Processing fluency affects subjective claims of recollection

Previous studies that have used the remember-know paradigm to investigate subjective awareness in memory have shown that fluency manipulations have an impact on "know" responses but not on "remember" responses (e.g., Rajaram, 1993), a finding typically accounted for by invoking inferential processing in judgments of familiarity but not of recollection. However, in light of several researchers' criticisms of this procedure, as well as findings documenting the influence of processing fluency on various subjective judgments, the present study was conducted in order to investigate whether judgments of recollection might also be subject to inferential processes and not solely the product of conscious retrieval. When the standard remember-know procedure was used (Experiment 1), manipulations of perceptual fluency increased "know" responses but had no effect on "remember" responses, replicating previous findings. However, when an independent ratings method was employed (Higham & Vokey, 2004), manipulations of perceptual fluency (Experiment 2) and conceptual fluency (Experiment 3) reliably increased claims of both familiarity and recollection, suggesting that the conclusion that fluency affects only "know" responses may be an artifact of the standard remember-know procedure.     

负性情绪强度对双加工再认提取的影响

双加工理论认为再认提取存在回想和熟悉性两种认知加工过程。本研究采用修正的“记得/知道”范式,考察不同强度的负性情绪对这两种再认提取过程的影响。结果发现：（1）在记得反应上不同负性情绪强度的材料呈现出以下模式：高度负性 > 中度负性 > 轻度负性 > 中性;（2）在知道反应上,不同负性情绪强度的材料呈现出以下模式：中性 > 轻度负性 > 中度负性 > 高度负性。这些结果表明,不同强度的负性材料对情绪记忆的影响表现为两条途径：依赖于回想的再认随着负性情绪强度的增加而逐步提高,另外一个依赖于熟悉性的再认随着负性情绪强度的增加而逐步降低。     

Is there a special association between self judgements and conscious recollection?

Dual‐process models of recognition memory posit a rapid retrieval process that produces a general sense of familiarity and a slower retrieval process that produces conscious recollections of prior experience. The Remember–Know paradigm has been used to study the subjective correlates of these two processes with Remember judgements assumed to index conscious recollection and Know judgements assumed to index familiarity. In this paper we examine Conway and Dewhurst's recent finding that judgements of self during encoding produce more Remember responses than alternative semantic judgements. While one might interpret this result to suggest a special association between self judgement and conscious recollection, we consider the possibility that it occurs because of greater discriminability in this condition. The results of four experiments demonstrate that a self judgement condition produces more, fewer, or an equal number of Remember responses relative to a control condition depending on whether overall discriminability in the self judgement condition is greater than, less than, or equal to that in the control condition. The implications of these results for conceptions of self judgement and the use of the Remember–Know paradigm are detailed. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Automatic processing influences free recall: converging evidence from the process dissociation procedure and remember-know judgments

Dual-process theories of retrieval suggest that controlled and automatic processing contribute to memory performance. Free recall tests are often considered pure measures of recollection, assessing only the controlled process. We report two experiments demonstrating that automatic processes also influence free recall. Experiment 1 used inclusion and exclusion tasks to estimate recollection and automaticity in free recall, adopting a new variant of the process dissociation procedure. Dividing attention during study selectively reduced the recollection estimate but did not affect the automatic component. In Experiment 2, we replicated the results of Experiment 1, and subjects additionally reported remember–know–guess judgments during recall in the inclusion condition. In the latter task, dividing attention during study reduced remember judgments for studied items, but know responses were unaffected. Results from both methods indicated that free recall is partly driven by automatic processes. Thus, we conclude that retrieval in free recall tests is not driven solely by conscious recollection (or remembering) but also by automatic influences of the same sort believed to drive priming on implicit memory tests. Sometimes items come to mind without volition in free recall.     

On the validity of remember-know judgments: evidence from think aloud protocols

The use of remember–know judgments to assess subjective experience associated with memory retrieval, or as measures of recollection and familiarity processes, has been controversial. In the current study we had participants think aloud during study and provide verbal reports at test for remember–know and confidence (i.e., sure–probably) judgments. Results indicated that the vast majority of remember judgments for studied items were associated with recollection from study (87%), but this correspondence was less likely for high-confidence judgments (72%). Instead, high-confidence judgments were more likely than remember judgments to be associated with incorrect recollection and a lack of recollection. Know judgments were typically associated with a lack of recollection (62%), but still included recollection from the study context (33%). Thus, although remember judgments provided fairly accurate assessments of retrieval including contextual details, know judgments did not provide accurate assessments of retrieval lacking contextual details.     

