Overestimating the Importance of the Given Information in Multiattribute Consumer Judgment

Consumer judgment often is based on incomplete or limited knowledge of the relevant attributes. We performed 3 experiments to investigate why these judgments are often insensitive to set size and why evaluations based on limited information tend to be stronger (more extreme and confident) than is warranted. The findings indicate that the importance of the given or known attributes is often overestimated, leading to evaluations that are overly extreme. The experiments also revealed important factors moderating this insensitivity to limited information. The overweighing of the given evidence was attenuated when participants were knowledgeable of the target domain. Overweighing and the formation of extreme judgments based on limited information was also diminished when participants considered their judgmental criteria prior to evaluating a target or when a comparison target described by different attributes was present.     

Just how comparative are comparative judgments?

Three studies investigate the psychology of comparative judgment, examining the circumstances under which judgments tend to concentrate disproportionately on one of the two elements that underlie the comparison (i.e., focused comparisons). We examine these tendencies at the judgment formation and information retrieval stages by examining judgment content as well as the speed and efficiency with which people make comparisons. The results replicate prior findings of differential weighting, indicating that focusing occurs in the formation stage of comparative judgments. However, focusing is absent in the reaction time data, suggesting that both elements of the comparison are equally accessible when individuals retrieve comparison-relevant information. These findings clarify the process by which people arrive at comparative judgments and demonstrate precisely when focused comparisons occur.     

The Effects of Decoys on Preference Shifts: The Role of Attractiveness and Providing Justification

The relative preference for a target product over a competitor can be increased by providing a third alternative (a “decoy”) that is clearly inferior to the target but is not necessarily inferior to the competitor. In 3 experiments, we examined the conditions in which these decoy effects occur. When participants reported their preferences immediately after being exposed to the information about them, the influence of decoys on preferences was attributable to the justification they provided for choosing the target over the competitor. (That is, a decoy had an impact if and only if the target was superior to the decoy but the competitor was not.) When participants evaluated each product individually before making their choices, however, they based their preferences on these evaluations. In this case, decoys exerted their influence through their impact on the values that participants assigned to the attributes on which the evaluations were based. This influence was evident even when the decoy was clearly inferior to both the target and competitor. Moreover, it occurred under conditions in which the target and competitor were in different product categories and also when the decoy was in a totally different product domain than the target and competitor.     

Effects of salience and time pressure on ratings of social causality

A model is proposed to account for the effects of a target person's salience on judgments of that target. It is argued that salience leads to more extreme inferences in the direction implied by prior knowledge that is relevant to the judgment. This knowledge may include both specific information about the target being rated and general information about the class of stimuli to which the target belongs. Two experiments supported these hypotheses. When subjects were under time pressure to make judgments of a target person's influence in a social situation, their judgments increased with the salience of the target when they had prior knowledge that the target was generally high in social influence. However, their judgments decreased with the target's salience when subjects had prior knowledge that the target was generally low in social influence. When subjects were given ample time to make their judgments, however, the effects of target salience were attenuated. Possible implications of these findings for prior research on salience effects are discussed.     

Narcissistic Responding to Ego Threat: When the Status of the Evaluator Matters

ABSTRACT Narcissists and nonnarcissists were insulted by high-status and low-status evaluators and were given an opportunity to self-protect with a comparative (evaluator derogation; Experiment 1 ) and noncomparative (inflated state self-esteem; Experiments 1 and 2 ) strategy. Narcissists engaged in comparative self-protection indiscriminately (i.e., derogating both low-status and high-status evaluators), whereas nonnarcissists showed some mercy to low-status evaluators. With regard to noncomparative protection, the findings were consistent across studies: Evaluator status interacted with narcissism such that narcissists engaged in noncomparative self-protection more than nonnarcissists when the evaluator was high, but not low, in status. Evaluator status and, more generally, source of feedback are worth serious consideration when untangling the intricacies and flexibility of narcissistic self-protection.     

Interpersonal similarity as a social distance dimension: Implications for perception of others’ actions

Building on the assumption that interpersonal similarity is a form of social distance, the current research examines the manner in which similarity influences the representation and judgment of others’ actions. On the basis of a construal level approach, we hypothesized that greater levels of similarity would increase the relative weight of subordinate and secondary features of information in judgments of others’ actions. The results of four experiments showed that compared to corresponding judgments of a dissimilar target, participants exposed to a similar target person identified that person’s actions in relatively more subordinate means-related rather than superordinate ends-related terms (Experiment 1), perceived his or her actions to be determined more by feasibility and less by desirability concerns (Experiment 3), and gave more weight to secondary aspects in judgments of the target’s decisions (Experiment 2) and performance (Experiment 4). Implications for the study of interpersonal similarity, as well as social distance in general, are discussed.     

