Finding the faithless: perceived atheist prevalence reduces anti-atheist prejudice

Although prejudice is typically positively related to relative outgroup size, four studies found converging evidence that perceived atheist prevalence reduces anti-atheist prejudice. Study 1 demonstrated that anti-atheist prejudice among religious believers is reduced in countries in which atheists are especially prevalent. Study 2 demonstrated that perceived atheist prevalence is negatively associated with anti-atheist prejudice. Study 3 demonstrated a causal relationship: Reminders of atheist prevalence reduced explicit distrust of atheists. These results appeared distinct from intergroup contact effects. Study 4 demonstrated that prevalence information decreased implicit atheist distrust. The latter two experiments provide the first evidence that mere prevalence information can reduce prejudice against any outgroup. These findings offer insights about anti-atheist prejudice, a poorly understood phenomenon. Furthermore, they suggest both novel directions for future prejudice research and potential interventions that could reduce a variety of prejudices.     

The Robustness of Anti-Atheist Prejudice as Measured by Way of Cognitive Errors

Over the past decade, distrust of atheists has been documented in psychological literature yet remains relatively understudied. The current research sought to test the robustness of anti-atheist prejudice. Specifically, it examined the extent to which an individual’s anti-atheist prejudice remained unchanged in light of new information. One hundred participants from the United Kingdom completed an online experiment. The experiment involved reading a vignette describing the actions of an untrustworthy individual. Participants were asked to make a judgment with regards to the untrustworthy individual’s identity. The occurrence of a cognitive bias, namely, the conjunction fallacy, was used to measure the frequency of anti-atheist prejudice. An examination of judgment errors (i.e., conjunction fallacies) under different conditions was used to test the robustness of anti-atheism prejudice. The results show that anti-atheist prejudice is not confined either to dominantly religious countries or to religious individuals but rather appears to be a robust judgment about atheists.     

Analytic Thinking,Religion, and Prejudice: An Experimental Test of the Dual-Process Model of Mind

Dual-process models of the mind, as well as the relation between analytic thinking and religious belief, have aroused interest in recent years. However, few studies have examined this relation experimentally. We predicted that religious belief might be one of the causes of prejudice, while analytic thinking reduces both. The first experiment replicated, in a mostly Muslim sample, past research showing that analytic thinking promotes religious disbelief. The second experiment investigated the effect of Muslim religious priming and analytic priming on prejudice and showed that, although the former significantly increased the total prejudice score, the latter had an effect only on antigay prejudice. Thus, the findings partially support our proposed pattern of relationships in that analytic thinking might be one of the cognitive factors that prevents prejudice, whereas religious belief might be the one that increases it.     

Mortality Salience and Perceptions of People with AIDS: Understanding the Role of Prejudice

Study 1 examined the perceived association of AIDS and death by showing that thinking about AIDS increased participants'; death-thought accessibility. Hypotheses about the consequences of this association for perceptions of people with AIDS were derived from terror management theory, which proposes that mortality salience increases derogation of those who threaten people's worldviews unless those worldviews oppose prejudice, in which case mortality salience can increase acceptance of people who are otherwise threatening. Consistent with these hypotheses, conservative participants had less favorable impressions (Study 2) and liberal participants had more favorable impressions (Study 3) of a target with AIDS following a death reminder. Study 4 suggested that the decrease in prejudice among liberals following mortality salience was a genuine decrease in prejudice (as indicated by responses to an unobtrusive attitude measure), not just an increase in the desire to appear nonprejudiced. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Are emotionally intelligent people less prejudiced? The importance of emotion management skills for outgroup attitudes