Recognition memory and introspective remember/know judgments: Evidence for the influence of distractor plausibility on “remembering” and a caution about purportedly nonparametric measures

One popular technique in the study of human recognition memory involves the elicitation of remember and know judgments and the attribution of those judgments to qualitative states of memory retrieval. An alternative view, reviewed here, implicates quantitative, but not qualitative, differences in evidence as the basis for those two judgments. That theory makes two clear and testable predictions: that of criterion shifts in "remembering" and that of isodiscriminability across different response sets. In this experiment, the makeup of the distractor set in a recognition test is shown to influence overall recognition criterion and also rates of "remember" responses. The second portion of the article demonstrates how A' is a poor choice of a measure to test the prediction of isodiscriminability. When this measure is corrected (Equation 7) to make it more consistent with current knowledge about the receiver-operating characteristic in recognition memory, it reveals that there is no difference in discriminability between "remember" and all positive responses.     

The role of extralist associations in false

The finding that new items are judged as remembered in the remember-know paradigm presents a challenge to traditional process and systems accounts of memory. In three experiments, we demonstrated that false remember responses can be caused by misattributing recollection to a context other than the study list. In Experiments 1 and 2, false remember responses to distractors that were unrelated to studied words increased if they were encountered in a “preexposure” phase a few minutes or even a few days prior to the studied list. A third experiment demonstrated that remember responses to preexposed distractors increased when they were encoded in a manner similar to studied items, despite the more similar items being of weaker overall memory strength. We propose a source misattribution account of false remembering to explain these data, suggesting that all remember judgments reflect conscious recollection of contextual details, but false remember judgments are partly the result of recollection of details from an extralist context (i.e., from a source other than the study list).     

Modeling the conscious correlates of recognition memory: Reflections on the remember-know paradigm

Understanding how memory processes contribute to the conscious experience of memory is central to contemporary cognitive psychology. Recently, many investigators (e.g., Gardiner, 1988) have examined theremember-know paradigm to understand the conscious correlates of recognition memory. A variety of studies have demonstrated that variables have different effects on remember and know responses, and these findings have been interpreted in the context of dual-process models of recognition memory. This paper presents a single-process model of the remember-know paradigm, emphasizing the dependence of remember and know judgments on a set of common underlying processes (e.g., criterion setting). We use this model to demonstrate how a single-process model can give rise to the functional dissociations presented in the remember-know literature. We close by detailing procedures for testing our model and describing how those tests may facilitate the development of dual-process models.     

Subjective qualities of memories associated with the picture superiority effect in schizophrenia

Patients with schizophrenia (n = 24) matched with 24 normal subjects were presented with both words and pictures. On a recognition memory task, they were asked to give remember, know, or guess responses to items that were recognized on the basis of conscious recollection, familiarity, or guessing, respectively. Compared with normal subjects, patients exhibited a lower picture superiority effect selectively related to remember responses. Unlike normal subjects, they did not exhibit any word superiority effect in relation to guess responses; this explains why the overall picture superiority effect appeared to be intact. These results emphasize the need to take into account the subjective states of awareness when analyzing memory impairments in schizophrenia.     

Remembering and knowing: Two means of access to the personal past

The nature of recollective experience was examined in a recognition memory task. Subjects gave “remember” judgments to recognized items that were accompanied by conscious recollection and “know” judgments to items that were recognized on some other basis. Although a levels-of-processing effect (Experiment 1) and a picture-superiority effect (Experiment 2) were obtained for overall recognition, these effects occurred only for “remember” judgments, and were reversed for “know” judgments. In Experiment 3, targets and lures were either preceded by a masked repetition of their own presentation (thought to increase perceptual fluency) or of an unrelated word. The effect of perceptual fluency was obtained for overall recogrntion and “know” judgments but not for “remember” judgments. The data obtained for confidencejudgments using the same design (Experiment4) indicated that “remember”/”know” judgments are not made solely on the basis of confidence. These data support the two-factor theories of recognition memory by dissociating two forms of recognition, and shed light on the nature of conscious recollection.     

Cognitive effort and recollective experience in recognition memory

The difficulty of the cognitive operations required to process study items was manipulated in two experiments investigating recollective experience. In subsequent recognition tests, subjects indicated whether their recognition judgements for items processed in these tasks were based on recollection ("remember" responses) or on familiarity ("know" responses). In Experiment 1 target items were presented in the context of a category decision task. It was found that remember responses increased with the difficulty of the category decision. For positive instances, remember responses were greater for items of low instance frequency than for items of high instance frequency, while for negative instances remember responses were greater for items from similar categories than for items from dissimilar categories. These effects were not present in know responses. In Experiment 2, remember responses were more frequent when study items had been presented in the form of anagrams to be solved than when they had been presented in the form of words to be read aloud. The incidence of know responses was not affected by the format in which study items were presented. Source judgements were also more accurate when recognition was based on recollection. It is argued that the type of conscious awareness experienced during recognition is determined by the knowledge activated by items presented in the recognition test, which in turn is determined by the nature of the operations engaged at encoding.     

