三值量子逻辑进路探析

量子测量实验显示部分经典逻辑规则在量子世界中失效。标准量子逻辑进路通过特有的希尔伯特空间的格运算揭示出一种内在于微观物理学理论的概念框架结构,也即量子力学测量命题的正交补模或弱模格,解释了经典分配律的失效,它在形式化方面十分完美,但在解释方面产生了一些概念混乱。在标准量子逻辑进路之外,赖欣巴赫通过引入"不确定"的第三真值独立地提出一种不同的量子逻辑模型来解释量子实在的特征,不是分配律而是排中律失效,但是他的三值量子逻辑由于缺乏标准量子逻辑的上述优点而被认为与量子力学的概率空间所要求的潜在逻辑有很少联系。本文尝试引入一种新的三值逻辑模型来说明量子实在,它有以下优点:(1)满足卢卡西维茨创立三值逻辑的最初语义学假定;(2)克服赖欣巴赫三值量子逻辑的缺陷;(3)澄清标准量子逻辑遭遇的概念混乱;(4)充分地保留经典逻辑规则,特别是标准量子逻辑主张放弃的分配律。     

Function and Argument in Begriffsschrift

It is well known that the formal system developed by Frege in Begriffsschrift is based upon the distinction between function and argument—as opposed to the traditional distinction between subject and predicate. Almost all of the modern commentaries on Frege's work suggest a semantic interpretation of this distinction, and identify it with the ontological structure of function and object, upon which Grundgesetze is based. Those commentaries agree that the system proposed by Frege in Begriffsschrift has some gaps, but it is taken as an essentially correct formal system for second-order logic: the first one in the history of logic. However, there is strong textual evidence that such an interpretation should be rejected. This evidence shows that the nature of the distinction between function and argument is stated by Frege in a significantly different way: it applies only to expressions and not to entities. The formal system based on this distinction is tremendously flexible and is suitable for making explicit the logical structure of contents as well as of deductive chains. We put forward a new reconstruction of the function-argument scheme and the quantification theory in Begriffsschrift. After that, we discuss the usual semantic interpretation of Begriffsschrift and show its inconsistencies with a rigorous reading of the text.     

A semantical investigation on Brouwer-Zadeh logic

Conclusion In the standard approach to quantum mechanics, closed subspaces of a Hilbert space represent propositions. In the operational approach, closed subspaces are replaced by effects that represent a mathematical counterpart for properties which can be measured in a physical system. Effects are a proper generalization of closed subspaces. Effects determine a Brouwer-Zadeh poset which is not a lattice. However, such a poset can be embedded in a complete Brouwer-Zadeh lattice. From an intuitive point of view, one can say that these structures represent a natural logical abstraction from the structure of propositions of a quantum system. The logic that arises in this way is Brouwer-Zadeh logic. This paper shows that such a logic can be characterized by means of an algebraic and a Kripkean semantics. Finally, a strong completeness theorem for BZL is proved.     

Extended Quantum Logic

The concept of quantum logic is extended so that it covers a more general set of propositions that involve non-trivial probabilities. This structure is shown to be embedded into a multi-modal framework, which has desirable logical properties such as an axiomatization, the finite model property and decidability.     

形式化量子力学不必使用量子逻辑

一般认为,标准量子力学需要使用一套它自己的逻辑系统,即量子逻辑。量子逻辑采用与一般逻辑系统不同的语义规则,因此和古典逻辑无法兼容。此篇文章将呈现一套量子力学的严格形式基础,它是对古典二值逻辑之保守扩充;保守扩充意指比原先之逻辑系统强,但较强的原因为它有较多之词汇。此套逻辑为三值逻辑。古典逻辑中为真的句子仍然为真。古典逻辑中为假的句子将被区分为强性假与中性。第三个真值一中性一考虑了非本征态情况中之观察句。本文详列了物理的公理并显示它们具有一个模型。此提案的可行性说明了量子逻辑是不必要的,并且存在一个共同的逻辑架构可提供给数学、非量子物理及量子力学使用。     

Analysis versus laws boole’s explanatory psychologism versus his explanatory anti-psychologism

This paper discusses George Boole’s two distinct approaches to the explanatory relationship between logical and psychological theory. It is argued that, whereas in his first book he attributes a substantive role to psychology in the foundation of logical theory, in his second work he abandons that position in favour of a linguistically conceived foundation. The early Boole espoused a type of psychologism and later came to adopt a type of anti-psychologism. To appreciate this invites a far-reaching reassessment of his philosophy of logic     

Logic for dialogue games

The purpose of this paper is to work toward an explicit logic and semantics for a game theoretically inspired theory of action. The purpose of the logic is to explicate the conceptual machinery implicit in the dialogue-game model of rational discourse developed in Carlson (1983).A variety of ideas and techniques of modal and philosophical logic are used to define a model structure that generalizes the game theoretical notion of a game in extensive form (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). Relative to this model structure, semantic characterizations are given to the action-theoretic notions oftime, possibility, belief, preference, ability, intention, action, andrationality. The unification of these characterizations under the game-theoretical paradigm leads to insights about the logical interdependences between these concepts.The resulting theory of rational interaction is applied to the explication of rational dialogue. The main benefit of the enterprise for a theory of rational dialogue is that concepts and results of game theory become accessible to the explication of dialogue. In particular, the task of proving the logical coherence of a discourse is reduced to the task of showing the rationality of strategy choices made in an associated dialogue game.     

