专名、摹状词与葛梯尔问题

论文认为葛梯尔第一个反例的实质，在于专名与摹状词之间的混用。一个专名的意义应当是在它与有关个体的关联的基础上产生的。个体提供了意义规定的基础，但个体并不等于意义本身。从本原上说，名称的确定性恰恰来自它与所指称的对象的关联性。专名的涵义是潜在的、隐而未显的，它通过摹状词来展现。专名在获得命名之后，即成为一个约定的符号。意义论的基础应当是“指称论”，而不是维特根斯坦的语言游戏说的“使用论”。     

空专名、意向性与指称行动

系统把握空专名的意义机制应立足于有关指称对象存在问题与指称行为本身问题的区分与关联。基于"假装"概念的分析,可准确把握意向性在空专名指称过程中的作用机理。只有在空专名本体论上坚持一种广义的实在论,才可为虚构对象提供适当的居所。关于指称行为的意向性分析有助于把握和充分发挥指称作为一种"行动"的实质与功能,进而把握"意向对象"的形成机理。以明确指称过程的实质为指针,可以明确:内涵和外延是思想层面的范畴,含义和指称是语言层面的范畴,概念的内涵表达为名称的含义,概念的外延表达为名称的指称对象;只要搞清楚这些层面区分并把握其中的关联,便可去除笼罩在空专名身上的神秘光环,并把握描述论和因果论之争的实质。     

专名指称的一种因果描述观点

本文的焦点是下面这个问题:在现实世界中一个专名的指称究竟是如何被确定的。在第一节中,我首先介绍克里普克对关于专名指称的传统描述理论的批判,然后讨论克里普克自己的因果理论以及这一理论所面临的困难。在克里普克的工作之后不少哲学家都对专名指称问题进行了有益的研究(突出的工作包括:BERGER,1989,2002;CHALMERS,2002;DEVITT,1981;EVANS,1973,1982;LANCE,1984)。在第二节中,我将集中介绍埃文斯(GARETH EVANS)的重要工作,将解释为什么他的工作能帮助我们更好地理解专名指称这个课题,为什么他的理论还需要进一步被发…     

专名和确定摹状词区分的一个哲学前提

自克里普克试图运用可能世界语义学恢复传统的密尔式专名理论,并反对摹状词理论以来,一些哲学家继续完善克里普克的理论,另一些哲学家则不断地使摹状词理论更加精致化。两派哲学家各自维护自己理论的基本前提,互相指责从对方理论的基本前提出发会导致令人难以接受的结论。毫无疑问,两派的对立是很明显的:一派认为,作为语言不可缺少的组成部分的专名是对象的标记,它本身是没有任何涵义(内涵)的,它在语言中的功用是直接指示它所指的对象,因而它是严格指示词(rigiddesignator);另一派则认为,我们实际使用的专名是一族摹状词的改装,摹状词族的涵…     

专名意义的一种生活整体主义观点

一、专名意义问题研究的历史、现状及挑战关于专名意义问题的研究在西方有着悠久的传统和历史。柏拉图早在《克拉底鲁篇》(Cratylus)中就对专名问题作了全面深入的探讨:他的论述中蕴含了不少闪光的思想,并且预期了当代专名及意义研究的一些标志性成果(参见Cooper)。近代对专名意义的研究始于密尔:他认为专名只是贴在其指称上的一个标签,没有描述性的内涵或意义。(Mill)弗雷格在其名著《论含义与指称》中指出,密尔的理论无法解释为什么诸如“晨星=暮星”这样的语句能够向我们传达后天的认知信息。他进而提出自己的专名意义理论:每个专名都…     

信念之谜(上)

在1972年《命名与必然性》的演讲中,作者提出了直接指称论的观点:名字的语义学内容仅仅就是所指称的对象。一般认为,如果接受直接指称论就必然导致信念之谜。因为,假如专名的语义学内容仅仅就是所指称的对象,那么两个共指称的专名,比如"Cicero"("西塞罗")和"Tully"("图利"),就应该在信念语境中可以替换。但这似乎是错误的,因为,似乎"琼斯相信西塞罗是秃子但不相信图利是秃子"可以是真的,而倘若作替换,就会得出矛盾。在本文中,作者试图论证:实际上导致信念之谜的乃是两个更为基本的原则,即去引号原则和翻译原则;不能把信念之谜的产生归咎于直接指称论。通过这种间接论证,作者认为,直接指称论没有被信念之谜难题驳倒,它还是能够获得辩护的。     

信念之谜(下)

在1972年《命名与必然性》的演讲中,作者提出了直接指称论的观点:名字的语义学内容仅仅就是所指称的对象。一般认为,如果接受直接指称论就必然导致信念之谜。因为,假如专名的语义学内容仅仅就是所指称的对象,那么两个共指称的专名,比如"Cicero"("西塞罗")和"Tully"("图利"),就应该在信念语境中可以替换。但这似乎是错误的,因为,似乎"琼斯相信西塞罗是秃子但不相信图利是秃子"可以是真的,而倘若作替换,就会得出矛盾。在本文中,作者试图论证:实际上导致信念之谜的乃是两个更为基本的原则,即去引号原则和翻译原则;不能把信念之谜的产生归咎于直接指称论。通过这种间接论证,作者认为,直接指称论没有被信念之谜难题驳倒,它还是能够获得辩护的。     

专名表达概念——也与张尚水同志商榷

张尚水同志在《关于专名》一文(简称张文)中,认为专名不表达概念。其主要理由概括起来有两条:第一,一个专名只是代表那个对象的名字.对那个对象的性质来说是外在的。名字和它所表示的对象的关系,是命名关系,是那个对象的符号;第二,专名没有反映那个对象的特有属性和本质属性,它没有概念所具有的内涵。     

