Gaze cuing and affective judgments of objects: I like what you look at

When we see another person look somewhere, we automatically attend to the same location in space. Thisjoint attention emerges early in life and has a great impact on social interactions in development and in everyday adult life. The direction of another’s gaze indicates what object is of current interest, which may be the target for a subsequent action. In this study, we found that objects that are looked at by other people are liked more than objects that do not receive the attention of other people (Experiment 1). This suggests that observing averted gaze can have an impact on the affective appraisals of objects in the environment. This liking effect was absent when an arrow was used to cue attention (Experiment 2). This underlines the importance of other people’s interactions with objects for generating our own impressions of such stimuli in the world.     

Why does the gaze of others direct visual attention?

Viewing another person directing his or her gaze can produce automatic shifts of covert visual attention in the same direction. This holds true even when the task‐relevant target is much more likely to occur at the uncued location. These findings, along with other evidence, have been taken to suggest that gaze represents a “special” stimulus—the foundation of a social cognition system that can make inferences about the mental states of other people. However, gaze‐driven cueing effects could simply be due to spatial compatibility between cue and target. We compared the attentional effects of gaze shifts to a face with the tongue extended laterally to the left or right. When tongue direction was a nonpredictive cue, we found cueing effects from tongues that were indistinguishable from those produced by gaze. However, in contrast to previous findings with gaze, tongue cues did not overcome a validity manipulation in which targets were four times more likely to appear at the uncued location. We conclude that simple attentional cueing effects from gaze may be better explained by spatial compatibility, and that more complex, unique features of cueing from gaze may be better indices into perceptual systems specialized for social cognition.     

From gaze cueing to perspective taking: Revisiting the claim that we automatically compute where or what other people are looking at

ABSTRACT

Two paradigms have shown that people automatically compute what or where another person is looking at. In the visual perspective-taking paradigm, participants judge how many objects they see; whereas, in the gaze cueing paradigm, participants identify a target. Unlike in the former task, in the latter task, the influence of what or where the other person is looking at is only observed when the other person is presented alone before the task-relevant objects. We show that this discrepancy across the two paradigms is not due to differences in visual settings (Experiment 1) or available time to extract the directional information (Experiment 2), but that it is caused by how attention is deployed in response to task instructions (Experiment 3). Thus, the mere presence of another person in the field of view is not sufficient to compute where/what that person is looking at, which qualifies the claimed automaticity of such computations.     

The eye gaze direction of an observed person can bias perception,memory, and attention in adolescents with and without autism spectrum disorder

The reported experiments aimed to investigate whether a person and his or her gaze direction presented in the context of a naturalistic scene cause perception, memory, and attention to be biased in typically developing adolescents and high-functioning adolescents with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). A novel computerized image manipulation program presented a series of photographic scenes, each containing a person. The program enabled participants to laterally maneuver the scenes behind a static window, the borders of which partially occluded the scenes. The gaze direction of the person in the scenes spontaneously cued attention of both groups in the direction of gaze, affecting judgments of preference (Experiment 1a) and causing memory biases (Experiment 1b). Experiment 2 showed that the gaze direction of a person cues visual search accurately to the exact location of gaze in both groups. These findings suggest that biases in preference, memory, and attention are caused by another person’s gaze direction when viewed in a complex scene in adolescents with and without ASD     

Automatic Mechanisms for Social Attention Are Culturally Penetrable

Are mechanisms for social attention influenced by culture? Evidence that social attention is triggered automatically by bottom‐up gaze cues and is uninfluenced by top‐down verbal instructions may suggest it operates in the same way everywhere. Yet considerations from evolutionary and cultural psychology suggest that specific aspects of one's cultural background may have consequence for the way mechanisms for social attention develop and operate. In more interdependent cultures, the scope of social attention may be broader, focusing on more individuals and relations between those individuals. We administered a multi‐gaze cueing task requiring participants to fixate a foreground face flanked by background faces and measured shifts in attention using eye tracking. For European Americans, gaze cueing did not depend on the direction of background gaze cues, suggesting foreground gaze alone drives automatic attention shifting; for East Asians, cueing patterns differed depending on whether the foreground cue matched or mismatched background cues, suggesting foreground and background gaze information were integrated. These results demonstrate that cultural background influences the social attention system by shifting it into a narrow or broad mode of operation and, importantly, provides evidence challenging the assumption that mechanisms underlying automatic social attention are necessarily rigid and impenetrable to culture.     

