Prior’s defence of Hintikka’s theorem. A discussion of Prior’s ‘The logic of obligation and the obligations of the logician’

In his paper, The logic of obligation and the obligations of the logician, A.N. Prior considers Hintikka??s theorem, according to which a statement cannot be both impossible and permissible. This theorem has been seen as problematic for the very idea of a logic of obligation. However, Prior rejects the view that the logic of obligation cannot be formalised. He sees this resistance against such a view as an important part of what could be called the obligation of the logician. Prior argues that Hintikka??s theorem should not be seen as something paradoxical. On the contrary, it should be seen as a fully acceptable consequence of a basic and reasonable assumption in deontic logic, namely Hintikka??s rule.     

Distress vocalizations in infant rats: what's all the fuss about?

Ultrasonic vocalizations emitted by infant rodents are typically characterized as cries of distress. There are two contexts that are known to reliably elicit ultrasound production: extreme cold exposure and administration of clonidine, an α₂ adrenoceptor agonist. Noting that these two contexts both entail pronounced decreases in cardiac rate, we have hypothesized that the vocalizations are acoustic by-products of a physiological maneuver, the abdominal compression reaction (ACR), that increases venous return to the heart when return is compromised. As a critical test of this hypothesis, we measured venous pressure near the right atrium in 15-day-old rats after clonidine administration. Consistent with the ACR hypothesis, emission of ultrasound was accompanied by large and reliable increases in venous pressure and, therefore, venous return. These results provide strong, direct support for the ACR hypothesis and, by doing so, underscore the potential pitfalls of anthropomorphic interpretations of the vocalizations of infant rats.     

Genetic Counseling in the Era of Genomics: What’s all the Fuss about?

As genomic sequencing becomes more widely available in clinical settings for diagnostic purposes, a number of genetic counseling issues are gaining precedence. The ability to manage these issues will be paramount as genetic and non-genetic healthcare professionals navigate the complexities of using genomic technologies to facilitate diagnosis and inform patient management. Counseling issues arising when counseling for diagnostic genomic sequencing were identified by four genetic counselors with 10 years of collective experience providing genetic counseling in this setting. These issues were discussed and refined at a meeting of genetic counselors working in clinical genomics settings in Melbourne, Australia. Emerging counseling issues, or variations of established counseling issues, were identified from the issues raised. Illustrative cases were selected where pre- and post-test genetic counseling was provided in clinical settings to individuals who received singleton or trio WES with targeted analysis. Counseling issues discussed in this paper include a reappraisal of how genetic counselors manage hope in the genomic era, informed consent for secondary use of genomic data, clinical reanalysis of genomic data, unexpected or unsolicited secondary findings, and trio sequencing. The authors seek to contribute to the evolving understanding of genetic counseling for diagnostic genomic sequencing through considering the applicability of existing genetic counseling competencies to managing emerging counseling issues and discussing genetic counseling practice implications.     

Prior’s Fable and the limits of de re possibility

Prior??s hitherto unpublished ??Fable of the Four Preachers?? illuminates the connection of the metaphysical issues of trans-world identity with moral trans-world continuity. The paper shows Prior??s position with regard to genuine de re temporal possibility of individuals on the basis of chapter VIII of his Papers on Time and Tense. His position is that radical coming-into-being is not a genuine de re temporal possibility of individuals since there is no identifiable individual, before birth, who could be the subject of such possibility. The paper strengthens Prior??s claim by showing how an uncomfortable consequence of this intuitively appealing position can be avoided. As a result, the proper claim would be that the possibility of origin is general or de dicto: it is possible that someone be born to such and parents, but it is not possible of someone that he should be born to these or other parents.     

Moment/History Duality in Prior’s Logics of Branching-Time

The basic notions in Prior’s Ockhamist and Peircean logics of branching-time are the notion of moment and that of history (or course of events). In the tree semantics, histories are defined as maximal linearly ordered sets of moments. In the geometrical approach, both moments and histories are primitive entities and there is no set theoretical (and ontological) dependency of the latter on the former. In the topological approach, moments can be defined as the elements of a rank 1 base of a non-Archimedean topology on the set of histories. In this paper, it will be shown that the topological approach, and hence the other approaches, can be reconstructed in a framework in which the basic notions are those of history and of relative closeness relation among histories.     

