Swinging Door Invariants: Optical Information from Rotating Panels

Ecological perceptual research focuses on stimulus array invariants as information that might guide organismic (particularly human) actions. Constructed by human agency, built environments entail structural regularities (e.g., planarity, verticality, horizontality, orthogonality) that constrain stimulus array information; here the emphasis is optical information (invariants). Built environments involve barriers that restrict behavior; doors allow passage through such barriers. Doors (more generally, swinging panels) yield surprisingly many instances of optical information. Specifically, invariants exist for (a) panel collision and bypass, (b) the panel’s axis of rotation, (c) the horizon line, and (d) the panel’s frontal-parallel orientation. Affordances are associated with each of those. Invariants described exemplify meta-invariant patterns (i.e., similarities in invariant stimulus array structure that occur across disparate environmental objects and events); meta-invariants may serve as research heuristics for the discovery of invariants in delimited contexts. Empirical considerations for optical invariants identified are described. Derivations described may be helpful for teaching the concept of invariants from stimulus array transformations, as well.     

Statistical power in complex experimental designs

We show that power and sample size tables developed by Cohen (1988, pp. 289–354, 381–389) produce incorrect estimates for factorial designs: power is underestimated, and sample size is overestimated. The source of this bias is shrinkage in the implied value of the noncentrality parameter, λ, caused by using Cohen’s adjustment ton for factorial designs (pp. 365 and 396). The adjustment was intended to compensate for differences in the actual versus presumed (by the tables) error degrees of freedom; however, more accurate estimates are obtained if the tables are used without adjustment. The problems with Cohen’s procedure were discovered while testing subroutines in DATASIM 1.2 for computing power and sample size in completely randomized, randomized-blocks, and split-plot factorial designs. The subroutines give the user the ability to generate power and sample size tables that are as easy to use as Cohen’s, but that eliminate the conservative bias of his tables. We also implemented several improvements relative to “manual” use of Cohen’s tables: (1) Since the user can control the specific values of 1- β,n, andf used on the rows and columns of the table, interpolation is never required; (2) exact as opposed to approximate solutions for the noncentralF distribution are employed; (3) solutions for factorial designs, including those with repeated measures factors, take into account the actual error degrees of freedom for the effect being tested; and (4) provision is made for the computation of power for applications involving the doubly noncentralF distribution.     

Cohen’s Rescue

G. A. Cohen’s Rescuing Justice and Equality proposes that both concepts need rescuing from the work of John Rawls. Especially, it is concerned with Rawls’ famous second principle of justice according to which social primary goods should be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution is to the benefit of the worst off. The question is why this would ever be necessary if all parties are just. Cohen and I agree that Rawls cannot really justify inequalities on the basis given. But he also thinks equality is the correct analysis of justice, though he provides no actual direct arguments for this. He does, however, provide a striking analytical argument claiming that fundamental principles of justice must be fact insensitive, and that Rawls’s view of justice violates this requirement. I argue that the requirement is itself misconceived and that principles of justice cannot possibly be fact insensitive in the sense developed by Cohen. Few philosophers share this view of Cohen’s—which I argue is due to several conceptual mistakes. With these ironed out, the contractarian view, broadly speaking, is seen to be plausible and powerful. Meanwhile Cohen appears to embrace intuitionism, a stance that cannot possibly be acceptable in social philosophy. In the end, Cohen is successful in arguing that Rawls cannot have what he wants, but neither is Cohen successful in claiming that justice is equality.     

A colorful walk, but is it on the mental number line? Reply to Cohen Kadosh, Tzelgov, and Henik

Cohen Kadosh, Tzelgov, and Henik [Cohen Kadosh, R., Tzelgov, J., and Henik, A. (2008). A synesthetic walk on the number line: The size effect. Cognition, 106, 548-557] present a new paradigm to probe properties of the mental number line. They describe two experiments which they argue to be inconsistent with the exact small number model proposed by Verguts, Fias, and Stevens [Verguts, T., Fias, W., Stevens, M. (2005). A model of exact small-number representation. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 12, 66-80]. We discuss the data, assumptions, and conclusions of Cohen Kadosh et al.'s paper in relation to existing models of numerical cognition.     

