The Objectivity of Values: Invariance without Explanation

This paper develops and motivates minimalism about the objectivity of values: the objectivity of values is no more, and no less, than invariance with respect to possible differences in attitudes. Thus the relation of invariance need not have any particular explanation, or, indeed, any explanation at all, for values to count as fully objective. Values need not be metaphysically real, simply in order to be objective, as according to traditional realist views. But we should not suppose, as some recent writers do, that there is no special issue of objectivity to consider: the issue of objectivity is the issue whether or how values vary with our attitudes.     

From Aperspectival Objectivity to Strong Objectivity: The Quest for Moral Objectivity

Sandra Harding is working on the reconstruction of scientific objectivity. Lorraine Daston argues that objectivity is a concept that has historically evolved. Her account of the development of “aperspectival objectivity” provides an opportunity to see Harding's “strong objectivity” project as a stage in this evolution, to locate it in the history of migration of ideals from moral philosophy to natural science, and to support Harding's desire to retain something of the ontological significance of objectivity.     

New objects can capture attention without a unique luminance transient

Recent evidence has suggested that new objects capture attention solely because they are typically accompanied by a unique luminance transient. In the present study, we presented a stationary pattern mask after an array of placeholders but before a subsequent search display. This allowed all of the search elements to be presented simultaneously, thereby eliminating the unique luminance transient associated with the appearance of any new objects. Under these circumstances, new objects still captured attention. In another experiment, we jiggled the mask. This caused new objects to lose their advantage. We discuss implications for the importance of new objects, and the attentional consequences of motion.     

New objects do not capture attention without a sensory transient

Attention capture occurs when a stimulus event involuntarily recruits attention. The abrupt appearance of a new object is perhaps the most well-studied attention-capturing event, yet there is debate over the root cause of this capture. Does a new object capture attention because it involves the creation of a new object representation or because its appearance creates a characteristic luminance transient? The present study sought to resolve this question by introducing a new object into a search display, either with or without a unique luminance transient. Contrary to the results of a recent study (Davoli, Suszko, & Abrams, 2007), when the new objects transient was masked by a brief interstimulus interval introduced between the placeholder and search arrays, a new object did not capture attention. Moreover, when a new objects transient was masked, participants could not locate a new object efficiently even when that was their explicit goal. Together, these data suggest that luminance transient signals are necessary for attention capture by new objects.     

New objects do not capture attention without a top-down setting: Evidence from an inattentional blindness task

Past studies have suggested that a new object can involuntarily capture attention in a visual search task (Yantis & Jonides, 1984 Yantis, S. and Jonides, J. 1984. Abrupt visual onsets and selective attention: Evidence from visual search. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 10: 601–621. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). However, trials in these experiments usually begin with abrupt onsets that are considered to signal new objects; thus, there may be a bias toward paying attention to new objects. We examine whether new objects can still capture attention when this bias is excluded, using an inattentional blindness task. Our results showed that when the trials began with new objects, a new object captured attention. When new objects were totally irrelevant and all top-down settings for new objects were prevented, a new object did not capture attention. Our findings argue against the view that new objects capture attention in a purely stimulus-driven fashion.     

Noncanonical orientation without occlusion: Children's drawings of transparent objects

The use of a transparent model in a drawing task allows all the features of the model to remain visible whatever its orientation. N. H. Freeman (1980, Strategies of Representation in Young Children, New York/London, Academic Press) found that when drawing a transparent glass with its handle turned away, children made more canonical errors (drawing the handle at the side) than when drawing a similarly orientated opaque cup. According to Freeman being able to see the handle in a noncanonical orientation “triggers” a canonical representation of the object (N. H. Freeman 1980, p. 252). Two experiments are reported which investigated children's drawings of transparent objects. The drawings obtained from children between 4 and 7 years old produced two major findings. First, the tendency toward canonicality when drawing a glass with its handle turned away was significantly reduced when two glasses in differeing orientations were presented side by side. Second, the number of canonical errors was lower when the glass was filled with milk (thus hiding the handle). This latter finding confirms that of N. H. Freeman (1980). However, the first suggests that children use situationally appropriate information when drawing transparent objects in a way similar to that noted by A. M. Davis (1983, Contextual Sensitivity in Young Children's Drawings, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 35, 478–486) using opaque objects.     

