论人的尊严与死亡权

人的尊严是一项古老价值,历史上的思想家对人的尊严理论的分歧在于它是内生的还是获得的。尽管这种争论至今未有定论,但二战后的法律文件将人的尊严地位提升到人权基础的高度。就临终病人的死亡权而言,康德"基于道德自主的人的尊严"之哲学智慧受到挑战。人的尊严之现代意蕴主张以"尊重人"替代"尊重选择"而成为首要原则。人的尊严是病人自主的基础。死亡权的尊严内涵是作为选择的尊严和作为关系的尊严之有效结合。     

生殖技术和女性的尊严

当代生殖技术对女性的尊严可能带来双重效应:一方面可能提升女性的尊严,另一方面也可能贬损女性的尊严.女性惟有摆脱父权制文化给定的女性形象,重构女性主体性,赢得做人的尊严,才能维护自己的女性尊严.也就是说女人只有首先被当做人来尊重,然后才可能被当做女人来尊重.惟其如此,生殖技术对于女人才是福音,否则它会成为女人的梦魇.     

死亡的尊严:儒家和西方观点的比较

死亡的尊严问题是当代生命伦理学中讨论的一个重要问题。在当代的医疗实践中,各种新的医疗技术在老年人临终阶段的应用,已经引发了各种维护死亡的尊严之激烈争论。本文试图重建儒家的人的尊严和死亡的尊严之基本含义,并从这些观念出发,对死亡的尊严与人的生物学生命之关系,死亡的尊严与人的痛苦之关系,以及死亡的尊严同人的自主性之关系进行分析,并与西方思想家在这些问题上的立场做比较。文章还表明了,儒家关于人的尊严的观点是对以上问题作出的更好回答,它有助于化解西方死亡伦理研究中出现的概念混乱和理论矛盾。     

论人的尊严之向度

人的尊严是人之为人的基本属性和内在价值,它在哲学上具有两个向度,即人的尊严一方面是普遍性的,这是确保人的生存地位的基本尊严,是人之为人的根本标志。作为普遍性的人的尊严是授予性的,是平等的、客观的,这是人所共有的生物性使然。另一方面,人的尊严又是独特性的,是我之为我的特殊符号,这是由于每个人在后天的自我发展中都会凸显个我性。作为独特性的人的尊严是获得性的,是差异的、主观的、相对的,这是人所区别的社会性使然。作为独特性的尊严,既可获得,使之丰厚、高尚,也可丧失,使之薄寡、卑劣。     

生命伦理学语境中人的尊严

学科语境的首要因素是学科宗旨。生命伦理学以保护人类生命及其相关权利为宗旨,其语境中人的尊严有三个主要特征:以生命尊严为内核,以人格尊严为外围;属于现代人类中心主义价值观;具有指导化解原则冲突、奠基相关权利、贯通法律和政策等作用,是生命伦理学建制化行动的指南。在如何对待人的问题上,"人的尊严"凝聚了宗教和世俗、伦理和法律、政府和民间的道德共识,是生命伦理学的宝贵资源。     

宪政的伦理基础及其社会价值追求

宪政伦理是指宪政的正当性及其道德意蕴.宪政的正当性来源于人类个体固有的最高价值--人的尊严,宪政制度生存的正当性基础即在于它是保障人有尊严地生活.人的尊严和价值的实现,是人的各种本质力量的全面发挥,是人之生存所内在的终极关怀的理性表达.终极关怀是人类最终获得全面自由的发展和彻底解放所需要的最高关怀.因此,在这个意义上可以说,宪政伦理在社会雏度所具有的道德意蕴就是人的解放,而在社会中保障人的应有权利则是人的解放的具体途径.     

精神科医师医疗干涉权的伦理限度

精神科医师特殊干涉权,因精神科领域医疗活动的行为、对象及医师权利具有特殊性,同时符合伦理学的不伤害原则和公正原则,这也是医师自主权的合理运用,因此具有合理性.但是在社会实践中,干涉权由于经常被扩张化而侵犯了患者的利益.由此提出干涉权必须坚持人道主义精神的、坚持医学伦理学的基本原则以及技术规范.     

