Ferenczi’s Revolutionary Therapeutic Approach*

Many of the revolutionary principles introduced by Ferenczi in his clinical practice have now been widely accepted especially in the field of trauma and trauma therapy. Examples of these innovative views include his emphasis on empathy as opposed to technical neutrality and his stress on the real conditions of child caring and family environmental deficits and on the consequences of interpersonal violence and abuse that lead to “identification with the aggressor” by the victim thereby resulting in the internalization of both aggressiveness and guilt (the split guilt of the abuser). The resulting “fragmentation” of the personality, which is now considered dissociation (instead of Freud’s “repression”), is at the root of several severe disorders, characterized by distortion of reality, loss of touch with one’s body and loss of trust in the other. Therefore “abreaction is not enough”. A new, positive relational experience must be re-inscribed at the level of implicit memory.     

Christer Sjödin interviews Jan Stensson

Abstract

The author examines different definitions and applications of the terms “psychic energy” and “libido.” With regard to the “psychic energy” terminology, he shows that its application and usage relate in particular to the perspective of Brenner and not to Freud's definition. He argues that Freud uses the term “psychic energy” as a synonym for “libido,” and not “libido” as a synonym for “psychic energy.” It is demonstrated that in Freud's view, up until 1914, “libido” relates to manifestations of bodily sexual tensions, and subsequently this term applies to the manifestations of sexual energy in the psychic field. The author rejects this change in terminology and also challenges Freud's attempt to use dynamic-economic considerations as an explanatory device for epistemological reasons. Freud's concept of energy is inconsistent with the meaning of energy as defined in the physical sciences, and whereas the metapsychological topographical, dynamic, and structural viewpoints have a solid foundation in the representational world to which the psychoanalytic process affords unique access, this is not true of the economic viewpoint. It is claimed that bodily tensions only exist in the representational world in the form of affects, so that, in the author's opinion, the economic viewpoint should be abandoned in favour of an affective one. In the context of the endeavour to obtain pleasure and avoid unpleasure adduced by Freud, this viewpoint focuses on the relationships between affects and the different elements of the representational world, thereby serving as the subject of metapsychological investigation.     

如何解决团队创新悖论?基于成员认知风格“组型”与“构型”视角的探究

如何提升团队创新绩效?这是近年来管理实践界与学术界共同关注的热门话题。鉴于创新是一项兼具“探索”与“利用”双元特征的活动, 懂得如何平衡二者之间的悖论关系就成为提升团队创新绩效的关键。基于成员认知风格的微观视角, 从“组型”与“构型”两方面探索了解决这一悖论关系的方法。具体而言：(1)成员认知风格组型与团队领导行为之间的互补效应有助于解决团队创新悖论; (2)在合理的“成员认知风格-工作角色要求”构型基础上, 营造良好的团队协作氛围, 有助于解决团队创新悖论。进一步地, 还基于阴阳哲学思想研究了解决团队创新悖论的内在机制。为论证相关理论命题, 将开展三个研究模块, 采用定量与定性相结合的研究方法对提出的研究模型进行检验。相关发现不仅有助于丰富从微观视角研究团队创新前因、悖论管理方法的理论成果, 还将为企业的创新管理实践提供建议。     

Public Entrepreneurship as Social Creativity

The article begins with an overview of the innovation process and the entrepreneurial process, each treated as separate but interrelated phenomena. The innovation process tracks the evolution of a new idea through time, whereas the entrepreneurial process tracks the activities that entrepreneurs develop to promote and defend the idea against its detractors. The model of innovation and entrepreneurship introduced distinguishes between individual and collective entrepreneurship and identifies two types of collective entrepreneurship: team entrepreneurship and functional entrepreneurship. A Minnesota case study demonstrates the power of both team and functional entrepreneurship. It also illustrates how important the linkages are between the entrepreneurs and their larger community. An innovative idea's development and survival depends on an “ecology of organizations” that provide “venture” capital for analysis and experimentation. The vast networks of contacts and associations represent a form of social capital just as important as the community's economic capital. In this case, both aspects of social creativity—the community resources and the network of social relations—were found to be instrumental in passing and implementing the first public school choice program in the country.     