Comparative judgments as an alternative to ratings: identifying the scale origin

Although comparative judgment methods have a number of distinct advantages over ratings, they share one common problem: On the basis of comparative judgments, it is not possible to recover the origin of item evaluations. One item may be judged more positively than another, but this result does not allow any conclusions about whether either of the items are attractive or unattractive. This article discusses the implications of this limitation for the interpretation of individual differences in comparative judgments. It also presents 3 different methods that may allow determination of the scale origin using a nested model comparison approach. An application illustrates the proposed approach as well as the benefits of determining the scale origin in understanding value judgments.     

Using latent semantic analysis to assess reader strategies

We tested a computer-based procedure for assessing reader strategies that was based on verbal protocols that utilized latent semantic analysis (LSA). Students were given self-explanation—reading training (SERT), which teaches strategies that facilitate self-explanation during reading, such as elaboration based on world knowledge and bridging between text sentences. During a computerized version of SERT practice, students read texts and typed self-explanations into a computer after each sentence. The use of SERT strategies during this practice was assessed by determining the extent to which students used the information in the current sentence versus the prior text or world knowledge in their self-explanations. This assessment was made on the basis of human judgments and LSA. Both human judgments and LSA were remarkably similar and indicated that students who were not complying with SERT tended to paraphrase the text sentences, whereas students who were compliant with SERT tended to explain the sentences in terms of what they knew about the world and of information provided in the prior text context. The similarity between human judgments and LSA indicates that LSA will be useful in accounting for reading strategies in a Web-based version of SERT.     

Brand Congruity and Comparative Advertising: When and Why Comparative Advertisements Lead to Greater Elaboration

Two experiments are conducted to examine when and why comparative advertisements lead to elaboration. Comparative advertisements in which the sponsor brand and the comparison brand are perceived to be dissimilar lead to greater elaboration, as evidenced by differences in argument quality, than comparative advertisements in which the sponsor and comparison brands are perceived to be similar. This pattern is particularly strong for those individuals not chronically predisposed to elaborate (low need for cognition), whereas those individuals chronically predisposed to elaborate (high need for cognition) elaborate the ads regardless of comparison composition. Results are consistent with our proposed brand congruity explanation.     

How Judgments Change Following Comparison of Current and Prior Information

Although much observed judgment change is superficial and occurs without considering prior information, other forms of change also occur. Comparison between prior and new information about an issue may trigger change by influencing either or both the perceived strength and direction of the new information. In four experiments, participants formed and reported initial judgments of a policy based on favorable written information about it. Later, these participants read a second passage containing strong favorable or unfavorable information on the policy. Compared to control conditions, subtle and direct prompts to compare the initial and new information led to more judgment change in the direction of a second passage perceived to be strong. Mediation analyses indicated that comparison yielded greater perceived strength of the second passage, which in turn correlated positively with judgment change. Moreover, self-reports of comparison mediated the judgment change resulting from comparison prompts.     

Proportionate responses to life events influence clinicians' judgments of psychological abnormality

Psychological abnormality is a fundamental concept in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and in all clinical evaluations. How do practicing clinical psychologists use the context of life events to judge the abnormality of a person's current behaviors? The appropriate role of life-event context in assessment has long been the subject of intense debate and scrutiny among clinical theorists, yet relatively little is known about clinicians' own judgments in practice. The authors propose a proportionate-response hypothesis, such that judgments of abnormality are influenced by whether the behaviors are a disproportionate response to past events, rendering them difficult to understand or explain. Licensed, practicing clinical psychologists (N = 77) were presented with vignettes describing hypothetical people's behaviors (disordered, mildly distressed, or unaffected) that had been preceded by either traumatic or mildly distressing events. Experts' judgments of abnormality were strongly and systematically influenced by the degree of mismatch between the past event and current behaviors in strength and valence, such that the greater the mismatch, the more abnormal the person seemed. A separate, additional group of clinical psychologists (N = 20) further confirmed that the greater the degree of mismatch, the greater the perceived difficulty in understanding the patient. These findings held true across clinicians of different theoretical orientations and in disorders for which these patterns of judgments ran contrary to formal recommendations in the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The rationality of these effects and implications for clinical decision science are discussed.     

Dilution and confirmation of probability judgments based on nondiagnostic evidence

Previous research has shown that probability judgments based on a mix of diagnostic and nondiagnostic information are less extreme than judgments based on the diagnostic information alone. Results of the present experiments suggest that this dilution effect holds only under a limited set of conditions. When judgments based on a mix of diagnostic and nondiagnostic information are compared with separately elicited judgments based on the diagnostic information alone, the dilution effect is consistently observed. When judgments based on the diagnostic evidence are revised in light of additional, nondiagnostic evidence, by contrast, the dilution effect is eliminated or even reversed (yielding a confirmation effect) depending on the type of nondiagnostic evidence under evaluation.     