Dissociating familiarity from recollection using rote rehearsal

Recollection-based recognition memory judgments benefit greatly from effortful elaborative encoding, whereas familiarity-based judgments are much less sensitive to such manipulations. In this study, we have examined whether rote rehearsal under divided attention might produce the opposite dissociation, benefiting familiarity more than recollection. Subjects rehearsed word pairs during the "distractor" phase of a working memory span task, and were then given a surprise memory test for the distractor items at the end of the experiment. Experiment 1 demonstrated that increasing rehearsal elevated the recognition rate for intact and rearranged pairs, but neither associative recognition accuracy nor implicit fragment completion benefited from rehearsal. The results suggest that rote rehearsal leads to a greater increase in familiarity than in recollection, and that the increase in observed familiarity cannot be attributed to effects of repetition priming. In Experiment 2, we tested item recognition with the remember/know procedure, and the results supported the conclusions of Experiment 1. Moreover, a signal detection model of remember/know performance systematically overpredicted rehearsal increases in remember rates, and this worsened when high-rehearsal items were assumed to be more variable in strength. The results suggest that rote rehearsal can dissociate familiarity from recollection at the time of encoding and that item recognition cannot be fully accommodated within a one-dimensional signal detection model.     

Binding of multidimensional context information as a distinctive characteristic of remember judgments

This research investigated the cognitive processes underlying remember-know judgments in terms of contextual binding in multidimensional source memory. Stochastic dependence between the retrieval of different context attributes, which formed the empirical criterion of binding, was observed for remembered items but not for known items. Experiment 1 showed that the qualitative difference in the stochastic relation holds even if quantitative source-memory performance is equated for items with remember and know judgments. Experiment 2 generalized the findings to context information from different modalities, and Experiment 3 ruled out a spurious stochastic dependence due to interindividual differences. Supporting recent dual-process models of remember-know judgments, the findings show that remember and know judgments differ with respect to binding processes that correspond to episodic recollection.     

The detection model of recognition using know and remember judgments

The signal detection model forknow andremember recognition judgments was tested in two experiments. In Experiment 1, two predictions of the model were tested: (1) that measures of memory sensitivity,A′, are equivalent in value when based on either the recognition (know or remember) criterion or on the remember criterion; and (2) that there is a positive correlation between recognition bias and the proportion of know judgments that are hits, but no correlation between recognition bias and proportion of remember hits (Donaldson, 1996). Both predictions were supported by the data. In Experiment 2, the context of test items was manipulated to make it more or less similar to learning context. The detection model requires that memory sensitivity be the same for both recognition and remember judgments, regardless of test context. Alternatively, if remember judgments reflect only the retrieval of episodic information from memory, the two measures of memory sensitivity should become more disparate in value as learning and test context are made more similar. Memory sensitivity was generally the same in value for recognition and remember criteria but different across context conditions, thus supporting the detection model. The nature of the memory continuum used in detection theory is also discussed.     

In defense of the signal detection interpretation of remember/know judgments

Donaldson (1996) argued that remember/know judgments can be conceptualized within a signal detection framework by assuming that they are based on two criteria situated along a strength-of-memory decision axis. According to this model, items that exceed a high criterion receive a remember response, whereas items that only exceed a lower criterion receive a know response. Although a variety of findings have been presented in evidence against this idea, Dunn (2004) recently showed that detection theory is fully compatible with those findings. We present a variety of new results and new analyses that weigh strongly in favor of the detection interpretation. We further show that a dual-process account of recognition memory is compatible with a unidimensional detection model despite the common notion that such a model necessarily assumes a single process. The key assumption of this model is that individual recognition decisions are based on both recollection and familiarity (not on one process or the other).     

Examining the basis for illusory recollection: The role of remember/know instructions

Curiously, studies using the remember/know paradigm to measure recollective experience show that people often vividly remember events that never occurred, a phenomenon referred to asillusory recollection. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that false remember responses in the converging associates, or Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, reflect accurate memory for the study episode, rather than false recollection of critical lures. To test this hypothesis, we used standard remember instructions that emphasized recollection of the study context by allowing participants to use memory of surrounding list items as evidence for recollection, or we used modified instructions that did not include memory for surrounding list items as a basis for recollection. Results showed that, as compared with the standard instruction condition, the modified instructions selectively reduced reports of false remember responses to critical lures, but did not affect remember responses to studied items. By contrast, remember responses to critical lures were unaffected by an instruction condition that excluded the use of voice information as evidence for remembering. These results suggest that remember responses to falsely recognized items are driven partly by retrieval of studied items, rather than illusory recollection of the critical lures themselves. They further point to the importance of instructions in influencing subjective reports.     