People vary in their ability to understand, process, and manage information about one's own and others’ emotions, a construct known as Emotional Intelligence (EI). Past research highlighted the importance of EI in interpersonal relations as well as the key role of emotions underlying outgroup prejudice. Remarkably, hardly any research has investigated the associations between EI and outgroup prejudice. In three studies (total N = 922) conducted in Spain and the United Kingdom, we measured emotional intelligence using self-report and performance tests and prejudice toward a variety of outgroups. Results showed that those with stronger performance-based emotion management skills expressed lower generalized ethnic prejudice (Studies 1–3), more positive attitudes toward immigrants (Study 2a) and refugees (Study 2b), and less homophobic attitudes (Study 3). This negative association between emotion management and prejudice was found with different performance-based EI measures and held after controlling for self-perceived EI (Study 1) and self-reported abilities to regulate emotions (Study 3). Study 3 further demonstrated that higher empathy partly accounted for the association between emotion management and prejudice. The findings suggest that emotion management abilities play an important, but so far largely neglected role in generalized prejudice.     

The Obama effect: Decreasing implicit prejudice and stereotyping

This project explores the impact of Barack Obama’s presidential campaign and the resulting high levels of exposure to a positive, counter-stereotypic Black exemplar, on prejudice and stereotyping among non-Black participants. We found dramatically decreased levels of implicit anti-Black prejudice and stereotyping as compared with bias observed previously at the same institutions and in the literature. Providing some insight why the bias was reduced, Study 1 demonstrated that participants had positive Black exemplars come to mind or anticipated that other people have positive exemplars come to mind when they thought of Black people and this was associated with low levels of racial prejudice. Our second study revealed that participants who had qualities strongly associated with Obama as a political figure (e.g., president) activated when they were primed with “Black” had lower levels of implicit prejudice. These findings indicate that the extensive exposure to Obama resulted in a drop in implicit bias.     

Does peace have a prayer? The effect of mortality salience, compassionate values, and religious fundamentalism on hostility toward out-groups

Religious fundamentalism has been shown to be associated with higher levels of prejudice, ethnocentrism, and militarism, in spite of the compassionate values promoted by the religious faiths that most fundamentalists believe in. Based on terror management theory, we hypothesized that priming these compassionate values would encourage a shift toward less support for violent solutions to the current Middle Eastern conflict, especially when they are combined with reminders of one’s mortality. Study 1 demonstrated that among Americans, religious fundamentalism was associated with greater support for extreme military interventions, except when participants were reminded of their mortality and primed with compassionate religious values. The combination of mortality salience and compassionate religious values led to significant decreases in support for such interventions among high but not low fundamentalists. Study 2 replicated this finding and showed that it depends on the association of the compassionate values with an authoritative religious source; presentation of these values in a secular context had no effect on fundamentalists. Study 3 replicated these effects in a sample of Iranian Shiite Muslims: although a reminder of death increased anti-Western attitudes among participants primed with secular compassionate values, it decreased anti-Western attitudes among those primed with compassionate values from the Koran.     

Putting your best pet forward: Language patterns of persuasion in online pet advertisements

This paper evaluates persuasion dynamics of animal adoption using text data from a large archive of online pet advertisements. In Study 1, 184,805 adoption profiles from Petfinder indicated how long a pet will remain online and unadopted. Consistent with evidence from related persuasion settings such as peer-to-peer lending, pets spent less time online if profile writers had an analytic thinking style and advertisements contained few peripheral processing cues such as social words. Study 2 (N = 676,004 adoption profiles) replicated Study 1 patterns and found that adopted pet profiles contained more markers of analytic thinking and fewer social words than unadopted pet profiles. In an experiment (Study 3, N = 987), participants read an adoption advertisement typical of adopted or unadopted pets. Participants self-reported that they would be more likely to adopt a pet and visit its shelter after reading a more analytic and less social adoption profile (indicators of adopted pets) than a less analytic and more social profile (indicators of unadopted pets). Finally, Study 4 (N = 3,245 Tweets) demonstrated that more analytic and less social word patterns relate to increased engagement online, such as likes and retweets. These data suggest pet adoption that begins online is a social and psychological process, enhanced by messages with markers of complex thinking and few humanizing references. Advances to persuasion theory are discussed, underscored by the implications for pet adoption and how language patterns in online advertisements can reflect influence at scale.     