论职业安全卫生权

职业安全卫生权是雇员享有或应该享有的不受职场危险因素和有害因素的侵害以及遭受侵害后获得及时充分救济,从而使其职业安全和健康获得保障的权利体系,包含着安全卫生知情权、安全卫生条件权、紧急避险权等十多项子权利.职业安全卫生权在个别劳权中处于首要位置,是劳动者的基本人权;它既是公权利,也是私权利;既是法定权利,也是应有权利.法律途径是职业安全卫生权实现的基本途径,但同时,社会途径和劳资契约途径也起着不可替代的作用.     

人的尊严是社会保障的伦理基础

社会保障的伦理阐释是一项以伦理学的讨论为基础,同时运用哲学思辨的方法探讨社会保障的道德正当性、内涵的伦理意蕴及伦理价值并对它们进行反思的活动。活动的起点是社会保障的道德正当性,即社会保障的伦理基础问题。作为一种道德权利的人的尊严体现着人之为人的价值,彰显出社会保障的道德正当性。社会保障通过保障每个人免于生存危机来实现人的尊严;社会保障体系的建立意味着对人的尊严和自由的生存状态的保障。     

论保护基因隐私需要引入权利形式

基因技术的发展将基因隐私保护问题摆在人类面前,“采用怎样的方式才能有效保护基因隐私”是一个亟待解决的疑问。从分析侵犯基因隐私所带来的社会危害出发,对“权利形式是否适用于保护基因隐私”这一问题进行分析,并得出肯定性结论。     

Communication Rights in a Divided World

This article explores the implications of advances in communication technology for communication rights and the political, economic, and cultural challenges at global, national, and local levels. It argues that digital transformation cannot be left to market forces or to a benign vision of a world in which all governments are sufficiently liberal minded to permit dissent and peaceful revolution. Rather, digital transformation needs to be driven by the needs of peoples and communities who help construct communication and information ecosystems that are firmly rooted in principles of justice, freedom, equality, and mutual solidarity. To that extent, people and communities must be enabled to reach their own consensuses around their needs and what should be done, and they must be regularly and constructively consulted by those charged with implementing, regulating, and monitoring such ecosystems.     

Welfare Rights and Conflicts of Rights

The fact that welfare rights – rights to food, shelter and medical care – will conflict with one another is often taken to be good reason to exclude welfare rights from the catalogue of genuine rights. Rather than respond to this objection by pointing out that all rights conflict, welfare rights proponents need to take the conflicts objection seriously. The existence of potentially conflicting and more weighty normative considerations counts against a claim’s status as a genuine right. To think otherwise would be to threaten the peremptory force – and hence the analytical integrity – of rights. The conflicts objection is made more pressing once we have conceded that welfare rights give people entitlements to what are potentially scarce goods. I argue that welfare rights can survive the conflicts objection if, and only if, we take scarcity into account in the framing of a given welfare right. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Nuffield Political Theory Workshop in Oxford and the Canadian Philosophical Association Congress 2006 at York University. I am grateful to Adam Swift, David Miller, Idil Boran, Sarah McCallum and two anonymous referees for their comments, and to the Economic and Social Research Council for research funding.     

Genetic Information,Rights, and Autonomy

Rights, autonomy, privacy, and confidentialityare concepts commonly used in discussionsconcerning genetic information. When theseconcepts are thought of as denoting absolutenorms and values which cannot be overriden byother considerations, conflicts among themnaturally occur.In this paper, these and related notions areexamined in terms of the duties and obligationsmedical professionals and their clients canhave regarding genetic knowledge. It issuggested that while the prevailing idea ofautonomy is unhelpful in the analysis of theseduties, and the ensuing rights, an alternativereading of personal self-determination canprovide a firmer basis for ethical guidelinesand policies in this field.     

