Spinoza’s error: Memory for truth and falsity

Two theoretical frameworks have been proposed to account for the representation of truth and falsity in human memory: the Cartesian model and the Spinozan model. Both models presume that during information processing a mental representation of the information is stored along with a tag indicating its truth value. However, the two models disagree on the nature of these tags. According to the Cartesian model, true information receives a “true” tag and false information receives a “false” tag. In contrast, the Spinozan model claims that only false information receives a “false” tag, whereas untagged information is automatically accepted as true. To test the Cartesian and Spinozan models, we conducted two source memory experiments in which participants studied true and false trivia statements from three different sources differing in credibility (i.e., presenting 100% true, 50% true and 50% false, or 100% false statements). In Experiment 1, half of the participants were informed about the source credibility prior to the study phase. As compared to a control group, this precue group showed improved source memory for both true and false statements, but not for statements with an uncertain validity status. Moreover, memory did not differ for truth and falsity in the precue group. As Experiment 2 revealed, this finding is replicated even when using a 1-week rather than a 20-min retention interval between study and test phases. The results of both experiments clearly contradict the Spinozan model but can be explained in terms of the Cartesian model.     

Learning,awareness, and instruction: Subjective contingency awareness does matter in the colour-word contingency learning paradigm

In three experiments, each of a set colour-unrelated distracting words was presented most often in a particular target print colour (e.g., “month” most often in red). In Experiment 1, half of the participants were told the word-colour contingencies in advance (instructed) and half were not (control). The instructed group showed a larger learning effect. This instruction effect was fully explained by increases in subjective awareness with instruction. In Experiment 2, contingency instructions were again given, but no contingencies were actually present. Although many participants claimed to be aware of these (non-existent) contingencies, they did not produce an instructed contingency effect. In Experiment 3, half of the participants were given contingency instructions that did not correspond to the correct contingencies. Participants with these false instructions learned the actual contingencies worse than controls. Collectively, our results suggest that conscious contingency knowledge might play a moderating role in the strength of implicit learning.     

Directed forgetting of a single item

In two experiments, we investigated directed forgetting of a single item. We presented participants with two phone numbers to remember and instructed half of the participants to forget the first phone number. The first number was either learned on a single trial (Experiment 1) or on three trials (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, there was evidence of directed forgetting as a result of differential encoding; the forget instruction affected recall and recognition for both phone numbers. In Experiment 2, the evidence favored differential rehearsal because the forget instruction affected recall but not recognition. These results indicate that instructions to forget can affect memory of single items.     

Effects of auditory feedback on gait behavior,gaze patterns and outcome performance in long jumping

In the current study, we conducted two experiments to investigate the impact of concurrent, action-induced auditory feedback on gait patterns, gaze behavior and outcome performance in long jumping. In Experiment 1, we examined the effects of present vs. absent auditory feedback on gait, gaze and performance outcome measures. Results revealed a significant interaction effect between condition (present vs. absent auditory feedback) and phase (acceleration vs. zeroing-in phase) on participants' step lengths indicating that the absence (rather than the presence) of auditory feedback led to facilitatory effects in terms of a more prototypical gait pattern (i.e., shorter steps in the acceleration phase and longer steps in the zeroing-in phase). Similarly, the absent auditory feedback led to a higher gaze stability in terms of less switches between areas of interest (AOIs). However, there was no effect on jumped distance. In Experiment 2, we scrutinized the influence of concurrent vs. delayed auditory feedback on all three performance parameters. In contrast to concurrent feedback, delayed auditory feedback negatively affected all three measures: participants showed (i) dysfunctional deviations from their prototypical gait pattern (i.e., shorter steps across both phases of the run-up), (ii) less stable, maladaptive gaze patterns (i.e., more switches between AOIs) and (iii) poorer jumping performance (i.e., shorter jumped distances). Together, the two experiments provide clear evidence for the impact of concurrent, action-induced auditory feedback on the coordination of complex, rhythmical motor tasks such as the long jump.     

‘Good,you identified the suspect…but please ignore this feedback’: can warnings eliminate the effects of post‐identification feedback?

