Arithmetic,set theory,reduction and explanation

Philosophers of science since Nagel have been interested in the links between intertheoretic reduction and explanation, understanding and other forms of epistemic progress. Although intertheoretic reduction is widely agreed to occur in pure mathematics as well as empirical science, the relationship between reduction and explanation in the mathematical setting has rarely been investigated in a similarly serious way. This paper examines an important and well-known case: the reduction of arithmetic to set theory. I claim that the reduction is unexplanatory. In defense of this claim, I offer some evidence from mathematical practice, and I respond to contrary suggestions due to Steinhart, Maddy, Kitcher and Quine. I then show how, even if set-theoretic reductions are generally not explanatory, set theory can nevertheless serve as a legitimate and successful foundation for mathematics. Finally, some implications of my thesis for philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science are discussed. In particular, I suggest that some reductions in mathematics are probably explanatory, and I propose that differing standards of theory acceptance might account for the apparent lack of unexplanatory reductions in the empirical sciences.     

Aggression,violence, and the death of a Dutch soccer hooligan: A reversal theory explanation

In March 1997, an aggressive and violent confrontation took place between more than 3000 rival soccer hooligans in the small town of Beverwijk in the Netherlands. In the prearranged and well‐organized confrontation, a 35 year‐old man was beaten and stabbed to death and others were seriously wounded. In this paper, the details of what happened at Beverwijk and the response of the Dutch authorities, including the subsequent arrest and conviction of the main perpetrators, are reviewed. In addition, the psychological approach of reversal theory [Apter MJ. 1992. The Dangerous Edge. New York: The Free Press] is used to answer several unresolved questions about the motivation of the Dutch soccer hooligans involved in the aggressive behavior and violent fighting at Beverwijk. Aggr. Behav. 28:1–10, 2002. © 2002 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

Hospital ethics committees: One of many centers of responsibility

Ethical reality is coextensive with human dignity. Therefore, one essential way to understand ethics is as the systematic effort to discern the imperatives of human dignity. Seeing ethics in this way highlights the fact that health care institutions have many centers of ethical responsibility (CERs) — the Chief Executive Officer, Board of Trustees, senior management team, etc. The Ethics Committee is only one such CER and not the most important one. These other CERs will benefit from identifying: (1) the fact that they are consistently dealing with ethical reality and making ethical decisions; (2) some critical elements of good ethical decision-making: (i) having the appropriate community; (ii) making the guiding value priorities explicit and specific; (iii) gaining skill in using the needed intellectual tools; and (iv) fashioning appropriate process and structure for discernment.     

One, two, three, many - Subitizing in active touch

‘Subitizing’ refers to rapid and accurate judgement of small numbers of items, while response times and error rates increase rapidly for larger set-sizes. Most enumeration studies have been done in vision. Enumeration studies in touch have mostly involved ‘passive touch’, i.e. touch without active exploration. In daily life a much more common situation is that of ‘active touch’, e.g. when we count the number of coins in our pocket. To investigate numerosity judgement in active touch, we let subjects haptically explore varying numbers of spheres. Our results show that enumeration for up to 3 items is more efficient than for larger numbers of items. We also show that enumeration in this regime was not performed through estimation. Furthermore, it is shown that numerosity information was accessed directly and not through mass or volume cues. Not only do our results show that a haptic version of subitizing exists in active touch, they also suggest similar underlying enumeration mechanisms across different modalities.     

A new dialectical theory of explanation

This paper offers a dialogue theory of explanation. A successful explanation is defined as a transfer of understanding in a dialogue system in which a questioner and a respondent take part. The questioner asks a special sort of why-question that asks for understanding of something and the respondent provides a reply that transfers understanding to the questioner. The theory is drawn from recent work on explanation in artificial intelligence (AI), especially in expert systems, but applies to scientific, legal and everyday conversational explanations.     

Probabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence

Research on people's confidence in their general knowledge has to date produced two fairly stable effects, many inconsistent results, and no comprehensive theory. We propose such a comprehensive framework, the theory of probabilistic mental models (PMM theory). The theory (a) explains both the overconfidence effect (mean confidence is higher than percentage of answers correct) and the hard-easy effect (overconfidence increases with item difficulty) reported in the literature and (b) predicts conditions under which both effects appear, disappear, or invert. In addition, (c) it predicts a new phenomenon, the confidence-frequency effect, a systematic difference between a judgment of confidence in a single event (i.e., that any given answer is correct) and a judgment of the frequency of correct answers in the long run. Two experiments are reported that support PMM theory by confirming these predictions, and several apparent anomalies reported in the literature are explained and integrated into the present framework.     

