Whiteness Uncovered: Commentary on Papers by Melanie Suchet and Gillian Straker

In this discussion of papers by Gillian Straker and Melanie Suchet, the author draws some links between the two papers in the interest of expanding analysts' understanding of the nature of whiteness as part of a racist discourse.     

Engaging with the Hatred of the Other: Personal Reflections Discussion of “States of Exile and Marginalization”

Drawing upon experiences associated with racialized tensions and interactions related to living in neocolonial, post-apartheid South Africa, I engage with Gillian Straker’s complex paper on “States of Exile and Marginalization” (this issue) as elaborated in response to Moffatt’s film Night Cries. In particular, I question what it means to receive the hatred of the other in contexts in which previous relations of power become challenged and inverted and grapple with how it may be possible to sustain a relational ethics in such instances. Straker’s reading of the tension between the real and the symbolic in Night Cries and what this signals for modes of expression, multiplicity of meaning, and potentialities in relating is also highlighted.     

To See or Not to See: Blinded by Guilt: Reply to Commentary

In response to Annabella Bushra's discussion and her focus on what is missing in the clinical material, the author speculates about the repetition of the historical trauma of purifying mixed race in the face of its complexity—trying to neatly package race despite it not so neatly fitting into any one category—and losing the individual by overly focusing on skin color. The author considers the silence, secrecy, and transgression in the treatment and, in this context, a few of Bushra's key points are addressed—sorting out the nature of hate in relation to Susan, passing as transgression, and White guilt. A distinction is made between a malevolent, destructive hate and a loving hate, and White guilt is considered as a defense against recognition of the other.     

Whiteness Revisited: Reply to Commentary

In reply to Altman's discussion, the author explores in more depth the topic of whiteness, both her South African and American whiteness. She situates American whiteness in the history of slavery, Jim Crow, and the ongoing racial discrimination of the present. When Altman points to the author's unconscious submission to the regulatory power of the larger society, she postulates that her submission is to American whiteness. She notes that, in finding a new home, that which she wished to discard—a white racist identity synonymous with the oppressor—has reappeared, to be confronted once again.     

Transforming despair to hope in the treatment of extreme trauma: a view from the supervisor’s chair

The author considers how, when working with severely traumatised patients, times of despair can be transformed into moments of hope within the therapeutic process. She considers these moments from the perspective of ‘the supervisor’s chair’ and what emerges within the supervisory relationship when difficult and distressing sessions are openly and honestly bought to supervision. Drawing on Thomas Ogden’s ideas about ‘dreaming up the patient’ in supervision, and Michael Parsons’ thoughts about the supervisory relationship, she gives two examples of this process in action, the first about the transformation of despair to hope in the consulting room, and the second about the transformation of despair to hope in the professional network. She argues that these transformational moments of hope correspond to what Daniel Stern and his colleagues have described as ‘moments-of-meeting’ and are indicative of a potential turning point in the therapy. These fleeting moments need to be attended to and nurtured so that their potential for change and emotional growth and recovery can be harnessed.     

White Habits,Anti-Racism,and Philosophy as a Way of Life

This paper examines Pierre Hadot’s philosophy as a way of life in the context of race. I argue that a “way of life” approach to philosophy renders intelligible how antiracist confrontation of racist ideas and institutionalized white complicity is a properly philosophical way of life requiring regulated reflection on habits—particularly, habits of whiteness. I first rehearse some of Hadot’s analysis of the “way of life” orientation in philosophy, in which philosophical wisdom is understood as cultivated by actions which result in the creation of wise habits. I analyze a phenomenological claim about the nature of habit implied by the “way of life” approach, namely, that habits can be both the cause and the effect of action. This point is central to the “way of life” philosophy, I claim, in that it makes possible the intelligent redirection of habits, in which wise habits are more the effect than simply the cause of action. Lastly, I illustrate the “way of life” approach in the context of anti-racism by turning to Linda Martín Alcoff's whiteness antieliminativism, which outlines a morally defensible transformation of the habits of whiteness. I argue that anti-racism provides an intelligible context for modern day forms of what Hadot calls “spiritual exercises” insofar as the “way of life” philosophy is embodied in the practice of whites seeing themselves seeing as white and seeing themselves being seen as white.     

