The role of self-esteem in the misinformation effect

Previous research using the Gudjonnson suggestibility scale has suggested a role for self-esteem in suggestibility, with participants low in self-esteem being more suggestible than participants high in self-esteem. Four experiments are presented examining the role of self-esteem in the misinformation effect and whether enhanced suggestibility effects in participants low in self-esteem reflect genuine memory impairment. In Experiments 1 and 4 participants completed a standard recognition test. In Experiment 2 participants completed the modified recognition test. In Experiment 3 participants completed a free recall test. In Experiments 1 and 4 participants low in self-esteem demonstrated greater misinformation effects than participants high in self-esteem. In Experiment 3 a 3-day retention interval was employed with the modified test and no differences were found between the two groups on the reporting of the new item. The findings suggest that participants low in self-esteem are particularly sensitive to demand characteristics and post-event suggestion but do not suffer from genuine memory impairment.     

Why misinformation is reported: evidence from a warning and a source-monitoring task

People report suggested misinformation about a previously witnessed event for manifold reasons, such as social pressure, lack of memory of the original aspect, or a firm belief to remember the misinformation from the witnessed event. In our experiments (N?=?429), which follow Loftus's paradigm, we tried to disentangle the reasons for reporting a central and a peripheral piece of misinformation in a recognition task by examining (a) the impact a warning about possible misinformation has on the error rate, and (b) whether once reported misinformation was actually attributed to the witnessed event in a later source-monitoring (SM) task. Overall, a misinformation effect was found for both items. The warning strongly reduced the misinformation effect, but only for the central item. In contrast, reports of the peripheral misinformation were correctly attributed to the misinformation source or, at least, ascribed to guesswork much more often than the central ones. As a consequence, after the SM task, the initially higher error rate for the peripheral item was even lower than that of the central item. Results convincingly show that the reasons for reporting misinformation, and correspondingly also the potential to avoid them in legal settings, depend on the centrality of the misinformation.     

Decreased susceptibility to false memories from misinformation in hormonal contraception users

Sex hormones are increasingly implicated in memory formation. Recent literature has documented a relationship between hormones and emotional memory and sex differences, which are likely related to hormones, have long been demonstrated in a variety of mnemonic domains, including false memories. Hormonal contraception (HC), which alters sex hormones, has been associated with a bias towards gist memory and away from detailed memory in women who use it during an emotional memory task. Here, we investigated whether HC was associated with changes in susceptibility to false memories, which may be related to the formation of gist memories. We tested false memory susceptibility using two well-validated false memory paradigms: the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) task, and a story-based misinformation task. We found that hormonal contraceptive users were less susceptible to false memories compared to non-users in the misinformation task, and no differences were seen between groups on the DRM task. We hypothesise that the differences in false memories from the misinformation task may be related to hormonal contraceptive users' memory bias away from details, towards gist memory.     

How to protect eyewitness memory against the misinformation effect: A meta-analysis of post-warning studies

Four decades of research and hundreds of studies speak to the power of post-event misinformation to bias eyewitness accounts of events (see e.g., Loftus’ summary, 2005). A subset of this research has explored if the adverse influence of misinformation on remembering can be undone or at least reduced through a later warning about its presence. We meta-analyzed 25 such post-warning studies (including 155 effect sizes) to determine the effectiveness of different types of warnings and to explore moderator effects. Key findings were that (1) post-warnings are surprisingly effective, reducing the misinformation effect to less than half of its size on average. (2) Some types of post-warning (following a theoretical classification) seem to be more effective than others, particularly studies using an enlightenment procedure (Blank, 1998). (3) The post-warning reduction in the misinformation effect reflects a specific increase in misled performance (relative to no warning), at negligible cost for control performance. We conclude with a discussion of theoretical and practical implications.     

The effect of mood on false memory for emotional DRM word lists

In the present study, we investigated the effect of participants’ mood on true and false memories of emotional word lists in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm. In Experiment 1, we constructed DRM word lists in which all the studied words and corresponding critical lures reflected a specified emotional valence. In Experiment 2, we used these lists to assess mood-congruent true and false memory. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three induced-mood conditions (positive, negative, or neutral) and were presented with word lists comprised of positive, negative, or neutral words. For both true and false memory, there was a mood-congruent effect in the negative mood condition; this effect was due to a decrease in true and false recognition of the positive and neutral words. These findings are consistent with both spreading-activation and fuzzy-trace theories of DRM performance and have practical implications for our understanding of the effect of mood on memory.     