On a recent argument for the impossibility of a statistical explanation of single events, and a defence of a modified form of Hempel''s theory of statistical explanation

An argument has been recently proposed by Watkins, whose objective is to show the impossibility of a statistical explanation of single events. This present paper is an attempt to show that Watkins's argument is unsuccessful, and goes on to argue for an account of statistical explanation which has much in common with Hempel's classic treatment.I am very grateful to Peter Clark for many helpful discussions of these issues.     

时空干扰效应：基于贝叶斯模型的解释

时空干扰效应是指时间知觉受空间信息干扰或空间知觉受时间信息干扰而出现错觉的现象。部分研究认为时空干扰是不对称的,空间对时间的干扰总是更大;还有研究认为时间和空间相互干扰的强度受实验因素影响,一般来说,空间对时间的干扰更大,但时间也能对空间产生同等程度甚至更大的干扰。在回顾隐喻理论和量值理论的主要观点之后,重点分析贝叶斯模型对时空干扰效应的解释,最后提出未来研究应关注的三个问题,即拓展贝叶斯模型对时空干扰效应的解释范围,探明基于贝叶斯推断的时空干扰神经机制和探索时空干扰的调控方法。     

Process,mechanism, and explanation related to externalizing behavior in developmental psychopathology

Advances in conceptualization and statistical modeling, on the one hand, and enhanced appreciation of transactional pathways, gene–environment correlations and interactions, and moderator and mediator variables, on the other, have heightened awareness of the need to consider factors and processes that explain the development and maintenance of psychopathology. With a focus on attentional problems, impulsivity, and disruptive behavior patterns, I address the kinds of conceptual approaches most likely to lead to advances regarding explanatory models in the field. Findings from my own research program on processes and mechanisms reveal both promise and limitations. Progress will emanate from use of genetically informative designs, blends of variable and person-centered research, explicit testing of developmental processes, systematic approaches to moderation and mediation, exploitation of natural experiments, and the conduct of prevention and intervention trials designed to accentuate explanation as well as outcome. In all, breakthroughs will occur only with advances in translational research—linking basic and applied science—and with the further development of transactional, systemic approaches to explanation.     

Decision noise: An explanation for observed violations of signal detection theory

In signal detection theory (SDT), responses are governed by perceptual noise and a flexible decision criterion. Recent criticisms of SDT (see, e.g., Balakrishnan, 1999) have identified violations of its assumptions, and researchers have suggested that SDT fundamentally misrepresents perceptual and decision processes. We hypothesize that, instead, these violations of SDT stem from decision noise: the inability to use deterministic response criteria. In order to investigate this hypothesis, we present a simple extension of SDT—the decision noise model—with which we demonstrate that shifts in a decision criterion can be masked by decision noise. In addition, we propose a new statistic that can help identify whether the violations of SDT stem from perceptual or from decision processes. The results of a stimulus classification experiment—together with model fits to past experiments—show that decision noise substantially affects performance. These findings suggest that decision noise is important across a wide range of tasks and needs to be better understood in order to accurately measure perceptual processes.     

Einstein's theory of theories and types of theoretical explanation

In this paper I draw on Einstein's distinction between “principle” and “constructive” theories to isolate two levels of physical theory that can be found in both classical and (special) relativistic physics. I then argue that when we focus on theoretical explanations in physics, i.e. explanations of physical laws, the two leading views on explanation, Salmon's “bottom‐up” view and Kitcher's “top‐down” view, accurately describe theoretical explanations for a given level of theory. I arrive at this conclusion through an analysis of explanations of mass—energy equivalence in special relativity.     

A balance theory explanation of challenges confronting cross-sex friendships

This study was part of an ongoing investigation into four of the potential challenges confronting women and men in cross-sex fiendships (O’Meara, 1989). Unlike previous research, which explored the perspective of only one member of each cross-sex fnendship, this study examined the perspectives of both individuals in cross-sex fienhhips. The levels of actual and perceived agreement and understanding were investigated through utilization of a variation of Heiderian Balance Theory and Laing’s Interpersonal Perception Method. Seventy three pairs of cross-sex fiends completed a survey examining direct perspectives, metaperspectives, and meta-metaperspectives, on the four challenges. Over 92% of the participants were heterosexual, 68% were Caucasian, 10% were Afican American, 10% were Hispanic, 3% were Asian, 4% were Native American, and 5% indicated “other.” Results indicate that cross-sex fiends generally agree that O’Meara’s four challenges present only minimal problems in their individual relationships, and that balance theory provides a viable explanation of how perceived agreement and understanding concerning challenges are arrived at within cross-sex fnendships. Additionally, results illustrating disagreements and misunderstandings within cross-sex friendships highlight the importance of looking at the perspectives of both individuals within a dyad.