Linda问题:"齐当别"抉择模型的解释

大量有关人类归因判断的研究表明,人类经常违反理性概率公理.Tversky和Kahneman(1983)使用Linda问题等特定场景的研究发现,人们系统性地表现出违反理性推断标准,判断合取事件发生概率大于其组成事件发生概率,称之为合取谬误,并用人们使用代表性启发式判断概率来解释该现象产生的原因.然而使用启发式观点对合取谬误现象进行解释过于模糊不清.该文首先介绍了合取谬误现象及其解释模型,然后应用Li(1994,2004)提出的不确定情形下决策理论--"齐当别"抉择模型对Linda问题中合取谬误产生的原因进行了新的解释.     

任务情境和证据信息对青少年贝叶斯推理的影响研究

采用生活情境测查任务和经典测查任务探讨了任务情境对青少年贝叶斯推理的影响,以及生活情境测查任务中不同证据信息对青少年贝叶斯判断的影响作用.结果表明:(1)在生活情境测查任务中,从小学六年级到大学二年级,被试的贝叶斯推理能力稳步缓慢提升(相邻的两个被试组之间差异不显著,而不相邻的两个被试组之间差异更容易达到显著水平),发展没有出现加速期,而经典测查任务情境下没有表现出年龄差异;(2)贝叶斯推理作为条件概率的判断不仅受任务情境的影响,而且同一任务情境中不同证据信息也会影响贝叶斯判断.当证据信息与先验信念一致时,被试可以充分利用线索进行推理.     

Linda问题：“齐当别”抉择模型的解释

大量有关人类归因判断的研究表明,人类经常违反理性概率公理。Tversky和Kahneman（1983）使用Linda问题等特定场景的研究发现,人们系统性地表现出违反理性推断标准,判断合取事件发生概率大于其组成事件发生概率,称之为合取谬误,并用人们使用代表性启发式判断概率来解释该现象产生的原因。然而使用启发式观点对合取谬误现象进行解释过于模糊不清。该文首先介绍了合取谬误现象及其解释模型,然后应用Li（1994,2004）提出的不确定情形下决策理论——“齐当别”抉择模型对Linda问题中合取谬误产生的原因进行了新的解释     

概率判断中的合取谬误

概率判断中的合取谬误是指违反事件发生概率的合取规则而认为包含多个独立事件的复合事件的发生可能性大于其中某些事件的发生可能性的一种概率判断偏差现象。合取谬误的界定存在一定争议, 相关的解释机制有因果模型理论、确认理论、惊奇理论等, 影响合取谬误的因素有频率效应、训练效应以及个体差异等等。未来研究应联系逆转合取谬误的心理机制来完善已有的理论, 同时注意应用研究以及其非理性的探讨。     

认知需要和警告类型对合取谬误的影响

合取谬误是一种常见的判断偏差,它指的是在不确定条件下,个体评估合取事件及其简单事件发生的概率时,对合取规则系统性偏离的一种现象.实验1 就认知需要类型对合取谬误的影响进行探讨,结果发现高认知需要的被试较不易表现出双重合取谬误和单合取谬误.实验2 探讨了警告类型对合取谬误的影响,结果发现无警告时个体最易表现出单合取谬误,其次是间接警告,最后是直接警告;此外,认知需要与警告类型的交互作用显著,高认知需要的被试在直接警告和间接警告时更少表现出双重合取谬误,在直接警告时更少表现出单合取谬误.     

中学生承诺判断的发展特点及友谊和情境因素的影响

本研究采用两难故事情境判断问卷,考察了428名中学生承诺判断的发展特点.结果发现,中学生在不同故事情境下的承诺判断呈现出不同的年级发展趋势.友谊对承诺判断存在影响,整体而言,对好朋友的守诺高于对普通同学的守诺.中学生的承诺判断存在情境差异,承诺对象有无过错和守诺后个人是否有损失两个情境因素共同影响着青少年的承诺判断.     

道德情绪判断、错误信念与行为问题的关系——损人情境中幼儿反应的一项研究

运用投射性情境故事和Rutter量表(教师问卷)研究了204名幼儿对损人情境的道德情绪判断、错误信念水平、行为问题及其关系。结果表明:(1)男性幼儿的违纪行为显著高于女性,神经症行为得分在不同年龄之间差异达到显著性水平。(2)随年龄增长,对成功损人者之情绪判断为积极的人数会减少、而判断为消极的人数会增加,对失败损人者之情绪判断为消极的居多、而对成功损人者情绪判断为积极的为主。(3)幼儿已经基本能完成道德情境中的错误信念任务,当接受别人的"错误"表扬时会产生积极情绪。(4)未完成错误信念任务儿童的神经症得分显著高于完成者,对成功损人者之情绪判断为积极的儿童的神经症得分显著高于判断为消极者。     

