Abstract modal logics

In this paper we develop a general framework to deal with abstract logics associated with a given modal logic. In particular we study the abstract logics associated with the weak and strong deductive systems of the normal modal logicK and its intuitionistic version. We also study the abstract logics that satisfy the conditionC ⁺(X)=C( _in I ⁿ X) and find the modal deductive systems whose abstract logics, in addition to being classical or intuitionistic, satisfy that condition. Finally we study the deductive systems whose abstract logics satisfy, in addition to the already mentioned properties, the property that the operatorC ⁺ is classical relative to some new defined operations.Work partially supported by Spanish DGICYT grant PB90-0465-C02-01.Presented byJan Zygmunt     

Labelled Resolution for Classical and Non-classical Logics

Resolution is an effective deduction procedure for classical logic. There is no similar "resolution" system for non-classical logics (though there are various automated deduction systems). The paper presents resolution systems for intuistionistic predicate logic as well as for modal and temporal logics within the framework of labelled deductive systems. Whereas in classical predicate logic resolution is applied to literals, in our system resolution is applied to L(abelled) R(epresentation) S(tructures). Proofs are discovered by a refutation procedure defined on LRSs, that imposes a hierarchy on clause sets of such structures together with an inheritance discipline. This is a form of Theory Resolution. For intuitionistic logic these structures are called I(ntuitionistic) R(epresentation) S(tructures). Their hierarchical structure allows the restriction of unification of individual variables and/or constants without using Skolem functions. This structures must therefore be preserved when we consider other (non-modal) logics. Variations between different logics are captured by fine tuning of the inheritance properties of the hierarchy. For modal and temporal logics IRS's are extended to structures that represent worlds and/or times. This enables us to consider all kinds of combined logics.     

Deductively Definable Logics of Induction

A broad class of inductive logics that includes the probability calculus is defined by the conditions that the inductive strengths [A|B] are defined fully in terms of deductive relations in preferred partitions and that they are asymptotically stable. Inductive independence is shown to be generic for propositions in such logics; a notion of a scale-free inductive logic is identified; and a limit theorem is derived. If the presence of preferred partitions is not presumed, no inductive logic is definable. This no-go result precludes many possible inductive logics, including versions of hypothetico-deductivism.     

Refutation systems in modal logic

Complete deductive systems are constructed for the non-valid (refutable) formulae and sequents of some propositional modal logics. Thus, complete syntactic characterizations in the sense of Lukasiewicz are established for these logics and, in particular, purely syntactic decision procedures for them are obtained. The paper also contains some historical remarks and a general discussion on refutation systems.Presented byJan Zygmunt     

Equationally definable implication algebras for orthomodular lattices

The fact that it is possible to define three different material conditionals in orthomodular lattices suggests that there exist three different orthomodular logics whose conditionals are material conditionals and whose models are orthomodular lattices. The purpose of this paper is to provide equationally definable implication algebras for each of these material conditionals.     

Interactions between Knowledge,Action and Commitment within Agent Dynamic Logic

This paper considers a new class of agent dynamic logics which provide a formal means of specifying and reasoning about the agents activities and informational, motivational and practical aspects of the behaviour of the agents. We present a Hilbert-style deductive system for a basic agent dynamic logic and consider a number of extensions of this logic with axiom schemata formalising interactions between knowledge and commitment (expressing an agent s awareness of her commitments), and interactions between knowledge and actions (expressing no learning and persistence of knowledge after actions). The deductive systems are proved sound and complete with respect to a Kripke-style semantics. Each of the considered logics is shown to have the small model property and therefore decidable.Presented by Ewa Orlowska     