论柯亨对社会主义的平等主义的辩护

柯亨是分析学马克思主义的主要代表人物之一。在《自我所有、自由和平等》等著作中,他从早期专注于历史唯物主义转向了对政治哲学的研究。柯亨结合当代西方社会历史条件的变化,通过批     

Clarifying Cohen: A Response to Jubb and Hall

In this brief essay, we clarify Cohen’s ‘Facts and Principles’ argument, and then argue that the objections posed by two recent critiques of Cohen—Robert Jubb (Res Publica 15:337–353, 2009) and Edward Hall (Res Publica 19:173–181, 2013)—look especially vulnerable to the charge of being self-defeating. It may still be that Cohen’s view concerning facts and principles is false. Our aim here is merely to show that two recent attempts to demonstrate its falsity are unlikely to succeed.     

Cohen’s Conservatism and Human Enhancement

In an intriguing essay, G. A. Cohen has defended a conservative bias in favour of existing value. In this paper, we consider whether Cohen’s conservatism raises a new challenge to the use of human enhancement technologies. We develop some of Cohen’s suggestive remarks into a new line of argument against human enhancement that, we believe, is in several ways superior to existing objections. However, we shall argue that on closer inspection, Cohen’s conservatism fails to offer grounds for a strong sweeping objection to enhancement, and may even offer positive support for forms of enhancement that preserve valuable features of human beings. Nevertheless, we concede that Cohen’s arguments may suggest some plausible and important constraints on the modality of legitimate and desirable enhancements.     

Reviews

Book reviewed in this article:
The Philosophical Letters of Wang Yang-ming (translated and annotated by Julia Ching)
Chong-hong Park (editor), Studies on the Learning of Toegye (Toegye Hahk Yeon Ku in Korean, Toegye Hsueh Yen Chiu^a in Chinese)
Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation (ed. by James B. Crowley)
Frank A. Kiennan, Jr. and John K. Fairbank (eds), Chinese Ways in Warfare
Marx and Modem Economics (Ed. by David Horowitz)
R. J. Seeger and R. S. Cohen, editors, Philosophical Foundations of Science {Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science , Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky     

On the origins of dynamical awareness

An inquiry into the origins of dynamical awareness is conducted. Particular attention is given to a theory that postulates that impressions of dynamical quantities are derived from and structured by lawful physical relations. It is shown that impressions of dynamical quantities are not generally correlated with the values that these quantities take in the equations of motion but rather are highly correlated with simple ratios of kinematic quantities or with specific kinematic features that do not specify the underlying dynamics. It is argued that kinematic information, to the extent that it is used, is used heuristically, and its availability for dynamical analysis is constrained by general principles of organization. A formal analysis of the physical organization implicit in the specification of dynamical invariants is given and compared with types of perceptual organization that are observed.     

Now you see it,now you don't--the confusing case of confusion as an emotion: commentary on Rozin and Cohen (2003)

P. Rozin and A. B. Cohen (2003) contend that confusion is an emotion because it is valenced, it has a distinct facial expression, and it has a distinct internal state. On the basis of these criteria, they call for further study of this unstudied stateand challenge emotion researchers to consider "confusion" to be an emotion. The author agrees with Rozin and Cohen (2003) that confusion is an affective state, is valenced, has an (internal) object, may be expressed facially, and that laypersons may, under certain circumstances, consider it an emotion. However, its expression is likely to be an expressive component of emotions for which goal obstruction is central. Further, confusion may also not be as commonly considered an emotion by laypersons, as Rozin and Cohen contend. Finally, confusion is not unstudied, only most of the time it is not emotion researchers who do the researching.     