Individual differences in false memory from misinformation: Cognitive factors

This research investigated the cognitive correlates of false memories that are induced by the misinformation paradigm. A large sample of Chinese college students (N=436) participated in a misinformation procedure and also took a battery of cognitive tests. Results revealed sizable and systematic individual differences in false memory arising from exposure to misinformation. False memories were significantly and negatively correlated with measures of intelligence (measured with Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices and Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale), perception (Motor-Free Visual Perception Test, Change Blindness, and Tone Discrimination), memory (Wechsler Memory Scales and 2-back Working Memory tasks), and face judgement (Face Recognition and Facial Expression Recognition). These findings suggest that people with relatively low intelligence and poor perceptual abilities might be more susceptible to the misinformation effect.     

Reduced misinformation effects following saccadic bilateral eye movements

The effects of saccadic bilateral (horizontal) eye movements on memory for a visual event narrative were investigated. In the study phase, participants were exposed to a set of pictures accompanied by a verbal commentary describing the events depicted in the pictures. Next, the participants were asked either misleading or control questions about the depicted event and were then asked to engage in 30s of bilateral vs. vertical vs. no eye movements. Finally, recognition memory was tested using the remember-know procedure. It was found that bilateral eye movements increased true memory for the event, increased recollection, and decreased the magnitude of the misinformation effect. The findings are discussed in terms of source monitoring, dual-process theories of memory and the potential neural foundations of such effects.     

Interactions between spontaneous instantiations to the basic level and post-event suggestions

Extensive research shows that post-event suggestions can distort the memory for a target event. In this study we examined the effect of such suggestions as they interact with the products of a spontaneous memory process: instantiation of abstract information to an intermediate level of abstractness, the basic level (Pansky & Koriat, 2004 Pansky, A. and Koriat, A. 2004. The basic-level convergence effect in memory distortions. Psychological Science, 15: 52–59. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). Participants read a narrative containing items presented at the superordinate level (e.g., FRUIT), were exposed to suggestions that referred to these items at the basic level (e.g., APPLE), and were finally asked to recall the original items. We found that the tendency to instantiate spontaneously in the control (non-misleading) condition, particularly over time, increased following exposure to suggestions that were likely to coincide with those instantiations. Exposure to such suggestions, either immediately or following a 24-hour delay, reduced subsequent correct recall of the original items only if the suggested information coincided with the information one tends to instantiate spontaneously in a given context. Suggestibility, in this case, was particularly pronounced and phenomenologically compelling in terms of remember/know judgements. The findings are taken to imply that effects of post-event suggestions can be understood in terms of the constructive processes that set the stage for their occurrence.     

Influence of individual differences in working memory on the continued influence effect of misinformation

ABSTRACT

Misinformation often continues to influence people’s cognition even after being retracted (the continued influence effect of misinformation, CIE). The current research aimed to investigate whether the individual differences in the central executive function of WM and updating could influence the CIE of misinformation with varying relevance. The results showed that the individual differences in central executive function could significantly affect the CIE, especially for the high-relevant misinformation. While the individual differences in the updating ability had a weaker impact on the CIE in general and only negatively related to the CIE for the low-relevant misinformation. The study extends the understanding of the relationship between individual differences and the CIE from previous studies, which is in line with the mental-model-updating hypothesis, and offers a preliminary clue for identifying the persons vulnerable to the CIE of misinformation in the real world.     

False memories in music listening: exploring the misinformation effect and individual difference factors in auditory memory

ABSTRACT

The study of false memory has had a profound impact on our understanding of how and what we remember, as shown by the misinformation paradigm [Loftus, E. F. (2005). Planting misinformation in the human mind: A 30-year investigation of the malleability of memory. Learning & Memory, 12(4), 361–366. doi:10.1101/lm.94705]. Though misinformation effects have been demonstrated extensively within visual tasks, they have not yet been explored in the realm of non-visual auditory stimuli. Thus, the present study aimed to investigate whether post-event information can create false memories of music listening episodes. In addition, we explored individual difference factors potentially associated with false memory susceptibility in music, including age, suggestibility, personality, and musical training. In two music recognition tasks, participants (N?=?151) listened to an initial music track, which unbeknownst to them was missing an instrument. They were then presented with post-event information which either suggested the presence of the missing instrument or did not. The presence of misinformation resulted in significantly poorer performance on the music recognition tasks (d?=?.43), suggesting the existence of false musical memories. A random forest analysis indicated that none of the individual difference factors assessed were significantly associated with misinformation susceptibility. These findings support previous research on the fallibility of human memory and demonstrate, to some extent, the generality of the misinformation effect to a non-visual auditory domain.     