What’s New about the New Induction?

The problem of underdetermination is thought to hold important lessons for philosophy of science. Yet, as Kyle Stanford has recently argued, typical treatments of it offer only restatements of familiar philosophical problems. Following suggestions in Duhem and Sklar, Stanford calls for a New Induction from the history of science. It will provide proof, he thinks, of “the kind of underdetermination that the history of science reveals to be a distinctive and genuine threat to even our best scientific theories” (Stanford 2001, p. S12). This paper examines Stanford’s New Induction and argues that it – like the other forms of underdetermination that he criticizes – merely recapitulates familiar philosophical conundra.     

Knowledge and attitude of Malaysia’s Muslim faith healers in dealing with the mentally ill

Muslim faith healers are often sought by the Malaysian public as an avenue to address psychological distress. “Ruqyah” refers to the recitation of verses from the Qur'an and/or sayings of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and is used by Muslim faith healers as a method of treatment. This study was conducted to assess the knowledge and attitude of Muslim faith healers in dealing with psychiatric patients in Malaysia. Seven Muslim faith healers were interviewed. The interviews were transcribed verbatim, and analysed qualitatively using thematic content analysis. The authors identified four themes: understanding of psychiatric illnesses, diagnostic competence, patients' referral, and integrating “ruqyah” into mainstream psychiatry. It was found that the respondents had limited knowledge of psychiatric illness, focusing on “ruqyah” as the main intervention in treating psychiatric illness. Recognizing the important role played by Muslim faith healers in the treatment of psychiatric illness in Malaysia, collaboration between them and fellow psychiatrists is deemed highly necessary.     

Why Do Women Do the Lion’s Share of Housework? A Decade of Research

The body of recent American research indicates that women continue to perform the vast majority of household labor. Understanding the conditions under which couples can achieve an egalitarian division of household labor constitutes one of the first steps in attaining gender equity in the private and public spheres. This article discusses the state of research on the division of household labor published between 2000 and 2009. After a discussion of conceptualization and methodological issues, we review empirical findings that support or challenge the micro- and macro-level perspectives (focusing on individual characteristics and national contexts, respectively) that have been proposed to explain the gendered allocation of labor. We then review studies focusing on the interplay between these two prominent perspectives.     

Who’s right about rights?

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Development of students’ knowledge about didactics during their first year of the master’s programme in didactics

In this study, I reflect critically on my own experiences as a university teacher of students’ expressed knowledge about the academic subject of didactics at the beginning and end of their first semester as students in the Master’s Programme in Didactics. My reflections are made using a phenomenographic approach to learning, which regards learning as a qualitatively deeper and different way of understanding content. The results of the study are expected to deepen my understanding of knowledge expressed about didactics in two different student groups, and give insight on what is critical for knowledge development in higher education. The first course design consisted of 12 lectures in total by 12 different teachers representing different fields of didactics, such as general didactics and subject-based didactics in different specializations. The second course design consisted of eight seminars where course literature about didactics was discussed, together with three seminars in smaller groups wherein the students in each specialization of didactics met. A comparison between the groups is made, based on a qualitative analysis of the responses on an open question before and after the first semester forms the basis of my own reflections. The analysis aims to establish in what way the students’ explanations of didactics might have changed during the courses, and if there are differences in this development which could be explained by differences in course design. In the first student group, 10 students (in-service teachers) answered both questionnaires, and 11 students in the second group answered both questionnaires.     

Why did Bodhidharma go to the east? Buddhism’s struggle with the mind in the world

This question—why did Bodhidharma come from the West?— is ubiquitous in Chinese Ch’an Buddhist literature. Though some see it as an arbitrary question intended merely as an opener to obscure puzzles, I think it represents a genuine intellectual puzzle: Why did Bodhidharma come from theWest—that is, fromIndia? Why couldn’tChina with its rich literary and philosophical tradition have given rise to Buddhism? We will approach that question, but I prefer to do so backwards. I want to ask instead, “why was it so fortuitous for the development of Buddhist philosophy that Bodhidharma wentEast? I will argue that by doing so he gave a trajectory to Buddhist thought about the mind and knowledge that allows certain issues that are obscure in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, despite their centrality to the Buddhist critique of Indian orthodoxy, to come into sharper relief, and hence to complete a project begun, but not completable, in that Indo-European context.     