数字加工任务影响时距知觉的数字效应

本研究采用复制时距和数字加工双任务,探讨数字大小影响时距知觉的机制。实验首先呈现不同时距的圆点,然后让被试按键复制圆点呈现的时距,与此同时,对屏幕上出现的数字进行命名(实验1)、奇偶数判断(实验2)、大小判断(实验3)。实验结果发现对数字进行奇偶数判断时,数字大小对时距知觉没有影响;进行数字命名和大小判断任务时,数字大小对时距知觉都产生了影响,并且时距不同,数字大小对时距知觉的影响也不同。该结果表明时距知觉的数字效应与数字加工任务和时距长短有关,呈现出动态变化的过程。     

冲突情境下幼儿的选择性信任和信念修正

幼儿如何选择性地采信他人提供的信息、获取知识, 是幼儿社会认知发展研究的重要问题。除客观的信息内容外, 信息传递者的特征也影响幼儿的选择性信任。另外, 在不确定情境下, 他人证言与幼儿已有信念可能存在冲突, 在二者冲突的情境下, 幼儿是否可以采信他人的证言, 并最终改变幼儿的已有判断是以往研究忽略的问题。本研究考察了当母亲证言与幼儿已有信念冲突时, 不同程度的冲突情境(面对不同比例的合成动物时)对幼儿选择性信任和信念修正的影响。研究采用冲突信息源范式, 向74名4~6岁幼儿呈现对不同比例合成动物(50%-50%任务 vs 75%-25%任务)命名的证言, 考察幼儿对信息提供者的询问意愿、对证言的信任情况和在证言前后对合成动物的判断(信念修正)。信息提供的一方为母亲(提供相似度低的动物名称), 另一方为陌生人(提供相似度高的动物名称)。结果发现, 幼儿的选择性信任和信念修正受到母亲证言与已有信念冲突程度的影响。在低冲突情境下, 幼儿对母亲证言的询问意愿和外显信任均高于高冲突情境。幼儿的信念修正存在年龄差异, 在低冲突情境下, 年长幼儿比年幼幼儿更倾向于改变已有信念, 在高冲突情境下, 年长的幼儿比年幼幼儿更不愿意改变已有信念。本研究结果表明, 当母亲的证言与幼儿已有信念冲突时, 中国幼儿可以区分不同程度的冲突情境, 并且可以根据冲突的程度进行选择性信任和信念修正。     

媒体多任务的效用：听觉信息干扰和视听信息整合的实验证据

采用心理旋转范式和词汇判断范式,探讨媒体多任务经验不同者,在听觉信息干扰和视听信息整合情境下对图形一致性和真假词的判断表现。结果发现：(1)以判断图形一致性为实验任务,在无声和低音干扰条件下,低经验组的正确率均显著高于高经验组,两组的反应时差异均不显著;在高音干扰条件下,高经验组的反应时显著短于低经验组,正确率则没有显著差异。(2)以真假词判断为实验任务,对真词的判断,在三种听觉条件下,高经验组在语音匹配条件下的反应时最短,与低经验组无显著差异,但正确率显著高于低经验组,与另两种听觉条件没有显著差异;低经验组在语音匹配条件下的反应时显著长于另两种听觉条件,正确率则显著高于无声条件,与不匹配条件差异不显著。对假词的判断,低经验组在三种听觉条件下的反应时均显著短于高经验组,正确率与高经验组均无显著差异。研究表明,媒体多任务经验丰富者相比经验缺乏者受到任务无关的纯短高音干扰的影响要小一些,在需要视听通道语义整合的加工中具有一定的优势。     

The Effect of Inference Order and Experience-Related Knowledge on Diagnostic Conjunction Probabilities

Ideally, a decision maker′s diagnostic probability judgments should not be affected by making predictive judgments before making diagnostic inferences. The purpose of this study is to investigate how experience-related knowledge and the inference presentation order affect a decision maker′s diagnostic conjunction probability judgments. Specifically, when decision makers are asked to make diagnoses in different judgment domains with which they have different levels of experience, we examine how making predictions first affects their subsequent diagnostic judgments in a standard conjunction paradigm. Professional auditors with experience in the auditing domain and MBA students with little or no auditing experience participated in the experiment. The results indicate that when the task involves a domain with which people have experience, making predictions prior to diagnoses has a significant influence on their subsequent diagnostic conjunction probabilities. When auditors made diagnoses in a familiar audit task situation, they were strongly influenced by whether or not they were asked to make predictions in advance. However, there was no influence of inference order on auditors′ diagnoses in a medical task, with which they do not have experience-related knowledge. Similarly, MBA students, having no experience-related knowledge in either audit or medical domains, were not affected by the inference order in making diagnoses. In the discussion of these exploratory results, we suggest that this inference order effect may be due to subjects′ anchoring on the predictive probability and insufficiently adjusting it to yield the diagnostic probability judgment.     

