Egocentrism and focalism in unrealistic optimism (and pessimism)

People tend to overestimate their comparative likelihood of experiencing a rosy future. The present research suggests that one reason for this error is that when people compare their likelihood of experiencing an event with that of the average person, they focus on their own chances of experiencing the event and insufficiently consider the likelihood of the average person experiencing the event. As a consequence, people tend to think that they are more likely than the average person to experience common events and less likely than the average person to experience rare events. This causes unrealistic optimism in the case of common desirable events and rare undesirable events, but unrealistic pessimism in the case of rare desirable events and common undesirable events (Studies 1 and 2). Study 2 further suggests that both egocentrism and focalism underlie these biases. These results suggest that unrealistic optimism is not as ubiquitous as once thought.     

A group size effect on personal risk judgments: implications for unrealistic optimism

In Experiments 1 and 2, college students (N = 32 and N = 18, respectively) read heart attack risk profiles (i.e., lists of risk factors) for each of several employees at a series of fictional companies and judged the heart attack risk of the typical employee at each company. In both experiments, subjects' risk judgments increased as a function of the number of employees at the companies. In Experiments 3A and 3B, college students (N = 56 and N = 33, respectively) judged the heart attack risk of the typical employee at a company and also judged the risk of each individual employee. In these experiments, the typical employee was generally judged to be at higher risk than the individual employees. This group size effect might help to explain unrealistic optimism--people's tendency to judge themselves to be at lower risk than their peers for negative life events. Furthermore, it can be modeled successfully within Fiedler's (1996) BIAS framework.     

Cultural differences in unrealistic optimism and pessimism: the role of egocentrism and direct versus indirect comparison measures

Recent research has raised questions regarding the consistency of unrealistic optimism and related self-enhancing tendencies, both within cultures and across cultures. The current study tested whether the method used to assess unrealistic optimism influenced cross-cultural patterns in the United States and Japan. The results showed that the direct method (a single comparison judgment between self and peers) produced similar patterns across cultures because of cognitive biases (e.g., egocentrism); specifically, participants were unrealistically optimistic about experiencing infrequent/negative events but pessimistic about experiencing frequent/ negative events. However, the indirect method (separate self- and peer judgments) produced different patterns across cultures because culturally specific motivational biases emerged using this method; specifically, the U.S. sample was more unrealistically optimistic than the Japanese sample. The authors discuss how these results might influence the interpretation of previous findings on culture and self-enhancement.     

Unrealistic optimism and event threat

Individuals typically exhibit "unrealistic optimism" (UO), the belief that they are less likely than the average person to experience a negative event. This may be because, fearing the event, they try to reassure themselves by distorting their reasoning to conclude that they are at comparatively little risk. If this is so, the greater the "event threat" (i.e., the more serious the event's consequences and/or the greater the likelihood that those consequences will be experienced), the more reassurance should be required, and the greater the UO that should be observed. This prediction was tested in a study in which students (N = 148) were informed about a type of heart disease that could develop in later life due to inadequate diet when young. The risk attributable to diet was stated to be either slight (low-threat condition) or great (high-threat condition). Participants were asked to rate their own risk and that of the average student of developing the disease; question order was counterbalanced. The effects of event threat and question order were found to interact: event threat affected UO in the predicted way, but only when the question about own risk came first. The results are explained in motivational terms. Implications for health education are discussed.     

Correlations between optimism and social relationships

This study examined the relationships between self-report scores of 275 Japanese college students on the Japanese version of the revised Life Orientation Test and the Interpersonal Relationship Inventory. Ratings for optimism were positively correlated with those for social support and reciprocity (rs= .39 and .29, respectively) and negatively correlated with those for interpersonal conflict (r = -.26).     

The measurement of optimism and pessimism

Procedures employed in the development and validation of a new Optimism & Pessimism Scale are described, and information about test-retest reliability is reported. Internal consistency analyses and other data suggest that optimism and pessimism are not polar opposites and bring up questions about the intrerelatedness of the cognitive and affective realms. The magnitude of the correlation between pessimism and measures of anxiety suggests a link between this measure and the Negative Affectivity construct, and the potential relationships among optimism, pessimism, the Pollyanna Principle, and Positive and Negative Affect are discussed. Conceptually, it appears that optimism and pessimism may aid in psychological defense by helping to bind anxiety. This report was based on theses submitted separately by the second and third authors to the Division of Graduate Studies and Research of the University of Cincinnati, both in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree. For reprints of the article or copies of the Optimism & Pessimism Scale, please direct requests to William N. Dember, Department of Psychology, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio 45221.     