The mutual influence of gaze and head orientation in the analysis of social attention direction

Three experiments are reported that investigate the hypothesis that head orientation and gaze direction interact in the processing of another individual's direction of social attention. A Stroop-type interference paradigm was adopted, in which gaze and head cues were placed into conflict. In separate blocks of trials, participants were asked to make speeded keypress responses contingent on either the direction of gaze, or the orientation of the head displayed in a digitized photograph of a male face. In Experiments 1 and 2, head and gaze cues showed symmetrical interference effects. Compared with congruent arrangements, incongruent head cues slowed responses to gaze cues, and incongruent gaze cues slowed responses to head cues, suggesting that head and gaze are mutually influential in the analysis of social attention direction. This mutuality was also evident in a cross-modal version of the task (Experiment 3) where participants responded to spoken directional words whilst ignoring the head/gaze images. It is argued that these interference effects arise from the independent influences of gaze and head orientation on decisions concerning social attention direction.     

Social influence on metacognitive evaluations: The power of nonverbal cues

Metacognitive evaluations refer to the processes by which people assess their own cognitive operations with respect to their current goal. Little is known about whether this process is susceptible to social influence. Here we investigate whether nonverbal social signals spontaneously influence metacognitive evaluations. Participants performed a two-alternative forced-choice task, which was followed by a face randomly gazing towards or away from the response chosen by the participant. Participants then provided a metacognitive evaluation of their response by rating their confidence in their answer. In Experiment 1, the participants were told that the gaze direction was irrelevant to the task purpose and were advised to ignore it. The results revealed an effect of implicit social information on confidence ratings even though the gaze direction was random and therefore unreliable for task purposes. In addition, nonsocial cues (car) did not elicit this effect. In Experiment 2, the participants were led to believe that cue direction (face or car) reflected a previous participant's response to the same question—that is, the social information provided by the cue was made explicit, yet still objectively unreliable for the task. The results showed a similar social influence on confidence ratings, observed with both cues (car and face) but with an increased magnitude relative to Experiment 1. We additionally showed in Experiment 2 that social information impaired metacognitive accuracy. Together our results strongly suggest an involuntary susceptibility of metacognitive evaluations to nonverbal social information, even when it is implicit (Experiment 1) and unreliable (Experiments 1 and 2).     

Arrows don’t look at you: Qualitatively different attentional mechanisms triggered by gaze and arrows

Eye gaze conveys rich information concerning the states of mind of others, playing a critical role in social interactions, signaling internal states, and guiding others’ attention. On the basis of its social significance, some researchers have proposed that eye gaze may represent a unique attentional stimulus. However, contrary to this notion, the majority of the literature has shown indistinguishable attentional effects when eye gaze and arrows have been used as cues. Taking a different approach, in this study we aimed at finding qualitative attentional differences between gazes and arrows when they were used as targets instead of as cues. We used a spatial Stroop task, in which participants were required to identify the direction of eyes or arrows presented to the left or the right of a fixation point. The results showed that the two types of stimuli led to opposite spatial interference effects, with arrows producing faster reaction times when the stimulus direction was congruent with the stimulus position (a typical spatial Stroop effect), and eye gaze producing faster reaction times when it was incongruent (a “reversed” spatial Stroop effect). This reversed Stroop is interpreted as an eye-contact effect, therefore revealing the unique nature of eyes as special social-attention stimuli.     