Truth Values and Proof Theory

I present an account of truth values for classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and the modal logic S5, in which truth values are not a fundamental category from which the logic is defined, but rather, an idealisation of more fundamental logical features in the proof theory for each system. The result is not a new set of semantic structures, but a new understanding of how the existing semantic structures may be understood in terms of a more fundamental notion of logical consequence.     

Temporal necessity and the conditional

In [12] Richmond Thomason and Anil Gupta investigate a semantics for conditional logic that combines the ideas of [8] and [9] with a branching time model of tense logic. The resulting branching time semantics for the conditional is intended to capture the logical relationship between temporal necessity and the conditional. The central principle of this logical relationship is Past Predominance, according to which past similarities and differences take priority over future similarities and differences in determining the comparative similarity of alternative possible histories with respect to a given present moment.In this paper I will use ordinary possible worlds semantics (i.e. Kripke frames) to solve the completeness problem for a system of logic that combines conditional logic with temporal necessity in the context of Past Predominance. Branching time models turn out not to be necessary for the articulation of Past Predominance, and this means that one can axiomatize Past Predominance without first having to solve a much more difficult problem: the completeness problem for the logic of temporal necessity in the context of branching time.Thomason and Gupta argue in [12] that in addition to Past Predominance, temporal necessity and the conditional are logically related, by what have become known as the Edelberg Inferences, whose apparent validity motivates the very complicated theory presented at the end of [12]. I will conclude this paper by examining how the Edelberg inferences would be incorporated into the possible worlds based system presented in the earlier sections of this paper.This article is based on the second chapter of my doctoral dissertation Studies in the Semantics of Modality, University of Pittsburgh, 1985. I thank my adviser Richmond Thomason for his patient help throughout the course of that project.     

The logic of epistemic justification

Theories of epistemic justification are commonly assessed by exploring their predictions about particular hypothetical cases—predictions as to whether justification is present or absent in this or that case. With a few exceptions, it is much less common for theories of epistemic justification to be assessed by exploring their predictions about logical principles. The exceptions are a handful of ‘closure’ principles, which have received a lot of attention, and which certain theories of justification are well known to invalidate. But these closure principles are only a small sample of the logical principles that we might consider. In this paper, I will outline four further logical principles that plausibly hold for justification and two which plausibly do not. While my primary aim is just to put these principles forward, I will use them to evaluate some different approaches to justification and (tentatively) conclude that a ‘normic’ theory of justification best captures its logic.     

Husserl’s Foundation of the Formal Sciences in his “Logical Investigations”

This article is composed of three sections that investigate the epistemological foundations of Husserl’s idea of logic from the Logical Investigations. First, it shows the general structure of this logic. Husserl conceives of logic as a comprehensive, multi-layered theory of possible theories that has its most fundamental level in a doctrine of meaning. This doctrine aims to determine the elementary categories that constitute every possible meaning (meaning-categories). The second section presents the main idea of Husserl’s search for an epistemological foundation for knowledge, science and logic. Their epistemological clarification can only be reached through a detailed analysis of the structure of those intentions that give us what is meant in our intentions. To reveal the intuitive giveness of logical forms is the ultimate aim of Husserl’s epistemology of logic. Logical forms and meaning-categories can only be given in a certain higher-order intuition that Husserl calls categorical intuition. The third section of this article distinguishes different kinds of categorical intuition and shows how the most basic logical categories and concepts are given to us in a categorical abstraction.     

A Dynamic-Logical Perspective on Quantum Behavior

In this paper we show how recent concepts from Dynamic Logic, and in particular from Dynamic Epistemic logic, can be used to model and interpret quantum behavior. Our main thesis is that all the non-classical properties of quantum systems are explainable in terms of the non-classical flow of quantum information. We give a logical analysis of quantum measurements (formalized using modal operators) as triggers for quantum information flow, and we compare them with other logical operators previously used to model various forms of classical information flow: the “test” operator from Dynamic Logic, the “announcement” operator from Dynamic Epistemic Logic and the “revision” operator from Belief Revision theory. The main points stressed in our investigation are the following: (1) The perspective and the techniques of “logical dynamics” are useful for understanding quantum information flow. (2) Quantum mechanics does not require any modification of the classical laws of “static” propositional logic, but only a non-classical dynamics of information. (3) The main such non-classical feature is that, in a quantum world, all information-gathering actions have some ontic side-effects. (4) This ontic impact can affect in its turn the flow of information, leading to non-classical epistemic side-effects (e.g. a type of non-monotonicity) and to states of “objectively imperfect information”. (5) Moreover, the ontic impact is non-local: an information-gathering action on one part of a quantum system can have ontic side-effects on other, far-away parts of the system.     