Gender differences in attitudes toward gay men and lesbians: the role of motivation to respond without prejudice

Research has uncovered consistent gender differences in attitudes toward gay men, with women expressing less prejudice than men (Herek, 2003). Attitudes toward lesbians generally show a similar pattern, but to a weaker extent. The present work demonstrated that motivation to respond without prejudice importantly contributes to these divergent attitudes. Study 1 revealed that women evince higher internal motivation to respond without prejudice (IMS, Plant & Devine, 1998) than do men and that this difference partially mediates the relationship between gender and attitudes toward gay men. The second study replicated this finding and demonstrated that IMS mediates the relationship between gender and attitudes toward lesbians. Study 2 further revealed that gender-role variables contribute to the observed gender differences in motivation to respond without prejudice. These findings provide new insights into the nature of sexual prejudice and for the first time point to possible antecedents of variation in motivation to respond without prejudice.     

Avoiding affect in intergroup relations: The roles of dispositional and intergroup empathy in the relationship between alexithymia and prejudice

Alexithymia, that is, difficulties in recognizing, communicating, and processing one's own emotions, is associated with poorer interpersonal relations. Emotional processes are key drivers and mechanisms of prejudice and its reduction, and alexithymia is thought to influence individuals' empathic responses. This research examined the relationship between alexithymia and prejudice, and the role of empathy in this relationship. Three studies were conducted in three intergroup contexts to test whether alexithymia is also associated with poorer intergroup relations with lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender+ individuals (Study 1, N = 126 heterosexual late adolescents) and Asian British people (Study 3, N = 300 White adults) in the United Kingdom, and immigrants in Italy (Study 2, N = 381 Italian adults). Participants completed the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20), measures on dispositional and intergroup empathic concern (EC) and perspective taking (PT) as well as measures of prejudice (anti-outgroup hostility, anti-outgroup attitudes, and anti-outgroup behavioral intentions). Lower dispositional EC (Studies 1, marginal effect in Study 2) and intergroup EC and PT (Study 3) mediated the relationship between the Externally Oriented Thinking subscale of the TAS-20 (i.e., avoiding emotions and affective thinking) and greater prejudice. The findings are important for understanding the challenges of late adolescents and adults with alexithymia in intergroup relations, highlighting the role of dispositional and intergroup empathy for individual differences such as alexithymia in endorsing prejudice.     

Essentialism goes social: belief in social determinism as a component of psychological essentialism

Individuals tend to explain the characteristics of others with reference to an underlying essence, a tendency that has been termed psychological essentialism. Drawing on current conceptualizations of essentialism as a fundamental mode of social thinking, and on prior studies investigating belief in genetic determinism (BGD) as a component of essentialism, we argue that BGD cannot constitute the sole basis of individuals' essentialist reasoning. Accordingly, we propose belief in social determinism (BSD) as a complementary component of essentialism, which relies on the belief that a person's essential character is shaped by social factors (e.g., upbringing, social background). We developed a scale to measure this social component of essentialism. Results of five correlational studies indicate that (a) BGD and BSD are largely independent, (b) BGD and BSD are related to important correlates of essentialist thinking (e.g., dispositionism, perceived group homogeneity), (c) BGD and BSD are associated with indicators of fundamental epistemic and ideological motives, and (d) the endorsement of each lay theory is associated with vital social-cognitive consequences (particularly stereotyping and prejudice). Two experimental studies examined the idea that the relationship between BSD and prejudice is bidirectional in nature. Study 6 reveals that rendering social-deterministic explanations salient results in increased levels of ingroup favoritism in individuals who chronically endorse BSD. Results of Study 7 show that priming of prejudice enhances endorsement of social-deterministic explanations particularly in persons habitually endorsing prejudiced attitudes.     

