Computational theories of vision

This exciting and original book describes the work of David Marr and his colleagues at MIT on the computational theory of vision, particularly the early stages of shape analysis. Although much of the theorising is frankly speculative and not certain to survive without major modification, it sets new standards of rigour in its formal approach and is certain to have a stimulating effect upon the field. Sadly, Marr's death from leukaemia at the age of 35 means that he will not himself be able to take part in the further development of his ideas, but the book itself will exert an important influence for some time to come. The first point to make, for those who may already have attempted Marr's lengthy and difficult research papers, is that the book is clearly and entertainingly written: It can be tackled by the non-specialist who wishes to see why Marr's work has caused such interest in the vision community. Despite the very difficult circumstances in which the book must have been written, it is carefully put together and gives a fascinating insight into the way in which the author's ideas developed.     

Texture discrimination and the analysis of proximity.

A major theory of early visual processing has recently been proposed by Marr, which considers a number of aspects of visual perception in great detail, including grouping and texture discrimination. New phenomena associated with texture discrimination are described and experiments reported which allow a preliminary comparison of Marr's theory, as it applies to texture discrimination, with more established theories such as that due to Julesz. One experiment produced results which are clearly consistent with Marr's account, but the ability of his theory to deal with additional data on region suppression is not established. The theory of the analysis of proximity relations proposed by Fox offers a broadly satisfactory account of many texture perception results, while relying on the more fundamental parts of Marr's theory of primitive visual processes to deal with the remainder. A further attraction of proximity analysis is that it may shed new light on the classical paradox of symmetry perception. Some ways in which the preliminary proximity analysis model is incomplete are discussed, and it is concluded that development of the model may be profitable for theories of early visual processing.     

Death and the “life review” in Halakhah

Coping with old age involves resolving the task of integrity versus despair, which demands a nondefensive confrontation with the inevitability of death. Halakhah (Jewish ethics) also considered this task critical in later years of life, spoke of death's inevitability, and attempted to discourage denial of death. The Jewish approach seems compatible with Butler's concept of life review as a reconciliation with death and a reintegration of one's identity that occurs throughout later years. While the Eriksonian goal is confronting old age with a certain capacity for wisdom, the rabbis maintained that such wisdom must culminate in the creative act of repentance.     

Inferential Contextualism, Epistemological Realism and Scepticism: Comments on Williams

In this paper I will discuss Michael Williamss inferential contextualism – a position that must be carefully distinguished from the currently more fashionable attributer contextualism. I will argue that Williamss contextualism is not stable, though it avoids some of the shortcomings of simple inferential contextualism. In particular, his criticism of epistemological realism cannot be supported on the basis of his own account. I will also argue that we need not give up epistemological realism in order to provide a successful diagnosis of scepticism.     

Category theory and the foundations of mathematics: Philosophical excavations

The aim of this paper is to clarify the role of category theory in the foundations of mathematics. There is a good deal of confusion surrounding this issue. A standard philosophical strategy in the face of a situation of this kind is to draw various distinctions and in this way show that the confusion rests on divergent conceptions of what the foundations of mathematics ought to be. This is the strategy adopted in the present paper. It is divided into 5 sections. We first show that already in the set theoretical framework, there are different dimensions to the expression foundations of. We then explore these dimensions more thoroughly. After a very short discussion of the links between these dimensions, we move to some of the arguments presented for and against category theory in the foundational landscape. We end up on a more speculative note by examining the relationships between category theory and set theory.Various versions of this paper have been read by many people, many of whom have made crucial comments. Needless to say, I am entirely responsible for the claims made in this paper. I would particularly like to thank, in alphabetical order, Mario Bunge, Marta Bunge, Michael Hallett, Andrew Irvine, Saunders Mac Lane, Collin McLarty, Peneloppe Maddy and Mihaly Makkai. Part of the work was done while the author was a visiting fellow at REHSEIS in Paris and at the Center for Philosophy of Science in Pittsburgh. I would like to thank everyone for his or her help and support. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support received from the SSHRC of Canada while this work was done.     

