Relation availability was not confounded with familiarity or plausibility in Gagné and Shoben (1997): Comment on Wisniewski and Murphy (2005)

C. L. Gagné and E. Shoben (1997) proposed that the conceptual system contains information about how concepts are used to modify other concepts and that this relational information influences the ease with which concepts combine. Recently, E. J. Wisniewski and G. L. Murphy suggested that C. L. Gagné and E. Shoben's measure of relation availability was confounded with familiarity and plausibility and that the participants could simply retrieve the stored meanings of the phrases because the phrases were not novel. In this article, the authors demonstrate that E. J. Wisniewski and G. L. Murphy's plausibility and familiarity judgments are dependent variables that (a) are themselves responsive to changes in relation availability, (b) modifier relation availability predicts response time even when the influence of phrase familiarity and plausibility is controlled, and (c) the materials consisted of mainly novel phrases.     

Determinants of pigeons' choices in token-based self-control procedures

Four pigeons were exposed to a token-based self-control procedure with stimulus lights serving as token reinforcers. Smaller-reinforcer choices produced one token immediately; larger-reinforcer choices produced three tokens following a delay. Each token could be exchanged for 2-s access to food during a signaled exchange period each trial. The main variables of interest were the exchange delays (delays from the choice to the exchange stimulus) and the food delays (also timed from the choice), which were varied separately and together across blocks of sessions. When exchange delays and food delays were shorter following smaller-reinforcer choices, strong preference for the smaller reinforcer was observed. When exchange delays and food delays were equal for both options, strong preference for the larger reinforcer was observed. When food delays were equal for both options but exchange delays were shorter for smaller-reinforcer choices, preference for the larger reinforcer generally was less extreme than under conditions in which both exchange and food delays were equal. When exchange delays were equal for both options but food delays were shorter for smaller-reinforcer choices, preference for the smaller reinforcer generally was less extreme than under conditions in which both exchange and food delays favored smaller-reinforcer choices. On the whole, the results were consistent with prior research on token-based self-control procedures in showing that choices are governed by reinforcer immediacy when exchange and food delays are unequal and by reinforcer amount when exchange and food delays are equal. Further, by decoupling the exchange delays from food delays, the results tentatively support a role for the exchange stimulus as a conditioned reinforcer.     

Situational Familiarity,Efficacy Expectations,and the Process of Credibility Attribution

Four experiments investigated the influence of situational familiarity within a judgmental context on the process of credibility attribution. We predicted that high familiarity with a situation would lead to higher efficacy expectations for, and a more pronounced use of, verbal information when making judgments of credibility. Under low situational familiarity, judges were expected to experience higher efficacy expectations for, and a more pronounced use of, nonverbal information. In Experiments 1 through 4, participants under low or high situational familiarity saw a film in which nonverbal cues (fidgety vs. calm movements) and verbal content cues (low vs. high plausibility) were manipulated. As predicted, when familiarity was low, only the nonverbal cues influenced participants’ judgments of credibility. In contrast, participants in the high familiarity condition used only the verbal cues. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that efficacy expectations regarding verbal and nonverbal information, but not processing motivation, drive this familiarity effect.     

Pressure and perverse flights to familiarity

Under pressure, people often prefer what is familiar, which can seem safer than the unfamiliar. We show that such favoring of familiarity can lead to choices precisely contrary to the source of felt pressure, thus exacerbating, rather than mitigating, its negative consequences. In Experiment 1, time pressure increased participants' frequency of choosing to complete a longer but incidentally familiar task option (as opposed to a shorter but unfamiliar alternative), resulting in increased felt stress during task completion. In Experiment 2, pressure to reach a performance benchmark in a chosen puzzle increased participants' frequency of choosing an incidentally familiar puzzle that both augured and delivered objectively worse performance (i.e., fewer points obtained). Participants favored this familiar puzzle even though familiarity was established through unpleasant prior experience. This "devil you know" preference under pressure contrasted with disfavoring of the negatively familiar option in a pressure-free situation. These results demonstrate that pressure-induced flights to familiarity can sometimes aggravate rather than ameliorate pressure, and can occur even when available evidence points to the suboptimality of familiar options.     