A modality congruency effect in verbal false memory

The involvement of working memory sub-systems in syllogistic reasoning problems was assessed by dual task methods. Effects of skill level and training on working memory involvement in syllogistic reasoning were examined. In Study 1, participants were pre-selected into groups of High and Low skill at syllogistic reasoning on the basis of a pencil-and-paper screening test. Six separate High and Low skill groups completed syllogistic reasoning tasks in control conditions and each group was also tested under one of the following six dual task conditions: articulatory suppression, unattended speech, verbal random generation, spatial random generation, tapping in a simple pattern, unattended pictures. The results indicated that the more skilled participants were generally following a high demand strategy, which loaded the central executive, phonological loop and imagery sub-systems, but that lower skill participants were generally following a less demanding strategy which did not load working memory components so heavily. In two Pilot Studies a training procedure was assessed and validated. In Study 2, participants were selected, on the basis of a screening test, as being unskilled at solving syllogisms but as performing above guessing level. These participants underwent the training regime validated in the Pilot Studies. Following training, separate groups of participants carried out syllogistic tests with and without one of the following four secondary tasks: articulatory suppression, unattended pictures, spatial random generation, and verbal random generation. The pattern of results indicated that training had induced high demand strategies (often logic-equivalent), which loaded the central executive and to a lesser extent the phonological loop.     

Mood-congruent false memories in the DRM paradigm

This study investigated the creation of mood-congruent false memories within the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm using recall and recognition of critical lures as performance measures. Participants (n=93) were randomly assigned to three mood-induction conditions (positive, negative and control) and were presented with positive, negative and neutral DRM word lists in audio form. We predicted that intrusion errors of the critical lures would be higher in the mood-congruent conditions. Results confirmed this prediction and extended previous DRM research by showing that already high false memory rates were increased when the valence of the lures matched the mood-induction condition. Furthermore, participants made more “remember” judgements for the emotion critical lures in their mood-congruent conditions. Discussion draws on spreading activation explanations of DRM findings, and considers how moods could increase activation of non-presented information.     

Effects of bilateral eye movements on gist based false recognition in the DRM paradigm

The effects of saccadic bilateral (horizontal) eye movements on gist based false recognition was investigated. Following exposure to lists of words related to a critical but non-studied word participants were asked to engage in 30s of bilateral vs. vertical vs. no eye movements. Subsequent testing of recognition memory revealed that those who undertook bilateral eye movement were more likely to correctly recognise previously presented words and less likely to falsely recognise critical non-studied associates. This result joins other research in demonstrating the conditions in which false memory effects can be attenuated.     

Correcting the misinformation effect

Decades of memory research have demonstrated a dire need for effective methods of correcting misinformation, particularly once it has been encoded. However, much of this research has exposed participants to misinformation first then provided a correction, and used indirect memory questions. Using a misinformation effect (ME) paradigm, in which participants' memory is distorted by misleading postevent information, we examine whether corrections can combat memory distortion on direct memory tests. Experiment 1 showed corrections greatly reduced the ME. Experiment 2 replicated this finding with a longer lag time (3 min) between exposure to misinformation and its correction, except for participants that read only the misinformation and its correction. Experiment 3 ruled out the possibility that participants reported the most recent information they read, suggesting participants evaluate the correction's veracity. Finally, a meta‐analysis of the three experiments reiterates that corrections may be effective in combating misinformation.     