G. A. Cohen’s Vision of Socialism

This essay is an attempt to piece together the elements of G. A. Cohen’s thought on the theory of socialism during his long intellectual voyage from Marxism to political philosophy. It begins from his theory of the maldistribution of freedom under capitalism, moves onto his critique of libertarian property rights, to his diagnosis of the “deep inegalitarian” structure of John Rawls’ theory and concludes with his rejection of the “cheap” fraternity promulgated by liberal egalitarianism. The paper’s exegetical contention is that Cohen’s work in political philosophy is best understood in the background of lifelong commitment to a form of democratic, non-market, socialism realizing the values of freedom, equality and community, as he conceived them. The first part of the essay is therefore an attempt to retrieve core socialism-related arguments by chronologically examining the development of Cohen’s views, using his books as thematic signposts. The second part brings these arguments together with an eye to reconstructing his vision of socialism. It turns out that Cohen’s political philosophy offers a rich conception of objective and subjective freedom, an original understanding of justice as satisfaction of genuine need, and a substantive ideal of fraternity as justificatory community with others. If properly united, these values can suggest a full-bloodied account of the just polity, and give us a glimpse into what it means, for Cohen, to treat people as equals.     

Re: Views

Book reviewed in this article: Exploring Human Values: Psychological and Philosophical Considerations: Richard A. Kalish and Kenneth W. Collier You and the Senior Boom: New Challenges and Opportunities for All: Louise Minter Odell and Charles Edward Odell The Religious Education of Preschool Children: Lucie W. Barber Transactional Analysis for Police Personnel: Anne T. Romano The Facts About “Drug Abuse”: The Drug Abuse Council; New York Implementation of Independent Living Programs in Rehabilitation: Arkansas Rehabilitation Research and Training Center (William P. Clark, Study Group Chairman and B. Douglas Rice, University Sponsor) Education in the 80's: Health Education: Robert D. Russell, Ed. The College Cost Book: 1981–82: (2nd Ed.) The College Board New York: College Entrance Examination Board The Promotable Woman: Becoming a Successful Manager: Norma Carr-Ruffino Therapeutic Psychology: Fundamentals of Counseling and Psychotherapy (4th ed.): Lawrence M. Brammer and Everett L. Shostrom A Review of Behavioral Group Therapy, 1980: An Annual Review.: Dennis Upper and Steven M. Ross (Eds.) The Psychiatric Rehabilitation Practice Series: (See individual listings below): Book 1: The Skills of Diagnostic Planning: W.A. Anthony, R.M. Pierce, M.R. Cohen, and J.R. Cannon Book 1: The Skills of Diagnostic Planning W.A. Anthony, R.M. Pierce, M.R. Cohen, and J.R. Cannon Book 2: The Skills of Rehabilitation Programming: W.A. Anthony, R.M. Pierce, M.R. Cohen, and J.R. Cannon Book 3: The Skills of Professional Evaluation: M.R. Cohen, W.A. Anthony, R.M. Pierce, L.A. Spaniol, and J.R. Cannon Book 4: The Skills of Career Counseling: R.M. Pierce, M.R. Cohen, W.A. Anthony, B.F. Cohen, and T.W. Friel Book 5: The Skills of Career Placement: R.M. Pierce, M.R. Cohen, W.A. Anthony, B.F. Cohen, and T.W. Friel Book 6: The Skills of Community Service Organization: M.R. Cohen, R.L. Vitalo, W.A. Anthony, and R.M. Pierce Experiential Psychotherapies in Australia: Dick Armstrong and Phil Boas, (Eds.) Black Children/White Children: Competence, Socialization and Social Structure: Zena Smith Blau Counselling Psychology: S. Narayano Rao Maslach Burnout Inventory, Research Edition, Manual.: Christina Maslach and Susan E. Jackson Planning and Using a Total Personnel System: Richard A. Kaumeyer, Jr. Your Career: Choices, Chances, Changes: David C. Borchard, John J. Kelly, and Nancy Pat K. Weaver     

Reviews

Book reviewed in this article:
Punishment — A Philosophy & Public Affairs Reader. Edited by A. John Simmons, Marshall Cohen, Joshua Cohen, and Charles Beitz.
Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays. Edited by David J. Furley and Alexander Nehamas.
Past, Space and Self. By John Campbell.
Vorlesungen über Ethik. By Ernst Tugendhat.     

