Evading conceptual self-annihilation: Some implications of Albert Bandura's theory of the self-system for the status of psychology

There are two cognitive revolutions occuring in psychology. The first in the fields of perception, memory, language and thought uses information processing and computer models of cognition. The second in learning theory and behavioral therapy uses folk psychological concepts of cognition. To test the philosophical compatibility of these cognitive revolutions I examine the implications of Albert Bandura's theory of the self-system for the disputed question of the status of folk psychology. I argue that if the theory of the self-system is correct, then strong eliminative materialist claims about the falsity of folk psychology are disconfirmed, functionalist homunculi hypotheses need modification, and certain constraints are imposed on neurophysiological accounts of the self. Thus I conclude that the cognitive revolution in learning theory and behavior therapy is making its own distinctive contribution to the new philosophical psychology emerging from the cognitive revolution in psychology as a whole.     

Direct Perception Requires an Animal-Dependent Concept of Specificity and of Information

Specificity and information are at center stage in ecological psychology. Nevertheless, the usual theorizing on these concepts may have made the problem of accounting for perception and action more difficult by so far underestimating the role of animals as both meaning-detectors and meaning-determiners. The usual understanding of information and specificity in ecological psychology seems neither necessary nor even compatible with ecological premises and empirical findings. I argue that a reframing of these concepts to fully take animals into account is necessary to explain perception of action-specific meanings. The reframing proposed converges on ideas from developmental systems theory and in no way concedes to inputs-followed-by-processing-followed-by-representation models. Fully acknowledging the animal for properly defining information over the animal-environment system poses no threat lawfulness, realism, or direct perception. It also invites serious consideration of self-organization and interactivism as sources for further development of ecological science.     

Theoretical Hubris and the Willingness To Be Radical: An Open Letter to James J. Gibson

J.J. Gibson's direct perception thesis is the cornerstone of ecological psychology. Not to understand this is not to understand ecological psychology. Beginning in the summer of 1968, when I first met Gibson, and after working with him for the next year at Cornell, I underwent a conversion crisis. I came to appreciate his thesis through a few philosophical insights that I here share with the reader through an open letter to Gibson, where I seek to illuminate the reasons for my conversion from being a Miller-Chomsky psycholinguist and a Piaget devotee to a radical Gibsonian. This conversion has influenced my work even until the present. Indeed, I am still working through its implications in all that I attempt. I share this intimate portrait of my relationship to Gibson and his profound ideas in hope that others who have struggled with his thesis might be helped along their way as I was.     

‘The Echo of a Thought in Sight’: Property Perception,Universals and Wittgenstein

Contemporary philosophers of perception, even those with otherwise widely differing beliefs, often hold that universals enter into the content of perceptual experience. This doctrine can even be seen as a trivial inference from the observation that we observe properties – ways that things are – as well as things. I argue that the inference is not trivial but can and should be resisted. Ordinary property perception does not involve awareness of universals. But there are visual (and aural) experiences which do involve determinate universals: following Wittgenstein, I call these ‘aspect experiences’. The common view of perceptual content effectively conflates aspect experiences with mere property perceptions. Wittgenstein’s later writings on the philosophy of psychology provide an alternative way to think about both aspects and properties. It also forms a contrast with Wittgenstein’s own early treatment of perception in the Tractatus, the doctrine of which is much closer to the contemporary norm among philosophers of perception. In seeing how Wittgenstein moved away from his early view, we can see how we might move away from that norm.     

Reflections of an eclectic skeptic

Following primary and secondary education in Europe, I came to the United States for further education. After majoring in engineering, I shifted to liberal arts and social sciences. I minored in mathematics, philosophy, and education at the undergraduate level and physiology at the graduate level, ultimately obtaining a PhD in personality psychology. My interests were primarily academic, but I did not neglect the emerging field of clinical psychology. After working in hospitals for 9 years, I joined the faculty of Michigan State University where I established the psychological clinic and served as its director for 13 years. Subsequently, during 2 sabbaticals in Israel, I researched personality development in unconventional family settings (the kibbutz). I also studied such diverse issues as motivation for parenthood, time perception and time perspective, and cognition in psychopathology. After editing several textbooks on assessment techniques, I initiated the series of triennial Murray lectures that highlighted the dynamic approach to the study of personality.     

1966 and All That: James Gibson and Bottom-Down Theory

ABSTRACT

The “later” James Gibson is widely misrepresented as an extreme stimulus–response theorist. In fact, Gibson's 1966 book presents a radical alternative to stimulus–response theory. “Perceptual systems” are not passive and receptive but “organs of active attention” (1966/1968, p. 58). Perceivers “reach out” into the world. This commentary examines some of the implications of Gibson's systems-cum-functionalist-cum-ecological approach, including the relations between the senses; the concept of “sensationless” perception; and most fundamentally, the nature of perceptual systems as extending beyond the body. I conclude that an adequate understanding of perception cannot be limited to the already severely limited domain of psychology. If Gibson is right, “ecological psychology” is a contradiction in terms.     