Relatively Socially Acceptable Prejudice Within and Between Societies

Two studies investigated the relative social acceptability of certain prejudices within a society (Study 1) and between societies (Study 2), using (less) internal motivation to control prejudice as an indicator of social acceptability. In Study 1, White British participants reported less internal motivation to control prejudice against people with schizophrenia than against Black people. In Study 2, Jamaican participants reported less internal motivation to control anti‐homosexual prejudice than did either British participants or American participants. Other differences in motivation to control prejudice were smaller, absent, or at odds with this difference, indicating that differences in motivation to control anti‐homosexual prejudice were not solely due to cultural differences concerning motivation to control prejudice in general. Results are discussed in terms of novel findings, relevance to the literature and possible future research. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mental simulation and sexual prejudice reduction: the debiasing role of counterfactual thinking

Reducing prejudice is a critical research agenda, and never before has counterfactual priming been evaluated as a potential prejudice‐reduction strategy. In the present experiment, participants were randomly assigned to imagine a pleasant interaction with a homosexual man and then think counterfactually about how an incident of sexual discrimination against him might not have occurred (experimental condition) or to imagine a nature scene (control condition). Results demonstrated a significant reduction in sexual prejudice from baseline levels in the counterfactual simulation group. Importantly, whereas intergroup anxiety and motivation to control prejudice were not predictive factors, number of counterfactual thoughts generated independently predicted variance in prejudice reduction. Mechanisms for, and implications of, prejudice‐reduction strategies including counterfactual thinking are discussed.     

On the self-regulation of implicit and explicit prejudice: a self -determination theory perspective

The present study identifies a broad taxonomy of motives underlying the desire to regulate prejudice and assess the impact of motivation to regulate prejudice on levels of explicit and implicit prejudice. Using self-determination theory as the foundation, six forms of motivation to regulate prejudice are proposed. In Study 1 (N = 257), an exploratory factor analysis reveals evidence for the six proposed dimensions. In Study 2 (N = 198), the six-factor taxonomy of motivation to regulate prejudice is further validated using a confirmatory factor analysis, and construct validity is obtained. In Study 3 (N = 62), motivation to regulate prejudice is manipulated before participants complete the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and explicit measures of prejudice. Results reveal that those with highly self-determined regulation of prejudice demonstrate lower implicit and explicit prejudice than their less self-determined counterparts. Results are discussed in terms of an increased understanding of the motivation to control prejudice.     

Right-wing authoritarianism predicts prejudice against “homosexuals” but not “gay men and lesbians”

Can different social category labels for a single group be associated with different levels of prejudice — specifically, sexual prejudice? Some theorizing, and a pilot study in the present research, suggests that the label “homosexuals” carries more deviance-related connotations than does the label “gay men and lesbians.” Given that right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) correlates positively with prejudice against groups stereotyped as deviant, it was hypothesized that RWA would predict greater prejudice against “homosexuals” than “gay men and lesbians” among heterosexual participants. Two studies supported this hypothesis and demonstrated that the effect was driven by both perceived threats to heterosexuals' values (i.e., symbolic threat; Study 1) and perceived fundamental differences between “homosexuals” and heterosexuals as social categories (i.e., psychological essentialism; Study 2). Implications for the factors that predict social categorization of and prejudice toward sexual minorities are discussed.     

Reducing implicit prejudice: Matching approach/avoidance strategies to contextual valence and regulatory focus

Two general strategies for reducing prejudice are to approach equality and to avoid prejudice. The current research investigated the importance of matching two factors, contextual valence and regulatory focus, on the efficacy of these two strategies in reducing implicit prejudice. The findings demonstrate that although an approach strategy is more effective in decreasing prejudice on the Implicit Association Test in a positive rather than a negative context, an avoidance strategy is more effective in decreasing prejudice in a negative rather than a positive context (Study 1). In addition, the results show that although an approach strategy is more effective in decreasing prejudice when a promotion rather than a prevention focus is primed, an avoidance strategy is more effective in reducing prejudice when a prevention rather than a promotion focus is primed (Study 2). The implications of these findings for current interventions aimed at decreasing implicit prejudice are discussed.     

