Testing emotional memories: does negative emotional significance influence the benefit received from testing?

A large body of research shows that emotionally significant stimuli are better stored in memory. One question that has received much less attention is how emotional memories are influenced by factors that influence memories after the initial encoding of stimuli. Intriguingly, several recent studies suggest that post-encoding factors do not differ in their effects on emotional and neutral memories. However, to date, only detrimental factors have been addressed. In the present study, we examined whether emotionally negative memories are differentially influenced by a well-known beneficial factor: the testing of memories. We employed a standard cued recall testing-effect paradigm where participants studied cue-target pairs for negative and neutral target pictures. In a subsequent post-encoding phase, one third of the cue-target pairs were tested and one third restudied; the remaining third served as control pairs. After one week, memory for all cue-target pairs was tested. While replicating both the testing effect and the emotional enhancement effect, no differences between negative and neutral memories in the benefits received from testing and restudying were observed. Thus, it seems to be true that post-encoding factors do not influence emotional memories in any other way than neutral memories, even when they are beneficial.     

Memory enhancement for emotional words: Are emotional words more vividly remembered than neutral words?

Individuals are more likely to remember negative information than neutral information. In the experiments reported here, we examined whether individuals were also more likely to remember details of the presentation of negative words, as compared with neutral words. In Experiment 1, the remember-know procedure was used to examine the effect of emotion on the vividness of an individual's memory, showing that remember responses were more frequently assigned to negative words than neutral words. In Experiment 2, a source memory paradigm was used, and again, evidence that individuals' memories were more detailed for negative than for neutral words was found. In Experiments 3-6, we examined the relative contribution of valence and arousal, finding that both dimensions increased the vividness of remembered information (i.e., items with valence only and those that elicited arousal were better remembered than neutral information) but that the effect was greater for words that evoked arousal than for those with valence only. The results support a qualitative, as well as a quantitative, memory benefit for emotional, as compared with neutral, words.     

Attention for emotional faces under restricted awareness revisited: do emotional faces automatically attract attention?

Theoretical models of attention for affective information have assigned a special status to the cognitive processing of emotional facial expressions. One specific claim in this regard is that emotional faces automatically attract visual attention. In three experiments, the authors investigated attentional cueing by angry, happy, and neutral facial expressions that were presented under conditions of limited awareness. In these experiments, facial expressions were presented in a masked (14 ms or 34 ms, masked by a neutral face) and unmasked fashion (34 ms or 100 ms). Compared with trials containing neutral cues, delayed responding was found on trials with emotional cues in the unmasked, 100-ms condition, suggesting stronger allocation of cognitive resources to emotional faces. However, in both masked and unmasked conditions, the hypothesized cueing of visual attention to the location of emotional facial expression was not found. In contrary, attentional cueing by emotional faces was less strong compared with neutral faces in the unmasked, 100-ms condition. These data suggest that briefly presented emotional faces influence cognitive processing but do not automatically capture visual attention.     

Is panic a unique emotional experience?

The establishment of Panic Disorder (PD) as a distinct diagnostic category stems largely from the conceptualization of panic as a phenomenon qualitatively different from severe levels of anxiety. The current study utilized patients with Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) as comparison groups to examine the validity of this conceptualization. Seventeen PD, 29 OCD, and 12 GAD patients completed self-report inventories from which a panic factor was derived. Controlling for level of overall anxiety, the total panic factor was rated significantly higher by the PD group. A cluster of symptoms emerged which differentiated the PD group from the other two groups. The panic items and total score were correlated with total levels of state and trait anxiety but correlations were generally low, accounting for a limited amount of the total variance. Results were interpreted as providing only equivocal support for viewing panic as a separate dimension apart from high levels of general anxiety. A discussion of conceptual issues is presented.     