Libido und psychische Energie

The authors investigate different definitions of “psychic energy” and “libido” as well as their critique. With regard to “psychic energy” it is shown that the critique relates in particular to the perspective of Brenner and others and not to Freud's definition. They argue that Freud uses the term “psychic energy” as a synonym for “libido” and not “libido” as a synonym for “psychic energy”. It is assumed that until 1914, Freud related “libido” to manifestations of bodily sexual tensions and afterwards to manifestations of sexual energy in the psychic field. The authors reject this change for epistemological reasons as well as Freud's attempt to use dynamic, economic considerations as an explanatory device. Freud's energy concept is inconsistent with the definition of energy in natural sciences, and, whereas the meta-psychological topographical, dynamic and structural viewpoints have a solid foundation in the representational world to which the psychoanalytic process affords unique access, this is not true of the economic viewpoint. It is claimed that bodily tensions exist in the representational world only in the form of affects, so that the economic viewpoint should, in the authors' opinion, be abandoned in favour of an affective one. In the context of the endeavour to obtain pleasure and avoid unpleasure as adduced by Freud, this viewpoint concentrates on the relationships between affects and the different elements of the representational world, thereby serving as the topoi of meta-psychological investigation dimensions.     

Conflictual Moralities,Ethical Torture: Revisiting the Problem of “Dirty Hands”

The problem of “dirty hands” has become an important term, indeed one of the most important terms of reference, in contemporary academic scholarship on the issue of torture. The aim of this essay is to offer a better understanding of this problem. Firstly, it is argued that the problem of “dirty hands” can play neither within rule-utilitarianism nor within absolutism. Still, however, the problem of “dirty hands” represents an acute, seemingly irresolvable, conflict within morality, with the moral agent understood, following Nagel, as necessarily holding mixed, absolutist-consequentialist moral intuitions, pulling in opposite directions. Secondly, a distinction is drawn between real situations of “dirty hands,” and other conflictual scenarios, which are commonly, but unjustifiably placed under the metaphorical title of “dirty hands.” Finally, it is suggested - utilizing Nagel’s own ideas, as developed in his later work, and Sen’s notion of evaluator relativity—that the moral “blind alley” manifested in the problem of “dirty hands” may not be totally blind after all, at least from the situated agent’s own internal point of view (as opposed to that of an external observer trying to put herself in the agent’s position by way of moral simulation). Thus, contrary to Walzer’s approach, it is possible for a person (politician) acting in a situation of “dirty hands,” not to believe herself to be guilty, but still be a moral person.     

Evidence for all-or-none preperceptual processing in perceptual set

“Set” is known to improve the accuracy of report of the stimulus attributes for which Ss are set to respond. The set may produce this effect by acting on either preperceptual or postperceptual processes, or both. To elucidate the manner by which set produces its effect, this paper explores the consequences of two assumptions concerning set (1) On any given trial, a S is either “set” or “not set”: (2) if “set” by the stimulus information. S’s perception of the stimulus actually improves, whereas, if “not set” by the stimulus reformation, the S’s report correctness is improved by an independent interaction of stimulus and set information on a response process. Evidence is provided for both these assumptions. In addition. It is argued that only set given before stimulation can affect a perceptual process.     

Radical views on cognition and the dynamics of scientific change

Radical views on cognition are generally defined by a cluster of features including non-representationalism and vehicle-externalism. In this paper, I concentrate on the way radical views on cognition define themselves as revolutionary theories in cognitive science. These theories often use the Kuhnian concepts of “paradigm” and “paradigm shift” for describing their ambitions and the current situation in cognitive science. I examine whether the use of Kuhn’s theory of science is appropriate here. There might be good reasons to think that cognitive science is in a situation of foundational crisis, but that does not entail that the classical paradigm (computationalism) is currently displaced to the benefit of a new paradigm. Larry Laudan’s theory of research traditions is more enlightening than Kuhn’s theory for describing the scope and ambitions of radical views on cognition, and their relations with an anti-intellectualist tradition in philosophy.

     

How Can We Love Our Enemies When We Kill Our Friends? Shifting the Theological Debate Over Violence

Violence is often thought of in terms of intentional, discrete actions, and in the debate between so-called “neo-Anabaptists” and “neo-Augustinians” this has often been the focus, especially around actions like policing and war. However, this idea of violence is insufficient and, intentionally or not, obfuscates forms of violence like the “slow violence” of destructive economic arrangements that harm not only enemies but friends as well. Through an investigation of the apparel industry this article addresses the too-narrow understandings of violence that implicate theologians themselves in the “systemic” and “slow” violence inflicted through exploitative economic arrangements and systematic environmental degradation. The violence of the contemporary political economy compounds exponentially when one considers not only the human costs of global industry but also the toll it takes on the planet, which in turn affects the world’s poorest people no matter their geographic location or type of work. How might various sides of the more traditional argument find common ground for doing justice around these forms of violence in which they already daily participate, rather than giving the majority of attention to actions taking place periodically (or speculating about violence that may not even happen)? In short, violence is not just the realm of militaries, it is the reality of our global political economy, and this must be addressed by theologians of all types and traditions.     