An associative framework for probability judgment: an application to biases

Three experiments show that understanding of biases in probability judgment can be improved by extending the application of the associative-learning framework. In Experiment 1, the authors used M. A. Gluck and G. H. Bower's (1988a) diagnostic-learning task to replicate apparent base-rate neglect and to induce the conjunction fallacy in a later judgment phase as a by-product of the conversion bias. In Experiment 2, the authors found stronger evidence of the conversion bias with the same learning task. In Experiment 3, the authors changed the diagnostic-learning task to induce some conjunction fallacies that were not based on the conversion bias. The authors show that the conjunction fallacies obtained in Experiment 3 can be explained by adding an averaging component to M. A. Gluck and G. H. Bower's model.     

A quantum theoretical explanation for probability judgment errors

A quantum probability model is introduced and used to explain human probability judgment errors including the conjunction and disjunction fallacies, averaging effects, unpacking effects, and order effects on inference. On the one hand, quantum theory is similar to other categorization and memory models of cognition in that it relies on vector spaces defined by features and similarities between vectors to determine probability judgments. On the other hand, quantum probability theory is a generalization of Bayesian probability theory because it is based on a set of (von Neumann) axioms that relax some of the classic (Kolmogorov) axioms. The quantum model is compared and contrasted with other competing explanations for these judgment errors, including the anchoring and adjustment model for probability judgments. In the quantum model, a new fundamental concept in cognition is advanced--the compatibility versus incompatibility of questions and the effect this can have on the sequential order of judgments. We conclude that quantum information-processing principles provide a viable and promising new way to understand human judgment and reasoning.     

Understanding conjunction effects in probability judgments: the role of implicit mental models

Subjective probability judgments often violate a normative principle in that the conjunction of two events is judged to be more likely than the probability of either of the two events occurring separately. Most previous explanations of these conjunction effects have assumed that probability judgments depend on some psychological relation (e.g. representativeness) between the constituents mentioned explicitly in the stimulus information. In contrast, the present approach highlights the fundamental role of implicitly inferred information. Participants are assumed to transform the explicit stimulus information into implicit mental models in their attempt to make sense of the experimental task. Probability judgments should then reflect the degree of activation of such a mental model in memory given a set of propositions, rather than the quantitative fit or likelihood of the propositions themselves. Two studies are reported which provide converging evidence for the proposed mental model approach. In the first study, using graded conjunctions of one to five propositions, probability judgments are shown to vary as a function of the activation of a mental model rather than the likelihood of the component events. In a second study, a priming procedure is employed to activate mental models that either fit an event conjunction or do not, leading to an increase or decrease of conjunction effects in probability judgment. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

儿童“期望值”判断的研究

以 7岁、9岁、12岁小学生和成人大学生为被试 ,让他们在 5种实验任务中进行期望值判断 ,以探讨儿童期望值判断的发展。结果表明 :(1) 7岁儿童就能够在简单任务中进行概率推理和正确判断事件的期望值 ;(2 )儿童对概率和价值两个维度相乘关系的认知呈现发展趋势 ,但其乘法规则的运用仍逊于成人水平。而成人期望值判断的成绩有较大的个体差异。 (3)在期望值相同的情况下 ,儿童更注重事件发生的概率而相对忽视价值     

How to explain receptivity to conjunction-fallacy inhibition training: Evidence from the Iowa Gambling Task

Intuitive predictions and judgments under conditions of uncertainty are often mediated by judgment heuristics that sometimes lead to biases. Using the classical conjunction bias example, the present study examines the relationship between receptivity to metacognitive executive training and emotion-based learning ability indexed by Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) performance. After completing a computerised version of the IGT, participants were trained to avoid conjunction bias on a frequency judgment task derived from the works of Tversky and Kahneman. Pre- and post-test performances were assessed via another probability judgment task. Results clearly showed that participants who produced a biased answer despite the experimental training (individual patterns of the biased → biased type) mainly had less emotion-based learning ability in IGT. Better emotion-based learning ability was observed in participants whose response pattern was biased → logical. These findings argue in favour of the capacity of the human mind/brain to overcome reasoning bias when trained under executive programming conditions and as a function of emotional warning sensitivity.     

The influence of improper sets of information on judgment: how irrelevant information can bias judged probability

This article introduces 2 new sources of bias in probability judgment, discrimination failure and inhibition failure, which are conceptualized as arising from an interaction between error prone memory processes and a support theory like comparison process. Both sources of bias stem from the influence of irrelevant information on participants' probability judgments, but they postulate different mechanisms for how irrelevant information affects judgment. The authors used an adaptation of the proactive interference (PI) and release from PI paradigm to test the effect of irrelevant information on judgment. The results of 2 experiments support the discrimination failure account of the effect of PI on probability judgment. In addition, the authors show that 2 commonly used measures of judgment accuracy, absolute and relative accuracy, can be dissociated. The results have broad implications for theories of judgment.