The present experiments focus on whether the post‐identification feedback effect can be reduced by providing participants with warnings. Participants viewed a crime on video and identified a suspect from a target‐absent lineup (Experiment 1) or target‐present lineup (Experiment 2). Participants then received positive feedback, negative feedback or no feedback. Half of the participants received a warning saying their feedback was randomly generated by the computer, and the other half received no warning. Robust post‐identification feedback effects were observed in both experiments in the no warning condition. These effects were largely eliminated when participants received a warning. In Experiments 3 and 4, we failed to find an ameliorative effect of a forensically realistic warning. These results indicate that warnings can reduce the effect of post‐identification feedback in principle, but the application of warnings in practice may be more difficult. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Assessing the effectiveness of warnings and the phenomenological characteristics of false memories

The phenomenology of false memories was investigated in three experiments in which participants heard two experimenters read lists of items that were related to critical nonpresented items. In Experiments 1, following a recognition memory test, participants rated the phenomenological characteristics of their memories immediately and after a 48-hour delay. False recognition was prevalent and on several dimensions participants rated their true memories as more vivid than their false memories. In Experiments 2 and 3, following the study phase, participants were warned about the phenomenological differences between true and false memories and were instructed to use this information to avoid reporting nonpresented items. This type of warning was ineffective at reducing false recall (Experiment 2) and false recognition (Experiment 3) relative to unwarned participants. Importantly, the inability of explicit warnings to impact illusory recollections demonstrates that the false memories cannot be attributed simply to a criterion shift.     

Assessing the effectiveness of warnings and the phenomenological characteristics of false memories

The phenomenology of false memories was investigated in three experiments in which participants heard two experimenters read lists of items that were related to critical nonpresented items. In Experiments 1, following a recognition memory test, participants rated the phenomenological characteristics of their memories immediately and after a 48-hour delay. False recognition was prevalent and on several dimensions participants rated their true memories as more vivid than their false memories. In Experiments 2 and 3, following the study phase, participants were warned about the phenomenological differences between true and false memories and were instructed to use this information to avoid reporting nonpresented items. This type of warning was ineffective at reducing false recall (Experiment 2) and false recognition (Experiment 3) relative to unwarned participants. Importantly, the inability of explicit warnings to impact illusory recollections demonstrates that the false memories cannot be attributed simply to a criterion shift.     

Correlation between self-reported rigidity and rule-governed insensitivity to operant contingencies

Adults were selected on the basis of their scores on the Scale for Personality Rigidity (Rehfisch, 1958a). Their scores served as a measure of hypothesized rule governance in the natural environment. Experiment 1 studied the effects of accurate versus minimal instructions and high versus low rigidity on performance on a multiple differential-reinforcement-of-low-rate (DRL) 4-s fixed-ratio (FR) 18 schedule. When the schedule was switched to extinction, accurate instructions and high rigidity were associated with greater perseveration in the response pattern subjects developed during the reinforcement phase. In Experiment 2, the effects of rigidity and of accurate versus inaccurate instructions were studied. Initially, all subjects received accurate instructions about an FR schedule. The schedule was then switched to DRL, but only half of the subjects received instructions about the DRL contingency, and the other half received FR instructions as before. Accurate instructions minimized individual differences because both high and low scorers on the rigidity scale earned points in DRL. However, when inaccurate instructions were provided, all high-rigidity subjects followed them although they did not earn points on the schedule, whereas most low-rigidity subjects abandoned them and responded appropriately to DRL. The experiments demonstrate a correlation between performances observed in the human operant laboratory and a paper-and-pencil test of rigidity that purportedly reflects important response styles that differentiate individuals in the natural environment. Implications for applied research and intervention are discussed.     

The influence of extinction and counterconditioning instructions on evaluative conditioning effects

In three experiments, we tested the influence of instructions about an allegedly upcoming extinction or counterconditioning phase on evaluative conditioning (EC) effects. After an acquisition phase in which neutral stimuli were related to positive or negative stimuli via instructions (Experiments 1 and 2a) or actual pairings (Experiment 2b), three different groups of participants were either informed that in the next phase the neutral stimuli would be presented without positive or negative stimuli (extinction instruction), that the neutral stimuli in the next phase would be paired with stimuli of the opposite valence than before (counterconditioning instruction), or received no further instructions. Afterwards, liking of the originally neutral stimuli was measured either with an evaluative rating (Experiment 1) or with an Implicit Association Test (IAT; Experiments 2a and 2b). EC was reduced in the counterconditioning condition of Experiment 1 and in the joint analysis of Experiments 2a and 2b. The extinction instruction led to a reduction of EC only in Experiment 1. Finally, whether the acquisition phase consisted of instructions about CS–US pairings (Experiment 2a) or the actual experience of CS–US pairings (Experiment 2b) did not significantly impact the observed changes in liking. Overall, our results suggest that similar mechanisms might mediate instruction- and experienced-based EC. Our results are in line with propositional models of EC but can be explained also by association formation models and dual process models of EC, provided that certain auxiliary assumptions are made.     