Cognitive processes and conflict in close relationships: an attribution-efficacy model

A recently proposed model of cognitive processes underlying conflict in close relationships (Doherty, 1978, 1981a, 1981b) is revised and tested in two studies. Central to the original model are the causal attributions made for conflict and the perceived efficacy or ability to resolve conflict. The model is revised to incorporate judgments of responsibility and to provide a closer link to self-efficacy theory. The first study examines attributions and efficacy expectations in mother-child relationships. As anticipated, only weak evidence was obtained for predictions retained from the original model, high-lighting the relationship-specific nature of cognitive processes for conflict in families. A second study examines husband-wife relationships and provides evidence for the usefulness of an attribution-efficacy model for marital conflict. The attributional component of the model received greater support than that pertaining to efficacy expectations. In both studies, support was obtained for the proposal that the relation between conflict dimensions (e.g., blame) and causal dimensions is mediated by judgments of responsibility. The significance of the revisions to Doherty's model for understanding conflict in close relationships is discussed, and several avenues for further research are outlined.     

The Effect of Effort and Weight Controllability on Perceptions of Obese Individuals

We examined the impact of offset controllability (capability of losing weight) and offset effort (efforts to lose weight) on judgments of an obese target. Participants (n = 216) read about an obese person whose body weight was controllable/uncontrollable, and who did/did not put in effort to eat healthily and exercise. Effort played a more important role than controllability in evaluations of the target. Targets who put in effort to be healthy were ascribed fewer obesity stereotypes, evoked less disgust, and were considered to have a more acceptable lifestyle. These findings extend attribution theory and have implications for strategies to reduce weight bias.     

Pragmatic expectations and linguistic evidence: Listeners anticipate but do not integrate common ground

When listeners search for the referent of a speaker’s expression, they experience interference from privileged knowledge, knowledge outside of their ‘common ground’ with the speaker. Evidence is presented that this interference reflects limitations in lexical processing. In three experiments, listeners’ eye movements were monitored as they searched for the target of a speaker’s referring expression in a display that also contained a phonological competitor (e.g., bucket/buckle). Listeners anticipated that the speaker would refer to something in common ground, but they did not experience less interference from a competitor in privileged ground than from a matched competitor in common ground. In contrast, interference from the competitor was eliminated when it was ruled out by a semantic constraint. These findings support a view of comprehension as relying on multiple systems with distinct access to information and present a challenge for constraint-based views of common ground.     

The cost of collaboration: why joint decision making exacerbates rejection of outside information

Prior investigators have asserted that certain group characteristics cause group members to disregard outside information and that this behavior leads to diminished performance. We demonstrate that the very process of making a judgment collaboratively rather than individually also contributes to such myopic underweighting of external viewpoints. Dyad members exposed to numerical judgments made by peers gave significantly less weight to those judgments than did individuals working alone. This difference in willingness to use peer input was mediated by the greater confidence that the dyad members reported in the accuracy of their own estimates. Furthermore, dyads were no better at judging the relative accuracy of their own estimates and the advisor's estimates than individuals were. Our analyses demonstrate that, relative to individuals, dyads suffered an accuracy cost. Specifically, if dyad members had given as much weight to peer input as individuals working alone did, then their revised estimates would have been significantly more accurate.     

The Effect of Reducing Opportunities for Downward Comparison on Comparative Optimism

Comparative optimism is a pervasive tendency for people to rate personal future prospects more favorably than those of comparable others. This may be caused by deliberately choosing targets on the basis of vulnerability. Restricting the range of comparison targets reduces the opportunity to make downward comparisons and should reduce comparative optimism. We asked 100 undergraduates to assemble a list of other students known to them. Participants estimated their personal risk of being victim of a road crash and skin cancer, and estimated the risk of 2 targets from the list. The participant selected one target, while the experimenter randomly chose the other target. Comparative optimism was greater in the participant-selected target condition, and this effect was almost exclusive to participants who reported making downward comparisons. We concluded that downward comparison processes could affect comparative optimism when targets are individual people.     

Elaboration and Attitude Strength: The New Meta‐cognitive Perspective

The effect of elaboration (i.e., information processing) on attitude strength has been a key prediction of some of the most influential theories of persuasion over the past few decades. This article provides a new look at this relationship. After reviewing support for the notion that structural processes (i.e., knowledge acquisition, structural consistency, and attitude accessibility) drive the effect of elaboration on attitude strength, we examine recent work investigating the role of meta‐cognitive factors in this domain. Based on recent evidence, we propose that the effect of elaboration on attitude strength depends largely on people's perceptions of their own elaboration and their beliefs that more elaboration produces better judgments that can be held with greater certainty. We highlight the role of naïve theories in these effects, suggesting that they might be more malleable than previously known, and call for future research into some of the important remaining questions in this area that have yet to be fully explored.