The heart of consequentialism

Conclusion My goal in this paper was to argue that consequentialism should be construed as the view that the better a state of affairs the better the action that produces it and the more moral reason there is to perform that action. I call this view BETTER. I tried to show that treating this rather than a claim about the right as crucial to consequentialism had significant advantages. Finally, I demonstrated the relevance of my account to the issue of whether consequentialism is correct. It doesn't provide a conclusive answer to that question (we should be suspicious if it did) but allows us to see it in a new light and hopefully, suggests new and fruitful ways to tackle it.I am grateful to Daniel Howard-Snyder for help with this paper and to David McNaughton and Piers Rawling for correspondence regarding some of their views. Thanks also to an anonymous referee atPhilosophical Studies for comments.     

“Being one with god is something that can be done without rules”: Commentary on Allan Kellehear's “Near-death experiences and the pursuit of the ideal society”

Allan Kellehear's article is a pioneering venture exploring features of the transcendent society and comparing it with J.C. Davis's typology of ideal societies. Kellehear assumed that in the life after life there is a sociocultural ordering that can be discussed via structural functional theory and concepts; and he also assumed internal and external validity, despite evidence to the contrary in his article. I think both of these assumptions are incorrect. What we need are alternative sociocultural frameworks and alternative research strategies, possibly from the new science.     

Control theory and understanding motivated behavior: A different conclusion

In the preceding article it was argued that control theory is not a useful paradigm for understanding work motivation. In doing so, three primary criticisms were presented: (a) that control theory, as originally formulated, does not adequately describe human behavior, (b) that modifications of control theory to describe human behavior have not been successful, and (c) that the use of logical deductions to develop a control theory model of work motivation is less efficacious than a grounded theory approach. In this reply, it will be shown that (a) the first criticism is not incorrect but is an inappropriate basis for criticism, (b) statements regarding modified control theory models are either inaccurate or premature, and (c) both inductive and deductive reasoning play an important role in theory development. In addressing these issues and in discussing the distinct advantages of current control theory models it will be shown that control theory does provide a viable paradigm for understanding work motivation.Thanks to John R. Hollenbeck for his helpful comments on this paper.     

Pr?dikative klassen

We consider certain predicative classes with respect to their bearing on set theory, namely on its semantics, and on its ontological power. On the one hand, our predicative classes will turn out to be perfectly suited for establishing a nice hierarchy of metalanguages starting from the usual set theoretical language. On the other hand, these classes will be seen to be fairly inappropriate for the formulation of strong principles of infinity. The motivation for considering this very type of classes is a reasonable philosophy of set theory. Familiarity is assumed only with basic concepts of both set theory and its philosophy.     

The Divine Command Theory of Mozi1

In this study, I will examine the famous ‘divine command theory’ of Mozi. Through the discussion of several important chapters of Mozi, including Fayi (law), Tianzhi (the will of heaven), Minggui (knowing the spirits) and Jianai (universal love), I attempt to clarify the arguments of Mozi offered in support of his distinctive ideas of serving heaven, knowing the spirits and loving all. The analysis shows that there are serious problems with his assumptions, hence they fail to support his conclusions as to the heaven–human relationship, and the man–man relationship. That is to say, at least in the texts covered, Mozi did not justify the moral or social relationship in society by appealing to the religious relationship.     