Contextual Deduction Theorems

Logics that do not have a deduction-detachment theorem (briefly, a DDT) may still possess a contextual DDT??a syntactic notion introduced here for arbitrary deductive systems, along with a local variant. Substructural logics without sentential constants are natural witnesses to these phenomena. In the presence of a contextual DDT, we can still upgrade many weak completeness results to strong ones, e.g., the finite model property implies the strong finite model property. It turns out that a finitary system has a contextual DDT iff it is protoalgebraic and gives rise to a dually Brouwerian semilattice of compact deductive filters in every finitely generated algebra of the corresponding type. Any such system is filter distributive, although it may lack the filter extension property. More generally, filter distributivity and modularity are characterized for all finitary systems with a local contextual DDT, and several examples are discussed. For algebraizable logics, the well-known correspondence between the DDT and the equational definability of principal congruences is adapted to the contextual case.     

Categorical Abstract Algebraic Logic: Behavioral π-Institutions

Recently, Caleiro, Gon¸calves and Martins introduced the notion of behaviorally algebraizable logic. The main idea behind their work is to replace, in the traditional theory of algebraizability of Blok and Pigozzi, unsorted equational logic with multi-sorted behavioral logic. The new notion accommodates logics over many-sorted languages and with non-truth-functional connectives. Moreover, it treats logics that are not algebraizable in the traditional sense while, at the same time, shedding new light to the equivalent algebraic semantics of logics that are algebraizable according to the original theory. In this paper, the notion of an abstract multi-sorted π-institution is introduced so as to transfer elements of the theory of behavioral algebraizability to the categorical setting. Institutions formalize a wider variety of logics than deductive systems, including logics involving multiple signatures and quantifiers. The framework developed has the same relation to behavioral algebraizability as the classical categorical abstract algebraic logic framework has to the original theory of algebraizability of Blok and Pigozzi.     

Algebraic Semantics for Deductive Systems

The notion of an algebraic semantics of a deductive system was proposed in [3], and a preliminary study was begun. The focus of [3] was the definition and investigation of algebraizable deductive systems, i.e., the deductive systems that possess an equivalent algebraic semantics. The present paper explores the more general property of possessing an algebraic semantics. While a deductive system can have at most one equivalent algebraic semantics, it may have numerous different algebraic semantics. All of these give rise to an algebraic completeness theorem for the deductive system, but their algebraic properties, unlike those of equivalent algebraic semantics, need not reflect the metalogical properties of the deductive system. Many deductive systems that don't have an equivalent algebraic semantics do possess an algebraic semantics; examples of these phenomena are provided. It is shown that all extensions of a deductive system that possesses an algebraic semantics themselves possess an algebraic semantics. Necessary conditions for the existence of an algebraic semantics are given, and an example of a protoalgebraic deductive system that does not have an algebraic semantics is provided. The mono-unary deductive systems possessing an algebraic semantics are characterized. Finally, weak conditions on a deductive system are formulated that guarantee the existence of an algebraic semantics. These conditions are used to show that various classes of non-algebraizable deductive systems of modal logic, relevance logic and linear logic do possess an algebraic semantics.     

Categorical Abstract Algebraic Logic: Referential Algebraic Semantics

Wójcicki has provided a characterization of selfextensional logics as those that can be endowed with a complete local referential semantics. His result was extended by Jansana and Palmigiano, who developed a duality between the category of reduced congruential atlases and that of reduced referential algebras over a fixed similarity type. This duality restricts to one between reduced atlas models and reduced referential algebra models of selfextensional logics. In this paper referential algebraic systems and congruential atlas systems are introduced, which abstract referential algebras and congruential atlases, respectively. This enables the formulation of an analog of Wójcicki’s Theorem for logics formalized as π-institutions. Moreover, the results of Jansana and Palmigiano are generalized to obtain a duality between congruential atlas systems and referential algebraic systems over a fixed categorical algebraic signature. In future work, the duality obtained in this paper will be used to obtain one between atlas system models and referential algebraic system models of an arbitrary selfextensional π-institution. Using this latter duality, the characterization of fully selfextensional deductive systems among the selfextensional ones, that was obtained by Jansana and Palmigiano, can be extended to a similar characterization of fully selfextensional π-institutions among appropriately chosen classes of selfextensional ones.     