Is emotional intelligence an advantage? An exploration of the impact of emotional and general intelligence on individual performance

Emotional intelligence is an increasingly popular consulting tool. According to popular opinion and work-place testimonials, emotional intelligence increases performance and productivity; however, there has been a general lack of independent, systematic analysis substantiating that claim. The authors investigated whether emotional intelligence would account for increases in individual cognitive-based performance over and above the level attributable to traditional general intelligence. The authors measured emotional intelligence with the Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS; J. D. Mayer, P. Salovey, & D. R. Caruso, 1997). As measured by the MEIS, overall emotional intelligence is a composite of the 3 distinct emotional reasoning abilities: perceiving, understanding, and regulating emotions (J. D. Mayer & P. Salovey, 1997). Although further psychometric analysis of the MEIS is warranted, the authors found that overall emotional intelligence, emotional perception, and emotional regulation uniquely explained individual cognitive-based performance over and beyond the level attributable to general intelligence.     

Forebrain emotional asymmetry: a neuroanatomical basis?

There is considerable psychophysiological evidence to indicate that the left and right halves of the human forebrain differentially associate with particular emotions and affective traits. A neurobiological model is needed. Here I propose that forebrain emotional asymmetry is anatomically based on an asymmetrical representation of homeostatic activity that originates from asymmetries in the peripheral autonomic nervous system. This proposal builds on recent evidence indicating that lateralized, higher-order re-representations of homeostatic sensory activity provide a foundation for subjective human feelings. It can subsume differing views of emotion and the forebrain because it suggests that emotions are organized according to the fundamental principle of autonomic opponency for the management of physical and mental energy.     

Judgements of others’ emotional appropriateness are multidimensional

This study investigated the multidimensional structure of judgements of emotional appropriateness, the degree to which an observer judges a target's emotion to conform to observer-valued expectations for emotion in that context. Participants (N=169) were shown one of two brief video clips of an actor either showing anger or neutral expressions in an anger-evoking situation of either low, medium, or high severity. Participants rated the target's emotion on the Perception of Emotion Appropriateness Rating Scale (PEARS), which taps observers’ perceptions of a target's emotional appropriateness for a specific situation. We found that appropriateness ratings are comprised of three factors, assessment of Type Present (type of emotion in expression); Type Absent (missing key emotions); and Intensity (intensity with which the emotion is felt or expressed). Results are discussed in terms of the usefulness of a multidimensional conceptualisation of emotional appropriateness.     

Are emotional intelligent workers also more empathic?

This paper analyzes whether emotional intelligence and self‐monitoring are related to empathy among a sample of workers in both the public and private employment sectors. Two hundred and forty‐two employees (42.5% men and 57.5% women) with a mean age of 35.21 years (SD = 10.07, range 18–61) completed a questionnaire that measured the variables of interest. The results showed that emotion regulation, a dimension of emotional intelligence, accounts for most of the variance of empathy, followed by the ability to understand emotions and the management of others' emotions. Furthermore, gender did not yield any moderator effect on the relations among emotional intelligence, self‐monitoring and empathy. We conclude that the intrapersonal aspects of emotional intelligence, in particular, emotion regulation, help explain the empathy of workers. The implications of these findings are discussed herein.     

The emotional geographies of the ‘livingdying’

This paper engages with Madge's (2016; 2018) notion of the ‘livingdying’ through an analysis of three recent autobiographies of death and dying. Dying: A Memoir by Australian author, Cory Taylor (2016), In Gratitude by British writer, Jenny Diski (2016), and The Bright Hour by American memoirist, Nina Riggs (2017), provide insight into the sometimes contradictory emotional responses to the different spaces traversed by the ‘livingdying’. We identify how the emotions of fear and anxiety, sadness and grief, anger and frustration, and isolation and loneliness infuse the liminal spaces that the ‘livingdying’ occupy. In doing so we highlight how the normative dualism of ‘the living’ and ‘the dying’ shapes emotional vulnerabilities. Finally, hoping to further advance Madge's (2016; 2018) provocation to acknowledge, account for and honour the intrinsic entanglement of living and dying and life and death, we propose a reframing of her notion of ‘livingdying’ that includes the ‘ordinary’ living, that is, those not dealing with a terminal illness.     