Reflections on thomism and client-centered psychotherapy

Conclusion To summarize, Rogers and Aquinas both stress the importance of existential experience and sense data. Although Rogers is more concerned with human freedom and being than are many modern adjustment psychotherapists, he is still circumscribed by his initial positivistic assumptions about the nature of man in his therapy. but these assumptions may be in the process of change.But like Aquinas, Rogers has a deep respect for the person, a respect for his emotions, a respect for his whole existential being.³⁸ Rogers once stated that the client-centered point of view is devoid of thequid pro quo aspect of most experiences we call love. It is the simple outgoing human feeling of one individual for another, a feeling it seems ... which is even more basic than sexual or parental feelings. It is a caring enough about the person that you do not wish to interfere with his development, nor to use him for any self-aggrandizing goals of your own. Your satisfaction comes in having set him free to grow in his own fashion.³⁹ Isn't this the spiritual detachment of real Christian love?He has taught at the University of California at Los Angeles and at Loyola University (Los Angeles), and has been a staff psychologist at the Metropolitan State Hospital, Los Angeles. He is a member of the American Psychological Association and the American Academy of Psychotherapists.Portions of this paper were presented at the 16th Annual Scientific Session, Guild of Catholic Psychiatrists, Los Angeles, 1964.     

Hick's interpretation of religious pluralism

Conclusion There is no question that Hick's theory rests upon multiple assumptions about a singular, transcendental grounding and the fundamental equality of the various religions that cannot be inductively verified beyond all doubt. That need not mean, however, that the attractiveness of his theory derives solely from the peculiar charm of supposing that the One and the Many are no more at odds in the realm of religion than anywhere else. For Hick's assumptions are not just an exercise in wishful thinking or wild speculation. They are based upon experience from within what he calls the benign circle of faith. Because the reality experienced is ambiguous, acceptance or rejection of his views will, of course, be a matter of choice. And, admittedly, this choice will be dictated not so much by a weighing of empirical evidence that might prove the various religions to be exactly as he sees them, as by a consideration of what we have been surveying in the preceding pages, namely, the import of seeing things as Hick does.

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Beyond verisimilitude: A linguistically invariant basis for scientific progress

This paper proposes a solution to David Miller's Minnesotan-Arizonan demonstration of the language dependence of truthlikeness (Miller 1974), along with Miller's first-order demonstration of the same (Miller 1978). It is assumed, with Peter Urbach, that the implication of these demonstrations is that the very notion of truthlikeness is intrinsically language dependent and thus non-objective. As such, truthlikeness cannot supply a basis for an objective account of scientific progress. I argue that, while Miller is correct in arguing that the number of true atomic sentences of a false theory is language dependent, the number of known sentences (under certain straightforward assumptions) is conserved by translation; degree of knowledge, unlike truthlikeness, is thus a linguistically invariant notion. It is concluded that the objectivity of scientific progress must be grounded on the fact (noted in Cohen 1980) that knowledge, not mere truth, is the aim of science.For criticism and comments I am indebted to Noretta Koertge, David Miller, and an anonymous Synthese referee.     

Once More into the Breach of Self-Ownership: Reply to Narveson and Brenkert

In reply to Narveson, I distinguish his no-proviso argument from his liberty argument, and I show that both fail. I also argue that interference lacks the strategic status he assigns to it, because it cannot be appropriately distinguished, conceptually and morally, from prevention; that natural resources do enjoy the importance he denies they have; that laissez-faire economies lack the superiority he attributes to them; that ownership can indeed be a reflexive relation; that anti-paternalism does not entail libertarianism; and that he misrepresents the doctrines of a number of philosophers, including John Locke, Ronald Dworkin, and myself. In reply to Brenkert, I show that he seriously misconstrues my view of the nature of freedom, and of its relationship to self-ownership. I then refute his criticisms of my treatment of the contrasts between self-ownership, on the one hand, and autonomy and non-slavery, on the other. I also show that his attempt to exorcize the demon of self-ownership is multiply flawed.     

Definitional and Research Issues in the Common Factors Approach to Psychotherapy Integration: Misconceptions, Clarifications, and Proposals

This paper focuses on two common misconceptions of common factors in therapy. The first misconception entails the confusion between common factors and therapeutic factors, and thus the inappropriate and misleading use of the term therapeutic common factors in various situations. The second misconception is the mixing of commonalities of different kinds and levels in proposed lists and studies of common factors. These areas are discussed and clarified, and recommendations designed to facilitate conceptual and methodological improvements relative to each misconception are offered. The selection of best levels and kinds of common factors to be studied are further explored (i.e., the study of client change events and antecedent therapist behaviors across different therapies), and specific proposals for their research are outlined.     