An Approach to Glivenko’s Theorem in Algebraizable Logics

In a classical paper [15] V. Glivenko showed that a proposition is classically demonstrable if and only if its double negation is intuitionistically demonstrable. This result has an algebraic formulation: the double negation is a homomorphism from each Heyting algebra onto the Boolean algebra of its regular elements. Versions of both the logical and algebraic formulations of Glivenko’s theorem, adapted to other systems of logics and to algebras not necessarily related to logic can be found in the literature (see [2, 9, 8, 14] and [13, 7, 14]). The aim of this paper is to offer a general frame for studying both logical and algebraic generalizations of Glivenko’s theorem. We give abstract formulations for quasivarieties of algebras and for equivalential and algebraizable deductive systems and both formulations are compared when the quasivariety and the deductive system are related. We also analyse Glivenko’s theorem for compatible expansions of both cases. Presented by Jacek Malinowski     

Kripke semantics for knowledge representation logics

This article provides an overview of development of Kripke semantics for logics determined by information systems. The proposals are made to extend the standard Kripke structures to the structures based on information systems. The underlying logics are defined and problems of their axiomatization are discussed. Several open problems connected with the logics are formulated. Logical aspects of incompleteness of information provided by information systems are considered.     

Monotonicity in Practical Reasoning

Classic deductive logic entails that once a conclusion is sustained by a valid argument, the argument can never be invalidated, no matter how many new premises are added. This derived property of deductive reasoning is known as monotonicity. Monotonicity is thought to conflict with the defeasibility of reasoning in natural language, where the discovery of new information often leads us to reject conclusions that we once accepted. This perceived failure of monotonic reasoning to observe the defeasibility of natural-language arguments has led some philosophers to abandon deduction itself (!), often in favor of new, non-monotonic systems of inference known as `default logics'. But these radical logics (e.g., Ray Reiter's default logic) introduce their desired defeasibility at the expense of other, equally important intuitions about natural-language reasoning. And, as a matter of fact, if we recognize that monotonicity is a property of the form of a deductive argument and not its content (i.e., the claims in the premise(s) and conclusion), we can see how the common-sense notion of defeasibility can actually be captured by a purely deductive system.     

Validity, the Squeezing Argument and Alternative Semantic Systems: the Case of Aristotelian Syllogistic

We investigate the philosophical significance of the existence of different semantic systems with respect to which a given deductive system is sound and complete. Our case study will be Corcoran’s deductive system D for Aristotelian syllogistic and some of the different semantic systems for syllogistic that have been proposed in the literature. We shall prove that they are not equivalent, in spite of D being sound and complete with respect to each of them. Beyond the specific case of syllogistic, the goal is to offer a general discussion of the relations between informal notions—in this case, an informal notion of deductive validity—and logical apparatuses such as deductive systems and (model-theoretic or other) semantic systems that aim at offering technical, formal accounts of informal notions. Specifically, we will be interested in Kreisel’s famous ‘squeezing argument’; we shall ask ourselves what a plurality of semantic systems (understood as classes of mathematical structures) may entail for the cogency of specific applications of the squeezing argument. More generally, the analysis brings to the fore the need for criteria of adequacy for semantic systems based on mathematical structures. Without such criteria, the idea that the gap between informal and technical accounts of validity can be bridged is put under pressure.     

Basic Quasi-Boolean Expansions of Relevance Logics

The basic quasi-Boolean negation (QB-negation) expansions of relevance logics included in Anderson and Belnap’s relevance logic R are defined. We consider two types of QB-negation: H-negation and D-negation. The former one is of paraintuitionistic or superintuitionistic character, the latter one, of dual intuitionistic nature in some sense. Logics endowed with H-negation are paracomplete; logics with D-negation are paraconsistent. All logics defined in the paper are given a Routley-Meyer ternary relational semantics.