Victims,Their Stories,and Our Rights

Diana Meyers argues that breaking the silence of victims and attending to their stories are necessary steps towards realizing human rights. Yet using highly personal victims' stories to promote human rights raises significant moral concerns, hence Meyers suggests that before victims' stories can be accessed and used, it is morally imperative that requirements of informed consent and non‐retraumatization are secured. This article argues that while Meyers' proviso is important, and necessary, it may not be sufficient. First, one potential problem with seeking to secure “informed consent” is that one has to ask for the consent, and in the act of asking one is potentially retraumatizing the victim. Secondly, the assumption that victims have ownership right over their stories, which is a key premise in Meyers's argument, is much more problematic than may appear.     

Respect for People's Rights and Dignity

Summary

This article examines the nature and application of aspirational General Principle E (Respect for Peoples' Rights and Dignity) of the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (American Psychological Association [APA], 2002) and similar principles in other mental health professional ethics codes. Issues about aspirational versus enforceable standards are reviewed. Case examples and illustrations of the principle are provided.     

History, Human Rights, and Globalization

An illustrative comparison of human rights in 1948 and the contemporary period, attempting to gauge the impact of globalization on changes in the content of human rights (e.g., collective rights, women's rights, right to a healthy environment), major abusers and guarantors of human rights (e.g., state actors, transnational corporations, social movements), and alternative justifications of human rights (e.g., pragmatic agreement, moral intuitionism, overlapping consensus, cross‐cultural dialogue).     

Religion and the Human Rights Idea

Three recent books focus, in different ways, on the idea of human rights and its relation to religion and religious ethics. All three books discussed here address criticisms of the human rights idea and seek to establish the relationship of religion and human rights with regard to the field of policy. The present discussion begins with an overview that places these three books in the larger context of the development of the human rights idea and its historical relationship with religion. It then turns to Little's book, next to the collection of essays edited by Twiss, Simion, and Petersen, which is described internally as a Festschrift for Little, and then to Hogan's book, and in the final section it explores comparisons among the books.     

A JEWISH CONCEPTION OF HUMAN DIGNITY

This paper depicts the meanings of human dignity as they unfold and evolve in the Bible and the Halakhah. I posit that three distinct features of a Jewish conception of human dignity can be identified in contrast to core characteristics of a liberal conception of human dignity. First, the original source of human dignity is not intrinsic to the human being but extrinsic, namely in God. Second, it is argued that the “dignity of the people” has precedence over personal autonomy and liberty, which are core liberal pillars. The third characteristic pertains to the potential conflict between personal autonomy and liberty, and God's commandments. The theoretical analysis of human dignity is then examined in light of several Supreme Court decisions in Israel during the 1990s. I illustrate that Jewish religious and secular‐liberal conceptions pull in different directions in the rulings of liberal and religious Justices in Israel.     

Should Inherent Human Dignity Be Considered Intrinsically Heuristic?

What are “human rights” supposed to protect? According to most human rights doctrines, including most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), human rights aim to protect “human dignity.” But what this concept amounts to and what its source is remain unclear. According to Glenn Hughes (2011), human rights theorists ought to consider human dignity as an “intrinsically heuristic concept,” whose content is partially understood but is not fully determined. In this comment, I criticize Hughes's account. On my view, understanding inherent human dignity as an intrinsically heuristic concept tethers it to an “indeterminateness of sense,” which leaves it open to exploitation from theorists unsympathetic to the moral salience of rights and what rights are supposed to protect.     

Human rights without human supremacism*

Early defenders of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights invoked species hierarchy: human beings are owed rights because of our discontinuity with and superiority to animals. Subsequent defenders avoided species supremacism, appealing instead to conditions of embodied subjectivity and corporeal vulnerability we share with animals. In the past decade, however, supremacism has returned in work of the new ‘dignitarians’ who argue that human rights are grounded in dignity, and that human dignity requires according humans a higher status than animals. Against the dignitarians, I argue that defending human rights on the backs of animals is philosophically suspect and politically self-defeating.