Why We Do Not See What We Feel

Of all of Berkeley's claims about perception, perhaps the most unusual is his assertion that we do not see the numerically same objects we feel. Ideas are radically heterogeneous. The question I seek to answer is why Berkeley thought this thesis true. Traditional accounts hold that Berkeley was forced into accepting heterogeneity by his views concerning either distance or abstraction, but careful analysis reveals these to be mistaken. I conclude that how Berkeley thought of the ontic status of ideas finishes the incomplete picture provided by traditional accounts, and supplies us with a better under-standing of his views on perceptual heterogeneity.     

Long Working Hours and Well-being: What We Know,What We Do Not Know,and What We Need to Know

Despite a widespread belief in both the academic and public policy literatures that working long hours is deleterious to health and well-being, our critical review of this large and complex literature fails to support a robust direct causal effect of work hours on either physical or mental well-being outcomes. Large-scale epidemiological studies, many of which are prospective and include objective health outcome measures, support a statistically significant association between long work hours and coronary heart disease and depression, but the effect sizes are very small. Moreover, there is an absence of true longitudinal studies that assess the consistency of working long hours over time and its relationship to well-being. Our review suggests that the effects of working long hours are nuanced in that they may vary considerably for different working populations based on gender, age, working conditions, and other factors. Primary and meta-analytic studies suggest that such moderator effects are plausible, yet rigorous testing of these remains to be done. We conclude with suggestions for specific moderator effects that seem worth investigating in future research.     

We Do Not Count by Identity

It is widely assumed in psychology, philosophy, and linguistics that we count by identity. For example, to count the dogs by identity, we correlate each dog that isn't identical to the rest with a natural number, starting with one and assigning each successive dog the successive natural number. When we run out of distinct dogs, we've yielded a correct count. I argue that this model of counting is incorrect. We do not count by identity.     

Frege's Cardinals Do Not Always Obey Hume's Principle

Hume's Principle, dear to neo-Logicists, maintains that equinumerosity is both necessary and sufficient for sameness of cardinal number. All the same, Whitehead demonstrated in Principia Mathematica's logic of relations (where non-homogeneous relations are allowed) that Cantor's power-class theorem entails that Hume's Principle admits of exceptions. Of course, Hume's Principle concerns cardinals and in Principia's ‘no-classes’ theory cardinals are not objects in Frege's sense. But this paper shows that the result applies as well to the theory of cardinal numbers as objects set out in Frege's Grundgesetze. Though Frege did not realize it, Cantor's power-theorem entails that Frege's cardinals as objects do not always obey Hume's Principle.     

Why We Do What We Do When We Teach Pastoral Theology at United Theological College (UTC), Sydney

This paper seeks to reflect in a narrative way on the pedagogical processes involved in teaching pastoral theology at United Theological College, Sydney. The paper recognizes that the process of learning pastoral theology is a significant part of the content learned in pastoral theology. The learning process in pastoral theology also contributes to (trans)formational learning in those being formed for ministry. The paper seeks to contribute to the community of pastoral theologians by reflecting on the experience of teaching within a particular school.     

Sincerely Asserting What You Do Not Believe

I offer examples showing that, pace G. E. Moore, it is possible to assert ‘Q and I don't believe that Q’ sincerely, truly, and without any absurdity. The examples also refute the following principles: (a) justification to assert p entails justification to assert that one believes p (Gareth Evans); (b) the sincerity condition on assertion is that one believes what one says (John Searle); and (c) to assert (to someone) something that one believes to be false is to lie (Don Fallis).     

Our Eyes Do Not Always Go Where We Want Them to Go: Capture of the Eyes by New Objects

Observers make rapid eye movements to examine the world around them. Before an eye movement is made, attention is covertly shifted to the location of the object of interest. The eyes typically will land at the position at which attention is directed. Here we report that a goal-directed eye movement toward a uniquely colored object is disrupted by the appearance of a new but task-irrelevant object, unless subjects have a sufficient amount of time to focus their attention on the location of the target prior to the appearance of the new object. In many instances, the eyes started moving toward the new object before gaze started to shift to the color-singleton target. The eyes often landed for a very short period of time (25–150 ms) near the new object. The results suggest parallel programming of two saccades: one voluntary, goal-directed eye movement toward the color-singleton target and one stimulus-driven eye movement reflexively elicited by the appearance of the new object. Neuroanatomical structures responsible for parallel programming of saccades are discussed.     

PREVENTING ACQUAINTANCE RAPE THROUGH EDUCATION What Do We Know

Emerging information that rape primarily occurs between acquaintances has not only exploded our understanding of this problem, but forced a reexamination of our notions of prevention. In recent years, the vast majority of rape prevention programs have taken the format of educational workshops, with the underlying assumption that change in rape-supportive ideologies will decrease the actual incidence of sexual aggression. This article critically reviews such rape prevention education with particular focus on common techniques such as: "debunking" rape mythology, generating participant interaction, providing sexuality education and a feminist orientation, and avoiding confrontational approaches. Finally, theoretical and practical concerns are discussed regarding previous experiences of sexual victimization or perpetration, the conceptualization and use of outcome measures, issues of program facilitation, and processes underlying change in rape-supportive ideologies. It is concluded that future research must seriously address these many issues through thoughtful conceptualization and rigorous experimentation, so that the promise of rape prevention can be fully realized.     

What We Share Is Who We Are and What We Do: How Emotional Intimacy Shapes Organizational Identification and Collaborative Behaviors

We focus on the concept of emotional intimacy among organizational members and investigate its influence on both their (a) perceptions and (b) behaviors. With regard to employees’ perceptions, we test whether it is organizational identification (operationalized as cognitive and affective identification with the organization) that influences emotional intimacy or the reverse. At the behavioral level, we investigate the interplay between employee emotional intimacy and organizational identification and their effects on employee interpersonal helping (OCB-Is; interpersonal organizational citizenship behaviors) and interpersonal conflict (CWB-Is; interpersonal counterproductive workplace behaviors). Based on a three-wave panel study among nurses working in a public hospital, our findings show that emotional intimacy influences organizational identification, and it represents a unique antecedent of OCB-Is and CWB-Is.     

Living Danger: On Not Knowing What We Know

This paper contextualizes the struggle around the American Psychological Association's ethical standards regarding psychologists' participation in abusive interrogations of detainees by examining the psychological and political meanings of living in a society in which the state assumes the right to torture. To highlight the implications of authoritarian trends in America's post-9/11 political culture, I offer an interdisciplinary psychoanalytic analysis of the extreme social situation of the Argentine Dirty War, in which torture was used by the military government not as a tactic to make detainees talk but as a strategy to silence an entire population. I explore the defense mechanism of disavowal and its use by both perpetrators and victims in ways that contributed to sustaining authoritarian rule in Argentina. I suggest that it is within the legitimate arena of psychoanalysis to consider the psychological meanings of patients' experience in the larger social order. I argue for a psychoanalytic project that does not disavow the centrality of social reality in the formation of subjectivity and for a clinical model that provides a potential space in which the subject can develop a critical psyche able to co-construct a more democratic political as well as personal life.