The Logic of Counterpart Theory with Actuality

It has been claimed that counterpart theory cannot support a theory of actuality without rendering obviously invalid formulas valid or obviously valid formulas invalid. We argue that these claims are not based on logical flaws of counterpart theory itself, but point to the lack of appropriate devices in first-order logic for “remembering” the values of variables. We formulate a mildly dynamic version of first-order logic with appropriate memory devices and show how to base a version of counterpart theory with actuality on this. This theory is, in special cases, equivalent to modal first-order logic with actuality, and apparently does not suffer from the logical flaws that have been mentioned in the literature.     

Does Science Influence the Logic we Ought to Use: A Reflection on the Quantum Logic Controversy

In this article I argue that there is a sense in which logic is empirical, and hence open to influence from science. One of the roles of logic is the modelling and extending of natural language reasoning. It does so by providing a formal system which succeeds in modelling the structure of a paradigmatic set of our natural language inferences and which then permits us to extend this structure to novel cases with relative ease. In choosing the best system of those that succeed in this, we seek certain virtues of such structures such as simplicity and naturalness (which will be explained). Science can influence logic by bringing us, as in the case of quantum mechanics, to make natural language inferences about new kinds of systems and thereby extend the set of paradigmatic cases that our formal logic ought to model as simply and naturally as possible. This can alter which structures ought to be used to provide semantics for such models. I show why such a revolution could have led us to reject one logic for another through explaining why complex claims about quantum mechanical systems failed to lead us to reject classical logic for quantum logic.     

Correspondence Truth and Quantum Mechanics

The logic of a physical theory reflects the structure of the propositions referring to the behaviour of a physical system in the domain of the relevant theory. It is argued in relation to classical mechanics that the propositional structure of the theory allows truth-value assignment in conformity with the traditional conception of a correspondence theory of truth. Every proposition in classical mechanics is assigned a definite truth value, either ‘true’ or ‘false’, describing what is actually the case at a certain moment of time. Truth-value assignment in quantum mechanics, however, differs; it is known, by means of a variety of ‘no go’ theorems, that it is not possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to a quantum system without generating a Kochen–Specker contradiction. In this respect, the Bub–Clifton ‘uniqueness theorem’ is utilized for arguing that truth-value definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a determinate sublattice of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a particular observable to be measured. An account of truth of contextual correspondence is thereby provided that is appropriate to the quantum domain of discourse. The conceptual implications of the resulting account are traced down and analyzed at length. In this light, the traditional conception of correspondence truth may be viewed as a species or as a limit case of the more generic proposed scheme of contextual correspondence when the non-explicit specification of a context of discourse poses no further consequences.     

Logic and Ontology in Hegel's Theory of Predication

In this paper I sketch some arguments that underlie Hegel's chapter on judgment, and I attempt to place them within a broad tradition in the history of logic. Focusing on his analysis of simple predicative assertions or ‘positive judgments’, I first argue that Hegel supplies an instructive alternative to the classical technique of existential quantification. The main advantage of his theory lies in his treatment of the ontological implications of judgments, implications that are inadequately captured by quantification. The second concern of this paper is the manner in which Hegel makes logic not only dependent on ontology generally, but also variant in regard to domains of objects. In other words, he offers a domain‐specific logical theory, according to which the form of judgment or inference is specific to the subject of judgment. My third concern lies with the metaphilosophical consequences of this theory, and this includes some more familiar Hegelian themes. It is well known that Hegel frequently questioned the adequacy of the sentential form for expressing higher order truths. My reading of his theory of predication explains and contextualizes this tendency by demystifying notions like the so‐called speculative proposition.     

A logical formalization of the OCC theory of emotions

In this paper, we provide a logical formalization of the emotion triggering process and of its relationship with mental attitudes, as described in Ortony, Clore, and Collins’s theory. We argue that modal logics are particularly adapted to represent agents’ mental attitudes and to reason about them, and use a specific modal logic that we call Logic of Emotions in order to provide logical definitions of all but two of their 22 emotions. While these definitions may be subject to debate, we show that they allow to reason about emotions and to draw interesting conclusions from the theory.     

The square of opposition — A new approach

Summary The theory of the square of opposition has been worked out many centuries ago as a part of Aristotelian logic of terms.In spite of its inexactness (for instance it is not possible to decide whether the termsquare of opposition is a logical or a metalogical term) this theory is included without any changes in the usual elementary course of logic.The author defines the square of opposition in the language of the logic of propositions (see Def. 1.000) and derives from this definition the usual laws of the square of opposition and several new theorems.     

Possibilities,models, and intuitionistic logic: Ian Rumfitt’s The boundary stones of thought

AIan Rumfitt's new book presents a distinctive and intriguing philosophy of logic, one that ultimately settles on classical logic as the uniquely correct one–or at least rebuts some prominent arguments against classical logic. The purpose of this note is to evaluate Rumfitt's perspective by focusing on some themes that have occupied me for some time: (i) the role and importance of model theory and, in particular, the place of counter-arguments in establishing invalidity, (ii) higher-order logic, and (iii) the logical pluralism/relativism articulated in my own recent *Varieties of logic*.