Recognition memory and awareness: A large effect of study-test modalities on “know” responses following a highly perceptual orienting task

Abstract

Two experiments investigated the effects of varying the correspondence between presentation and test modes on states of conscious awareness in recognition memory. Experiment 1 used visual test items and showed that auditory and visual study modes differentially affected recollective experience and feelings of familiarity assessed by “remember” and “know” responses accompanying recognition: “know” responses were slightly enhanced following visual presentation, but this was largely offset by a similarly small increase in “remember” responses. Experiment 2 employed conditions designed to maximise any effect on “know” responses of the correspondence between presentation and test modes by using a highly perceptual orienting task at study. Under these conditions, there was a large mode correspondence effect on “know” responses. The results support the idea that “know” responses are particularly sensitive to perceptual factors.     

The influence of decision criteria upon remembering and knowing in recognition memory.

One may recognise an item as 'old' on basis of a recollective experience or by a feeling of familiarity without specific recollection. The former is called a 'remember' judgement; the latter a 'know' judgement. It has been claimed that remember and know responses reflect qualitatively distinct components of recognition memory, and not just derive from gradual differences in perceived trace strength or subjective certainty (i.e. remember judgments include memories of which one is more confident). Nonetheless, the present study examined the possibility that the distinction does relate to decision criteria placed upon a single familiarity axis (see Donaldson, 1996; Hirshman & Master, 1997). To this purpose, two groups of subjects were compared: one, which was instructed to be very conservative in their old-new judgements, while the other group was stimulated to be very lenient instead. Remember hit rates increased with more lenient criteria, whereas know hit rates did not, but false alarm rates did. While remember sensitivity was equal in the two groups, know sensitivity was lower with liberal criteria. Also it correlated with overall response bias. This lends support to the possibility that subjects not only apply an old-new decision criterion, but also set a remember-know criterion, which is affected in a similar way by liberal versus conservative instructions.     

双加工再认提取中的情绪记忆增强效应

根据双加工理论, 再认提取可以划分为两种不同的加工：熟悉性与回想。以往的研究普遍认为情绪对再认提取具有增强效应, 但是情绪对再认记忆中两种不同加工方式(熟悉性与回想)的增强效应的神经机制尚存争议。本研究以ERP作为测量手段, 采用修正的“记得/知道”范式对情绪图片进行再认测验, 旨在探究在学习?测验间隔较长的条件下, 情绪信息如何对熟悉性与回想产生增强效应。在行为结果中, 对于知道判断, 情绪图片的记忆表现显著高于中性图片, 情绪效价间没有差异; 对于记得判断, 负性情绪图片的记忆表现要显著高于正性与中性图片。在ERP数据上, 对于知道判断, 情绪图片的FN400新旧效应有增强作用。对于记得判断, 负性图片的LPC的新旧效应波幅显著高于中性与负性图片; 而正性图片的LPC新旧效应增强作用不显著。以上证据表明：学习?测验间隔较长的情况下, 熟悉性再认提取中, 情绪记忆增强效应主要体现在情绪唤醒对记忆强度的提高, 而不仅仅体现在情绪效价对熟悉判断反应倾向的影响。在回想的再认提取中, 情绪效价的调节占据主导地位, 负性情绪图片有显著的情绪记忆增强效应; 正性情绪图片则不具有增强效应。     

Maintenance rehearsal affects knowing,not remembering; elaborative rehearsal affects remembering,not knowing

In a directed-forgetting paradigm, each word in a study list was followed by a cue designating that word as eitherlearn orforget. This cue appeared after either a short or a long delay. It was assumed that a long delay would increase maintenance rehearsal of all the words, and that only the words followed by a learn cue would be rehearsed elaboratively. Moreover, because the interval between the words was constant, a short cue delay should allow more time for elaborative rehearsal. In a subsequent test, subjects maderemember orknow responses to indicate whether recognition of each word was accompanied by conscious recollection or by feelings of familiarity in the absence of conscious recollection. The hypothesis was that remembering depends on elaborative rehearsal, and knowing depends on maintenance rehearsal. In accord with this hypothesis, the learn-versus-forget designation influenced remember but not know responses, and there were more remember responses after the short cue delay; cue delay influenced know responses, regardless of word designation.