The Potential of Paradox in States of Exile: Discussion of “States of Exile and Marginalization”

This commentary paper engages with Gillian Straker’s “States of Exile and Marginalization,” (this issue) in which she analyzes Tracey Moffatt’s film Night Cries through a Lacanian register. In addition, it surfaces certain aspects of Moffatt’s interpretation of her social world through the representational medium of her film. Tracing Straker’s themes of marginality and continued trauma as exilic consequences of colonization and coloniality, it also suggests that there are generative possibilities in the multiple states of exile that occur under such conditions, where the unknowability and irresolvability of trauma and its many associated states of exile are precisely what paradoxically allow for the emergence of productive alternatives to trauma repetition.     

Wishing to Be White: Begging to Be Black

With race in mind, in this response the author draws on her own experiences of exilic consciousness, racial melancholia, whiteness, dissociation, and self-censorship to dialogue with Yvette Esprey. The author explores the issue of voice and how this is affected by context. The notions of the normative unconscious, K (nots), and the anti-analytic third are differentiated from one another. The relative weight given in the literature to unconscious processes such dissociation as opposed to more conscious self-censorship is explored in theory and with reference to Esprey’s case studies.     

Teaching critical psychology of ‘race’ issues: problems in promoting anti‐racist practice

The aim of this paper is to illustrate the difficulties faced by teachers of issues related to ‘race’ and racism in psychology when trying to develop anti‐racist practice in their teaching. I argue that the promotion of anti‐racist practice can be impeded by the institutionalised cultures of some psychology departments and that such cultures have developed out of an over‐reliance on positivist ideas. Positivism obscures the fact that knowledge is constructed from positions of power and privilege, which in turn obscures the social and ideological construction of ‘race’. This is clearly a problem when trying to develop anti‐racist practice in teaching. It also leads to fixed ideas about what should be included in teaching content and what can be considered as good pedagogical practice, where notions of ‘balance’ and ‘neutrality’ are advocated, effectively overriding arguments for understanding the dynamics of knowledge production. It also obscures the power and privilege associated with workings of ‘whiteness’. I illustrate this by presenting examples from my own experiences of teaching ‘race’ issues on undergraduate degree courses. I conclude with suggestions for developing anti‐racist teaching by proposing a collective reflexive approach to changing institutional cultures that are currently at odds with anti‐racist practice. I also invite further discussion and suggestions on how best to achieve such collective conscientisation. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Joseph Margolis on Pragmatism

This paper begins with a memoir of the author’s interactions with Joseph Margolis that delineates both Margolis’s importance as a teacher and their disagreements on aspects of American philosophy. It then turns to Margolis’s discussions of pragmatism as a philosophical movement, with an emphasis on his understanding of John Dewey. The paper considers, third, Margolis’s account of the decline and rebirth of pragmatism, the latter process attributed largely to the work of Richard Rorty. The paper concludes with an examination of what it sees as Margolis’s most valuable work: his explorations of the nature of the self and of human society.     

Hybrid Identifications,Mixed Feelings: Reply to Commentaries

In responding to the insightful papers of Suchet and White I explore further my own hybrid identifications in regard to the socially constructed category of race. The paper explores the dangers of both idealization and denigration of otherness. It shows how a traumatic confrontation with otherness may destabilize later identifications in favor of earlier more archaic ones. Melanie Suchet, in her very gracious response to my paper, comments that I refuse to “reside in the comfortable.” However, any wish I may have had to reside in the comfortable was derailed by the thought-provoking comments of both Melanie Suchet and Cleonie White. Both authors prompted me to confront myself and to examine a number of painful issues. These included not only a resistance to owning my own vicarious traumatization but the fact that I was subject to the return of the repressed as the personal meanings of the signifier black shifted and changed in the course of my paper. But most significantly, both authors confronted me with the challenge of Otherness.     

