at the point of impact was varied so that an impact was varied so that an impact itself did not reliably predict when the second object would move. Half of these scenes, however, contained a colour change of the second object which did reliably predict when it would move. In accordance with Michotte's theory, subjects' ratings of the degree of perceived causality were not affected by the colour change. In Experiment 2 subjects saw scenes that contained launch events with or without temporal contiguity and a colour change. These were interspersed with events in which a colour change alone did or did not precede the second motion. Thus, movement of the second object was either contingent on or independent of the impact. Subjects repeatedly (a) rated perceived causality in single launch events and (b) judged the necessity of collisions for movement in the overall set of events. These responses dissociated, in that ratings type (a) showed only a substantial contiguity effect, whereas judgements of type (b) showed both a contingency and a much smaller contiguity effect. These results appear to support a distinction between judged and perceived causality and are discussed with respect to Michotte's theory of direct causal perception.     

Young children infer causal strength from probabilities and interventions

We examine the interaction of two cues that children use to make judgments about cause-effect relations: probabilities and interventions. Children were shown a "detector" that lit up and played music when a block was placed on its surface. We varied the probabilistic effectiveness of the block, as well as whether the experimenter or the child was performing the interventions. In Experiment 1, we found that children can use probabilistic evidence to make inferences about causal strength. However, when the results of their own interventions are in conflict with the overall frequencies, preschoolers favor the results of their own interventions. In Experiment 2, children used probabilistic evidence to infer a hidden causal mechanism. Though they again gave preference to their own interventions, they did not do so when their interventions were explicitly confounded by an alternative cause.     

Young children's discovery of spatial classification

Around the age of 18 months, children begin to classify objects spatially by kind, placing objects of the same kind close together in space and placing unlike objects apart. This behavior may be symbolic in the sense that children use spatial proximity to represent similarity. We examined the possibility that spatial classification is discovered during play—that the external products of play lead children to use space to represent similarity. Experiment 1 was a longitudinal study of four children's classification behaviors, observed from the age of 16 to 21 months. Results suggest that play with one kind of object to the exclusion of another kind leads to the discovery of spatial classification. Experiment 2 examined how children's tendencies to interact with one category might promote spatial classification of multiple categories. Twenty-four 18-month-old children who did not yet spatially classify objects by kind participated. Children who were given the experience of playing with two kinds of objects in a context that promoted interaction with only one kind were more likely to demonstrate spontaneous spatial classification of multiple kinds in a subsequent test period. Children who played equally with both kinds did not show heightened spontaneous classification. The results further suggest that comparison of different kinds during play is critical to the spontaneous occurrence of spatial classification.     

Artifacts and natural kinds: children's judgments about whether objects are owned

People's behavior in relation to objects depends on whether they are owned. But how do people judge whether objects are owned? We propose that people expect human-made objects (artifacts) to be more likely to be owned than naturally occurring objects (natural kinds), and we examine the development of these expectations in young children. Experiment 1 found that when shown pictures of familiar kinds of objects, 3-year-olds expected artifacts to be owned and inanimate natural kinds to be non-owned. In Experiments 2A and 2B, 3-6-year-olds likewise had different expectations about the ownership of unfamiliar artifacts and natural kinds. Children at all ages viewed unfamiliar natural kinds as non-owned, but children younger than 6 years of age only endorsed artifacts as owned at chance rates. In Experiment 3, children saw the same pictures but were also told whether objects were human-made. With this information provided, even 3-year-olds viewed unfamiliar artifacts as owned. Finally, in Experiment 4, 4- and 5-year-olds chose unfamiliar artifacts over natural kinds when judging which object in a pair belongs to a person, but not when judging which the person prefers. These experiments provide first evidence about how children judge whether objects are owned. In contrast to claims that children think about natural kinds as being similar to artifacts, the current findings reveal that children have differing expectations about whether they are owned.