The Role of Christianity and Islam in Explaining Prejudice against Asylum Seekers: Evidence from Malaysia

ABSTRACT

Prejudicial attitudes toward asylum seekers are prevalent, and an emerging body of literature has revealed that this is partly driven by religious affiliation. The population of Malaysia is multireligious, making it a fruitful location for testing religion-based prejudice hypotheses. Thus, across 2 studies we tested the roles of Christianity and Islam in explicit and implicit prejudices against asylum seekers in the Malaysian context. In Study 1 (n = 97), we present evidence that there are religion-based differences in prejudice against asylum seekers; specifically, Muslims reported higher levels of (classical) explicit prejudice toward asylum seekers than Christians (there were no differences in conditional or implicit prejudices). In Study 2 (n = 117), we tested the hypothesis that these religion-based differences are qualified by the religion of the asylum seeker. In this study, we used a framing paradigm to experimentally manipulate the religion of the asylum-seeking targets. The results revealed an out-group exacerbation effect; that is, participants reported higher levels of prejudice toward asylum seekers who had a different religion from their own. For classical explicit prejudice, the effect was strongest from Muslims toward Christian asylum seekers. Conversely, for implicit prejudice, the reverse was true: The effect was strongest from Christians toward Muslim asylum seekers. These findings are discussed in terms of the political and social circumstances in Malaysia, but we interpret these findings as evidence that explicit and implicit attitudes toward asylum seekers are driven by a complex pattern of religion-based intergroup biases.     

Category and stereotype activation revisited

In Study 1 (N= 230), we found that the participants' explicit prejudice was not related to their knowledge of cultural stereotypes of immigrants in Sweden, and that they associated the social category immigrants with the same national/ethnic categories. In Study 2 (N= 88), employing the category and stereotype words obtained in Study 1 as primes, we examined whether participants with varying degrees of explicit prejudice differed in their automatic stereotyping and implicit prejudice when primed with category or stereotypical words. In accord with our hypothesis, and contrary to previous findings, the results showed that people's explicit prejudice did not affect their automatic stereotyping and implicit prejudice, neither in the category nor stereotype priming condition. Study 3 (N= 62), employing category priming using facial photographs of Swedes and immigrants as primes, showed that participants' implicit prejudice was not moderated by their explicit prejudice. The outcome is discussed in relation to the distinction between category and stereotype priming and in terms of the associative strength between a social category and its related stereotypes.     

Analytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy theories

Belief in conspiracy theories has been associated with a range of negative health, civic, and social outcomes, requiring reliable methods of reducing such belief. Thinking dispositions have been highlighted as one possible factor associated with belief in conspiracy theories, but actual relationships have only been infrequently studied. In Study 1, we examined associations between belief in conspiracy theories and a range of measures of thinking dispositions in a British sample (N = 990). Results indicated that a stronger belief in conspiracy theories was significantly associated with lower analytic thinking and open-mindedness and greater intuitive thinking. In Studies 2–4, we examined the causational role played by analytic thinking in relation to conspiracist ideation. In Study 2 (N = 112), we showed that a verbal fluency task that elicited analytic thinking reduced belief in conspiracy theories. In Study 3 (N = 189), we found that an alternative method of eliciting analytic thinking, which related to cognitive disfluency, was effective at reducing conspiracist ideation in a student sample. In Study 4, we replicated the results of Study 3 among a general population sample (N = 140) in relation to generic conspiracist ideation and belief in conspiracy theories about the July 7, 2005, bombings in London. Our results highlight the potential utility of supporting attempts to promote analytic thinking as a means of countering the widespread acceptance of conspiracy theories.