Go big or go home: Risk seeking for experiential choices

In decision making under risk, do consumers evaluate intangible, experiential options in a choice set in the same way they evaluate tangible, material options? Prior research on prospect theory, typically using either monetary or material objects as choice options, demonstrates that consumers are risk averse for choices involving gains, with a fairly robust tendency to favor a more certain outcome even when that outcome is less desirable. The present research focuses on decision making under risk for experiential options (from movies to concert tickets to hotel stays)—identifying choices between experiential options as a realm in which prospect theory's pattern of risk aversion is weakened and sometimes reversed. Across six studies, this research demonstrates that consumers are more risk seeking for experiential choices and thus more likely to prefer more desirable options, even options that are less certain. Further, the stronger personal connection fostered by experiential (vs. material) choice options mediates risk‐seeking preferences. This work demonstrates a moderator for prospect theory and investigates the tendency toward increased risk seeking among experiential options, in this paper termed a “go big or go home” strategy. Conversely, consistent risk aversion is evidenced for choices involving material options (from clothing to accessories and furniture).     

Mood and judgments based on sequential sampling

Different adaptive styles characterize cognition and behavior in different affective states. Whereas negative affect supports accommodation (i.e., stimulus‐driven bottom‐up processing), positive affect supports assimilation (i.e., self‐determined top‐down processing). Applying this well‐established rule to binary choices after self‐truncated information sampling, we predicted that positive mood should render choices less dependent on large samples than negative mood. Consequently, the potential primacy advantage underlying Wald's ( 1947 ) sequential testing (i.e., quick and correct decisions from the first few items in a sample) was exploited more efficiently when participants were in positive rather than negative mood. This efficient utilization of small samples in positive mood was obtained under the very conditions derived on a priori ground from a statistical model, namely, when a response criterion or threshold was high and when the true difference between choice options was relatively small. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of imperfect memory recall on risk preferences

People often take on different levels of risk when deciding on future actions compared with when they take actions with immediate consequences. The presently reported research investigated how imperfect recall of previously chosen options influences temporal fluctuations in risk preferences. In two incentivized studies with a waiting time before decision resolution (a 4-week waiting period from an initial decision), we observed that errors in the recall of previous choices played a substantial role in constructing risk preferences for choices that are usually resolved after a delay. More specifically, in a first study, we found that after a waiting period (i.e., after participants waited for their risky choices to be resolved), participants perceived that they took less risk during their initial choices than they actually did. Importantly, when asked about whether they would change their initial choices, participants declared that they would take riskier choices. In a second study, we tested directly whether such a shift in initial choices could also be demonstrated behaviorally. Results revealed that after beliefs about past choices were induced, participants changed their risk preferences in line with the information presented during belief induction.     

Take-the-best and the influence of decision-inconsistent attributes on decision confidence and choices in memory-based decisions

Take-the-best (TTB) is a decision strategy according to which attributes about choice options are sequentially processed in descending order of validity, and attribute processing is stopped once an attribute discriminates between options. Consequently, TTB-decisions rely on only one, the best discriminating, attribute, and lower-valid attributes need not be processed because they are TTB-irrelevant. Recent research suggests, however, that when attribute information is visually present during decision-making, TTB-irrelevant attributes are processed and integrated into decisions nonetheless. To examine whether TTB-irrelevant attributes are retrieved and integrated when decisions are made memory-based, we tested whether the consistency of a TTB-irrelevant attribute affects TTB-users’ decision behaviour in a memory-based decision task. Participants first learned attribute configurations of several options. Afterwards, they made several decisions between two of the options, and we manipulated conflict between the second-best attribute and the TTB-decision. We assessed participants’ decision confidence and the proportion of TTB-inconsistent choices. According to TTB, TTB-irrelevant attributes should not affect confidence and choices, because these attributes should not be retrieved. Results showed, however, that TTB-users were less confident and made more TTB-inconsistent choices when TTB-irrelevant information was in conflict with the TTB-decision than when it was not, suggesting that TTB-users retrieved and integrated TTB-irrelevant information.     