Gaze Perception Triggers Reflexive Visuospatial Orienting

This paper seeks to bring together two previously separate research traditions: research on spatial orienting within the visual cueing paradigm and research into social cognition, addressing our tendency to attend in the direction that another person looks. Cueing methodologies from mainstream attention research were adapted to test the automaticity of orienting in the direction of seen gaze. Three studies manipulated the direction of gaze in a computerized face, which appeared centrally in a frontal view during a peripheral letter-discrimination task. Experiments 1 and 2 found faster discrimination of peripheral target letters on the side the computerized face gazed towards, even though the seen gaze did not predict target side, and despite participants being asked to ignore the face. This suggests reflexive covert and/or overt orienting in the direction of seen gaze, arising even when the observer has no motivation to orient in this way. Experiment 3 found faster letter discrimination on the side the computerized face gazed towards even when participants knew that target letters were four times as likely on the opposite side. This suggests that orienting can arise in the direction of seen gaze even when counter to intentions. The experiments illustrate that methods from mainstream attention research can be usefully applied to social cognition, and that studies of spatial attention may profit from considering its social function.     

自闭症谱系障碍儿童在多重线索下习得词语的眼动研究

本文利用眼动追踪技术在基线、一致和矛盾3种实验条件下考察感知觉线索和社会性线索在自闭症谱系障碍儿童词语习得中的相对作用。行为数据结果表明, 此类儿童在矛盾条件下选择枯燥物体作为新异词语的所指对象, 这说明社会性线索较之于感知觉线索具有优势作用; 而他们在基线和一致条件下选择有趣物体作为新异词语的所指对象, 且一致条件的词语习得成绩优于基线条件, 这说明社会性线索较之于感知觉线索具有促进作用。眼动数据结果表明, 此类儿童在脸部注视模式和视线追随行为上与普通儿童存在差异。这说明, 虽然社会性线索在此类儿童与普通儿童的词语习得中具有相同的相对作用, 但他们获取社会性信息的方式与普通儿童存在差异。     

Attunement and Affordance Learning in Infants

ABSTRACT

From a perceptual learning perspective, infants use social information (like gaze direction) in a similar way as other information in our physical environment (like object movements) to specify action possibilities. In the current study, we assumed that infants are able to learn an affordance upon observing an adult failing to act out that affordance, without appreciating object-directed intentions, or, communicative intent towards the infant. Using a variation of the Re-enactment procedure, we found that when the attention of infants (N = 46, M_age = 20 months) was drawn towards the eyes of the person before she acted out the failed attempt, either by ostensive cues or non-ostensive cues, infants achieved more affordances than when their attention was not directed towards the eyes. As directing the attention of infants to the eyes of another person frequently results in gaze following, this suggests that infants use the gaze direction of another person in order to learn what affordance that other person is trying to realize. In addition, the results of a spatiotemporal analysis on the eye-movements of infants suggest that the gaze and the object movements of the person facilitate learning by directing the attention of infants towards important object-directed actions on crucial moments during the failed attempt demonstrations. These results are discussed in terms of perceptual attunement and affordance learning.     

Do the eyes have it? Cues to the direction of social attention

The face communicates an impressive amount of visual information. We use it to identify its owner, how they are feeling and to help us understand what they are saying. Models of face processing have considered how we extract such meaning from the face but have ignored another important signal - eye gaze. In this article we begin by reviewing evidence from recent neurophysiological studies that suggests that the eyes constitute a special stimulus in at least two senses. First, the structure of the eyes is such that it provides us with a particularly powerful signal to the direction of another person's gaze, and second, we may have evolved neural mechanisms devoted to gaze processing. As a result, gaze direction is analysed rapidly and automatically, and is able to trigger reflexive shifts of an observer's visual attention. However, understanding where another individual is directing their attention involves more than simply analysing their gaze direction. We go on to describe research with adult participants, children and non-human primates that suggests that other cues such as head orientation and pointing gestures make significant contributions to the computation of another's direction of attention.     