简论摹状词

日常语言我们用两种方式指称个体,一种是专名,另一种是确定摹状词。确定摹状词通常就简称为摹状词。以下都是在这种意义上使用“摹状词”一词。虽然摹状词与相应的专名指称同一的个体.但两者的指称方式、意义、功能以及包含在语句中的含义是很不相同的。这一点只有在把现代逻辑的工具运用于日常语言的分析,特别是在罗素发表了     

虚构名字的接续主义指称观

针对创作语境下的虚构名字用法,我们拥有两个方面的直觉,即"无所指称"直觉和"有所指称"直觉,这导致虚构名字指称难题。针对该难题,空指称论者认为,创作语境下的虚构名字没有指称;全指称论者则认为,创作语境下的虚构名字同外部语境下的虚构名字一样,直接指称虚构对象。空指称论者尊重了"无所指称"直觉,但未能尊重"有所指称"直觉。全指称论者尊重了"有所指称"直觉,但未能尊重"无所指称"直觉。笔者提出接续主义指称观,据此,创作语境下的虚构名字通过指称时间部分完成对虚构对象整体的指称,虚构名字既"指称"了虚构对象,又"没有指称"虚构对象。笔者通过回应可能的质疑,完成对接续主义指称观的辩护。     

Proper Name Hypermnesia in an Autistic Subject

The case study of an autistic “savant” subject with person names hypermnesia is presented. NM's performance in memorizing person names is compared to that of normal controls, IQ-matched controls, and one overtrained control. The data show a selective hypermnesia for both the free recall of person names and the recognition of faces. Recall of common names and of biographical informations linked to faces is unremarkable. NM's hypermnesia is restricted to list learning as low performance is observed in face-name learning tasks. A comparison of the data with that of the overtrained control indicates that training is not responsible for NM's pattern of results. These findings, when combined with previous results involving proper names, demonstrate a double dissociation between proper names and other types of semantic and referential information. However, aspects of NM's performance pattern are more compatible with a network model of proper names than with a sequential model. We propose that the contextual regularity of proper names in ecological situations can be responsible for their high memorization by NM.     

理解弗雷格的专名涵义

论文提出了理解弗雷格专名涵义的一种新的角度:路径观点。这一观点比较吻合弗雷格所坚持的涵义概念的若干特征,解决了弗雷格名称理论的许多极具争议的问题,如间接涵义、涵义的本体论,涵义是否有无限多层次。对照克里普克的名称理论及其逻辑背景,论文分析了克里普克及戴维森等人对弗雷格涵义理论的批评,从路径的观点较好地回应了这些批评。     

关于Thomas Aquinas的译名问题

Thomas Aquinas（1224—1274）是13世纪意大利著名神学家和哲学家，700多年来其思想在西方产生深远影响，为此有人把他列入“世界十大思想家”。然而，国内出版物中Thomas Aquinas的译名五花八门：     

The Problem of Having Both a Body and a Name in the Work of Jean-Luc Marion

In this essay, and following upon both Jacques Lacan’s and Jacques Derrida’s personal struggles with fatherhood and the naming of their children, I take up what I consider to be Jean-Luc Marion’s failure to deal with the embodiment of fatherhood through an examination of patriarchal signification, or, specifically, the naming of one’s children after the father — at least insofar as Marion’s brief analysis of this symbolic act points toward his failure to think through the various potential and lived embodiments of the father. I aim to illuminate how his efforts to continue this naming of the child with the father’s name speak more directly to an idealized (“theologized”) vision of our world that need not be serviced, indeed, which we would benefit from not utilizing at all. I wish, in an autobiographical-phenomenological response to Marion, to point to other names, other relationships, and other ways of perceiving how one might be situated within our world. I follow Sara Ahmed in calling “queer” ways in which a phenomenological account of the subject’s identity are not a pretext for perpetuating a quasi-theological, patriarchal agenda.     

Proper bootstrapping

According to a much discussed argument, reliabilism is defective for making knowledge too easy to come by. In a recent paper, Weisberg aims to show that this argument relies on a type of reasoning that is rejectable on independent grounds. We argue that the blanket rejection that Weisberg recommends of this type of reasoning is both unwarranted and unwelcome. Drawing on an older discussion in the philosophy of science, we show that placing some relatively modest restrictions on the said type of reasoning suffices to block the anti-reliabilist argument.     

Proper Basicality

Foundationalist epistemologies, whether internalist or externalist, ground noetic structures in beliefs that are said to be foundational, or properly basic. It is essential to such epistemologies that they provide clear criteria for proper basicality. This proves, 1 argue, to be a thorny task, at least insofar as the goal is to provide a psychologically realistic reconstruction of our actual doxastic practices. I examine some of the difficulties, and suggest some implications, in particular for the externalist epistemology of Alvin Plantinga.     

Dishonesty in the Name of Equity

ABSTRACT— Under what conditions do people act dishonestly to help or hurt others? We addressed this question by examining the influence of a previously overlooked factor—the beneficiary or victim of dishonest acts. In two experiments, we randomly paired participants and manipulated their wealth levels through an initial lottery. We then observed how inequity between partners influenced the likelihood of one dishonestly helping or hurting the other, while varying the financial incentives for dishonest behavior. The results show that financial self-interest cannot fully explain people's tendency to dishonestly help or hurt others. Rather, such dishonesty is influenced by emotional reactions to wealth-based inequity, even when the dishonesty bears a personal financial cost. Envy evoked by negative inequity led to hurting behavior, whereas guilt induced by positive inequity motivated helping behavior. Finally, inequity between the partner and third parties triggered dishonest helping through empathy with the partner.