Two-category place representations persist over body rotations

We explored a system that constructs environment-centered frames of reference and coordinates memory for the azimuth of an object in an enclosed space. For one group, we provided two environmental cues (doors): one in the front, and one in the rear. For a second group, we provided two object cues: a front and a rear cue. For a third group, we provided no external cues; we assumed that for this group, their reference frames would be determined by the orthogonal geometry of the floor-and-wall junction that divides a space in half or into multiple territories along the horizontal continuum. Using Huttenlocher, Hedges, and Duncan’s (Psychological Review 98: 352-376, 1991) category-adjustment model (cue-based fuzzy boundary version) to fit the data, we observed different reference frames than have been seen in prior studies involving two-dimensional domains. The geometry of the environment affected all three conditions and biased the remembered object locations within a two-category (left vs. right) environmental frame. The influence of the environmental geometry remained observable even after the participants’ heading within the environment changed due to a body rotation, attenuating the effect of the front but not of the rear cue. The door and object cues both appeared to define boundaries of spatial categories when they were used for reorientation. This supports the idea that both types of cues can assist in environment-centered memory formation.     

Different mental representations for place recognition and goal localization

Determining one’s current location and locating a goal relative to one’s position are important components of successful human navigation in familiar environments. Several prominent cognitive theories of human spatial memory (e.g., McNamara, 2003; Sholl, 2001; Wang & Spelke, 2002) assume that both behaviors access the same enduring mental representations of the environment. Participants in the present experiment learned the locations of seven objects within a room from two views, and were then tested in a separate room using scene recognition and judgments of relative direction (JRD). Scene recognition results indicated that two viewer-centered representations of the layout of objects were preserved in long-term memory, whereas JRD showed evidence of a single orientation-dependent long-term mental representation. The challenges of incorporating the present findings into existing theories of human spatial memory are discussed.     

Multivariate pattern analysis and the search for neural representations

Synthese - Multivariate pattern analysis, or MVPA, has become one of the most popular analytic methods in cognitive neuroscience. Since its inception, MVPA has been heralded as offering much more...     

Identifying bilingual semantic neural representations across languages

The goal of the study was to identify the neural representation of a noun’s meaning in one language based on the neural representation of that same noun in another language. Machine learning methods were used to train classifiers to identify which individual noun bilingual participants were thinking about in one language based solely on their brain activation in the other language. The study shows reliable (p < .05) pattern-based classification accuracies for the classification of brain activity for nouns across languages. It also shows that the stable voxels used to classify the brain activation were located in areas associated with encoding information about semantic dimensions of the words in the study. The identification of the semantic trace of individual nouns from the pattern of cortical activity demonstrates the existence of a multi-voxel pattern of activation across the cortex for a single noun common to both languages in bilinguals.     

Comparing representations and computations in single neurons versus neural networks

Single-neuron-level explanations have been the gold standard in neuroscience for decades. Recently, however, neural-network-level explanations have become increasingly popular. This increase in popularity is driven by the fact that the analysis of neural networks can solve problems that cannot be addressed by analyzing neurons independently. In this opinion article, I argue that while both frameworks employ the same general logic to link physical and mental phenomena, in many cases the neural network framework provides better explanatory objects to understand representations and computations related to mental phenomena. I discuss what constitutes a mechanistic explanation in neural systems, provide examples, and conclude by highlighting a number of the challenges and considerations associated with the use of analyses of neural networks to study brain function.     

Explaining social norm compliance. A plea for neural representations

How should we understand the claim that people comply with social norms because they possess the right kinds of beliefs and preferences? I answer this question by considering two approaches to what it is to believe (and prefer), namely: representationalism and dispositionalism. I argue for a variety of representationalism, viz. neural representationalism. Neural representationalism is the conjunction of two claims. First, what it is essential to have beliefs and preferences is to have certain neural representations. Second, neural representations are often necessary to adequately explain behaviour. After having canvassed one promising way to understand what neural representations could be, I argue that the appeal to beliefs and preferences in explanations of paradigmatic cases of norm compliance should be understood as an appeal to neural representations.     

The neural fate of individual item representations in visual working memory

Previous research has demonstrated an interaction between eye gaze and selected facial emotional expressions, whereby the perception of anger and happiness is impaired when the eyes are horizontally averted within a face, but the perception of fear and sadness is enhanced under the same conditions. The current study reexamined these claims over six experiments. In the first three experiments, the categorization of happy and sad expressions (Experiments 1 and 2) and angry and fearful expressions (Experiment 3) was impaired when eye gaze was averted, in comparison to direct gaze conditions. Experiment 4 replicated these findings in a rating task, which combined all four expressions within the same design. Experiments 5 and 6 then showed that previous findings, that the perception of selected expressions is enhanced under averted gaze, are stimulus and task-bound. The results are discussed in relation to research on facial expression processing and visual attention.     

Incremental learning of perceptual and conceptual representations and the puzzle of neural repetition suppression

Incremental learning models of long-term perceptual and conceptual knowledge hold that neural representations are gradually acquired over many individual experiences via Hebbian-like activity-dependent synaptic plasticity across cortical connections of the brain. In such models, variation in task relevance of information, anatomic constraints, and the statistics of sensory inputs and motor outputs lead to qualitative alterations in the nature of representations that are acquired. Here, the proposal that behavioral repetition priming and neural repetition suppression effects are empirical markers of incremental learning in the cortex is discussed, and research results that both support and challenge this position are reviewed. Discussion is focused on a recent fMRI-adaptation study from our laboratory that shows decoupling of experience-dependent changes in neural tuning, priming, and repetition suppression, with representational changes that appear to work counter to the explicit task demands. Finally, critical experiments that may help to clarify and resolve current challenges are outlined.     