Automatic attentional orienting to other people’s gaze in schizophrenia

Explicit tests of social cognition have revealed pervasive deficits in schizophrenia. Less is known of automatic social cognition in schizophrenia. We used a spatial orienting task to investigate automatic shifts of attention cued by another person’s eye gaze in 29 patients and 28 controls. Central photographic images of a face with eyes shifted left or right, or looking straight ahead, preceded targets that appeared left or right of the cue. To examine automatic effects, cue direction was non-predictive of target location. Cue–target intervals were 100, 300, and 800?ms. In non-social control trials, arrows replaced eye-gaze cues. Both groups showed automatic attentional orienting indexed by faster reaction times (RTs) when arrows were congruent with target location across all cue–target intervals. Similar congruency effects were seen for eye-shift cues at 300 and 800?ms intervals, but patients showed significantly larger congruency effects at 800?ms, which were driven by delayed responses to incongruent target locations. At short 100-ms cue–target intervals, neither group showed faster RTs for congruent than for incongruent eye-shift cues, but patients were significantly slower to detect targets after direct-gaze cues. These findings conflict with previous studies using schematic line drawings of eye-shifts that have found automatic attentional orienting to be reduced in schizophrenia. Instead, our data indicate that patients display abnormalities in responding to gaze direction at various stages of gaze processing—reflected by a stronger preferential capture of attention by another person’s direct eye contact at initial stages of gaze processing and difficulties disengaging from a gazed-at location once shared attention is established.     

The importance of context information for the spatial specificity of gaze cueing

In three experiments, we investigated the spatial allocation of attention in response to central gaze cues. In particular, we examined whether the allocation of attentional resources is influenced by context information—that is, the presence or absence of reference objects (i.e., placeholders) in the periphery. On each trial, gaze cues were followed by a target stimulus to which participants had to respond by keypress or by performing a target-directed saccade. Targets were presented either in an empty visual field (Exps. 1 and 2) or in previewed location placeholders (Exp. 3) and appeared at one of either 18 (Exp. 1) or six (Exps. 2 and 3) possible positions. The spatial distribution of attention was determined by comparing response times as a function of the distance between the cued and target positions. Gaze cueing was not specific to the exact cued position, but instead generalized equally to all positions in the cued hemifield, when no context information was provided. However, gaze direction induced a facilitation effect specific to the exact gazed-at position when reference objects were presented. We concluded that the presence of possible objects in the periphery to which gaze cues could refer is a prerequisite for attention shifts being specific to the gazed-at position.     

自闭症儿童利用社会性注意线索习得词语的眼动研究

本研究采用眼动技术考察18名自闭症儿童利用社会性注意线索习得词语的能力。结果表明：1）自闭症儿童具有利用他人视线习得词语的能力;2）不同视线对自闭症儿童的词语习得产生不同的影响;3）自闭症儿童视线追随行为的潜在机制与普通儿童存在差异,自闭症儿童的视线追随行为可能是意识性的诱发行为而普通儿童则是反射性的自发行为。     

Gaze cues influence the allocation of attention in natural scene viewing

In two experiments we examined whether the allocation of attention in natural scene viewing is influenced by the gaze cues (head and eye direction) of an individual appearing in the scene. Each experiment employed a variant of the flicker paradigm in which alternating versions of a scene and a modified version of that scene were separated by a brief blank field. In Experiment 1, participants were able to detect the change made to the scene sooner when an individual appearing in the scene was gazing at the changing object than when the individual was absent, gazing straight ahead, or gazing at a nonchanging object. In addition, participants' ability to detect change deteriorated linearly as the changing object was located progressively further from the line of regard of the gazer. Experiment 2 replicated this change detection advantage of gaze-cued objects in a modified procedure using more critical scenes, a forced-choice change/no-change decision, and accuracy as the dependent variable. These findings establish that in the perception of static natural scenes and in a change detection task, attention is preferentially allocated to objects that are the target of another's social attention.     