Formulating Moral Objectivity

Objective moral facts are supposed to be independent from us, but it has proven difficult to provide a clear account of this independence condition. Objective moral facts cannot be overly independent of us, as even an objective morality would depend, in important respects, on features of us. The challenge is to respect these moral mind-dependencies without inappropriately counting too many moral facts as objective. In this paper, I delineate and evaluate several different versions of the independence condition in moral objectivity. I raise problems for these ways of formulating moral objectivity and then develop a better account of moral objectivity, one that avoids the pitfalls of other proposals.     

Objectivity and reliability

Scanlon’s Being Realistic about Reasons is a beautiful book – sleek, sophisticated, and programmatic. One of its key aims is to demystify knowledge of normative and mathematical truths, realistically construed – i.e. construed, roughly, as being true relevantly independent of minds and languages, when interpreted at face-value. In this article, I develop an epistemological problem that Scanlon fails to explicitly address. I argue that his ‘metaphysical pluralism’ can be understood as a response to that problem. However, it resolves the problem only if it undercuts the objectivity of normative and mathematical inquiry.     

Objectivity in ethics

In this paper I have tried to clarify the meaning of two very different sets of characteristics which philosophers have had in mind when they claimed that ethical terms were objective. I gave a very tentative answer to the question whether it is true to say that, in any of the distinguished senses, ethical statements are objective. Lastly, I indicated how the failure to make the distinction I draw was responsible for a number of confusions and unnecessary difficulties. More precisely, in (1) I defined the first set of the characteristics in question, which together I have called solidity; in (2) I give reasons why it is misleading to claim that ethical statements are solid and also misleading to claim they are not; in (3) I defined the second set of these characteristics, namely, proper contentiousness and proper complexity; in (4) I explained what I thought were the fundamental differences between these two sets of characteristics; in (5) I suggested that the solidity of an expression is normally a good reason for holding that the expression is properly contentious and properly complex; in (6) I claim that the failure to understand (4) and, therefore, also (5) leads to the following errors: (a) that, if an expression is solid, it must be properly contentious and properly complex; that, if an expression is non-solid, it must be either properly contentious and properly simple, or properly non-contentious. (5) That, if an expression is properly contentious and properly complex, it must be solid; if it is properly contentious and properly simple or if it is properly non-contentious, then it must be non-solid; and lastly in (7) I have mentioned some common reasons for holding that ethical expressions have one or the other of the above-mentioned characteristics.     

Metaphysical Realism and Objectivity: Some Theoretical Reflections

In this paper we aim to show an intrinsic contradiction of contemporary Metaphysical Realism by focusing on the relation between the subject and the object. Metaphysical Realism considers facts and objects as being empirical, and therefore they are considered in relation to the subject, while at the same time facts are assumed to belong to an autonomous and independent reality. However, if a real object is considered to be independent from the subject, once it enters in a relation with the latter, a real object must undergo an intrinsic transformation. However, since an object cannot avoid this transformation then recovering the real or “absolute” object from the perceived object is not possible. In this way, the inherent contradiction of the “absolute” as being determined, i.e., defined by virtue of a limit, is revealed.     

Farewell to Objectivity: A Critique of Brandom

I argue that Brandom's account of inconsistency in terms of the pragmatic notion of incompatibility, as originally set out in his Making It Explicit (1994) and defended in Articulating Reasons (2000), has the absurd consequence that all true claims are warranted. This is in obvious conflict with our ordinary conception of truth as objective, which is what Brandom intends to capture. My proof proceeds from two principles, extracted from Making It Explicit , that govern the notions of commitment and entitlement in terms of which the notion of incompatibility is being defined. If either of these principles is rejected, it will no longer be clear what the content of Brandom's thesis is.     

The Objectivity of Wellbeing

Subjective theories of wellbeing place authority concerning what benefits a person with that person herself, or limit wellbeing to psychological states. But how well off we are seems to depend on two different concerns, how well we are doing and how well things are going for us. I argue that two powerful subjective theories fail to adequately account for this and that principled arguments favoring subjectivism are unsound and poorly motivated. In the absence of more compelling evidence that how things go for us cannot directly constitute our wellbeing, I conclude that wellbeing is objective.