Distributed representations of action sequences in anterior cingulate cortex: A recurrent neural network approach

Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) has been the subject of intense debate over the past 2 decades, but its specific computational function remains controversial. Here we present a simple computational model of ACC that incorporates distributed representations across a network of interconnected processing units. Based on the proposal that ACC is concerned with the execution of extended, goal-directed action sequences, we trained a recurrent neural network to predict each successive step of several sequences associated with multiple tasks. In keeping with neurophysiological observations from nonhuman animals, the network yields distributed patterns of activity across ACC neurons that track the progression of each sequence, and in keeping with human neuroimaging data, the network produces discrepancy signals when any step of the sequence deviates from the predicted step. These simulations illustrate a novel approach for investigating ACC function.     

Using neural response properties to draw the distinction between modal and amodal representations

ABSTRACT

Barsalou has recently argued against the strategy of identifying amodal neural representations by using their cross-modal responses (i.e., their responses to stimuli from different modalities). I agree that there are indeed modal structures that satisfy this “cross-modal response” criterion (CM), such as distributed and conjunctive modal representations. However, I argue that we can distinguish between modal and amodal structures by looking into differences in their cross-modal responses. A component of a distributed cell assembly can be considered unimodal because its responses to stimuli from a given modality are stable, whereas its responses to stimuli from any other modality are not (i.e., these are lost within a short time, plausibly as a result of cell assembly dynamics). In turn, conjunctive modal representations, such as superior colliculus cells in charge of sensory integration, are multimodal because they have a stable response to stimuli from different modalities. Finally, some prefrontal cells constitute amodal representations because they exhibit what has been called ‘adaptive coding’. This implies that their responses to stimuli from any given modality can be lost when the context and task conditions are modified. We cannot assign them a modality because they have no stable relation with any input type.

Abbreviatons: CM: cross-modal response criterion; CCR: conjuntive cross-modal representations; fMRI: functional magnetic resonance imaging; MVPA: multivariate pattern analysis; pre-SMA: pre-supplementary motor area; PFC: prefrontal cortex; SC: superior colliculus; GWS: global workspace     

Supervision: A tale of the missing client

The profession of counselling is praised for its emphasis on the 'developmental' rather than 'policing' role of supervision. However, the profession is challenged on its presumption that supervision tells us anything about the client. For this to happen, the client must be admitted to the counselling room. Various means by which this can be achieved are explored and the resistance of the profession highlighted.     

Parental socioeconomic status and the neural basis of arithmetic: differential relations to verbal and visuo‐spatial representations

We examined the relation of parental socioeconomic status (SES) to the neural bases of subtraction in school‐age children (9‐ to 12‐year‐olds). We independently localized brain regions subserving verbal versus visuo‐spatial representations to determine whether the parental SES‐related differences in children's reliance on these neural representations vary as a function of math skill. At higher SES levels, higher skill was associated with greater recruitment of the left temporal cortex, identified by the verbal localizer. At lower SES levels, higher skill was associated with greater recruitment of right parietal cortex, identified by the visuo‐spatial localizer. This suggests that depending on parental SES, children engage different neural systems to solve subtraction problems. Furthermore, SES was related to the activation in the left temporal and frontal cortex during the independent verbal localizer task, but it was not related to activation during the independent visuo‐spatial localizer task. Differences in activation during the verbal localizer task in turn were related to differences in activation during the subtraction task in right parietal cortex. The relation was stronger at lower SES levels. This result suggests that SES‐related differences in the visuo‐spatial regions during subtraction might be based in SES‐related verbal differences.     

The chicken and egg problem of grid cells and place cells

Place cells and grid cells are major building blocks of the hippocampal cognitive map. The prominent forward model postulates that grid-cell modules are generated by a continuous attractor network; that a velocity signal evoked during locomotion moves entorhinal activity bumps; and that place-cell activity constitutes summation of entorhinal grid-cell modules. Experimental data support the first postulate, but not the latter two. Several families of solutions that depart from these postulates have been put forward. We suggest a modified model (spatial modulation continuous attractor network; SCAN), whereby place cells are generated from spatially selective nongrid cells. Locomotion causes these cells to move the hippocampal activity bump, leading to movement of the entorhinal manifolds. Such inversion accords with the shift of hippocampal thought from navigation to more abstract functions.     

The Hippo and the Fox: a cautionary tale

Matthew Fox's popular but over-simplified retelling of the history of Christian attitudes to creation makes St Augustine the prime enemy. In the table at the back of Original Blessing, Augustine is the first-named spokesperson in the enemy camp, so to speak, of 'fall-redemption' theologians. It might seem appropriate therefore to borrow the pages of a Dominican journal to ask whether Fox has somewhat missed the point.¹ It seems important to correct the distorted account for two reasons, negatively because Fox's sharp distinction into either 'creation-centred' or 'fall-redemption' theologians allows him to pretend that these two fundamental elements of Christian theology are conflicting rather than complementary; positively, because Augustine himself has a great deal to contribute to serious thought about creation.     

Forming subjective representations of subjective representations: evidence of a subjective status bias

In 3 studies and 2 pilot experiments, the author examined whether attending to the subjective status of mental representations would affect the ways humans view representational contents. The author found that simple drawing tasks were executed differently depending on whether or not the subject of the drawing was defined as a mental content (belief, imagination, perception). The results challenged particular lay epistemological concepts. They were partly accounted for by Gricean conversational rules (H. P. Grice, 1975), but the author postulated a subjective status bias to fully explain them. The discussion and recommendations for research center on the nature of this bias and relate it either to a tendency to conceive subjective representations as vague shadows of reality, or to an increased impact of the law of pregnance.