(White) Voices: Discussion of Articles by Gillian Straker and Tessa Philips

In this discussion, I consider two substantially different articles about growing up in South Africa and the authors’ reflections on how this has influenced them. I focus on two issues raised by both Straker and Philips: that of becoming conscious of what Straker, drawing on the work of Ngai (2003), describes as ugly emotions, and the issue of voice—who can speak, who cannot, and some of the complexities that surround this issue. I refer to the problematic fact that the three voices heard in this section on South Africa are White and that each one of us has benefitted markedly from apartheid. I make reference to the power of knowledge and the potentially transformative nature of the voices that speak it as is evidenced in both articles. However, I draw attention to the fact that the knowledge and the voices that speak it have not actually done much to change the status quo in current day South Africa—inequality, poverty, marginalization, and oppression continue to be reproduced and maintained. Referring to the emotional struggles that come with this consciousness on a daily basis, I conclude with a hope, nevertheless, that a tiny bit of growth and transformation might usefully come from what each of us has attempted to say in these articles.     

The invisibility of richness: A critique of Vice’s ‘strange place’

Abstract

This article builds on Samantha Vice’s argument on the problem of whiteness in contemporary South Africa. I will explore the thesis of invisibility regarding whiteness and argue for its relevance to the rich per se. This thesis demonstrates how white privilege and affluence, despite being glaringly visible in a concrete sense, is rendered invisible together with the mostly black poverty by which it is contrasted. The invisibility of whiteness translates and flows into the so-called ‘invisibility of richness’, which involves anyone who is economically affluent in this country and has the same effect of rendering poverty invisible. The massive and ever-growing divide between rich and poor means that both have fundamentally incommensurate experiences of life in this country, which is why post-apartheid South Africa is such a strange place to live in for all of its inhabitants. In the latter part of the article, a suggestion will be made about what the appropriate response to the injustices of this strange place might look like for whites.     

The Ubiquity of Self-Deception

My paper is a discussion of Bas van Fraassen’s important, but neglected, paper on self-deception, “The Peculiar Effects of Love and Desire.” Paradoxes of self-deception are widely thought to follow from the ease with which we know ourselves. For example, if self-deception were intentional, how could we fail to know as target of our own deception just those things necessary to undermine the deception? Van Fraassen stands that reasoning on its head, arguing that is the ease with which we accuse ourselves of self-deception that undermines our confidence in our claims to know ourselves. I unpack and modify his argument, attempting to show that it makes a powerful case for scepticism about self-knowledge. I argue, contra van Fraassen, that local scepticism about self-knowledge threatens our claims to know ourselves in a way that global scepticism does not threaten our claims about the external world. I support this claim by showing that the Wittgensteinian response to the sceptic in On Certainty—that we don’t know what to do with the sceptic’s doubts, that we don’t know how to incorporate those doubts into our practices—does not succeed in deflecting scepticism about self-knowledge because the local sceptic’s doubts—about whether we can distinguish genuine claims to know ourselves from self-deceived claims—are integral to language game of self-knowledge. The local sceptic’s doubts are our doubts because it is natural to ask whether we are deceiving ourselves when we claim to know ourselves. However, because, we have no way of distinguishing genuine claims to know ourselves from self-deceived claims, our claims to self-knowledge are systematically undermined.     

Socio-cognitive,expertise-based and appearance-based accounts of the other-‘race’ effect in face perception: A label-based systematic review of neuroimaging results

Two competing theories explain the other-‘race’ effect (ORE) either by greater perceptual expertise to same-‘race’ (SR) faces or by social categorization of other-‘race’ (OR) faces at the expense of individuation. To assess expertise and categorization contributions to the ORE, a promising—yet overlooked—approach is comparing activations for different other-‘races’. We present a label-based systematic review of neuroimaging studies reporting increased activity in response to OR faces (African, Caucasian, or Asian) when compared with the SR of participants. Hypothetically, while common activations would reflect general aspects of OR perception, ‘race’-preferential ones would represent effects of ‘race’-specific visual appearance. We find that several studies report activation of occipito-temporal and midcingulate areas in response to faces across different other-‘races’, presumably due to high demand on the visual system and category processing. Another area reported in response to all OR faces, the caudate nucleus, suggests the involvement of socio-affective processes and behavioural regulation. Overall, our results support hybrid models—both expertise and social categorization contribute to the ORE, but they provide little evidence for reduced motivation to process OR faces. Additionally, we identify areas preferentially responding to specific OR faces, reflecting effects of visual appearance.     