The “Big Two” and socially induced emotions: Agency and communion jointly influence emotional contagion and emotional mimicry

Motivation and Emotion - Three studies investigated the effects of two fundamental dimensions of social perception on emotional contagion (i.e., the transfer of emotions between people). Rooting...     

What if I am the one? Measuring individual differences in emotional sensitivity to probability and emotional reactivity to possibility

Current theories of risk perception point to the powerful role of emotion and the neglect of probabilistic information in the face of risk, but these tendencies differ across individuals. We propose a method for measuring individuals' emotional sensitivity to probability to assess how feelings about probabilities, rather than the probabilities themselves, influence decisions. Participants gave affective ratings (worry or excitement) to 14 risky events, each with a specified probability ranging from 1 in 10 to 1 in 10,000,000. For each participant, we regressed these emotional responses against item probabilities, estimating a slope (the degree to which emotional responses change with probability) and an intercept (the emotional reaction to an event with a fixed probability). These two parameters were treated as individual difference scores and included in models predicting reactions to several health risk scenarios. Both emotional sensitivity to probability (slope) and emotional reactivity to possibility (intercept) significantly predicted responses to these scenarios, above and beyond the predictive power of other well‐established individual difference measures.     

Executive control attenuates emotional effects-For high reappraisers only?

Irrelevant emotional information influences adaptive behavior. Previous results demonstrated that executive control may help reduce such influence. The current research studied the relationship between the tendency to use emotion regulation strategies (e.g., reappraisal and suppression) and the ability of executive control to reduce emotional interference. Our results demonstrate that negative stimuli disrupt performance in congruent flanker trials, regardless of individual tendencies to use reappraisal or suppression. In contrast, negative stimuli did not disrupt performance in incongruent trials in people who report frequent use of reappraisal. This pattern appeared both when a negative stimulus appeared before and after the flanker target and was not modulated by suppression level. We suggest that people who tend to use reappraisal have improved ability of executive control to reduce emotional effects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Disgust: Sensory affect or primary emotional system?

We argue in this paper for the inclusion in the primary emotional systems enumerated by Panksepp of a neural system that organises disgust responses. The DISGUST system arose phylogenetically in response to danger to the internal milieu from pathogens and their toxic products. We suggest that the primitive emotive circuit, which originally provided defence by regulating consummatory behaviours, gave rise to a primary emotional system that facilitates evaluation of reinforcers. Unlike the sensory affect of distaste from which it is experimentally dissociable, disgust responses can involve flexible learned components triggered by several modalities. The anterior insula is implicated as playing a major role in the DISGUST system both in organising disgust responses in the individual and recognising disgust responses in others.     

Negative emotional outcomes impair older adults’ reversal learning

In a typical reversal-learning experiment, one learns stimulus–outcome contingencies that then switch without warning. For instance, participants might have to repeatedly choose between two faces, one of which yields points whereas the other does not, with a reversal at some point in which face yields points. The current study examined age differences in the effects of outcome type on reversal learning. In the first experiment, the participants’ task was either to select the person who would be in a better mood or to select the person who would yield more points. Reversals in which face was the correct option occurred several times. Older adults did worse in blocks in which the correct response was to select the person who would not be angry than in blocks in which the correct response was to select the person who would smile. Younger adults did not show a difference by emotional valence. In the second study, the negative condition was switched to have the same format as the positive condition (to select who will be angry). Again, older adults did worse with negative than positive outcomes, whereas younger adults did not show a difference by emotional valence. A third experiment replicated the lack of valence effects in younger adults with a harder probabilistic reversal-learning task. In the first two experiments, older adults performed about as well as younger adults in the positive conditions but performed worse in the negative conditions. These findings suggest that negative emotional outcomes selectively impair older adults’ reversal learning.     