Making choices impairs subsequent self-control: a limited-resource account of decision making, self-regulation, and active initiative

The current research tested the hypothesis that making many choices impairs subsequent self-control. Drawing from a limited-resource model of self-regulation and executive function, the authors hypothesized that decision making depletes the same resource used for self-control and active responding. In 4 laboratory studies, some participants made choices among consumer goods or college course options, whereas others thought about the same options without making choices. Making choices led to reduced self-control (i.e., less physical stamina, reduced persistence in the face of failure, more procrastination, and less quality and quantity of arithmetic calculations). A field study then found that reduced self-control was predicted by shoppers' self-reported degree of previous active decision making. Further studies suggested that choosing is more depleting than merely deliberating and forming preferences about options and more depleting than implementing choices made by someone else and that anticipating the choice task as enjoyable can reduce the depleting effect for the first choices but not for many choices.     

Age-related changes in the appreciation of novel metaphoric semantic relations

In the present study we tested the possibility that older adults differ from younger adults in their appreciation of metaphoric semantic relations, and that age-related changes occur due to the perception of novel metaphors. In the first experiment 35 younger (mean age?=?23.1) and 35 older adults (mean age?=?75.3) were asked to rate the plausibility of metaphoric, literal, and unrelated word pairs. Relative to young participants, older participants rated fewer expressions as metaphorically plausible. The second experiment was conducted to examine whether the findings of the first experiment could be accounted for by an age-associated difference in the appreciation of metaphors with different levels of familiarity. In the second experiment, 25 younger (mean age?=?24.4) and 25 older adults (mean age?=?77.5) were asked to rate the familiarity level of the plausible metaphoric expressions. Relative to young participants, older participants rated fewer expressions as novel and more expressions as familiar. The results suggest that novelty plays an important role in appreciating the plausibility of semantic relationships, and age-related changes are associated with the appreciation of the novelty of expressions.     

Decision-making quality of younger and older adults in familiar and unfamiliar domains

Age-related differences in purchasing decisions were examined as a function of age and familiarity. On each trial, participants received purchasing options which varied in quality but ultimately cost the same amount of money. On half the trials, participants made decisions about items familiar to younger adults and on the other half of the trials, participants made decisions about products familiar to older adults. The participants’ task was to choose the option that provided the best value for the money. We were particularly interested in participants’ performance when inferencing was required to select the optimal option from the two choices. Younger adults outperformed older adults in unfamiliar but not familiar domains. It appeared that both younger and older adults used inferencing and elaborative processing to make the best decision in familiar domains but that only younger adults used inferencing and elaborative processing in unfamiliar domains.     

The Politics of Choice: Political Ideology and Intolerance of Ambiguity

The authors examine how political ideology impacts consumer preferences for hedonic and utilitarian choices and the underlying reasons for these differences. Five studies indicate that conservatives are less tolerant of ambiguity than liberals, leading to a preference for utilitarian options, whereas liberals are more tolerant of ambiguity leading to a preference for hedonic options. However, these preferences were reversed when utilitarian options were framed as ambiguous and hedonic options were framed as explicit and clear.     

Choice-supportive source monitoring: do our decisions seem better to us as we age?

Participants were given several 2-option choices and then asked to review how they felt about their decisions, to review the details of their decisions, or to do an unrelated task. When later asked to attribute features to the previous options, in each condition older adults (64-83 years) attributed significantly more positive and fewer negative features to their chosen options than to foregone options. Younger adults' (18-22 years) attributions were as choice-supportive as those of older adults in the affective review condition but were less so in the other conditions. The age difference was present even when older and younger adults were equated for source identification and recognition accuracy. This study suggests that as people age, their tendency to distort memory in favor of the options they chose increases. In addition, it suggests that affectively reviewing choices increases younger adults' tendency toward choice-supportive memory.     

College Students' Given Names: A Test of the Preference‐Feedback Hypothesis1

According to the preference‐feedback hypothesis, liking generally increases with familiarity up to a point and then declines. However, for stimuli such as given names, liking increases monotonically with familiarity, because given names that become too familiar tend to be chosen less frequently by parents, thus becoming less familiar once again. A college sample of 160 men and 211 women provided potential names for first son and first daughter, as well as reasons for their selections. Comparing given names of the research participants with names that they chose for sons and daughters, high‐frequency participants' names occurred less frequently as choices for sons and daughters' names, although this effect was significant for women's names only. Frequency was mentioned as a reason for choices by 10% to 20% of the sample, and significantly more often for daughters' names than for sons' names.     