     

Leibniz-linked Pairs of Deductive Systems

A pair of deductive systems (S,S??) is Leibniz-linked when S?? is an extension of S and on every algebra there is a map sending each filter of S to a filter of S?? with the same Leibniz congruence. We study this generalization to arbitrary deductive systems of the notion of the strong version of a protoalgebraic deductive system, studied in earlier papers, and of some results recently found for particular non-protoalgebraic deductive systems. The necessary examples and counterexamples found in the literature are described.     

Pure Extensions, Proof Rules, and Hybrid Axiomatics

In this paper we argue that hybrid logic is the deductive setting most natural for Kripke semantics. We do so by investigating hybrid axiomatics for a variety of systems, ranging from the basic hybrid language (a decidable system with the same complexity as orthodox propositional modal logic) to the strong Priorean language (which offers full first-order expressivity).We show that hybrid logic offers a genuinely first-order perspective on Kripke semantics: it is possible to define base logics which extend automatically to a wide variety of frame classes and to prove completeness using the Henkin method. In the weaker languages, this requires the use of non-orthodox rules. We discuss these rules in detail and prove non-eliminability and eliminability results. We also show how another type of rule, which reflects the structure of the strong Priorean language, can be employed to give an even wider coverage of frame classes. We show that this deductive apparatus gets progressively simpler as we work our way up the expressivity hierarchy, and conclude the paper by showing that the approach transfers to first-order hybrid logic.A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the fifth conference on Advances in Modal Logic (AiML 2004) in Manchester. We would like to thank Maarten Marx for his comments on an early draft and Agnieszka Kisielewska for help with the proof reading.Special Issue Ways of Worlds II. On Possible Worlds and Related Notions Edited by Vincent F. Hendricks and Stig Andur Pedersen     

基于广义谢弗竖的分析性模态公理系统

沿着安德森等人开创的方向,我们将分析性公理系统从经典逻辑推向模态逻辑,所定义的广义谢弗竖混合了模态词和广义析舍。在这篇论文中,我们给出常见的正规模态逻辑的分析性公理系统及其强完全性定理和插值定理,并讨论演绎关系的性质：单调性和切割性。     

Algebraic study of Sette's maximal paraconsistent logic

The aim of this paper is to study the paraconsistent deductive systemP ¹ within the context of Algebraic Logic. It is well known due to Lewin, Mikenberg and Schwarse thatP ¹ is algebraizable in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi, the quasivariety generated by Sette's three-element algebraS being the unique quasivariety semantics forP ¹. In the present paper we prove that the mentioned quasivariety is not a variety by showing that the variety generated byS is not equivalent to any algebraizable deductive system. We also show thatP ¹ has no algebraic semantics in the sense of Czelakowski. Among other results, we study the variety generated by the algebraS. This enables us to prove in a purely algebraic way that the only proper non-trivial axiomatic extension ofP ¹ is the classical deductive systemPC. Throughout the paper we also study those abstract logics which are in a way similar toP ¹, and are called hereabstract Sette logics. We obtain for them results similar to those obtained for distributive abstract logics by Font, Verdú and the author.     

Why Conclusions Should Remain Single

This paper argues that logical inferentialists should reject multiple-conclusion logics. Logical inferentialism is the position that the meanings of the logical constants are determined by the rules of inference they obey. As such, logical inferentialism requires a proof-theoretic framework within which to operate. However, in order to fulfil its semantic duties, a deductive system has to be suitably connected to our inferential practices. I argue that, contrary to an established tradition, multiple-conclusion systems are ill-suited for this purpose because they fail to provide a ‘natural’ representation of our ordinary modes of inference. Moreover, the two most plausible attempts at bringing multiple conclusions into line with our ordinary forms of reasoning, the disjunctive reading and the bilateralist denial interpretation, are unacceptable by inferentialist standards.