The Shifting Border Between Perception and Cognition

The distinction between perception and cognition has always had a firm footing in both cognitive science and folk psychology. However, there is little agreement as to how the distinction should be drawn. In fact, a number of theorists have recently argued that, given the ubiquity of top‐down influences (at all levels of the processing hierarchy), we should jettison the distinction altogether. I reject this approach, and defend a pluralist account of the distinction. At the heart of my account is the claim that each legitimate way of marking a border between perception and cognition deploys a notion I call ‘stimulus‐control.’ Thus, rather than being a grab bag of unrelated kinds, the various categories of the perceptual are unified into a superordinate natural kind (mutatis mutandis for the complimentary categories of the cognitive).     

Person perception and scientific objectivity

The perception of other people is shown to require a different set of scientific assumptions than that used in traditional psychology. Mind-body dualism, subject-object dichotomy and traditional notions of scientific causality are shown to be inapplicable to the perception of people, except where people are being seen as objects. The ?predict and control' model of psychology, and the ?medical model' of psychiatry both involve the perception of people as objects. The ?participant observer' model is seen to be the optimal one for the study of human beings.     

On the Utility of Virtuality for Relating Abilities and Affordances

This article introduces the concept of virtuality into the question of the ontological status of ability-affordance relations in ecological psychology. By differentiating concrete affordances and animal activities from the somatic-environmental networks they actualize, I argue that ecological-psychological thought is brought into a better position from which to think the ability-affordance relation as a ground for the developmental entanglements of organisms and their subjective environments (i.e., the affordances that constitute their niches). I begin by sketching the aporia to be filled in ecological psychology by an introduction of the virtual. Then, I turn toward a brief elucidation of the concept of virtuality. In the terms developed here, abilities and affordances together comprise a virtual meshwork or field of dynamically linked rates of change, capacities, and tendencies that are actualized or instantiated in terms of individual instances of organismic behavior, environmental configuration, and coevolution. Armed with these conceptual tools, I endeavor, in the article's final section, to provide in terms of virtuality a properly genetic analysis of the dynamic reciprocity between organismic abilities and the recursive configuration of their subjective worlds (or fields of affordances) without recourse to teleological functions, hylomorphic animal perception, or unknowable environments.     

The composite face illusion: A whole window into our understanding of holistic face perception

Two identical top halves of a face are perceived as being different when their bottom halves belong to different faces, showing that the parts of a face cannot be perceived independently from the whole face. When this visual illusion is inserted in a matching task, observers make more mistakes and/or are slower at matching identical top face halves aligned with different bottom halves than when the bottom halves are spatially offset: The composite face effect. This composite face paradigm has been used in more than 60 studies that have provided information about the specificity and nature of perceptual integration between facial parts (“holistic face perception”), the impairment of this process in acquired prosopagnosia, its developmental course, temporal dynamics, and neural basis. Following a review of the main contributions made with the paradigm, I explain its rationale and strengths, and discuss its methodological parameters, making a number of proposals for its optimal use and refinement in order to improve our understanding of holistic face perception. Finally, I explain how this standard composite face paradigm is fundamentally different than the application to facial parts of a congruency/interference paradigm that has a long tradition in experimental psychology since Stroop (1935), and which was originally developed to measure attentional and response interference between different representations rather than perceptual integration. Moreover, a version of this congruency/interference paradigm used extensively over the past years with composite faces lacks a baseline measure and has decisional, attentional, and stimulus confounds, making the findings of these studies impossible to interpret in terms of holistic perception. I conclude by encouraging researchers in this field to concentrate fully on the standard composite face paradigm, gaze contingency, and other behavioural measures that can help us take one of the most important challenges of visual perception research: Understanding the neural mechanisms of holistic face perception.     

Seeing what is not seen

This paper connects ideas from twentieth century Gestalt psychology, experiments in vision science, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. I propose that when we engage in simple sensorimotor tasks whose successful completion is open, our behavior may be motivated by practical perceptual awareness alone, responding to invariant features of the perceptual field that are invisible to other forms of perceptual awareness. On this view, we see more than we think we see, as evidenced by our skillful bodily behavior.     

Evolutionary internalized regularities

Roger Shepard's proposals and supporting experiments concerning evolutionary internalized regularities have been very influential in the study of vision and in other areas of psychology and cognitive science. This paper examines issues concerning the need, nature, explanatory role, and justification for postulating such internalized constraints. In particular, I seek further clarification from Shepard on how best to understand his claim that principles of kinematic geometry underlie phenomena of motion perception. My primary focus is on the ecological validity of Shepard's kinematic constraint in the context of ordinary motion perception. First, I explore the analogy Shepard draws between internalized circadian rhythms and the supposed internalization of kinematic geometry. Next, questions are raised about how to interpret and justify applying results from his own and others' experimental studies of apparent motion to more everyday cases of motion perception in richer environments. Finally, some difficulties with Shepard's account of the evolutionary development of his kinematic constraint are considered.     