The Implicit Assumptions of Dividing a Cake: Political or Comprehensive?

Rawls's recent modification of his theory of justice claims that political liberalism is free-standing and falls under the category of the political. It works entirely within that domain and does not rely on anything outside it In this article I pursue the metatheoretical goal of obtaining insight into the anthropological assumptions that have remained so far unacknowledged by Rawls and critics alike. My argument is that political liberalism has a dependence on comprehensive liberalism and its conception of a self-serving subjectivity that is far more binding as well as undesirable than it has been so far acknowledged. I proceed with a heuristic approach that introduces us to the possibility that political liberalism presupposes tacitly the Occidental metanarrative of reason harnessing rampant self-interest and subordinating it to a higher-order interest. As the presuppositions of political liberalism emerge, I draw from the debate between Rawls and Habermas in order to illustrate my argument for the existence of a dependence on these presuppositions. I outline some implications of the anthropological basis of political liberalism and conclude by exemplifying them with reference to Rawls's comments on the division of a cake.     

John Nash's Postdelusional Period: A Case of Transformed Narcissism

This article concludes the psychoanalytic study of mathematical genius John Nash begun in previous articles (Capps 2003a, 2003b) by focusing on his recovery from paranoid schizophrenia after more than a decade of being under control of his delusions. I develop the idea that Nash was a highly narcissistic personality, the primary focus of which was his beautiful mind, in the years preceding his mental breakdown. I attribute his recovery primarily to the transformation of his narcissistic personality and support this attribution by means of Heinz Kohut's identification of five major expressions of transformed narcissism in his classic essay on the forms and transformations of narcissism.     

Semantic indeterminacy and the realist stance

Semantic Indeterminacy and Scientific Realism are perhaps the two most ubiquitous and influential doctrines of the Quinean corpus. My concern is to argue against neither in isolation, but against their joint compatibility. Scientific Realism, I argue, when understood as Quine's realistic attitude toward the posits of physical theory, is essentially intentional in character. Thus, Realism requires Intentionality. In Section 1, I provide some necessary exegesis. In Section 2, I attempt to show how this Realism/Intentionality connection arises, surprisingly, within Quine's own mature work to create a tension in his views which he does not himself resolve. In Section 3, I examine the source of the Realism/Intentionality connection more deeply, and respond to possible Quinean objections to my account. In Section 4, I consider the consequences of the connection for various debates in recent analytic philosophy.     

R. B. Cattell: An Integration of Psychology and Ethics

Cattell has sought continually to bring psychology into dialogue with ethics. In the space available for this essay it is impossible to adequately review all of this work. The aim is to provide a brief overview by, first, discussing how Cattell has included morals and values in his theory of personality, and second, describing some features of his ideas for improving ethical reasoning and ethical systems. I will close w"ith some evaluative comments of Cattell's integration of psychology and ethics.     

Apriority and applied mathematics

I argue that we need not accept Quine's holistic conception of mathematics and empirical science. Specifically, I argue that we should reject Quine's holism for two reasons. One, his argument for this position fails to appreciate that the revision of the mathematics employed in scientific theories is often related to an expansion of the possibilities of describing the empirical world, and that this reveals that mathematics serves as a kind of rational framework for empirical theorizing. Two, this holistic conception does not clearly demarcate pure mathematics from applied mathematics. In arguing against Quine, I present a formal account of applied mathematics in which the mathematics employed in an empirical theory plays a role that is analogous to the epistemological role Kant assigned synthetic a priori propositions. According to this account, it is possible to insulate pure mathematics from empirical falsification, and there is a sense in which applied mathematics can also be labeled as a priori.I am especially indebted to Michael Friedman for his valuable suggestions and criticisms of this paper. I would also like to thank Mark Wilson, Anil Gupta, and Arthur Fine for their comments and encouragement.