不同情绪效价的DRM词表对错误记忆的影响

请49名在校大学生对自编的36个具有不同情绪效价的DRM词表进行评定,再以60名在校大学生为实验对象考察不同情绪效价的DRM词表对错误记忆的影响。结果发现,(1) 负性和中性DRM词表产生的错误记忆量显著高于正性DRM词表;(2) 被试在“记得/知道/猜测”判断上对负性和中性词表的关键诱饵倾向于“知道”,而对正性词表的关键诱饵更倾向于“记得”。结果表明,DRM词表本身所具有的情绪与人为诱发的情绪,对错误记忆的影响具有不同的性质和特点。     

The effect of mood on confidence in false memories

The goal of this study was to examine the effect of mood on suggestibility in the misinformation paradigm. To investigate the relative effects of valence and arousal, as well as affect-specific influences, six mood conditions were included: positive mood with low/high arousal (serene/happy), negative mood with low/high arousal (sad/angry), neutral mood, and a control condition. Participants watched a movie and were exposed to misleading information by means of a narrative. Memory was tested in a surprise forced-choice recognition task, with confidence judgements. The mood induction procedure was shown to be effective. A significant misinformation effect confirmed that participants were misled by the false information provided. Mood did not affect susceptibility to the misinformation effect, but did significantly influence participants’ belief in their false memories. Feeling sad induced the highest confidence ratings. Results are discussed in terms of different problem-solving strategies associated with discrete affective states, and have implications for both legal and clinical settings.     

Putting false memories into context: the effects of odour contexts on correct and false recall*

ABSTRACT

False memories created by the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm are often accompanied by contextual information. Yet, research investigating the effects of context on false memories is surprisingly scarce. We used the context-dependent memory (CDM) model to construct same versus different context conditions using odours as contexts and DRM lists as to-be-remembered stimuli. Experiment 1 showed that levels of correct recall were higher in the same-context condition than in the changed-context condition, but no effects of context were observed in false recall. Experiment 2 used different odours and a longer retention interval and showed that context-dependent memory effects were found for both true and false memory. For true memory, context reinstatement improved memory, whilst simultaneously reducing false memory. Theoretical and forensic implications of these findings are discussed.     

DRM范式下心境一致性错误记忆的认知机制

本研究以自编情绪DRM词表为实验材料, 用音乐诱发正常大学生被试正性、负性和中性心境, 探讨在被试处于某种心境下时是否产生心境一致性错误记忆现象、预警能否减少心境一致性错误记忆的发生。结果表明, 正性关键诱饵在正性心境下的错误再认率显著高于中性和负性心境, 负性关键诱饵在负性心境下的错误再认率显著高于中性和正性心境, 说明正常被试也会产生心境一致性错误记忆; 预警和无预警条件下被试对关键诱饵和心境一致性关键诱饵的错误再认率无显著差异, 说明外显的预警提示并不能消除部分由无意识产生的错误记忆和心境一致性错误记忆。研究结果支持记忆的扩散激活理论和情感的联想网络理论。     

The selective power of causality on memory errors

We tested the influence of causal links on the production of memory errors in a misinformation paradigm. Participants studied a set of statements about a person, which were presented as either individual statements or pairs of causally linked statements. Participants were then provided with causally plausible and causally implausible misinformation. We hypothesised that studying information connected with causal links would promote representing information in a more abstract manner. As such, we predicted that causal information would not provide an overall protection against memory errors, but rather would preferentially help in the rejection of misinformation that was causally implausible, given the learned causal links. In two experiments, we measured whether the causal linkage of information would be generally protective against all memory errors or only selectively protective against certain types of memory errors. Causal links helped participants reject implausible memory lures, but did not protect against plausible lures. Our results suggest that causal information may promote an abstract storage of information that helps prevent only specific types of memory errors.     

Valence and the development of immediate and long-term false memory illusions

Across five experiments we examined the role of valence in children's and adults’ true and false memories. Using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm and either neutral or negative-emotional lists, both adults’ (Experiment 1) and children's (Experiment 2) true recall and recognition was better for neutral than negative items, and although false recall was also higher for neutral items, false recognition was higher for negative items. The last three experiments examined adults’ (Experiment 3) and children's (Experiments 4 and 5) 1-week long-term recognition of neutral and negative-emotional information. The results replicated the immediate recall and recognition findings from the first two experiments. More important, these experiments showed that although true recognition decreased over the 1-week interval, false recognition of neutral items remained unchanged whereas false recognition of negative-emotional items increased. These findings are discussed in terms of theories of emotion and memory as well as their forensic implications.