警告对共同目击者讨论后产生的错误记忆的影响

采用误导信息干扰范式,研究了事件后正确诱导与事件后误导对共同目击者的记忆准确性的影响。实验1,要求被试接受事件后诱导信息后进行线索化自由回忆,结果发现,目击者对事件后正确诱导信息项目的记忆准确性显著提高;对事件后误导信息项目的记忆准确性显著下降,产生了共同目击者误导信息效应。实验2,研究了警告对目击者记忆准确性的影响。在回忆前警告被试共同目击者提供的事件后信息不完全正确,请按照自己的记忆来完成线索化自由回忆,讨论无警告组与讨论警告组比较发现,警告并没有改变事件后误导信息效应,也没有改变目击者对正确诱导项目     

Effects of delayed auditory feedback on timing of music performance

Three experiments examined effects of delayed auditory feedback (DAF) on music performance as a function of the temporal location of feedback onsets within produced inter-onset intervals (IOIs). In Experiment 1, pianists performed isochronous melodies at two production rates with different amounts of DAF. Timing variability decreased for DAF amounts that caused feedback onsets to occur halfway through IOIs (binary subdivisions) in a 500-ms, but not 600-ms, IOI rate condition. In Experiment 2, pianists performed melodies with DAF delays and chose a preferred rate. Performers chose slower rates for larger delays; preferred rates approximated twice the amount of DAF. Experiment 3 tested the possibility that subjects deliberately conceptualized subdivisions in Experiments 1 and 2. Performers were given (1) no instructions, (2) instructions to mentally subdivide produced events in two, or (3) instructions to mentally subdivide produced events in three, in different blocks. Instructions to subdivide reduced timing variability for larger feedback delays. These experiments indicate that DAF disruption is reduced by subdividing instructions and sometimes by coincidences of feedback onsets with subdivisions of produced intervals. Such facilitation may reflect the use of hierarchical cognitive plans in production.     

False physiological feedback and persuasion: Effect of fear arousal vs. fear reduction on attitude change

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that increases in false physiological feedback of fear arousal will enhance persuasion and that reduction in the arousal feedback is unnecessary for increased persuasion to occur. Prior research has usually found a positive relation between level of arousal and persuasion, but support for the drive reduction hypothesis is tenuous. However, Harris and Jellison (1971) claimed support for such a hypothesis. They manipulated subjects' fear arousal cognitively via false physiological feedback while the subjects listened to a persuasive communication. The present experiments used a similar procedure in an attempt to test an "arousal only" against an "arousal reduction" hypothesis. Subjects listened to a persuasive speech while receiving false feedback via a meter concerning their fear arousal. In Experiment I half of the subjects received high arousal and half received moderate arousal information. Within each of these conditions half of the subjects had their arousal reduced, and the other half did not. In Experiment II subjects received either low arousal, high arousal, or high then low arousal feedback while listening. The results of the two studies generally provided support for the "arousal only" hypothesis. An interpretation in terms of Bem's attribution theory was tentatively suggested.     

Instruction and load effects on high-skill and low-skill individuals: A study in the domain of mental arithmetic

What happens when people are asked to respond as quickly or as accurately as possible? This study tested the effects of speed/accuracy instructions and working-memory load on people's strategy efficiency and strategy selection. Adult participants solved simple addition problems (Experiment 1) and simple multiplication problems (Experiment 2) under load and no-load conditions and provided trial-by-trial strategy reports. High-skill participants were more efficient than low-skill participants, but the underlying causes of these skill-related effects differed across experiments. In the addition experiment, high-skill participants responded adaptively to the changing situations by changing their strategy choices, which resulted in smaller effects on their actual performance. Low-skill participants in contrast, did not change their strategy choices as adaptively, which resulted in less efficient performance—and especially so under load conditions. In the multiplication experiment, high-skill and low-skill participants differed in strategy efficiencies rather than in strategy choices. In the discussion, the results are further interpreted and future adaptations for the adaptive strategy choice model (ASCM; Siegler & Jenkins, 1989) are suggested.     

Evaluating information for truthfulness: The effects of logical subordination

Research has shown that many individuals do not routinely evaluate new information for consistency with respect to what they already know. One factor that may affect the likelihood of critical evaluation is whether or not the information is the central focus of the message. Two experiments tested this possibility by establishing differential emphasis of false information within complex sentences. Half of the target sentences contained a false fact in the main clause and half contained a false fact in the subordinate clause. In Experiment 1 subjects verified 64 sentences presented orally as either true or false. In Experiment 2 subjects read and evaluated 20 paragraphs for the presence of false information. As expected, subjects were less likely to report the false information when it was conveyed as logically subordinate rather than central. The results suggest one explanation for deficits in comprehension monitoring and have implications for understanding susceptibility to persuasive communications.     