Better Identity Politics

Suchet's paper is an inspiring demonstration of the power of openness and vulnerability. It offers a clinically daring and theoretically far-reaching account of the transformation that can sometimes occur in the psychoanalytic relationship. My commentary focuses on two of the paper's major threads: the interplay of subjective experience, intersubjective space, and collective forces, and the ethical dimension of the psychoanalytic project. From the outset, the meeting between Ara and Suchet is not only a meeting of bodies and minds, but also a meeting of collective histories and politics. Suchet finds, and in her account powerfully demonstrates, that addressing her patient's trouble requires an exploration of how collective traumas and political narratives infuse the possibilities of intersubjective exchange and subjective meaning. In my commentary I trace and elaborate on the trajectory of this analytic process, contemplating the ways in which identities and identifications involve both familial and social attachments. I attempt to highlight Suchet's contribution to our understanding of how what happens, and is made meaningful, in the register of collective identification and experience, forms the very substance of subjective and intersubjective life, and should be therefore formulated as an intrinsic aspect of the analytic endeavour. Turning to Suchet's engagement with the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, I consider her drive to reach beyond the traditional boundaries of psychoanalytic discourse. Following the same drive, I add some ideas developed by Theodor Adorno, as means of illustrating the trouble and the potential for reconciliation inherent in the experience and politics of identity.     

Gillian Straker on Tracey Moffatt’s Night Cries

Gillian Straker’s perceptive comments on Tracey Moffatt’s film Night Cries bring us into the heart of the intersubjective vulnerability of every clinical situation. Straker shows us how the film’s imagery expresses and strains the ethical, in the context of historical crimes written in ongoing suffering and fury but also grace.     

Was Merleau-Ponty a ‘transcendental’ phenomenologist?

Whether or not Merleau-Ponty’s version of phenomenology should be considered a form of ‘transcendental’ philosophy is open to debate. Although the Phenomenology of Perception presents his position as a transcendental one, many of its features—such as its exploitation of empirical science—might lead to doubt that it can be. This paper considers whether Merleau-Ponty meets what I call the ‘transcendentalist challenge’ of defining and grounding claims of a distinctive transcendental kind. It begins by highlighting three features—the absolute ego, the pure phenomenal field, and the reduction—that Husserl had used to justify claims of a specifically transcendental kind within a phenomenological framework. It then examines how Merleau-Ponty modifies each of these features to focus on the lived body and a factically conditioned phenomenal field, while remaining ambivalent about the reduction. Finally, it assesses whether Merleau-Ponty’s modified position can still legitimately be considered transcendental. I argue that—despite his own rhetoric—this modified position shapes the modality of Merleau-Ponty’s claims in such a way that his phenomenology cannot meet the transcendentalist challenge and therefore should not be considered ‘transcendental.’     

Revisiting the Concept of Time: Archaic Perplexity in Bergson and Heidegger

Though the claims they make about temporality are markedly different, Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger agree that time is a philosophically foundational phenomenon; indeed, they agree that time is, in certain respects, the basis for all discursively representable beings. This paper focuses not so much on their theories of temporality (i.e., their respective answers to the question “what is time?” and their justifications for these answers) but rather on the challenges involved in talking about this phenomenon at all. Both thinkers are highly sensitive to these challenges and to the problems involved in any attempt to represent time in a discursively straightforward manner. I will show that: (1) Bergson’s and Heidegger’s respective claims about time can be fully understood only if we keep this sensitivity in view and carefully note what they are—and aren’t—doing in “talking about time”; and (2) what is ultimately at stake in their analyses is not just the phenomenon of time but what it means to engage in rigorous philosophical praxis.     

Performing the imago Dei: human enhancement,artificial intelligence and optative image-bearing

If the imago Dei is not a taxonomic definition but rather something that is performed in context, what are the implications for questions of human enhancement and the development of artificial intelligence (AI)? The author considers Alistair McFadyen’s performative vision of the imago Dei, one that actively seeks humanity in concrete situations, in the context of human enhancement and AI, asking the questions, ‘Does becoming cyborg through human enhancement make us less bearers of the divine image?’ And, ‘Can AI ever be considered to be in the image of God?’ Briefly tracing the shift in perspectives on the imago Dei, before considering what a performance of the image might look like, the author proposes three performances that have significant implications for questions about what it means to be human. To be an image-bearer is not dependent upon human DNA or species membership, but on an optative performance of the imago Dei.