Regress,unity, facts,and propositions

The problem, or cluster of problems, of the unity of the proposition, along with the cluster of problems that tend to go under the name of Bradley’s regress, has recently again become a going concern for philosophers, after having for some time been regarded as primarily of historical interest. In this paper, I distinguish between the different problems that tend to be brought up under the heading of the unity of the proposition, and between different related regress arguments. I present my favored solutions to these problems.

     

Peirce on facts and true propositions

Peirce maintains that facts and propositions are structurally isomorphic. When we understand how Peirce thinks they are isomorphic, we find that a common objection raised against epistemic conceptions of truth – that there are facts beyond the ken of discovery – holds no water against Peirce’s claim that truth is what would be believed after a sufficiently long and rigorous course of inquiry.     

Meanings,propositions, and verbs

The event template for a verb is a lexical representation of the type of event that the verb can denote. Manner of motion verbs have a simple template: An entity is engaged in a manner of motion activity (e.g., walk). Change of location verbs have a different template: An entity changes from one location to another (e.g., arrive). We propose, and support empirically, that these templates determine the propositional structures of sentences in which the verbs are used.     

Arbitrary reference,numbers, and propositions

Reductionist realist accounts of certain entities, such as the natural numbers and propositions, have been taken to be fatally undermined by what we may call the problem of arbitrary identification. The problem is that there are multiple and equally adequate reductions of the natural numbers to sets (see Benacerraf, 1965), as well as of propositions to unstructured or structured entities (see, e.g., Bealer, 1998; King, Soames, & Speaks, 2014; Melia, 1992). This paper sets out to solve the problem by canvassing what we may call the arbitrary reference strategy. The main claims of such strategy are 2. First, we do not know which objects are the referents of proposition and numerical terms since their reference is fixed arbitrarily. Second, our ignorance of which object is picked out as the referent does not entail that no object is referred to by the relevant expression. Different articulations of the strategy are assessed, and a new one is defended.     

Tense,Aspect, and Temporal Reasoning

We report two experiments on temporal reasoning with problems, such as: John has cleaned the house. John is taking a shower. John is going to read the paper. Mary always does the dishes when John cleans the house. Mary always drinks her coffee when John reads the paper. What for Mary is the relation between doing the dishes and drinking coffee? The experiments showed that problems such as this one, which require one mental model, elicited correct answers more often than did those requiring multiple models (e.g. with the second premise modified to “John has taken a shower”, so that the order between the events in the first two premises is not fixed). These multiple-model problems, in turn, elicited more correct answers than did multiple-model problems with no valid answers (e.g. with the second premise modified to “John has taken a shower”, and the fifth premise modified to “Mary always drinks her coffee when John takes a shower”). One-model problems were also solved more quickly than multiple-model problems, which were solved more quickly than problems with no valid answers. These results corroborated the predictions of the mental model theory of reasoning.     

Functionalism and propositions

Conclusion Some have argued, following Stalnaker, that a plausible functionalist account of belief requires coarse-grained propositions. I have explored a class of functionalist accounts, and my argument has been that, in this class, there is no account which meetsall of the following conditions: it is plausible, noncircular, and allows for the validity of the argument to coarse-grained propositions. In producing this argument, I believe that I have shown that it might be open to a functionalist to adopt fine-grained propositions; thus, one might be a functionalist without holding that all mathematical beliefs are about strings of symbols (and that the belief that all bachelors are unmarried men is a belief about words).My project in this paper has been minimal in the following sense. I havenot argued thatno functionalist account of belief which meets the three conditions can be produced; rather, I have simply explored the inadequacies of certain sorts of accounts. I think that this is useful insofar as it makes clear the challenges to be met by an account of belief which can play the required role in the argument to coarse-grained propositions. It is compatible with my position that such an account is forthcoming, insofar as I have not produced a functionalist theory of belief which is clearly non-circular, plausible, and which yields fine-grained propositions. Of course, it is also compatible with my position that no plausible, non-circular functionalist account of belief of any sort can be produced. My argument has been that,if one construes such mental states as belief as functional states, no convincing argument has yet been produced that they require coarse-grained objects.     

Tense and Relativity

Those inclined to positions in the philosophy of time that take tense seriously have typically assumed that not all regions of space‐time are equal: one special region of space‐time corresponds to what is presently happening. When combined with assumptions from modern physics this has the unsettling consequence that the shape of this favored region distinguishes people in certain places or people traveling at certain velocities. In this paper I shall attempt to avoid this result by developing a tensed picture of reality that is nonetheless consistent with ‘hypersurface egalitarianism’—the view that all hypersurfaces are equal.     

Situation models,propositions, and the fan effect

According to theories of language comprehension, people can construct multiple levels of representation: the surface form, the propositional text base, and the situation model. In this study, I looked at how the referential nature of memory probes affects the experience of retrieval interference. All the subjects memorized sentences about objects in locations (e.g., “The potted palm is in the hotel”). When memory probes were sentences and, therefore, referential and most closely associated with the situation model level, no interference was observed during retrieval for information that could be integrated into a common situation model. In contrast, interference was observed in such cases when the memory probes were concept pairs (POTTED PALM-HOTEL) and hence not directly referential. This is interpreted to mean that nonreferential memory probes involve surface form and text base representations more than do referential sentence probes.     

Necessitarian propositions

The eternalist holds that all propositions specify the needed time information, and so are eternally true if true at all. The necessitarian holds the parallel view for worlds: she holds that all propositions specify the needed world information, and so are necessarily true if true at all. I will argue that the considerations for both views run parallel: the necessitarian can mimic the whole case for eternalism.