The measurement of optimism and pessimism

Procedures employed in the development and validation of a new Optimism & Pessimism Scale are described, and information about test-retest reliability is reported. Internal consistency analyses and other data suggest that optimism and pessimism are not polar opposites and bring up questions about the intrerelatedness of the cognitive and affective realms. The magnitude of the correlation between pessimism and measures of anxiety suggests a link between this measure and the Negative Affectivity construct, and the potential relationships among optimism, pessimism, the Pollyanna Principle, and Positive and Negative Affect are discussed. Conceptually, it appears that optimism and pessimism may aid in psychological defense by helping to bind anxiety. This report was based on theses submitted separately by the second and third authors to the Division of Graduate Studies and Research of the University of Cincinnati, both in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree.     

The future of optimism

Recent theoretical discussions of optimism as an inherent aspect of human nature converge with empirical investigations of optimism as an individual difference to show that optimism can be a highly beneficial psychological characteristic linked to good mood, perseverance, achievement, and physical health. Questions remain about optimism as a research topic and more generally as a societal value. Is the meaning of optimism richer than its current conceptualization in cognitive terms? Are optimism and pessimism mutually exclusive? What is the relationship between optimism and reality, and what are the costs of optimistic beliefs that prove to be wrong? How can optimism be cultivated? How does optimism play itself out across different cultures? Optimism promises to be one of the important topics of interest to positive social science, as long as it is approached in an even-handed way.     

Validation of a self-report measure of unrealistic relationship expectations

Cognitive models of intimate partner aggression implicate maladaptive relationship beliefs as antecedents to aggression and targets for intervention. However, existing self-report measures of relationship beliefs have failed to differentiate aggressive and nonaggressive individuals, raising questions about their assessment of and role in understanding aggression. To address these concerns, the authors developed and tested a new measure of unrealistic relationship beliefs in a sample of 453 community couples. Structural validity, concurrent validity, discriminant validity, internal consistency, and temporal stability of the new measure were examined. The final scale demonstrated adequate internal consistency (alphas=.83-.84), test-retest reliability (rs=.68-.74), and concurrent validity (small to moderate associations with predicted variables). Unrealistic relationship beliefs significantly differentiated aggressive and nonaggressive men, and this association remained significant after the authors controlled for other related variables.     

Social acceptance of comparative optimism and realism

Studies of optimism and realism (the accuracy of people's outlook on the future) seek to understand the respective effects of these elements on social approbation. Two experiments examined how comparative optimism (vs. pessimism) and realism (vs. unrealism) interacted to influence the targets' social acceptance based on their perceptions about the future. The results showed that realism, or accuracy of prediction, increased the positive social effects of a comparatively optimistic outlook on the future. In contrast, targets who exhibited comparative pessimism were more socially acceptable when their predictions were unrealistic rather than realistic. This phenomenon was examined by also considering the polarity of the events about which judgments were expressed. These results contribute to the body of research about the relationship between optimism and pessimism and the relationship between optimism and realism.     

Lateral asymmetry of personal optimism

By combining models of cerebral emotional asymmetry and unilateral hemispheric activation, it was hypothesized that orienting to the right would produce greater personal optimism about future events than would orienting toward the left. This was supported significantly in two experiments which differed from each other in their manipulations, hypothetical future events, means of responding, and settings. The results supported previous research on unrealistic optimism and extended the concept to show the effect of induced lateral orientation. It was proposed that this effect is mediated by mood, and possibly by perceived control, and that this methodology can be extended to other behaviors which have proven amenable to mood manipulation.     

Effect of anxiety on optimism

A quasi-experimental study was designed to investigate the possibility that people's optimism is reduced if they experience a specific form of negative affect, namely, anxiety. The level of optimism held by two groups of English students toward a range of life events was examined. Students taking examinations, the experimental group, were in an anxious state. Students who had completed their examinations, the control group, were less anxious. Those in the anxious group were less optimistic about the likelihood of both negative and positive events happening to them than were those in the control group. They were also less optimistic about the likelihood of events happening to others and of events happening to them in comparison with others. It was concluded that negative affect in general, and anxiety in particular, may have a global effect upon optimism: It may reduce optimism toward a broad range of judgments.     