Why Does Laudan’s Confutation of Convergent Realism Fail?

In his paper “A Confutation of Convergent Realism”, Larry Laudan offered one of the most powerful criticisms of scientific realism. I defend here that although Laudan’s criticism is right, this does not refute the realist position. The thesis that Laudan confutes is a much stronger thesis than realist needs to maintain. As I will exemplify with Salmon’s statistical-relevance model, a less strict notion of explanation would allow us to claim that (approximate) truth is the best explanation for such success, even if it is accepted that there can be cases of unsuccessful (approximately) true theories and cases of successful false theories.     

Epistemicism and Nihilism about Vagueness: What’s the Difference?

In this paper I argue, first, that the only difference between Epistemicism and Nihilism about vagueness is semantic rather than ontological, and second, that once it is clear what the difference between these views is, Nihilism is a much more plausible view of vagueness than Epistemicism. Given the current popularity of certain epistemicist views (most notably, Williamson’s), this result is, I think, of interest.     

What’s so Transparent about Transparency?

Representationalists often use intuitions about the transparency ofexperience to defend their view that qualitative content isrepresentational content. According to these intuitions, wecannot attend to our experience except by attending to theobject of that experience. Although the transparency intuitionappears to be widely shared, even among non-representationalists,in this paper I suggest that there are two ambiguities inherent indiscussions of transparency. One concerns the strength of thetransparency intuition, while the other concerns its scope. Oncewe bring these two ambiguities to the surface, we can see that therepresentationalists claim that experience is transparent turnsout to be considerably more controversial than ordinarily supposed.While the phenomenological data may support some kind of experientialtransparency, I argue that it does not support the kind of transparencyneeded for representationalism.     

Making sense of the libertarian’s semantic claim about agential phenomenology

Libertarians about free will sometimes argue for their position on the grounds that our phenomenology of action is such that determinism would need to be false for it to be veridical. Many, however, have thought that it would be impossible for us to have an experience that is in contradiction with determinism, since this would require us to have perceptual experience of metaphysical facts. In this paper I show how the libertarian claim is possible. In particular, if experience depicts the world such that there is more than one physically possible future, then determinism would need to be false for that experience to be veridical. I show that we have experiences, or perceptual episodes, of this kind on the basis of recent work in the study of perception. Theorists in this area have argued that we have vision-for-action, and that what we visually perceive are not just objects but also possibilities for action. If we experience that it is possible that we ?, then we also experience that it is possible that we not ?. Furthermore, we probably experience more than one possibility for action at any one moment. I argue that these are physical possibilities, and therefore that we experience the world such that there is more than one physically possible future. So the libertarian claim about the semantics of agential phenomenology is highly plausible, even if this does not entail libertarianism.     

Johannes Kepler’s computer simulation of the universe: Some remarks about theory in psychology

Computer simulation may be an overly seductive way of formulating theory in the social sciences. The capability of constructing complex computer simulation models may remove some of the incentive for finding simple laws. This point is illustrated via a fantasy in which the sixteenth century astronomical theorist, Johannes Kepler, uses Ms computer instead of his mind to account for extant data on stellar and planetary motion. Similarities between sixteenth century cosmology and twentieth century psychology are discussed.     

Why is that? Structural prediction and ambiguity resolution in a very large corpus of English sentences

Previous psycholinguistic research has shown that a variety of contextual factors can influence the interpretation of syntactically ambiguous structures, but psycholinguistic experimentation inherently does not allow for the investigation of the role that these factors play in natural (uncontrolled) language use. We use regression modeling in conjunction with data from the British National Corpus to measure the amount and specificity of the information available for disambiguation in natural language use. We examine the Direct Object/Sentential Complement ambiguity and the closely related issue of complementizer use in sentential complements, and find that both ambiguity resolution and complementizer use can be predicted from contextual information.