CULTURAL APPROPRIATION IN BIOREGIONALISM AND THE NEED FOR A DECOLONIAL ETHICS OF PLACE

Bioregionalism is an environmental movement that attempts to create decentralized, self‐determined communities connected to landscape and ecological features. Activists and scholars have used the phrase “becoming native” to describe the process of belonging to place. Despite its cultural appropriation, not only do bioregional writers still use the metaphor, but it has also been defended within religious studies. Instead of relying on these arguments to address ethical issues, claims to place need a decolonial framework. Looking at various voices within bioregionalism through Indigenous critiques displays both the movement’s issues as well as decolonial processes for local adaptation. Wendell Berry exemplifies the problems of bioregional ethics but also shows bioregionalism's capacity for decolonization.     

Moral Seriousness

“Philosophy as a way of life” has its roots in ancient ethics and has attracted renewed interest in recent decades. The aim in this paper is to construct a contemporized image of Socrates, consistent with the textual evidence. The account defers concern over analytical/theoretical inquiry into virtue, in favor of a neo-existentialist process of self-examination informed by the virtue of what is called “moral seriousness.” This process is modeled on Frankfurt’s hierarchical account of self-identification, and the paper suggests an expansion of Frankfurt’s concept of a person to include “full” personhood, in which the apprehended “meaning” of one’s “whole life” is taken as a necessary condition for eudaimonia (meaning of life) and is characterized by phenomenological transcendence. In addition, the importance of the informed scrutiny of a community of philosophers to the self-examination process is discussed.     

When the world went color: Emotions,senses and spaces in contemporary accounts of the Czechoslovak Velvet Revolution

Two decades after the dramatic conclusion of socialist rule in Czechoslovakia, Czechs’ personal recollections of the 1989 Velvet Revolution offer a counter-point to official histories of this period by downplaying the revolution’s role as a catalyst for political and economic modernization to focus on its affective, sensory and other bodily dimensions. In this paper I argue that Czechs’ personal memories of 1989 convey the feeling of having (in local terminology) “really lived” through the revolution by highlighting its emotional and sensorial impact and by locating the physical self within local, public spaces that were invested with novel political and personal meanings. Crucial here is the situating of not just memory, but also emotion, affect, and sensation, in sites that are culturally coded as “public” in distinction to the “private” realms of domesticity, the family, and the body, suggesting how the revolution instigated a significant experiential rupture between these two domains. In doing so, these accounts illuminate how local sites can become the nexus of not only personal and collective historical memories but also of emotional and sensorial anchorages of self to event.     

Intentional action and the frame-of-mind argument: new experimental challenges to Hindriks

Based on a puzzling pattern in our judgements about intentional action, Knobe [(2003). “Intentional Action and Side-Effects in Ordinary Language.” Analysis 63: 190–194] has claimed that these judgements are shaped by our moral judgements and evaluations. However, this claim goes directly against a key conceptual intuition about intentional action – the “frame-of-mind condition”, according to which judgements about intentional action are about the agent’s frame-of-mind and not about the moral value of his action. To preserve this intuition Hindriks [(2008). “Intentional Action and the Praise-Blame Asymmetry.” The Philosophical Quarterly 58: 630–641; (2014). “Normativity in Action: How to Explain the Knobe Effect and its Relatives.” Mind & Language 29: 51–72] has proposed an alternate account of the Knobe Effect. According to his “Normative Reason account of Intentional Action”, a side-effect counts as intentional only when the agent thought it constituted a normative reason not to act but did not care. In this paper, I put Hindriks’ account to test through two new studies, the results of which suggest that Hindriks’ account should be rejected. However, I argue that the key conceptual insight behind Hindriks’ account can still be saved and integrated in future accounts of Knobe’s results.     

Xunzi: A Paradigm of Rationalistic Virtue Ethics in Early Confucianism

Against the background of modern academic study, this article consciously uses Aristotle’s virtue ethics as a tool to theoretically analyze Xunzi’s ethical philosophy. This article tries to briefly analyze the basic structure of Xunzi’s moral philosophy and to reveal its unique rationalist theoretical character by exploring the following three topics: “the understanding of human beings,” “the establishment of a moral foundation,” and “the accomplishment of virtue in practice.” From the perspective of comparative philosophy, this article can also be viewed as a model for bringing about communication and synthesis between two philosophical traditions, namely Confucian ethics and Western virtue ethics.     

Lessons for experimental philosophy from the rise and “fall” of neurophilosophy

Experimental philosophy is a recent development whose broader aims and goals are still being debated. Some prominent experimental philosophers have articulated an attitude toward perennial philosophy that is reminiscent of an early explicitly defended goal of neurophilosophy, a field that predated experimental philosophy by at least one decade. But relative to that early goal, neurophilosophy quickly “fell” within broader philosophy, and came to assume its current status, a technical specialty within the philosophy of science (now more commonly referred to as “the philosophy of neuroscience”). In this paper I document the revolutionary goal of early neurophilosophy, provide a novel explanation of its “fall,” and suggest that analogous goals of some experimental philosophers set that field up for a similar “fall.” I document recent published evidence that experimental philosophy is trending in this direction.     