The twelfth Bartlett memorial lecture: The role of single neurons in the psychology of perception

I feel deeply honoured by your invitation to give the Bartlett lecture, and am especially glad to do so in Holland, the home of so many distinguished psychologists of sensation and perception. And there is a third reason why it has given me much pleasure, for Sir Frederick Bartlett was one of those who had an important influence on the direction of my career some 40 years ago. I had to decide whether to spend my last year at Cambridge reading psychology or physiology, so I attended a short course of introductory lectures he gave in July. About half a dozen of us sat on upright wooden chairs circled around him as he sat in an armchair, smiling benignly. The first thing he did was to tell us to close our notebooks, for he was not going to say anything that would help us to pass any exams. And I believe the very last words of his last lecture were, “So you see it is all very difficult”. I was very glad he said that, for I had in fact found it all very heavy going: my brain seemed always to be lost in clouds of uncertainty when “remembering”, “thinking”, or “perceiving” were mentioned, because there was no conceptual framework for these processes except the words themselves and others spun around them. What I was looking for were the definable quantities of physics, chemistry and even physiology, these I could handle conceptually in their geometric and functional interactions, whereas I always find a purely verbal argument about abstractions difficult to follow and impossible to believe. So this lack of any nonverbal conceptual framework was very painful.

There was one phrase I think I recall him using that particularly aroused my interest-“the effort after meaning”; intuitively this seemed to be very important, but however much effort I made the meaning never quite emerged. I had almost decided that my mistrust of words made me unsuited to a career in psychology, but all the same I put my problem about “physiology or psychology” directly to Bartlett. After finding out that I was mainly interested in problems of sensation and perception, he said he thought that E. D. Adrian's research over the last 20 years had made more difference to that subject than any results obtained from within psychology itself.     

Analytical psychology and its relation to psychoanalysis. A personal view

Jungian analysis is a process based on analytical psychology; it shows local variations giving emphasis to different aspects of Jung's work within the various societies which make up the IAAP. I describe the orientation of the Society of Analytical Psychology (SAP). I have emphasized the different origins of psychoanalysis and analytical psychology and described how, because we encounter the same clinical phenomena, our differences centre on technique and interpretation in the context of our theoretical differences (see Astor 1998, p. 697 & 2001). In the main the link to psychoanalysis has come from the connection forged by Fordham, who recognized that Jung and Klein shared a similar perception of the significance of unconscious phantasy. For Klein unconscious phantasy was the primary unconscious content, and this is different, as Spillius has recently pointed out, from Freud for whom, 'the prime mover, so to speak, is the unconscious wish.     

Cognition as the Cooperative Appropriation of Affordances

Michaels (2000) expressed concerns about the implications of the notion of 2 visual systems (Milner &; Goodale, 1995) for ecological psychology. This leads her to suggest a decoupling of perception and action, by which action is separate from perception. It is suggested that although Michaels noted, on the one hand, that Milner and Goodale's approach to perception is a constructivist one, she mistakenly adopts their view that separates vision for perception from vision for action. An alternative position is presented, based on a recent article (Norman, in press), in which the parallels between the 2 visual systems, dorsal and ventral, and the 2 theoretical approaches, ecological and constructivist, are elucidated. According to this dual-process approach to perception, both systems are perceptual systems. The ecological-dorsal system is the system that picks up information about the ambient environment allowing the organism to negotiate it. It is suggested that this type of perception always processes the relevant information for action and that there is no need to sever the perception-action coupling. Ecological psychology and the 2 visual systems are quite compatible, and there is no need for concern.     

The Embodied Subjective Perspective

Perspective is a distinctive feature of external perception. There is a question of how to account for perceptual constancy in spite of changing perspectives. Alva Noe proposes the notion of ＂perspectival property＂ [P-property] and appeals to the perspectival aspect of perceptual content. His proposal conflicts with perceptual experiences and hence incurs many criticisms. Drawing on Husserl＇s phenomenology and Gibsonian psychology, I propose the notion of ＂perspectival awareness＂ [P-awareness]. I will argue that P-awareness is embodied pre-thematic self-awareness instead of the experience of a special kind of objective property. With the notion of P-awareness in mind, I then elaborate on the embodied subjective feature of perspective.     

Spreadsheet modeling for research and teaching: Programming without programming

Spreadsheets can be used to focus academic research and teaching on theoretical models. Examples of models from learning, social psychology, and perception are presented to illustrate how spreadsheet techniques work. Two strengths of this approach are emphasized: (1) Spreadsheets provide a relatively user-friendly alternative to some kinds of instructional and research programming; and (2) the linked tables and graphs of modern spreadsheets provide a powerful display medium and a fast way to examine the behavior of models as parameters change. I suggest some models for which spreadsheets may be appropriate.