真实记忆与虚假记忆中的生命性效应研究

本研究采用DRM范式,探讨了生命性对真实和虚假记忆的影响。实验1使用类别呈现词语强化类别加工,实验2伪随机呈现词语弱化类别加工并进行即时及延时探测。结果发现：（1）当强化类别加工时,生命性和类别对击中率有相类似的促进效应;（2）当弱化类别加工并进行即时探测时,生命性对击中率的促进作用最强;（3）类别效应促进真实记忆和虚假记忆,但生命性效应仅促进了真实记忆,而不影响虚假记忆的产生;（4）在即时与延时探测中均发现类别效应和生命性效应。本研究证明了：（1）生命性效应的作用机制不同于类别效应;（2）生命性效应对真实和虚假记忆的作用机制不同;（3）类别效应和生命性效应的存在时效长达24小时,但是生命性效应的衰退速度较快。     

Features and feedback: enhancing metamnemonic knowledge at retrieval reduces source-monitoring errors

Three experiments explored the issue of whether enhanced metamnemonic knowledge at retrieval can improve participants' ability to make difficult source discriminations in the context of the eyewitness suggestibility paradigm. The 1st experiment documented differences in phenomenal experience between veridical and false memories. Experiment 2 revealed that drawing participants' attention to these differences by pairing the ratings of the features with instructions about their utility was successful in reducing source misattributions of suggested items to the event. The results of Experiment 3 showed that participants can make online adjustments in the types of evidence used to make source judgments, as participants who received correct feedback during the training portion of the test reduced misattribution errors on the remainder of the test where feedback was not provided. Altogether, these studies suggest that people can discover and benefit from updated knowledge of the types of memorial evidence that discriminate between sources of information in memory.     

False physiological feedback and emotion: Experimenter demand and salience effects

Four experiments examined the hypothesis that the Valins (1966) false physiological feedback effect with attractiveness ratings of slides is due to experimenter demand. Experiments 1 and 2 showed significant feedback effects with 5-sec feedback periods, previously reported by Barefoot and Straub (1971) to be too brief a time to search the slides for a cause of the apparent physiological arousal. Experiments 3 and 4 had 17 variations of instructions (emotional, nonemotional), stimuli (slides of people, scenic tourist slides), and type of feedback information (heart rate, eyeblink, or none). The typical false feedback effect was found under many conditions that did not seem to meet the presumptive attributional requirements for the effect. In Experiment 4, only subjects who said they were supposed to rate feedback slides higher showed the effect, regardless of instructions, stimuli, or type of feedback. The overall results are interpreted in terms of experimenter demand and stimulus salience effects.     

A case study of three theories of learned helplessness: The role of test importance

The current study tests three alternative explanations (learned helplessness, cognitive interference, and egotism) for poor performance following unsolvable problems. In Experiment 1, subjects were exposed to no feedback or to failure in unsolvable problems and were further divided according to the importance of a test task (unstipulated, low, and high importance). In Experiment 2, during the training phase subjects were exposed to either no feedback, failure, or failure plus explicit hypothesis instructions. Then, subjects in each group received either low or high test-importance instructions. Results bring support to the cognitive interference explanation of performance deficits. Exposure to unsolvable problems was found to impair performance in a high importance task, but not in a low importance task. Such a deleterious effect of prior failure and high importance instructions was reversed by discouraging people from engaging in state-oriented actions. The theoretical implications of the findings were discussed.     

The effects of social pressure on false memories

The present experiments were designed to examine the effects of social pressure on false memories. Participants studied lists created to elicit false memories and then worked in conjunction with virtual confederates on a recognition memory task. In Experiment 1, participants worked with one or two confederates to complete multiple study-test trials. On the group tests, participants were implicitly pressured to recognize words that did not appear on the studied lists. Experiment 2 was implemented similarly, but utilized a presumably more difficult recognition test involving one long study phase followed by one long test phase. After the purported group tests in both experiments, participants completed surprise individual recognition tests. In both experiments, social pressure influenced participants' responses on group recognition tests and subsequent individual recognition tests. Furthermore, the results indicated that social pressure affected both veridical memories and false memories.     

Intentional control and implicit sequence learning

Sequence knowledge acquired by repeated exposure to targets in a speeded localization task was studied in 3 experiments that sought to test A. Destrebecqz and A. Cleeremans's (2001, 2003) claim that, under certain circumstances, the expression of such sequence knowledge cannot be brought under intentional control. In Experiment 1 participants were trained on either a deterministic or a probabilistic sequence and then performed a free-generation test under either inclusion or exclusion instructions. Participants were found to be capable of both expressing (inclusion) and avoiding expressing (exclusion) sequence knowledge. These results were confirmed in Experiment 2 with a more exact replication of Destrebecqz and Cleeremans's methodology. In Experiment 3 participants performed a trial-by-trial generation test under both inclusion and exclusion conditions after a much longer period of training. All the findings are consistent with the proposal that information acquired during sequence learning is explicit in nature.