Bourdieu and Derrida on Gift: Beyond “Double Truth” and Paradox

Bourdieu and Derrida share a focus on the ambiguity of the practice of gift relationships already pointed out by Mauss. From Bourdieu’s perspective, the question of gratuity is epistemically futile, as it veils the objective truth of gift-giving, yet ethically and politically relevant, as it refers to a hypocrisy which can be instrumental to enhancing civic virtue and solidarity. Bourdieu’s “scientific humanism,” however, implausibly reduces this ambiguity to interest maximization, and aims to build a solidaristic democracy by means of the generalization of the hypocrisy of gratuity. In turn, by interpreting gratuity as “unconditionality,” Derrida aims not at dissolving, but at dramatizing the ambiguity of gift relationships by turning it into “madness” and an “impossible possibility”. Whereas I agree with Derrida’s insistence on the salience of the requirement of gratuity, his approach can lead to counterintuitive and hubristic consequences. Instead, I suggest some elements of an alternative way of understanding gratuitous gifts as communicative acts irreducible to an economic calculation or circle. From this standpoint, a gratuitous gift can be constituted by certain forms of recognition, emotions, or convictions without for that becoming an “impossibility”.     

Lie-toe-tease: double negatives and unexcluded middles

Litotes, “a figure of speech in which an affirmative is expressed by the negative of the contrary” (OED) has had some tough reviews. For Pope and Swift (“Scriblerus” 1727), litotes—stock examples include “no mean feat”, “no small problem”, and “not bad at all”—is “the peculiar talent of Ladies, Whisperers, and Backbiters”; for Orwell (1946), it is a means to affect “an appearance of profundity” that we can deport from English “by memorizing this sentence: A not unblack dog was chasing a not unsmall rabbit across a not ungreen field.” But such ridicule is not without equivocation, given that litotes, or “logical” (non-concordial) double negation, may or may not be semantically redundant. When the negation of a logical contrary yields an unexcluded middle, it contributes to expressive power: someone who is not unhappy may not be happy either, and an occurrence may not be infrequent without being frequent. But if something is not possible, what can it be but possible? Why does Crashaw’s “not impossible she” survive rhetorically while Orwell’s “not unsmall rabbit” is doomed? How is Robbie being “not not friends” with Mary on 7th Heaven distinct from being friends with her, if not not-p reduces to p? The key is recognizing in litotes a corollary of MaxContrary, the tendency for contradictory (wide-scope) sentential negation ¬p to strengthen (at least) pragmatically to a contrary ©p, as when the formal contradictory Fr. “Il ne faut pas partir” (lit. ‘It is not necessary to leave’) is reinterpreted as expressing a contrary (‘one must not-leave’). Just as the Law of Excluded Middle can apply where it “shouldn’t”, resulting in pragmatically presupposed disjunctions between semantic contraries, so that “p v ©p” amounts to an instance of “p v ¬p”, the Law of Double Negation can fail to apply where it “should”. When not not-p conveys ¬©p, the negation of a virtual contrary, the middle between p and not-p is no longer excluded, rendering the Fregean dictum that “Wrapping up a thought in double negation does not alter its truth value” not unproblematic.     

Necessity (not just novelty) is the mother of invention: using creativity research to improve research in work and organizational psychology

In this essay, we discuss reasons that work and organizational psychology does not live up to its self-declared mission of being an applied science in the service of improving both people’s quality of working life and organizational effectiveness. We use fundamentals of research on creativity and innovation as a lens through which we can view problems and possible solutions to these problems. In particular, we stress that innovation entails not only new, but also useful insights, that innovation requires “rewarding failure”, and that innovation feeds off of team diversity. We provide suggestions for how the definition of theoretical and empirical contributions of research, reward systems, and collaboration practices could be changed to foster innovative research that helps people thrive at work.     

奏响长者的“生命质量”凯歌

“健康老龄化”的探索中, 指标的定义至关重要。“生命质量”综合了生理、心理、社会、环境等多维度指标, 优于“预期寿命”、“健康预期寿命”等传统概念, 其定义在发展中被广为接受, 强调个体自评的主观性、可塑性和多维度。促进积极心理因素的干预是改善老年生命质量的有效路径。老龄化过程虽必然伴随生理系统衰退, 但心理系统积极参与, 仍能为年长者奏响生命质量的凯歌。