Perceptual transparency in neon color spreading displays

In neon color spreading displays, both a color illusion and perceptual transparency can be seen. In this study, we investigated the color conditions for the perception of transparency in such displays. It was found that the data are very well accounted for by a generalization of Metelli's (1970) episcotister model of balanced perceptual transparency to tristimulus values. This additive model correctly predicted which combinations of colors would lead to optimal impressions of transparency. Color combinations deviating slightly from the additive model also looked transparent, but less convincingly so.     

Mind,Machine, and Creativity: An Artist's Perspective

Harold Cohen is a renowned painter who has developed a computer program, AARON, to create art. While AARON has been hailed as one of the most creative AI programs, Cohen consistently rejects the claims of machine creativity. Questioning the possibility for AI to model human creativity, Cohen suggests in so many words that the human mind takes a different route to creativity, a route that privileges the relational, rather than the computational, dimension of cognition. This unique perspective on the tangled web of mind, machine, and creativity is explored by an application of three relational models of the mind to an analysis of Cohen's talks and writings, which are available on his website: www.aaronshome.com .     

Daily affective reactivity as a prospective predictor of depressive symptoms

Daily affective reactivity refers to the within-subject relationship between daily stress and daily mood. Most stress researchers have conceptualized daily affective reactivity as a dependent variable to be predicted by individual difference variables such as personality and psychopathology. In contrast, in our recent research, we have conceptualized daily affective reactivity as an independent variable that can predict depressive symptoms. In this article, we summarize three studies that relied on a daily process methodology and multilevel modeling to assess affective reactivity in the context of daily stressful events. Two of the studies (Cohen, Butler, Gunthert, & Beck, 2005; Gunthert, Cohen, Butler, & Beck, 2005) sampled adult outpatients in cognitive therapy and evaluated the predictive role of daily affective reactivity in treatment outcome (depression reduction). A third study (O'Neill, Cohen, Tolpin, & Gunthert, 2004) evaluated the predictive role of college students' daily affective reactivity in the development of depressive symptoms. We consider the strengths and weaknesses of a daily process methodology for research on depression in both clinical and nonclinical samples.     

A colorful walk on the mental number line: Striving for the right direction

Verguts and Van Opstal [Verguts, T., & Van Opstal, F. (2008). A colorful walk, but is it on the mental number line? Reply to Cohen Kadosh, Tzelgov, and Henik, Cognition, 106, 558-563] cleverly explained the results of Cohen Kadosh, Tzelgov, and Henik [Cohen Kadosh, R., Tzelgov, J., & Henik, A. (2008). A synesthetic walk on the mental number line: The size effect, Cognition, 106, 548-557] as a result of different association strength between the size of a number and its color in synesthesia. Here we present three challenges to their alternative explanation, and support our original suggestion.     

Political Realism and Fact-Sensitivity

Political realists complain that much contemporary political philosophy is insufficiently attentive to various facts about politics yet some political philosophers insist that any critique of normative claims on grounds of unrealism is misplaced. In this paper I focus on the methodological position G.A. Cohen champions in order assess the extent to which this retort succeeds in nullifying the realist critique of contemporary political philosophy. I argue that Cohen’s work does not succeed in doing so because the political principles that we are prepared to endorse are hostage to various fact-sensitive judgements about how they apply to the political domain. I then argue that this discredits various philosophical approaches to political theorising which begin by utilising non-political thought-experiments, such as Cohen’s own Why Not Socialism?     

Meta-Invariant Structure in Stimulus Arrays: A Response to Mace's Zetetic Challenge to Ecological Perceptual Researchers

ABSTRACT

Ecological perception, per James Gibson's theory, avows that perception depends on informative structure in stimulus arrays, where information is defined as stimulus array invariants. Gibson, however, was somewhat vague about the nature of such structure. Consequently, ecological perceptual research—even acknowledging some remarkable successes—has generally been ad hoc: Lacking principled heuristics, researchers examine array structure, which, by some means, they have come to discover as (or believe to be) informative. Here, I propose a series of heuristic principles potentially useful for the discovery of informative structure in stimulus arrays, with examples to suggest how those principles might apply. The major benefit of principled search for stimulus array invariants is more efficient elaboration of their function in perception. While admittedly preliminary, the principles outlined may both guide perceptual investigations and prompt additional consideration of how to approach the search for stimulus array invariants.