Fundamental axioms for preference relations

Summary The basic theory of preference relations contains a trivial part reflected by axioms A1 and A2, which say that preference relations are preorders. The next step is to find other axims which carry the theory beyond the level of the trivial. This paper is to a great part a critical survey of such suggested axioms. The results are much in the negative — many proposed axioms imply too strange theorems to be acceptable as axioms in a general theory of preference. This does not exclude, of course, that they may well be reasonable axioms for special calculi of preference. I believe that many axioms which are rejected here may be plausible if their range of application is restricted by conditions which are possible to formulate only in a language richer than that of the propositional calculus, e.g. in one containing modal operators or probabilistic concepts.     

A method of weighing qualitative preference axioms

A method is developed for determining the absolute and relative strengths of qualitative preference axioms in normative Bayesian decision theory. These strengths are calculated for the three most common qualitative axioms; transitivity, the sure-thing principle, and dominance. The relative strength of the latter two axioms with respect to transitivity is calculated for special cases, and a bound is derived which is applicable to a larger class of decision problems. Possible implications of this theoretical work for decision heuristics are discussed.     

Probability, logic and the cognitive foundations of rational belief

Since Pascal introduced the idea of mathematical probability in the 17th century discussions of uncertainty and “rational” belief have been dogged by philosophical and technical disputes. Furthermore, the last quarter century has seen an explosion of new questions and ideas, stimulated by developments in the computer and cognitive sciences. Competing ideas about probability are often driven by different intuitions about the nature of belief that arise from the needs of different domains (e.g., economics, management theory, engineering, medicine, the life sciences etc). Taking medicine as our focus we develop three lines of argument (historical, practical and cognitive) that suggest that traditional views of probability cannot accommodate all the competing demands and diverse constraints that arise in complex real-world domains. A model of uncertain reasoning based on a form of logical argumentation appears to unify many diverse ideas. The model has precursors in informal discussions of argumentation due to Toulmin, and the notion of logical probability advocated by Keynes, but recent developments in artificial intelligence and cognitive science suggest ways of resolving epistemological and technical issues that they could not address.     

New foundations for counterfactuals

Philosophers typically rely on intuitions when providing a semantics for counterfactual conditionals. However, intuitions regarding counterfactual conditionals are notoriously shaky. The aim of this paper is to provide a principled account of the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. This principled account is provided by what I dub the Royal Rule, a deterministic analogue of the Principal Principle relating chance and credence. The Royal Rule says that an ideal doxastic agent’s initial grade of disbelief in a proposition \(A\) , given that the counterfactual distance in a given context to the closest \(A\) -worlds equals \(n\) , and no further information that is not admissible in this context, should equal \(n\) . Under the two assumptions that the presuppositions of a given context are admissible in this context, and that the theory of deterministic alethic or metaphysical modality is admissible in any context, it follows that the counterfactual distance distribution in a given context has the structure of a ranking function. The basic conditional logic V is shown to be sound and complete with respect to the resulting rank-theoretic semantics of counterfactuals.     

A problem for information theoretic semantics

Information theoretic semantics proposes to construe predicate reference in terms of nomological relations between distal properties and properties of representational mental events. Research on the model has largely concentrated on the problem of choosing the nomological relation in terms of which distal properties are to be singled out. I argue that, in addition to this, an information theoretic account has to provide a specification of which properties of representational mental events will play a role in determining reference,qua bearers of nomological relations. I contend that this task poses a serious additional challenge to the viability of the model.I am indebted to Paul Boghossian, Allan Gibbard, Eric Lormand, Peter Railton, Gideon Rosen, Crispin Wright, and Steve Yablo for their comments on drafts of this paper.     

Semantic foundations for conditional permission

Conclusion The principal aim of the present paper has been the presentation of a semantical foundation for an important species of deontic logic (viz., the conditional variety). This semantical approach to the problem is essentially new and has the advantage of providing a complex of conceptual machinery by means of which this branch of applied logic can be placed upon a more rigorous and solid foundation. Above all, it makes available a logically rigorous criterion of acceptability for deontic principles by means of which questions in this sphere can be treated and resolved upon other than intuitive grounds.     

Probabilistic foundations for coefficients of generalizability

This paper explores certain problems which arise within the context of the theory of generalizability put forward by Cornbach, Rajaratnam, and Gleser. In particular, a formal explication of their theory for the single observation is given, and the various coefflcients of generalizability which they define are related to the estimation of universe scores.This work is based on a Master's thesis submitted to the University of Illinois in 1963. The author is particularly indebted to Dr. Lee J. Cornbach and Dr. Ledyard R Tucker for their unstinted advice and help.     

