Socialization and adolescent reckless behavior: A reply to Jessor

A developmental theory of reckless behavior among adolescents is presented, in which sensation seeking and adolescent egocentrism are especially prominent factors. Findings from studies of automobile driving, sex without contraception, illegal drug use, and minor criminal activity are presented in evidence of this. The influence of peers is then discussed and reinterpreted in the light of sensation seeking and adolescent egocentrism. Socialization influences are considered in interaction with sensation seeking and adolescent egocentrism, and the terms narrow and broad socialization are introduced. Factors that may be responsible for the decline of reckless behavior with age are discussed.     

Plasma corticosterone and immune reactivity in restrained female C3H mice

Psychological stressors are known to stimulate the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis and the sympathetic nervous system resulting in the release of corticosterone and catecholamines respectively. They have also been reported to induce cytokine production. All these molecules affect various immune parameters and can alter overall immune competence of the individual. The purpose of this investigation was to study the regulation of the production of corticosterone during stress and its possible effects on immune reactivity. In a first series of experiments, the possible regulation of corticosterone production by interleukin (IL)-1beta and peripheral catecholamines during restraint was assessed using a pharmacological approach in mice. Plasma IL-1beta concentrations remained at basal after 1-h restraint and the stress-induced increase of plasma corticosterone was not modified by a peripheral injection of an IL-1 receptor antagonist (IL-1ra). By contrast, chemical sympathectomy potentiated the restraint-induced increase in plasma corticosterone concentration, this potentiation being reversed by IL-1ra. In a second series of experiments, the role of corticosterone in stress-immune relationships was studied in adrenalectomized mice subjected to restraint and immunized with sheep erythrocytes. Non-specific immunity, i.e. proliferation of splenocytes and thymocytes and plasma levels of IL-1beta, as well as specific immunity, i.e. antibody production and delayed hypersensitivity, were not altered after 2-h restraint. Adrenalectomy failed to induce immune effects in stressed animals, except that delayed hypersensitivity was stronger in adrenalectomized animals, revealing that the high levels of corticosterone produced during stress have an anti-inflammatory activity. The present data show that the stress-induced production of corticosterone was modulated by both peripheral catecholamines and IL-1beta. However, this production of corticosterone was unable to modulate immune reactivity except delayed hypersensitivity.     

A reply to Mr. Dowling

This paper examines the interpretation of Hobbes as a political formalist which is developed by F. S. McNeilly in The Anatomy of Leviathan. McNeilly argues that Hobbes's demonstration of the necessity of political society is independent of Hobbes's particular view of man as an egotist bent at all costs on his own preservation. The first part of the argument of the paper uses techniques of decision theory and game theory to show that this argument which McNeilly ascribes to Hobbes is not valid. However, the argument which Hobbes is traditionally supposed to put forward is shown to be valid. The second part of the paper examines McNeilly's interpretation of the text of Leviathan and shows that he has insufficient grounds for supposing that Hobbes attempted to construct a purely formal science of politics.     

A utilitarian reply to Dr. McCloskey

A theory of punishment should tell us not only when punishment is permissible but also when it is a duty. It is not clear whether McCloskey's retributivism is supposed to do this. His arguments against utilitarianism consist largely in examples of punishments unacceptable to the common moral consciousness but supposedly approved of by the consistent utilitarian. We remain unpersuaded to abandon our utilitarianism. The examples are often fanciful in character, a point which (pace McCloskey) does rob them of much of their force. If there was no tension between utilitarian precepts and those which come naturally to plain men, utilitarianism could have no claim to provide a critique of moralities. The utilitarian's attitude to such tensions is somewhat complicated, but what is certain is that there is more room in his system for the sentiments to which McCloskey appeals against him than McCloskey realizes. We agree with McCloskey, however, on the absurdity of substituting rule‐utilitarianism for act‐utilitarianism as an answer to his attacks. The distinction itself may represent a conceptual confusion. In our view, indeed, unmodified act‐utilitarianism provides the best moral basis for thought about punishment.     

On inconsistent entities. A reply to Colyvan

In a recent article M. Colyvan has argued that Quinean forms of scientific realism are faced with an unexpected upshot. Realism concerning a given class of entities, along with this route to realism, can be vindicated by running an indispensability argument to the effect that the entities postulated by our best scientific theories exist. Colyvan observes that among our best scientific theories some are inconsistent, and so concludes that, by resorting to the very same argument, we may incur a commitment to inconsistent entities. Colyvan’s argument could be interpreted, and in part is presented, as a reductio of Quinean scientific realism; yet, Colyvan in the end manifests some willingness to bite the bullet, and provides some reasons why we shouldn’t feel too uncomfortable with those entities. In this paper we wish to indicate a way out to the scientific realist, by arguing that no indispensability argument of the kind suggested by Colyvan is actually available. To begin with, in order to run such an indispensability argument we should be justified in believing that an inconsistent theory is true; yet, in so far as the logic we accept is a consistent one it is arguable that our epistemic predicament could not be possibly one in which we are justified in so believing. Moreover, also if our logic admitted true contradictions, as Dialetheism does, it is arguable that Colyvan’s indispensability argument could not rest on a true premise. As we will try to show, dialetheists do not admit true contradictions for cheap: they do so just as a way out of paradox, namely whenever we are second-level ignorant as to the metaphysical possibility of evidence breaking the parity among two or more inconsistent claims; Colyvan’s examples, however, are not of this nature. So, even under the generous assumption that Dialetheism is true, we will conclude that Colyvan’s argument doesn’t achieve its surprising conclusion.