The differential effect of realistic and unrealistic counterfactual thinking on regret

Research has established that realistic counterfactual thinking can determine the intensity and the content of people's affective reactions to decision outcomes and events. Not much is known, however, about the affective consequences of counterfactual thinking that is unrealistic (i.e., that does not correspond to the main causes of a negative outcome). In three experiments, we investigate the influence of realistic and unrealistic counterfactuals on experienced regret after negative outcomes. In Experiment 1, we found that participants who thought unrealistically about a poor outcome reported less regret than those who thought realistically about it. In Experiments 2a and 2b, we replicated this finding and we showed that the decrease in regret was associated with a shift in the causal attributions of the poor outcome. Participants who thought unrealistically attributed it more to external circumstances and less to their own behaviours than those who thought realistically about it. We discuss the implications of these findings for the role of counterfactuals as self-serving biases and the functionality of regret as a counterfactual emotion.     

Two routes toward optimism: how agentic and communal themes in autobiographical memories guide optimism for the future

Autobiographical memories are particularly adaptive because they function not only to preserve the past, but also to direct our future thoughts and behaviours. Two studies were conducted to examine how communal and agentic themes of positive autobiographical memories differentially predicted the route from autobiographical memories to optimism for the future. Across two studies, results revealed that the degree to which participants focused on communal themes in their autobiographical memories predicted their experience of nostalgia. In turn, the experience of nostalgia increased participants’ levels of self-esteem and in turn, optimism for the future. By contrast, the degree to which participants focused on agentic themes in their memories predicted self-esteem and optimism, operating outside the experience of nostalgia. These effects remained even after controlling for self-focused attention. Together, these studies provide greater understanding of the interrelations among autobiographical memory, self-concept, and time, and demonstrate how agency and communion operate to influence perceptions of one’s future when thinking about the past.     

On the partial independence of optimism and pessimism

This study tested the hypothesis that the moderate correlation between optimism (O) and pessimism (P) scores (their non-bipolarity) found in earlier studies may be an artifact of the differential sensitivity of O and P items to two response sets: defensive pessimism and Pollyannaism. The data failed to support either component of the hypothesis. Thus, defensive pessimists, as measured in two quite different ways, had lower depression scores (BDI) than genuine pessimists, but contrary to prediction, had higher depression scores than optimists. Moreover, deleting P items with a strong defensive quality from the P scale failed to increase the correlation between O and P scores. Similarly, controlling Pollyannaism by a partial correlation procedure failed to increase the strength of the relation between O and P. The results in general support the notion that optimism and pessimism are not polar opposites. This article is based on a dissertation presented by the senior author to the Division of Graduate Studies and Research of the University of Cincinnati in partial fulfillment of the Doctor of Philosophy degree.     

Risk perception,fuzzy representations and comparative optimism

Rather than a unitary value, individuals may represent health risk as a fuzzy entity that permits them to make a number of specific possible estimates. Comparative optimism might be explained by people flexibly, using such a set to derive optimistic risk estimates. Student participants were asked to rate the likelihood of eight harmful alcohol‐related outcomes occurring to themselves and to an average student. Participants made either unitary estimates or estimates representing the upper and lower bounds of a set denoting ‘realistic probability’ estimates. Personal risk estimates were lower when they were made as unitary estimates than those calculated from the mid‐points of the bounded estimates. Unitary estimates of personal risk made after the bounded estimates were lower than initial unitary estimates. There were no effects for estimates made with regard to the average student. Risk may be internally represented as a fuzzy set, and comparative optimism may exist partly because this set allows people the opportunity to make optimistic unitary estimates for personal risk within what they see as realistic parameters.     

Hope and optimism as related to life satisfaction

This study explored the hope and optimism constructs and their unique variances in predicting life satisfaction. The subscales (Agency and Pathways) of the Adult Hope Scale (Snyder, Harris et al., 1991 Snyder, CR, Harris, C, Anderson, JR, Holleran, SA, Irving, LMSigmon, ST. 1991. The will and the ways: Development and validation of an individual-differences measure of hope. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60: 570–585. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) and optimism and pessimism as measured by the Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994) were compared in terms of ability to predict life satisfaction as measured by the domain-specific Quality of Life Inventory (QOLI®; Frisch, 1994 Frisch, MB. 1994. Manual and treatment guide for the Quality of Life Inventory (QOLI), Minneapolis, MN: National Computer Systems.  [Google Scholar]; Study 1, N?=?331) and the global measure Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985 Diener, E, Emmons, RA, Larsen, RJ and Griffin, S. 1985. The Satisfaction with Life Scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, 49: 71–75. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Study 2, N?=?215). The Agency subscale of the Adult Hope Scale was the better predictor of life satisfaction in both studies. The implications of these findings for theory and measurement of hope and optimism are discussed.