Age-related changes in the appreciation of novel metaphoric semantic relations

ABSTRACT

In the present study we tested the possibility that older adults differ from younger adults in their appreciation of metaphoric semantic relations, and that age-related changes occur due to the perception of novel metaphors. In the first experiment 35 younger (mean age?=?23.1) and 35 older adults (mean age?=?75.3) were asked to rate the plausibility of metaphoric, literal, and unrelated word pairs. Relative to young participants, older participants rated fewer expressions as metaphorically plausible. The second experiment was conducted to examine whether the findings of the first experiment could be accounted for by an age-associated difference in the appreciation of metaphors with different levels of familiarity. In the second experiment, 25 younger (mean age?=?24.4) and 25 older adults (mean age?=?77.5) were asked to rate the familiarity level of the plausible metaphoric expressions. Relative to young participants, older participants rated fewer expressions as novel and more expressions as familiar. The results suggest that novelty plays an important role in appreciating the plausibility of semantic relationships, and age-related changes are associated with the appreciation of the novelty of expressions.     

Local proactive interference in delayed matching to sample: the role of reinforcement

Discriminability in delayed matching to sample was lower when the samples on consecutive trials differed compared with when samples on consecutive trials were the same. This local proactive interference occurred when correct choices on the previous trial were reinforced but not when correct choices on the previous trial were not reinforced. When the choice on the previous trial was incorrect, discriminability was higher on different consecutive trials than on same trials. These effects were amplified by varying the ratio of reinforcers for correct choices, as predicted by a model that attributes local proactive interference to an interaction between control by the sample on the current trial and the influence of reinforcers for correct choices on previous trials.     

Unsure what the future will bring? You may overindulge: Uncertainty increases the appeal of wants over shoulds

This paper examines the effect of uncertainty about the future on whether individuals select want options (e.g., junk foods, lowbrow films) or instead exert self-control and select should options (e.g., healthy foods, highbrow films). Consistent with the ego-depletion literature, which suggests that self-control resembles an exhaustible muscle, coping with uncertainty about what the future may bring reduces self-control resources and increases individuals’ tendency to favor want options over should options. These results persist when real uncertainty is induced, when the salience of naturally-arising uncertainty is heightened and when individuals are able to make choices contingent upon the outcomes of uncertain events. Overall, this work suggests that reducing uncertainty in a decision maker’s environment may have important spillover effects, leading to less impulsive choices.     

Effects of self-other decision making on regulatory focus and choice overload

A growing stream of research is investigating how choices people make for themselves are different from choices people make for others. In this paper, I propose that these choices vary according to regulatory focus, such that people who make choices for themselves are prevention focused, whereas people who make choices for others are promotion focused. Drawing on regulatory focus theory, in particular work on errors of omission and commission, I hypothesize that people who make choices for others experience a reversal of the choice overload effect. In 6 studies, including a field study, I found that people who make choices for themselves are less satisfied after selecting among many options compared to few options, yet, people who make choices for others are more satisfied after selecting among many options compared to few options. Implications and suggestions for other differences in self-other decision making are discussed.     

The need to have an opinion as a driver of consumer choice

This research proposes that the need to have an opinion can make consumers choose less preferred options. We review literature from several disciplines indicating that holding opinions is an automatic human response associated with adaptive psychological benefits. We then theorize that when this need is activated in any domain, it can have carry‐over effects even in unrelated domains by inducing an inquisitive choice mindset and expanding consumers' consideration sets. This proposition rests on the assumption that less preferred options offer a higher experience utility, which can better satisfy the need to form opinions on a wider range of topics. Three experiments with diverse consumer and non‐consumer choices as well as various operationalizations and methodologies provide empirical evidence that priming the need to have an opinion makes consumers less likely to make choices based on their stated preferences. These results suggest that the need to have an opinion can affect consumer decision‐making in predictable and systematic ways by encouraging preference‐inconsistent choices. Theoretical and managerial implications are discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.