Model theoretic results for infinitely deep languages

We define a subhierarchy of the infinitely deep languagesN described by Jaakko Hintikka and Veikko Rantala. We shall show that some model theoretic results well-known in the model theory of the ordinary infinitary languages can be generalized for these new languages. Among these are the downward Löwenheim-Skolem and o's theorems as well as some compactness properties.     

Philosophical foundations of respect for autonomy

Understanding the philosophical foundations of the principle of respect for autonomy is essential for its proper application within medical ethics. The foundations provided by Immanuel Kant's principle of humanity and John Stuart Mill's principle of liberty share substantial areas of agreement including: the grounding of respect for autonomy in the capacity for rational agency, the restriction of this principle to rational agents, and the important distinction between influence and control. Their work helps to clarify the scope and role of the principle of respect for autonomy in health care delivery; its implications for truth telling, informed consent, and confidentiality; and its relationship to other moral principles, such as beneficence and distributive justice.     

Theological foundations for spiritual care

Five theological tenets are described which may undergird the integration of religious awareness and spiritual care into nursing curricula. The five all emphasize addressing the articulated needs of the patient within the context of the nursing process. These tenets, while Wesleyan in emphasis, suggest ways in which any nurse may engage in the common ministry of all Christians without usurping the role of clergy or chaplains.This article is a revision of a chapter of Dr. Brittain's doctoral dissertation from St. Mary's Seminary and University.     

Tests of product and additive scaling axioms

A product axiom for ratio judgments and an additive axiom for difference judgments were tested for six Ss judging brightness. The product axiom was rejected for all six Ss whereas the additive axiom was accepted for two Ss. Power functions did not fit the data well, although somewhat better for difference judgments than ratio judgments. A two-stage model fitted somewhat better, but failed to satisfy one important implication of that model, previously confirmed for lifted weights. The data gave stronger support for a theory of brightness estimation based on an additive axiom for difference judgments than a product axiom based on ratio judgments.     

Metascientific foundations for pluralism in psychology

In this paper, I explore the metascientific basis for pluralism in psychology. In the first half, I outline the two levels of the metaparadigm: the epistemological and the methodological. The epistemological level includes the dichotomy between an internal, first-person point of view and an external, third-person one. The methodological level includes the dichotomy between explanation and understanding. The continuing debate regarding methodology, explanation versus understanding, has distinguished the human sciences from the natural sciences. Similarly, the continuing debate regarding the epistemological point of view has distinguished psychology from other sciences. I illustrate these points by placing various trends in psychology into the two-dimensional space formed by the two coordinate axes depicting the methodological and the epistemological dimensions. Each quadrant represents one definition of the object of psychology: quadrant 1 (internal, first-person - explanation) represents “consciousness;” quadrant 2 (internal, first-person - understanding) represents “experiences;” quadrant 3 (external, third-person - understanding) represents “meaningful acts and expressions;” and quadrant 4 (external, third-person - explanation) represents “behaviors and higher processes of the brain.” All of the trends within the history of psychology can be placed within this two-dimensional space. In the second half of the paper, I introduce the third level of the metaparadigm: the metapsychological level. This level includes the three different, and incompatible conceptions of humans: the first-person, the second-person, and the third-person conceptions. A third-person conception of humans is most compatible with trends placed in quadrant 4. A second-person conceptualization is most congruent with quadrant 3, and so on. Thus, the unification of psychologies emerges as not only difficult but actually unreasonable, because the plurality of psychological paradigms originates from the epistemological, methodological, and metapsychological levels of the metaparadigm.     

The preference for potential

When people seek to impress others, they often do so by highlighting individual achievements. Despite the intuitive appeal of this strategy, we demonstrate that people often prefer potential rather than achievement when evaluating others. Indeed, compared with references to achievement (e.g., "this person has won an award for his work"), references to potential (e.g., "this person could win an award for his work") appear to stimulate greater interest and processing, which can translate into more favorable reactions. This tendency creates a phenomenon whereby the potential to be good at something can be preferred over actually being good at that very same thing. We document this preference for potential in laboratory and field experiments, using targets ranging from athletes to comedians to graduate school applicants and measures ranging from salary allocations to online ad clicks to admission decisions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Measures of kearnels of reducibility axioms and singlets

The present paper is a generalization and further development of the theory of Kernel measures of reducibility axioms formulated in [1], [2], [3] in. the years 1969–1973. In this paper logical connections of Kernel measures with some set-theoretical notions are studied and some suggestions related to these connections are formulated.