The anatomy of adolescents’ emotional engagement in schoolwork

This study explores the complexity of emotionally engaging schoolwork among students by analysing the interrelation between the affective and the social dimensions of emotional engagement. The data were collected from 78 Finnish sixth-grade (aged 12–13 years) and 89 eighth-grade (aged 14–15 years) students using picture tasks. The results show that the main elements of the affective dimension are the valuing of schoolwork and the enjoyment of learning, and the main element of the social dimension is a sense of belonging in terms of social cohesion and the support experienced by students. Furthermore, the results suggest that emotional engagement has internal dynamics: the affective and social dimension influence each other, regulating the students’ sense of emotional engagement. Consequently, neither of the dimensions alone result in strong, balanced emotional engagement. In addition, the results show that the relation between the affective and social dimension was more unbalanced in the peer interaction than in the teacher–student interaction at both grade levels. This suggests that tensions in the peer interaction at school make for a more complicated context in terms of emotional engagement.     

Children’s emotional norms for 600 French words

The present study provides a French child database containing a large corpus of words (N=600) that were rated on emotional valence (positive, neutral, and negative) by French children differing in both age (5, 7, and 9 years old) and sex (girls and boys). Good response reliability was observed in each of the three age groups. The results showed some age differences in the children’s ratings. With increasing age, the percentage of words rated positive decreased, whereas the percentage of neutral words increased and the percentage of negative words remained stable. Our study did not reveal marked differences across sex groups. The database compiled here should become a useful tool for experimental studies in which verbal material is used with children. It would be worthwhile in future research to study how children process emotional words and also to control the emotional variable in the same way as other linguistic variables in the experimental design. The norms from this study may be downloaded from brm.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.     

Infants’ emotional states influence maternal behaviors during holding

Previous studies have mainly examined how maternal behaviors influence infants during holding. However it is unclear how infants influence maternal holding. This current study investigated how infants’ emotional states influence maternal holding behaviors, and whether maternal holding behaviors are also influenced by the mothers’ parenting stress. We manipulated infants’ emotional states and videotaped mothers’ holding behaviors. The mothers also completed a questionnaire about their parental stress. Results showed that mothers varied their holding behaviors depending on their infants’ emotional states. When infants were comfortable, mothers rocked them horizontally and quietly. When infants were uncomfortable, mothers rocked them vertically at a high frequency. Furthermore, some types of parenting stress were related to several types of maternal behaviors in the context of holding. These findings suggest that maternal holding behaviors are influenced by both the infants’ emotional states and the mothers’ parenting stress.     

Mood-congruent memory in depression: emotional priming or elaboration?

We investigated whether mood-congruent memory (MCM) bias in depression is a function of implicit or explicit memory. Implicit memory is taken as a measure of ease of activation, whereas explicit memory also taps elaboration. As expected, MCM bias was found in the explicit memory task but not in the implicit memory task. We believe this finding supports the involvement of elaborative mechanisms in MCM. In addition, memory bias was found with words related to depression but not with words denoting physical threat. Thus, the MCM bias in explicit memory was found to be specific to information that was congruent with depression rather than to all negative information.     

Does remembering emotional items impair recall of same-emotion items?

In the part-set cuing effect, cuing a subset of previously studied items impairs recall of the remaining noncued items. This experiment reveals that cuing participants with previously-studied emotional pictures (e.g., fearevoking pictures of people) can impair recall of pictures involving the same emotion but different content (e.g., fear-evoking pictures of animals). This indicates that new events can be organized in memory using emotion as a grouping function to create associations. However, whether new information is organized in memory along emotional or nonemotional lines appears to be a flexible process that depends on people’s current focus. Mentioning in the instructions that the pictures were either amusement- or fear-related led to memory impairment for pictures with the same emotion as cued pictures, whereas mentioning that the pictures depicted either animals or people led to memory impairment for pictures with the same type of actor.