Doing without Desert

The idea of 'moral responsibility' is typically linked with praise and blame, and with the notion of 'the voluntary'. It is often thought that if we are free, in the relevant sense, we may "deserve" praise or blame; otherwise, we do not. But when we look at whether and why we need the notions of praise and blame, we find that they are not as intimately connected with desert as many philosophers have thought. In particular, this paper challenges the idea that forms of evaluation and behavior tied to our "reactive attitudes" (especially resentment) best further morality's aims, properly understood.     

On believing,saying and expressing

Examines the connections among believing, saying, and expressing in situations where the sentence used is a declarative sentence containing at least one proper name. Proposes a new way of understanding these connections. Develops an argument for the thesis that, although we typically believe the singular propositions expressed by our uses of name sentences, we rarely use such sentences because we believe those propositions.     

Empirical evidence and the knowledge-that/knowledge-how distinction

In this article I have two primary goals. First, I present two recent views on the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how (Stanley and Williamson, The Journal of Philosophy 98(8):411–444, 2001; Hetherington, Epistemology futures, 2006). I contend that neither of these provides conclusive arguments against the distinction. Second, I discuss studies from neuroscience and experimental psychology that relate to this distinction. Having examined these studies, I then defend a third view that explains certain relevant data from these studies by positing the double dissociation of knowledge-that and knowledge-how and that is also able to do explanatory work elsewhere.     

Belonging without believing: religion and attitudes towards gay marriage and abortion rights in Northern Ireland

ABSTRACT

Same-sex marriage has become a divisive issue in established western democracies. As in earlier research on abortion, there is now a growing body of studies which suggests that religious factors, such as identity, belief and practice, are the most frequent predictors of opposition towards gay marriage. Yet, what we know about the combined influence of these religious factors remains unexamined. Mindful of this omission, this study examines the relationship between regular church attendance and a belief in God on attitudes towards same-sex marriage and abortion rights. Using the recent survey data from Northern Ireland, the results suggest that not only are those who belong but do not believe distinctive in terms of their demographic makeup, but they are also significantly more likely to adopt a liberal stance in relation to both these issues – gay marriage and abortion rights – than the most religiously devout, or those who both belong and believe.     

Intending,believing, and supposing at will

In this paper I consider an argument for the possibility of intending at will, and its relationship to an argument about the possibility of believing at will. I argue that although we have good reason to think we sometimes intend at will, we lack good reason to think this in the case of believing. Instead of believing at will, agents like us often suppose at will.     

Thanks for being,loving, and believing

Philosophical Studies - Gratitude to others is typically understood as a response to good things people give to us or do for us. Occasionally, though, we thank people for things other than gifts or...     

Belief and believing

Conclusion This essay has been somewhat programmatic in quality but that is not accidental. It has tried to identify some elements, historical and philosophical, that might provide a context within which an adequate discussion of the concept of belief and its recent diverse employment might be measured. Not very much has been solved, but perhaps some issues have become clearer.     

Seeing is believing: Priors,trust, and base rate neglect

Kahneman and Tversky (1973) described an effect they called ‘insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes’, later dubbed base rate neglect, which describes people’s tendency to underweight prior information in favor of new data. As probability theory requires that prior probabilities be taken into account, via Bayes’ theorem, the fact that most people fail to do so has been taken as evidence of human irrationality and, by others, of a mismatch between our cognitive processes and the questions being asked (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996). In contrast to both views, we suggest that simplistic Bayesian updating using base rates is not necessarily rational. To that end, we present experiments in which base rate neglect is often the right strategy, and show that people’s base rate usage varies systematically as a function of the extent to which the data that make up a base rate are perceived as trustworthy.     