Gaze cues influence the allocation of attention in natural scene viewing

In two experiments we examined whether the allocation of attention in natural scene viewing is influenced by the gaze cues (head and eye direction) of an individual appearing in the scene. Each experiment employed a variant of the flicker paradigm in which alternating versions of a scene and a modified version of that scene were separated by a brief blank field. In Experiment 1, participants were able to detect the change made to the scene sooner when an individual appearing in the scene was gazing at the changing object than when the individual was absent, gazing straight ahead, or gazing at a nonchanging object. In addition, participants' ability to detect change deteriorated linearly as the changing object was located progressively further from the line of regard of the gazer. Experiment 2 replicated this change detection advantage of gaze-cued objects in a modified procedure using more critical scenes, a forced-choice change/no-change decision, and accuracy as the dependent variable. These findings establish that in the perception of static natural scenes and in a change detection task, attention is preferentially allocated to objects that are the target of another's social attention.     

Object-based attentional effects in response to eye-gaze and arrow cues

Recent studies have demonstrated that central cues, such as eyes and arrows, reflexively trigger attentional shifts. However, it is not clear whether the attention induced by these two cues can be attached to objects within the visual scene. In the current study, subjects' attention was directed to one of two objects (square outlines) via the observation of uninformative directional arrows or eye gaze. Then, the objects rotated 90° clockwise or counter-clockwise to a new location and the target stimulus was presented within one of these two objects. Results showed that independent of the cue type participants responded faster to targets in the cued object than to those in the uncued object. This suggests that in dynamic displays, both gaze and arrow cues are able to trigger reflexive shifts of attention to objects moving within the visual scene.     

Are eyes special? It depends on how you look at it

Recent behavioral data have shown that central nonpredictive gaze direction triggers reflexive shifts of attention toward the gazed-at location (e.g., Friesen & Kingstone, 1998). Friesen and Kingstone suggested that this reflexive orienting effect is unique to biologically relevant stimuli. Three experiments were conducted to test this proposal by comparing the attentional orienting produced by nonpredictive gaze cues (biologically relevant) with the attentional orienting produced by nonpredictive arrow cues (biologically irrelevant). Both types of cues produced reflexive orienting in adults (Experiment 1) and preschoolers (Experiment 2), suggesting that gaze cues are not special. However, Experiment 3 showed that nonpredictive arrows produced reflexive orienting in both hemispheres of a split-brain patient. This contrasts with Kingstone, Friesen, and Gazzaniga's (2000) finding that nonpredictive gaze cues produce reflexive orienting only in the face-processing hemisphere of split-brain patients. Therefore, although nonpredictive eyes and arrows may produce similar behavioral effects, they are not subserved by the same brain systems. Together, these data provide important insight into the nature of the representations of directional stimuli involved in reflexive attentional orienting.     

Gaze and arrow cueing of attention reveals individual differences along the autism spectrum as a function of target context

Observing averted gaze results in a reflexive shift of attention to the gazed‐at location. In two experiments, participants scoring high and low on the Autism‐Spectrum Quotient questionnaire (AQ; Baron‐Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001 ) observed arrow and gaze cues to investigate cueing effect magnitude as a function of the context in which peripheral targets could appear. While identical cueing effects were found with gaze and arrow cues, the more striking results concerned target stimuli. In Experiment 1, targets could appear on a peripheral face, or on scrambled face parts. Overall, greater cueing effects were found when the target appeared on a face. However, this face bias was only observed in participants with low AQ scores, whereas high AQ scorers oriented more to scrambled features. Experiment 2 found equal cueing to targets appearing on tools, as compared with tool parts. However, individual differences were again observed, where low AQ scorers showed larger cueing towards tools, while high scorers oriented more to scrambled parts, as in Experiment 1. These results support the idea that low AQ individuals orient strongly to objects attended by others. However, since the same results were found for arrow cues, this effect may generalize to all central cues to attention. High AQ scorers possessing many more autistic‐like traits tended to orient more to scrambled shapes, perhaps reflecting a bias for orienting to local details.