Seeing and believing: perception,belief formation and the divided mind

On many of the idealized models of human cognition and behavior in use by philosophers, agents are represented as having a single corpus of beliefs which (a) is consistent and deductively closed, and (b) guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all the time. In graded-belief frameworks, agents are represented as having a single, coherent distribution of credences, which guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all of the time. It’s clear that actual human beings don’t live up to this idealization. The systems of belief that we in fact have are fragmented. Rather than having a single system of beliefs that guides all of our behavior all of the time, we have a number of distinct, compartmentalized systems of belief, different ones of which drive different aspects of our behavior in different contexts. It’s tempting to think that, while of course people are fragmented, it would be better (from the perspective of rationality) if they weren’t, and the only reason why our fragmentation is excusable is that we have limited cognitive resources, which prevents us from holding too much information before our minds at a time. Give us enough additional processing capacity, and there’d be no justification for any continued fragmentation. I argue that this is not so. There are good reasons to be fragmented rather than unified, independent of the limitations on our available processing power. In particular, there are ways our belief-forming mechanisms—including our perceptual systems—could be constructed that would make it better to be fragmented than to be unified. And there are reasons to think that some of our belief-forming mechanisms really are constructed that way.

Fixing Descartes: Ethical Intellectualism in Spinoza's Early Writings

This paper aims at reconstructing the ethical issues raised by Spinoza's early Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. Specifically, I argue that Spinoza takes issue with Descartes’ epistemology in order to support a form of “ethical intellectualism” in which knowledge is envisaged as both necessary and sufficient to reach the supreme good. First, I reconstruct how Descartes exploits the distinction between truth and certainty in his Discourse on the Method. On the one hand, this distinction acts as the basis for Descartes’ epistemological rules while, on the other hand, it implies a “morale par provision” in which adequate knowledge is not strictly necessary to practice virtue. Second, I show that Spinoza rejects the distinction between truth and certainty and thus the methodological doubt. This move leads Spinoza to substitute the Cartesian Cogito with the idea of God as the only adequate standard of knowledge, through which the mind can attain the rules to reach the supreme good. Third, I demonstrate that in the Short Treatise Spinoza develops this view by equating intellect and will and thus maintaining that only adequate knowledge can help to contrast affects. However, I also insist that Spinoza's early epistemology is unable to explain why human beings drop conceive of the idea of God inadequately. Thus, I suggest that in his later writings Spinoza accounts for the insufficiency of adequate knowledge in opposing the power of the imagination and passions by reconnecting the nature of ideas with the mind's conatus.     

Privileged access,externalism, and ways of believing

By exploiting a concept called ways of believing, I offer a plausible reformulation of the doctrine of privileged access. This reformulation will provide us with a defense of compatibilism, the view that content externalism and privileged access are compatible.     

Community Engagement as Liberal Performance,as Critical Intellectualism and as Praxis

This article aims to illustrate that engagement is a dynamic and evolutionary process, moulded by contesting ideological, social actor and contextual forces. For purposes of illustration, I draw on a university-affiliated, participatory enactment of community engagement as a case example. The case illustrates that community engagement may assume a form of action, critical intellectualism and praxis. As action, community engagement is oriented towards performance of liberal democracy. Community engagement, as shaped by the critical intellectualism of the Black Consciousness philosophy, reflects community self-affirmation, autonomy and intellectual independence. Community engagement as praxis may be characterised by reflexivity, vision-making and the building of interpersonal relationships. Community engagement is marked by a dynamic interplay between race, power and counter-hegemonic ideology.     

Reading,feeling, believing: online testimonies and the making of Evangelical emotion

A personal relationship with God is central to Evangelical belief. It unfolds as believers interpret internal sensations as coming from outside—from God. How does the formulaic design of testimonies present the audience with a personal relationship with God as a pursuit that is both feasible and deeply desirable? Analyzing the discursive rules structuring the appearance of emotion in the most popular testimonies on the online platform of Christianity Today reveals that such texts expertly present a microcosm in which the experience of reading mirrors the trajectory toward belief writers describe. To read a testimony from start to finish, readers must choose to tolerate the unfamiliar: that is, feel emotions that specifically belong in an Evangelical frame. Online written testimony relies on compelling storytelling to move readers, making them practise what it feels like to hand over part of one’s own story to God.     

众善奉行 诸恶莫作

<太上感应篇>是太上道祖金口宣说.道祖大慈大悲,为劝诫世人断恶修善,明示天道好还之理,而启世人敬畏之心.     

Saying and believing: the norm commonality assumption

Philosophical Studies - One very popular assumption in the epistemological literature is that belief and assertion are governed by one and the same epistemic norm. This paper challenges this claim....